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FTD089

FULL RECOMMENDATION
FTC/07/5
DETERMINATIONNO.FTD089
(r-041763-ft-06/JH)
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTS, 1946 TO 1990
SECTION 15(1), PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES (FIXED-TERM WORK) ACT, 2003


PARTIES :
HSE
(REPRESENTED BY O'MARA GERAGHTY MCCOURT SOLICITORS)

- AND -

MUHAMMED GHULAM
(REPRESENTED BY MICHAEL J BYRNE SOLICITORS)


DIVISION :

Chairman: Ms Jenkinson
Employer Member: Mr Murphy
Worker Member: Ms Ni Mhurchu
SUBJECT:
1. Appeal of Rights Commissioners Decision R-041763-Ft-06/Jh


BACKGROUND:

2. The Complainant appealed the Rights Commissioner's Decision to the Labour Court on the 17th May, 2007. A Labour Court hearing took place on the 21st February, 2008. The following is the Labour Court's Determination:-


DETERMINATION:

This is an appeal by Dr. Muhammad Ghulam (the Complainant), against the Decision of a Rights Commissioner in which she found against him in a claim under the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act 2003 (the Act). At the Rights Commissioner hearing the Complainant claimed that the HSE - Midland Area (the Respondent) failed to provide him with a contract of indefinite duration in circumstances where he became entitled to such a contract pursuant to Section 9(1) of the Act.

Background

The Complainant was first appointed to the post of Accident & Emergency Consultant (Temporary) by the Midland Health Board on a fixed term contract by letter dated 5th October 2001, with his appointment commencing on 1st November 2001. Following the expiry of the initial period the Complainant was then employed on a number of successive fixed term contracts with the Midland Health Board (and its statutory successor, the HSE). The Complainant worked in the three acute Hospital sites operated in the Region by the Respondent - Portlaoise, Mullingar and Tullamore.

All of the contracts are headed Terms and Conditions of Employment Fixed Term Temporary Contract and describe Dr. Ghulam’s appointment as that of “Temporary Accident & Emergency Consultant-Board’s Region”. The contracts from 21st October 2003 specify a particular site/hospital as his work base, at which Dr. Ghulam was to provide a certain number of sessions per week, and an additional site/hospital at which he would provide a lesser number of sessions per week. All of the contracts expressly state that these session commitments “are subject to change from time to time”. The final two contracts specify his work base as Portlaoise, “subject to change from time to time”.

The following table lists the dates of the contracts and the location of the work as outlined by Dr. Ghulam and as stated by the HSE.

Dates of ContractsDr. Ghulam’sHSE’s Position
1st November 2001 - 31st October 2002Mullingar
1st Nov 2002 - 30th September 2003Mullingar
1st October 2003 - 31st December 2003Mullingar/Tullamore Mullingar
1st January 2004 - 31st March 2004Mullingar/Tullamore Mullingar
1st April 2004 -30th June 2004Mullingar/Tullamore Mullingar
1st July 2004 - 30th June 2005Portlaoise/Tullamore Portlaoise
1st July 2005 - 31st December 2005Portlaoise Portlaoise
1st January 2006 – 26th March 2006Portlaoise Portlaoise
The contracts from 1st October 2003 state that Dr. Ghulam’s employment with the Respondent “ shall be for the purpose of filling a post on a temporary basis, pending the filling of this post on a permanent basis in accordance with the required procedure.”

The Complainant’s case

Mr. Ken Bredin, B.L., Counsel for the Complainant, stated that Dr. Ghulam completed his third year of continuous employment with the Respondent on 31st October 2004, his contract was renewed again on 1st July 2005 until 31st December 2005 and again on 1st January 2006 until 26th March 2006. He contended that under the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the Act Dr. Ghulam’s contract from 1st January 2006 should be deemed to be a contract of indefinite duration. He submitted that the Complainant was continuously employed by the Respondent for a total period of 4 years, 4 months and 26 days.

