Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Warren  Boles

Aldi Stores (Ireland) Limited

Representatives

Self-Represented

Lorna Lynch SC instructed by

Walter Beatty Flynn O’Driscoll LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00081038-001

23/02/2026

The complaint is one of penalisation under 6C the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 (“the 1994 Act”).

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent as a Warehouse Selector and subsequently became a Warehouse Selector – Warehouse Deputy. For a considerable period, he worked primarily in the Recall function at the Respondent's warehouse in Mitchelstown, County Cork.

In 2024, the Respondent commenced a restructuring whereby the Recall function was moved organisationally from Goods In to the Inventory Control Team (“ICT”) at the same location. A dispute subsequently arose between the parties concerning the Complainant's working arrangements and, in particular, his contention that he had an established Monday-to-Friday working arrangement. He raised an internal grievance in May 2025. That grievance was not upheld, and an appeal was subsequently unsuccessful.

The Complainant subsequently referred a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission under the 1994 Act, CA-00077904, on 24 November 2025. The decision is at ADJ-00064216 and should be read in conjunction with this decision. At the hearing of the present complaint, it was accepted that the Respondent had received notification of that complaint by 3 December 2025.

The present complaint concerns a series of events which occurred thereafter. The Complainant contends that because he had pursued the earlier statutory complaint he was subjected to penalisation by the Respondent and, in particular, by his then Section Leader, Mr Gregor Smykla.

The matters relied upon include the manner in which a workplace accident on 19 December 2025 was dealt with; the incorrect treatment of two public holidays during the Complainant's subsequent sick leave; his assignment to ICT duties following his return to work; and an alleged threat by Mr Smykla concerning the withdrawal of “benefits” during an interaction on 12 February 2026.

The Complainant referred the present complaint to the WRC on 23 February 2026. His complaint form stated that he believed that his move from his original role was “a direct result of me taking a case against my employer with the WRC”.

The Respondent denies that the Complainant was subjected to penalisation contrary to section 6C of the  1994 Act. It submits that the matters relied upon by the Complainant were ordinary workplace events which were unrelated to his earlier WRC complaint. In particular, it maintains that his assignment to ICT formed part of a pre-existing programme of cross-training among Section Deputies and did not constitute a permanent removal from Recall; that the incorrect treatment of public holidays during his sick leave was an administrative error which was subsequently corrected; that the handling of his workplace accident was unrelated to his WRC proceedings; and that the reference to “benefits” during the disputed February 2026 conversation was not a threat but concerned the resolution of his holiday and medical-expense issues. The Respondent submits that there was no causal connection between the Complainant's earlier complaint to the WRC under the 1994 Act and any of the treatment complained of and that the complaint is therefore not well founded.

The Complainant submitted that the events complained of cannot properly be viewed in isolation from his earlier dispute with the Respondent. He had challenged the proposed alteration of his established working arrangements, pursued the Respondent's internal grievance procedure and ultimately invoked his statutory rights by referring CA-00077904 to the WRC. He submitted that the Respondent was aware of those proceedings by 3 December 2025 and that the treatment complained of occurred thereafter.

The Complainant's believes that the subsequent manner in which his injury was handled, his assignment to ICT, the treatment of his sick pay/public holidays and a threat to withdraw benefits constituted acts of penalisation.

Evidence of the Complainant

Workplace accident

The Complainant stated that on 19 December 2025 he sustained an injury to his shoulder/neck while picking turkeys. He reported the injury to Mr Smykla. He said that he was not offered first aid and that no medical assessment was carried out. He stated that he was instructed to wait in the temperature-controlled intake area and maintained that he was left there for approximately 20 minutes.

He stated that he had telephoned Mr Smykla “two or three times” seeking assistance. He said that when Mr Smykla eventually attended, they completed the accident documentation, and he thereafter left work to seek medical attention. He further complained that he had already commenced driving home before Mr Smykla telephoned to ask whether he was fit to drive.