The Respondent’s case

(a) distinct and discrete contracts of employmentMr. Brian O’Moore, B.L., Counsel for the Respondent, maintained that during his employment with the HSE Midland Area, Dr. Ghulam held two distinct and discrete positions with the employer. He held the post in Mullingar for 2 years and 8 months and the position in Portlaoise for 1 year and 9 months. Each of these positions was covered by separate contracts of employment, albeit with renewals, and should be treated separately for the purposes of the application of Section 9(1) or 9(2) of the Act. Therefore, Mr. O’ Moore contended that Dr. Ghulam’s periods of employment did not come within the scope of the Act.

COURTS FINDINGS ON THIS SUBMISSION

The Applicable Law

Section 2 of the Act provides definitions of “employee” and “employer”:
�“employee” means a person of any age, who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment and references, in relation to an employer, to an employee shall be construed as references to an employee employed by that employer and, for the purposes of this Act, a person holding office under, or in the service of, the State (including a civil servant within the meaning of the Civil Service Regulation Act 1956) shall be deemed to be an employee employed by the State or Government, as the case may be, and an officer or servant of a local authority, a harbour authority, the Eastern Regional Health Authority,the Northern Area Health Board, the East Coast Area Health Board or the South-Western Area Health Board, a health board or vocational education committee shall be deemed to be an employee employed by the authority, health board or vocational education committee, as the case may be ;�“employer” means, in relation to an employee, the person with whom the employee has entered into or for whom the employee works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment ;

The Court notes that the Complainant’s first contract, dated from 1st November 2001 states under the heading “Location”
  • “One of the three Acute Hospitals in the Midland Health Board region”

A copy of his second contract was not available. His third contract, dated from 1st October 2003 stated:
  • “Initially, your work base will be Midland Regional Hospital at Mullingar for 9 sessions per week, with 2 sessions per week in Midland Regional Hospital at Tullamore. This is subject to change from time to time”

His fourth contract, dated from 1st January 2004 stated:
  • “Your work base will be Midland Regional Hospital at Mullingar for 9 sessions per week, with 2 sessions per week in Midland Regional Hospital at Tullamore. This is subject to change from time to time”

His fifth contract, dated from 1st April 2004 stated:
  • “Your work base will be Midland Regional Hospital at Mullingar for 9 sessions per week, with 2 sessions per week in Midland Regional Hospital at Tullamore. This is subject to change from time to time”

His sixth contract, dated from 1st July 2004 stated:
  • “Your work base will be Midland Regional Hospital at Portlaoise for 8 sessions per week, with 3 sessions per week in Midland Regional Hospital at Tullamore. This is subject to change from time to time”

His seventh contract, dated from 1st July 2005 stated:
  • “Your work base will be Midland Regional Hospital at Portlaoise. This is subject to change from time to time”
His eighth contract, dated from 1st January 2006 stated:
  • “Your work base will be Midland Regional Hospital at Portlaoise. This is subject to change from time to time”
The Statute specifically provides protection to fixed term workers who have been on successive fixed term contracts with their “employer or associated employer”. The Court is satisfied that his period of employment from 1st November 2001 until 26th March 2006 can be considered as continuous, within the meaning of Section 9 (5), with his employer - HSE-Midland Area. The Court cannot accept the contention that the Complainant’s work location constitutes a separate and distinct “employment relationship” such that it renders void the protection provided by the Framework Agreement in Clause 5. Even if such a contention was acceptable, the Court notes that the Complainant was assigned to two different Hospitals for most of his employment and was at all times contractually liable to be moved “from time to time”, therefore, the Court cannot accept that his contracts were “Hospital specific”.

There is no argument that Dr. Ghulam’s employer at all times, from 1st November 2001 until 26th March 2006 was the HSE-Midland Area (previously known as the Midland Health Board). For Mr O’ Moore to succeed in his contention the Court would have to accept that an employer could defeat the provisions of the Act by switching employees between locations. The Court cannot accept this contention.

The Respondents appeal on this point fails.
  • OBJECTIVE GROUNDS

Mr. O’Moore contended that the Respondent also relied on the terms of Section 9(4) of the Act, which allows for the renewal of a contract, in breach of subsections (1) and (2) in circumstances where the employer can show that there was objective justification for such a renewal.