The Complainant also complained that the accident form had subsequently been altered outside his presence. In particular, answers which had been marked “N/A” had been changed to “No”. When questioned by me as to whether those changes made any significant difference to the substance of the form, the Complainant accepted that they did not.

In cross-examination, the Complainant was challenged concerning his assertion that he had telephoned Mr Smykla two or three times seeking assistance. He ultimately accepted that the relevant documentation showed one call enquiring whether Mr Smykla was coming to assist him. He was also challenged concerning additional details given orally about the seriousness of the symptoms which had not appeared in his earlier detailed written account.

Public holidays

The Complainant gave evidence that during his approximately three-week period of sick leave he discovered that two public holidays had been processed incorrectly. He regarded this as another example of adverse treatment following his WRC complaint.

In cross-examination, however, he accepted that on 3 February 2026 he had initially communicated with Mr Smykla by way of email, which was exhibited. The email stated:

“I was paid for two bank holidays... As far as aware, if you're sick on a bank holiday, a person should be put down as sick and not down a bank holiday. Could you please have a look at this for me, please?”

The matter was then escalated to payroll and corrected.

Assignment to ICT

The Complainant's principal allegation concerned his assignment to ICT. He stated that while he was absent on sick leave a decision was made that, on his return, he would cease performing his established Recall function and would instead work in ICT. He regarded this as a permanent removal rather than genuine cross-training.

The Complainant relied upon the fact that when other employees were cross-trained their arrangements appeared to have greater structure and a defined conclusion. He contrasted his own position with that of Ms Sara Browne, a work colleague, who underwent ICT training for approximately one month before returning to Recall duties. The Complainant remained assigned to ICT duties between January and 20 April 2026.

In cross-examination The Complainant accepted that Recall had already been moved organisationally into ICT. The documentary material also showed that at a “toolbox” meeting on 23 December 2025 an arrangement was recorded whereby Mr Wojciech Dulas would train in Recall while the Complainant would train in ICT.

The Complainant was also questioned concerning his own contemporaneous references to the arrangement as “training” and the fact that he had recorded Mr Smykla as saying that it would be for “just a couple of weeks”.

The alleged threat concerning “benefits”

The Complainant gave evidence concerning an interaction with Mr Smykla on 12 February 2026. A meeting had been proposed and the Complainant wished Ms Sara Browne to attend as a witness.

His evidence was that Mr Smykla indicated that the meeting would not proceed with a witness present and referred to there being “benefits” if he attended without one. The Complainant understood this as a threat that benefits due to him would be withheld if he insisted upon having a witness present.

The Complainant regarded this interaction as intimidation arising in the context of his ongoing dispute with the Respondent.

Evidence of Ms Sara Browne

Ms Sara Browne, a Section Deputy, gave evidence on behalf of the Complainant. The witness had prepared a contemporaneous written statement concerning the events of 12 February 2026, which was exhibited. she had been asked by the Complainant to attend the proposed meeting with Mr Smykla. She confirmed that she attended after being approached by the Complainant. Ms Browne did not, however, witness the entire initial exchange between the Complainant and Mr Smykla. She accepted that her written statement records that when she became involved, Mr Smykla refused to discuss the ICT issue further and said that the meeting was informal and concerned “holidays and expenses” before he walked away.

The witness also gave evidence concerning cross-training. She accepted in her testimony that Deputies were being cross trained between Recall and ICT and that she herself subsequently undertook such training.

In cross-examination the witness accepted her evidence was principally as to what occurred after she joined the interaction. She attested to the existence of a disagreement concerning her attendance at the proposed meeting but did not witness Mr Smykla threatening to withhold an employment benefit from the Complainant.

The Respondent denied that the Complainant had been penalised. It made a preliminary legal submission that the earlier complaint (ADJ-00064216/CA-00077904) under the 1994 Act did not amount to the invocation of a right within s.6C of that Act because the Complainant's underlying case concerned what he contended was an implied contractual term rather than a change in particulars requiring notification pursuant to s.5.

Without prejudice to that argument, the Respondent submitted that there was no causal connection whatsoever between the earlier WRC complaint and any of the events relied upon as penalisation. Its written submission stated that there was “no credible basis” for the assertion that any of the incidents constituted penalisation.