Mr. O’Moore explained that Dr. Ghulam was retained on a fixed term contract from 1st January 2006 until 26th March 2006 on the basis that he was filling in, pending the appointment of the successful appointee who had applied for the permanent position in Portlaoise. Dr. Ghulam had applied for this position but had not been successful as he was not on the specialist register of the Medical Council of the Royal College of Surgeons (RCSI). This was a mandatory requirement in order for the Hospital to retain its training recognition status with the RCSI. The HSE-Midland Area was under pressure from the RCSI to fill the position on a permanent basis and the College had facilitated it by allowing the position to be filled on a temporary basis during Dr. Ghulam’s tenure. However, Mr. O’Moore contended that if Dr. Ghulam had been granted a contract of indefinite duration as opposed to the successful appointee, the training status for Senior House Officers in the Hospital would have been withdrawn by the RCSI. On that basis the Respondent contended that it satisfied the proportionality test of “objective justification”.

Mr. O’Moore explained that in order to fill permanent Consultant posts in Accident & Emergency in the regional acute hospitals in the Midland Area, it was necessary to gain sanction from the Department of Health & Children. Sanction was granted for the Tullamore and Mullingar posts on 2nd July 2002 and for the Portlaoise post on 10th July 2003. However, Comhairle na nOspideal approval was also necessary and this was granted for the first two posts on 24th June 2003 and the 3rd post on 16th July 2003.

Once these sanctions were received the Local Appointments Commission advertised the three permanent Consultant posts on 25th September 2003. The Tullamore post was filled on 2nd March 2004. As the two remaining posts failed to be filled at that time, Dr. Ghulam was retained in the Mullingar post on a fixed term contract pending the filling of the permanent post through the statutory recruitment process.

Another competition was held on 6th April 2004 and the Mullingar post was filled on 1st July 2004. Again, as the third post was not filled in the 2004 competition, Dr. Ghulam was retained in the Portlaoise post on a fixed term contract. A third competition was held on 30th September 2005 and the successful appointee took up the Portlaoise post on 26th March 2006. In the meantime, Dr. Ghulam retained his post on a fixed term basis pending the filling of the Portlaoise post on a permanent basis. The successful appointee commenced in the Portlaoise Hospital on 27th March 2006, at which time Dr. Ghulam’s employment was terminated.

In support of his submission Mr. O’Moore referred the Court to the ETUC-Unice-CEEP Framework Agreement on Fixed Term Work. He referred in particular to the second clause, which states:
  • “The parties to this agreement recognise that contracts of indefinite duration are and will continue to be, the general form of employment relationship between employers and workers. They also recognise that fixed-term employment contracts respond, in certain circumstances, to the needs of both employers and workers.”

He submitted also that the Court should take cognisance of the scope of the Framework Agreement. The Agreement states that it applies:
  • “to fixed term workers who have an employment contract or employment relationship as defined in law, collective agreement or practice in each Member State”.

Mr. O’Moore contended that the fact that the Framework agreement covers not just contracts of employment but also employment relationships provided for the type of situation which applies in this case, i.e. embedded and endemic in the Health Sector is the principle that Consultants are assigned to specific Hospitals and do not have the option to relocate.

The Respondent further submitted that because Dr. Ghulam was not on the specialist register of the Medical Council of the Royal College of Surgeons (RCSI), he could not be appointed into a permanent position in the Hospital. It held that such a requirement was essential for the Hospital in order to retain its training recognition status with the RCSI.

Information was submitted to the Court on the “Register of Medical Specialists”

  • The Register of Medical Specialists was established on the 1st January 1997 in accordance with the provisions set out in Section 30 of the Medical Practitioners Act 1978. Section 38(2) of this Act permits the Medical Council to specify the qualifications, which may be required to enable a person to secure registration in the Register of Medical Specialists.

    The recognised Postgraduate Training Body for Emergency Medicine is the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland (RCSI). To become a Specialist in Emergency Medicine in Ireland a doctor can undertake the Higher Specialist Training (HST) in Emergency Medicine programme operated by the RSCI. This Scheme is a rigorous 4-6 year training scheme, which includes a research component. The selection process for the scheme is outlined in Appendix 1. The RCSI organises the employment of the participants of scheme in various hospitals throughout the health services where the doctors work at Specialist Registrar level under Trainer Consultants in various hospital settings while completing the specialist training. The posts in which the doctors are placed are recognised by the RCSI as being capable of providing higher specialist training to the participants of the scheme.