The Respondent submitted that the accident was dealt with in the ordinary course; that the public-holiday issue was an administrative error which was immediately corrected; that the ICT assignment formed part of a pre-existing cross-training programme; and that the reference to “benefits” was not a threat but a reference to matters advantageous to the Complainant which Mr Smykla intended to address, namely holidays and medical expenses.

Evidence of Mr Grzegorz Smykla

Mr Smykla gave evidence that he was the Complainant's Section Leader and Personnel Leader during the material period. The witness accepted he had knowledge of the Complainant’s complaint to the WRC in December 2025.

Accident

The witness stated that on 19 December 2025 the Complainant approached him concerning an issue with his arm. He asked the Complainant whether he remained capable of driving the order picker and whether he required assistance. According to the witness, the Complainant said that he could continue driving and exhibited no obvious signs of distress. The witness asked him to wait while he dealt with an operational matter. His recollection was that he had asked the Complainant to wait approximately two minutes, although the documentation subsequently established a longer interval.

The witness subsequently completed the relevant accident procedures. He explained that his name appeared in the witness section of the electronic system because a dropdown selection had to be made and because he had completed a statement. He accepted that he had not actually witnessed the accident. He denied deliberately withholding first aid or otherwise treating the Complainant differently because of the WRC complaint.

Public holidays

The witness accepted that the public holidays had been processed incorrectly. His evidence was that this arose because of the operation of the rostering/payroll system and the requirement manually to override the default treatment of the days. When the Complainant brought the matter to his attention, he escalated it and the error was corrected. He denied deliberately depriving the Complainant of pay.

Cross-training

The witness gave evidence that cross-training of Deputies had been contemplated before the Complainant's WRC complaint. He said that he had discussed cross-training with the Complainant in September and November 2025.

He denied permanently removing the Complainant from Recall. The plan was that Deputies familiar with Recall would learn ICT functions and Deputies familiar with ICT would learn Recall. Ms Magdalena Dymarkowska had previously been cross trained The arrangement subsequently recorded on 23 December was that the Complainant would train in ICT while Mr Wojciech Dulas  would train in Recall.

When reference was made to his interview (exhibited) during the internal grievance investigation, the witness had expressly stated: “I didn't remove him permanently; there was a plan.” He described that plan as cross-training.

“Benefits”

Mr Smykla accepted using the word “benefits” but denied that it constituted a threat. During the internal grievance investigation, he explained: “The benefits were fixing the bank holiday and the expenses.” He stated that he also intended to explain more about the Complainant's cross-training. When asked specifically whether “benefits” referred to the contents of the meeting rather than an inducement to attend without a witness, he answered: “Yes.” The witness rejected the proposition that he had threatened to remove any benefit because the Complainant wished Ms Browne to attend.

Evidence of Mr Jonathon Carroll

Mr Jonathon Carroll, Warehouse Operations Manager, also gave evidence. The witness had conducted the subsequent grievance investigation. He met the Complainant, Mr Smykla and Magdelana Dymarkowska. He said he considered the documentation relating to the allegations. He elaborated upon the operation of ICT and Recall and the cross-training arrangements.

Mr Carroll also gave evidence concerning the payroll/rostering system and confirmed that the type of error which occurred in respect of the Complainant's public holidays was not unique to him. He was aware of another manager making the same error by failing manually to override the system. He said that what occurred was an administrative mistake rather than deliberate interference with the Complainant's entitlement. The witness said his investigation ultimately did not substantiate the Complainant's contention that the various matters complained of represented deliberate adverse treatment by Mr Smykla.

Applicable Law

Section 6C of the 1994 Act provides:

(1) An employer shall not penalise or threaten penalisation of an employee for—

(a) invoking any right conferred on him or her by this Act,

(b) having in good faith opposed by lawful means an act that is unlawful under this Act,

(c) giving evidence in any proceedings under this Act, or

o(d) giving notice of his or her intention to do any of the things referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the making of a complaint that is a protected disclosure within the meaning of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014.

(3) In proceedings under Part 4 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint that subsection (1) has been contravened, it shall be presumed until the contrary is proved that the employee concerned has acted reasonably and in good faith in forming the opinion and making the communication concerned.

(4) If a penalisation of an employee, in contravention of subsection (1), constitutes a dismissal of the employee within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2015, relief may not be granted to the employee in respect of that penalisation both under this Act and under those Acts.

(5) In this section “penalisation” means any act or omission by an employer or a person acting on behalf of an employer that affects an employee to his or her detriment with respect to any term or condition of his or her employment, and, without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes—

(a) suspension, lay-off or dismissal (including a dismissal within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 to 2015), or the threat of suspension, lay-off or dismissal,

(b) demotion or loss of opportunity for promotion,

(c) transfer of duties, change of location of place of work, reduction in wages or change in working hours,

(d) imposition or the administering of any discipline, reprimand or other penalty (including a financial penalty), and

(e) coercion or intimidation.

The complaint before me is that the Complainant was penalised contrary to section 6C of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.

The protected activity

The Complainant referred complaint CA-00077904 to the WRC on 24 November 2025. That complaint was brought under section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994. It was accepted at the hearing that the Respondent became aware of that complaint by 3 December 2025.

The Respondent submits that CA-00077904 did not amount to the invocation of a right for the purposes of section 6C because they argue that the previous complaint was fundamentally misconceived. The earlier complaint concerned the Complainant's contention that a Monday-to-Friday working arrangement had become an implied contractual term through custom and practice and that the Respondent was required to notify him in writing of the change to that arrangement.

I do not consider it necessary to determine the present complaint upon the Respondent's contention that the earlier complaint could not constitute the invocation of a right within section 6C. For the purposes of the present decision, I proceed on the basis that the referral of CA-00077904 constituted protected activity within section 6C(1). I am also satisfied that the Respondent had knowledge of that activity by 3 December 2025.

The question for me to determine is consequently whether the treatment subsequently relied upon by the Complainant occurred because of that protected activity.

I consider each alleged act separately and thereafter consider the cumulative effect of the matters relied upon.

The workplace accident of 19 December 2025

The Complainant sustained an injury at work on 19 December 2025 while engaged in picking turkeys. He relies upon the manner in which the accident was subsequently handled as an act of penalisation. He complained, amongst other things, about the time taken by Mr Smykla to attend to him, the absence of an offer of first aid, the absence of an assessment as to whether he was fit to drive home and the subsequent completion or amendment of the accident documentation.

I accept that the Complainant was dissatisfied with aspects of the manner in which the incident was managed. I also accept that some aspects of the Respondent's handling and recording of the accident could have been better communicated to him. Those findings do not, however, establish penalisation under section 6C.

There were also aspects of the Complainant's oral account which were not entirely consistent with the contemporaneous documentation. He initially described making two or three telephone calls seeking assistance. In cross-examination the telephone records were put to him where it showed he rang Mr Smykla once only.

The Complainant also placed considerable emphasis upon alterations made to the accident documentation outside his presence, including the alteration of certain answers from “N/A” to “No”. When questioned as to the significance of those particular alterations, he accepted that they did not materially change the substance of the information recorded.

Mr Smykla denied deliberately withholding assistance or treating the Complainant differently because of his WRC proceedings. Whatever shortcomings may have existed in the administration of the accident, I have been presented with no persuasive evidence connecting them to CA-00077904. The Respondent's knowledge of the earlier WRC complaint does not, of itself, permit me to infer that the manner in which an unforeseen workplace accident was subsequently dealt with was retaliatory. I am therefore not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the acts or omissions surrounding the accident occurred because the Complainant had invoked a right under the Act. This aspect of the penalisation complaint has not been established.

The public holiday entitlements

The Complainant next relies upon the incorrect processing of two public holidays which occurred during his certified sick leave. The underlying error is not disputed. The question is whether this was a deliberate withholding of an employment entitlement connected with the Complainant's earlier WRC proceedings or as submitted by the Respondent, an administrative error.