    The RCSI also has a standing committee of its Council called the ISPTC which is responsible for defining the criteria used in framing the guidelines for evaluating applications for entry on the Register of Medical Specialists for doctors who apply on the basis that s/he has equivalent qualifications, training and experience as a doctor who has completed the Higher Specialist Training Schemes operated by the RCSI


1. The qualifications required to hold the post of permanent Consultant in Emergency Medicine include,inter alia, the requirement to:
  • Be included on the division of emergency medicine of the Register of Medical Specialists maintained by the Medical Council in Ireland,
    or
    • Have seven years’ satisfactory postgraduate training and experience in the medical profession including four years in emergency medicine and one year in related specialties;
�A Specialist is a doctor who has completed their training and requires no further training or supervision to practice independently in the medical specialty of their choice. Specialist registration is deemed to be the best assurance by the Medical Council to the public of the ability of a doctor to practice without supervision.

�There are presently four ways for a doctor to be entered on the Specialist Register:

a. Completion of Recognised Specialist Training – i.e. completion of recognised postgraduate training in Ireland under the supervision of an approved postgraduate training body.b. Holding a GMS or permanent Comhairle na nOspideal post prior to 1997- “the grandfather clause”.

c. Eligibility on the basis of EU Qualifications – an EU national who holds the appropriate EU specialist qualifications may be entered in the relevant division of the Register.

d. Assessment by a Recognised Postgraduate Training Body – on the recommendation of the relevant postgraduate training body following assessment of the doctor’s training and experience to date. Doctors who apply to have their application assessed by a recognised Training Body must meet certain criteria before the Training Body will recommend that their name be entered onto the Specialist Register to the Council.The Respondent submitted that Dr. Ghulam had not undertaken the HST in Emergency Medicine run by the RCSI. He holds the qualification FRCSI. This is a primary qualification that all Registrars in Surgical specialties must have attained. It is not a specialist qualification and it is in no way equivalent to the HST in Emergency Medicine. If Dr. Ghulam wished to have his qualifications, training and experience evaluated to determine if he is eligible for entry onto the Register of Medical Specialist he should apply to the RCSI who will examine his case to establish if he meets the criteria for eligibility. However, Dr. Ghulam is currently not on the Register of Medical Specialists.

The Respondent submitted that securing a permanent appointment did not mean that Dr. Ghulam would be eligible for entry onto the Register of Medical Specialists, or that his case would be looked upon more favourably by the RSCI or the Medical Council.

The Consultants’ Common Contract allows for locum Consultants to work for short periods of time at Consultant level without holding the same qualifications as a permanent post-holder. During Dr. Ghulam’s employment the RCSI was in ongoing contact with the Midland Health Board asking for an improvement in the situation, i.e. for a permanent Consultant to be appointed. This was not an affirmation that they were satisfied with the training on an ongoing basis; they simply wanted the position to be filled on a permanent basis with an appointee who held the required specialist qualifications. Having the Consultant / Trainer on the Register of Medical Specialists is deemed to be the only reliable indicator by the RCSI of the competencies of the individual to deliver training to SHOs.In contesting the Respondent’s contention that there were objective grounds for the renewal of Dr. Ghulam’s contract on 1st January 2006, Counsel for the Complainant relied on the tests stipulated in theAdenelercase and also cited a Determination of this CourtHealth Service Executive North Eastern Area v Khan[2006] 17 E.L.R. 313.). where the Court found :

  • Moreover, a purposive interpretation of section 9 indicates that a Respondent must establish that the reason relied upon as constituting objective grounds was the operative reason for the failure to offer a contract of indefinite duration at the time the fixed-term contract was renewed. This suggests that the Respondent must at least have considered offering the Claimant a contract of indefinite duration before renewing his or her fixed-term contract and decided against doing so for the reason relied upon.