I attach significance to the Complainant's own contemporaneous approach to the matter. When he raised it with Mr Smykla on 3 February 2026, he did so as a query concerning the manner in which the public holidays had been processed and asked Mr Smykla to examine the matter. Mr Smykla referred the issue onwards and it was corrected.

Mr Carroll also gave evidence concerning the operation of the relevant system and explained that an employee on sick leave could be incorrectly processed for a public holiday unless the default position was manually overridden. Importantly, his evidence was that a similar error had occurred in respect of another employee. I accept that explanation. It is consistent with the contemporaneous manner in which the matter was raised and subsequently corrected. The Complainant has established that an error occurred. He has not established that the error was deliberately caused or permitted to continue because he had brought CA-00077904. I therefore find that the incorrect treatment of the public holidays was an administrative error and did not constitute penalisation within section 6C.

The alleged threat to withdraw “benefits”

The Complainant relies upon an interaction with Mr Smykla on 12 February 2026 as an act of intimidation or threatened penalisation. There is no dispute that Mr Smykla used the word “benefits”. The dispute concerns what was meant by that expression.

The Complainant's evidence was that Mr Smykla indicated that there would be “benefits” if he attended a proposed meeting without Ms Sara Browne being present as a witness. He understood this as a threat that benefits or entitlements would be withheld or withdrawn if he insisted upon having a witness at the meeting. Mr Smykla denied that interpretation. His evidence was that the “benefits” to which he referred were matters which he intended to address for the Complainant, including the public-holiday issue and medical expenses that would have benefitted him.

I have carefully considered Ms Browne's evidence because she was called by the Complainant and prepared a contemporaneous statement concerning the interaction. Ms Browne was not present for the entirety of the initial conversation between the Complainant and Mr Smykla. She therefore could not give direct evidence of everything that was said before she joined them. Her contemporaneous statement is nevertheless significant. It did not record that the Complainant told her that Mr Smykla had threatened to withdraw benefits if she attended the meeting. Rather, it recorded that when she became involved Mr Smykla described the proposed meeting as informal and said that it concerned “holidays and expenses”. That is materially consistent with Mr Smykla's subsequent explanation of what he meant by “benefits”. I accept that there was a disagreement concerning whether Ms Browne should be present at the proposed informal meeting. I do not accept that this fact establishes that the Complainant was threatened with the loss of an employment benefit.

On the balance of probabilities, I am not satisfied that the words used by Mr Smykla constituted coercion, intimidation or a threat of detriment within section 6C (5). This allegation therefore fails at the stage of establishing the alleged penalisation itself. In any event, the Complainant has not established that the interaction occurred because of his earlier WRC complaint.

The assignment from Recall to ICT

The Complainant's principal allegation is that, following his return from sick leave, he was permanently removed from the Recall function in which he had worked for approximately eight years and transferred to ICT in retaliation for bringing CA-00077904 in November 2025.

A transfer of duties is expressly included within the examples of penalisation contained in section 6C(5)(c). I therefore accept that an adverse transfer of duties is capable of constituting penalisation under the Act. The critical questions in this case are what actually occurred and why.

I have paid particular attention to the chronology. The Respondent knew of CA-00077904 by 3 December 2025. The Complainant commenced sick leave following his accident on 19 December. The “toolbox” (operations meeting) documentation of 23 December records that, upon his return, the Complainant would undertake training in ICT while Mr Wojciech Dulas would train in Recall. The sequence is therefore capable of giving rise to the question posed by the Complainant. It does not, however, answer that question.

The wider evidence establishes that the reorganisation of Recall and ICT substantially predated CA-00077904. Recall had already been moved organisationally into ICT. The evidence also establishes that cross-training was not confined to the Complainant.  Magdalena Dymarkowska had undergone cross-training and Ms Browne subsequently did so.