    Section 8(2) is also of considerable significance on this point. It seems to the Court that the purpose of Section 8 is not just to ensure that a fixed-term employee is informed of the reason why his or her contract is being renewed. On a reading of the Section as a whole it is clear that it is intended to ensure that the employer definitively commits itself, at the point at which the contract is being renewed, to the grounds upon which it will rely if subsequently pleading a defence under Section 9(4). Thus where an employer fails to provide a fixed-term employee with a statement in writing, in accordance with Section 8(2), it is apt to infer, in accordance with Section 8(4) of the Act, that the grounds subsequently relied upon were not the operative grounds for the impugned decision and it would be for the employer to prove the contrary.”
Findings of the Court

The Court must consider if there was objective justification for the renewal of the contract on 1st January 2006.

Applicable Law

Section 9 Successive fixed-term contracts
  • (1) Subject to subsection (4), where on or after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee completes or has completed his or her third year of continuous employment with his or her employer or associated employer, his or her fixed-term contract may be renewed by that employer on only one occasion and any such renewal shall be for a fixed term of no longer than one year.

    (2) Subject to subsection (4), where after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee is employed by his or her employer or associated employer on two or more continuous fixed-term contracts and the date of the first such contract is subsequent to the date on which this Act is passed, the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years.

    (3) Where any term of a fixed-term contract purports to contravene subsection (1) or (2) that term shall have no effect and the contract concerned shall be deemed to be a contract of indefinite duration.

    (4) Subsections (1) to (3) shall not apply to the renewal of a contract of employment for a fixed term where there are objective grounds justifying such a renewal.

    (5) The First Schedule to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973 to 2001 shall apply for the purpose of ascertaining the period of service of an employee and whether that service has been continuous.

Section 8(2) of the Act states:

Written statements of employer

  • " Where an employer proposes to renew a fixed-term contract, the fixed-term employee shall be informed in writing by the employer of the objective grounds justifying the renewal of the fixed term contract and the failure to offer a contract of indefinite duration, at the latest by the date of the renewal. "

Section 8(4) of the Act states:
  • “ If it appears to a Rights Commissioner or the Labour Court in any proceedings under this Act—

    • (a) that an employer omitted to provide a written statement, or(b) that a written statement is evasive or equivocal,
    the Rights Commissioner or the Labour Court may draw any inference he or she or it consider just and equitable in the circumstances.”

Section 7 of the Act defines the ambit of what can be regarded as objective grounds for the purposes of the Act, which states:

Objective grounds for less favourable treatment

  • (1) A ground shall not be regarded as an objective ground for the purposes of any provision of this Part unless it is based on considerations other than the status of the employee concerned as a fixed-term employee and the less favourable treatment which it involves for that employee (which treatment may include the renewal of a fixed-term employee's contract for a further fixed term) is for the purpose of achieving a legitimate objective of the employer and such treatment is appropriate and necessary for that purpose.
This section makes it clear that the objective grounds referred to in section 9(4) must be based on considerations other than the status of the employee as a fixed-term worker.

The definition is identical in terms to that of objective justification contained at Section 22(1)(a) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 and 2004. This, in turn, is derived from the jurisprudential criteria established by the ECJ against which indirect discrimination may be justified. This approach was first applied in the case of gender discrimination inBilka-Kaulhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz[1986] ECR 1607

In that case the ECJ set out a three-tiered test by which an indirectly discriminatory measure may be justified. It said that the measure must firstly meet a “real need” of the employer; secondly the measure must be “appropriate” to meet the objective, which it pursues and finally the measure must be “necessary” to achieve that objective.

While the test prescribed by Section 7(1) is in slightly different words than that inBilka, it is essentially the same test. This has now been put beyond doubt by the recent Judgment of the ECJ inAdeneler and Others v Ellinikos Organismos Galakto.Here, at paragraph 74 of its Judgment, the Court referred to the need to show that the grounds relied upon: -
  • “Respond to a genuine need, is appropriate for achieving the objective pursued and is necessary for that purpose”
With the exception of the first contract, all his contracts stated:
  • “Your employment with the HSE- Midland Area [Midland Health Board] shall be for the purposes of filling a post on a temporary basis, pending the filling of this post on a permanent basis in accordance with required procedures.”

The Respondent contended that even if the Complainant had aprima facieentitlement to a contract of indefinite duration, there were objective grounds for the continuing renewal of his contract. The Respondent argued that he was retained to fill in pending the take up by the successful appointee of the permanent Consultants post in Portlaoise on 27th March 2006.