The arrangement recorded on 23 December is particularly significant. It does not record simply that the Complainant was being removed from Recall and replaced. It records a reciprocal arrangement whereby the Complainant would train in ICT while Mr Dulas would train in Recall. I consider that contemporaneous record to be more consistent with the Respondent's explanation of cross-training between Deputies than with the Complainant's contention that he was selected for permanent removal from his longstanding function.

I have also considered the Complainant's own contemporaneous communications. He repeatedly referred to what he was undertaking as “training” and sought clarification concerning its duration and structure. His own written account recorded Mr Smykla as stating that it would be for “just a couple of weeks.” That contemporaneous account does not readily support the proposition that the Complainant had been informed that his removal from Recall was permanent.

I nevertheless accept certain criticisms made by the Complainant. The Respondent has not produced contemporaneous documentation corroborating Mr Smykla's evidence that he specifically discussed the Complainant's proposed cross-training with him in September and November 2025. Nor was there a clearly documented training programme setting out its duration, objectives, review date or completion criteria. The period ultimately spent by the Complainant in ICT was also longer than the “couple of weeks” apparently suggested to him.

I therefore do not find it established that a final decision that this particular Complainant would be assigned to ICT had been made before the Respondent became aware of CA-00077904. That finding does not, however, establish the converse proposition that the assignment was made because of CA-00077904.

The evidence demonstrates a pre-existing organisational restructuring and a programme of cross-training affecting other Deputies. The contemporaneous documentation demonstrates that another Deputy was to train in Recall while the Complainant trained in ICT. The Complainant subsequently returned to working primarily in Recall from 20 April 2026. Taking those matters together, I am satisfied that the Respondent has provided a credible operational explanation for the assignment which is independent of the Complainant's protected activity i.e. the complaint to the WRC.

I therefore find, on the balance of probabilities, that the Complainant's assignment to ICT formed part of the Respondent's cross-training arrangements and has not been shown to have occurred because he had referred CA-00077904 to the WRC.

Consideration of the allegations cumulatively

I have also considered whether the incidents, although individually insufficient to establish penalisation, acquire a different character when viewed cumulatively.

The Complainant places considerable reliance upon timing. That is understandable. The Respondent was aware of his earlier WRC complaint by 3 December 2025, and the matters now complained of occurred thereafter. The fact that the events occurred close together in time is relevant. It is not, however, a substitute for the statutory requirement of causation. When the individual incidents are examined against the contemporaneous documentation and oral evidence, I do not find a pattern from which I can reasonably infer retaliation.

The workplace accident was an unforeseen event, and the evidence does not establish that the manner in which it was dealt with was influenced by the earlier proceedings. The public-holiday issue is credibly explained as an administrative error of a type which also affected another employee and was corrected when identified. The alleged threat to withdraw benefits has not been established on the balance of probabilities and is inconsistent with the contemporaneous account of Ms Browne that the proposed meeting concerned “holidays and expenses”. The ICT assignment occurred against the background of an established restructuring and cross-training programme involving other Deputies.

The common feature identified by the Complainant is that these matters occurred after the Respondent became aware of CA-00077904. That establishes chronology. It does not establish that CA-00077904 was the reason for them.

I am also conscious that section 6C (3) requires me to presume, until the contrary is proved, that the Complainant acted reasonably and in good faith in forming the relevant opinion and making the relevant communication. Nothing in my findings should be understood as a finding that the Complainant acted otherwise. I accept that he genuinely regarded the matters complained of as connected with his earlier WRC proceedings. The statutory test is nevertheless an objective one. A genuine belief that one has been penalised does not establish that the employer's conduct was in fact caused by the protected activity.

Having considered the oral testimony, the cross-examination of the witnesses and the contemporaneous documentation, both individually and cumulatively, I am not satisfied that the Complainant has discharged the burden of establishing, on the balance of probabilities, the necessary causal connection between his protected activity and any of the alleged acts of penalisation.

In conclusion, I find that the Respondent did not penalise or threaten to penalise the Complainant contrary to section 6C of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 and therefore the complaint is not well founded.

CA-00081038-001: For the reasons outlined above, I find the complaint was not well founded.

Section 6C Terms of Employment (Information) 1994. Penalisation.