The Respondent informed the Court that Dr. O’R was appointed to the permanent Consultant A & E post in Portlaoise in October 2005 but was not due to take up that post until 27th March 2006. This period was not unusual, as he was a serving Consultant at Tralee General Hospital, and had to make arrangements to leave that post as well as make arrangements to take up the position in the Midlands. Therefore it was necessary to give Dr. Ghulam a fixed term contract from 1st January 2006 until 26th March 2006.

Dr. O’R was the third and final Accident and Emergency Consultant appointed to the area. Dr. Ghulam had applied for and had not been appointed to the position.

There is no doubt that as of the 1st of January 2006 the following was known to all parties:

i. Dr. O’R had been appointed to the permanent post and was due to take up his position on the 27th of March.ii. Dr Ghulam had been unsuccessful in his application for the position.


iii. It was not possible to appoint Dr. Ghulam to the permanent post without Portlaoise losing its training accreditation.


iv. It was necessary to maintain cover in the Accident and Emergency Department until Dr. O’R took up his appointment. Therefore it was appropriate to give Dr. Ghulam a fixed term contract from 1st January 2006 until 26th March 2006.

Section 8(4) of the Act states that the Court may draw such inferences from a failure to provide a written statement of the objective grounds as it sees fit. There is no doubt that the failure to provide such a statement is a breach of the provisions of the Act. The failure to provide a written statement of these grounds is to be deplored and in normal circumstances would put the Respondent in a position of considerable difficulty.


However, a failure to provide a written statement is not fatal to the Respondent’s case. As stated, it merely allows the Court to draw such inference as it sees fit, and the obvious inference to be drawn is that the objective grounds advanced by the Respondents at the hearing were not the grounds which were in its mind at the time of the renewal of the contract. The onus then switches to the Respondent to prove that the objective grounds relied upon by it at the hearing are the objective grounds which it would have considered when renewing the contract, that these grounds meet a real need of the Respondent and are both appropriate and necessary.

In the circumstances of this particular case there were clear objective grounds for the renewal of the Dr. Ghulam’s fixed term contract. There was an absolute need for cover until the 27th of March. Dr. Ghulam could not be appointed to a permanent post because of his lack of specialist qualification and it was appropriate to offer him a contract until the 26th of March 2006 to fill the gap until Dr. O’R could take up the post. The Court accepts that these were the matters which were in the Respondent’s mind when it decided to issue Dr. Ghulam with a further fixed term contract until the 26th of March 2006.

DETERMINATION

The Court accepts that there were objective grounds justifying the Respondents failure to appoint the Complainant on a contract of indefinite duration on the 1st of January 2006.

However, there is no doubt that the Respondent contravened Section 8(2) of the Act by not furnishing the Complainant with a statement in writing of the objective grounds justifying the renewal of his fixed-term contract on 1st of January 2006 and the failure to offer him a contract of indefinite duration, at the latest by the date of the renewal.

In the circumstances of this particular case the Court accepts that the contravention, which occurred in this case, was technical and was due to inadvertence on the part of the Respondent. Nevertheless Section 8(2) is a mandatory provision admitting of no exceptions. This omission can neither be overlooked nor excused by the Court.

The Court has decided that the appropriate award is one of compensation. In deciding the level of the award the Court also takes cognisance of the fact that Dr. Ghulam was himself aware of the circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s decision to renew his contract until the 26th of March 2006. However, in the case ofVon Colson & Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen[1984] ECR1891, the European Court of Justice stated that the remedies proposed by National Law and implemented by a National Court when enforcing domestic legislation enacting the terms of a Directive should be "effective, proportionate and dissuasive". Therefore, in all the circumstances of this case, the Court determines that the appropriate redress is compensation in the sum of €25,000. This award is wholly comprised of compensation for the breach of the Act found by the Court with respect to the Complainant and contains no element of loss of earnings. The Respondent is directed to pay the Complainant compensation in that amount.

To this extent the appeal is allowed and the decision of the Rights Commissioner is set aside.



Signed on behalf of the Labour Court



Caroline Jenkinson
12th May, 2008______________________
JFDeputy Chairman



NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Determination should be addressed to John Foley, Court Secretary.