Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Kirstyn  Davidson

My Life By Estrela Hall  

Representatives

Self- represented

Arag Legal Protection Limited

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00079310-001

08/01/2026

The complainant has submitted a complaint of discriminatory dismissal contrary to the provisions of the Employment Equality Act,1998.

She had been employed as a healthcare assistant with the respondent from 7/8/2024 until hewr dismissal on 28/4/2025.

The complainant was paid €13.50 an hour and worked 72 hours per fortnight.

She submitted her complaint to the WRC on 8th January 2026.

The respondent raised three preliminary issues.

1.Statutory time limits.

The respondent states that the complainant was dismissed on the 28th of April 2025. Her appeal was refused on the 10/6/2025. The complainant did not lodge this complaint of discriminatory dismissal until the 8th of January 2026, by which time this complaint was in or around 3 months out of time. The respondent submitted that there is no basis for this delay and as such the WRC does not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint by virtue of Section41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

Furthermore, the complainant referred a dispute to the WRC on the 10th July 2025 pursuant to the Industrial Relations Act 1969 about the exact same matter. The WRC had declined the complainant’s request in accordance with section 13 (b) of the Industrial Relations Act ,1969. The complainant on notice that this route was not available to her chose to delay a referral of her complaint under the Act until after the statutory time limits had elapsed.

The respondent refers to the strict obligations resting with complainant.

The respondent relies on the principal authority for permitting an extension as provided for in section of the Act which is found in Cementation Skanska v Carroll DWT 38/2003. The Labour Court stated as follows:

‘It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the

claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford

an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it

must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the

context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it

suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and

circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. “

The respondent also relies on Business Mobile Security Ltd t/a Senaca Limited v John

McEvoyEDA 1621, where the Court held that the claim was statute-barred where:

“There was a delay in processing the grievance which lasted for more than six

months. In the meantime, the Complainant was out of work on sick leave.

Again, he decided to allow that procedure take its course while time was

running under the Act.”

The Court proceeded to state:

“He chose not to pursue a complaint under the Act, allowed time to pass

and found himself statute barred when his chosen procedure did not resolve the

matter to his satisfaction.”

2. The complaint has failed to identify which of the grounds as set out in the Act apply to her complaint. The complainant has not provided any comparator,

In Trony v Waterford Ledc Clg ADJ-00050869, the Adjudication Officer held that inter alia the failure to identify a comparator, was fatal to the case:

“The Complainant in this instant case has firstly not identified the ground on

which he based his claim and then submitted general assertions that he had

been dismissed “based on unreasonable grounds”.

The Complainant’s dismissal in the instant cased related to a medication error and absence due to a reason which was not genuine.

1.Statutory time limits

The complaint stated that she had been unwell, and that her distress and poor mental health as a result of what she considers to be an unfair disciplinary process based on untrue allegations caused the delay.

She had been unable to secure legal advice.

2.Failure to identify a comparator and no identification of grounds upon which she is making this complaint

When asked by the adjudicator to identify under which of the nine grounds she had suffered discrimination, the complainant stated that she had been discriminated against because she was new.  She was scapegoated.

The complainant was unable to identify the less favourable treatment, based on any of the grounds, relative to a colleague facing the same circumstances obtaining at the time of her dismissal or during the course of her employment with the respondent.

The complaint was unrepresented, and I offered the complainant the opportunity to make a submission post the hearing on the two preliminary points. The complainant did submit a medical certificate dated attesting to her ill health. But otherwise, no submission was made on these two points.

The complainant’s mother advised of the complainant’s distress at the disciplinary process and sanction. 

I must first decide on the preliminary issues.

Statutory time limits.

Statutory framework.

Section 77(5)(a) of the Acts provides: -

“(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a claim for redress in respect of discrimination or victimisation may not be referred under this section after the end of the period of 6 months from the date of occurrence of the discrimination or victimisation to which the case relates or, as the case may require the most recent occurrence.”

(c) This subsection does not apply in relation to a claim not to be receiving remuneration in accordance with an equal remuneration term.”

Section 77(5)(b) allows for an extension of an additional 6 months where the complainant shows reasonable cause for her failure to submit her complaint in accordance with the limits set out in section 77(5)(a) above.

The established test for identifying if reasonable cause exists to extend time up to 12 Months is set out in Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll DWT 0388.There, the Labour Court determined as follows:

“In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time…

Where reasonable cause is shown the Court must still consider if it is appropriate in the circumstances to exercise its discretion in favour of granting an extension of time”

Applying this test to the circumstances of the instant case, the complainant’s explanation for the delay is that her ill health prevented her presenting her complaint in time. But this stated reason is undermined by the fact that she was sufficiently competent to present a complaint under the Industrial Relations Act, 1969 at a time when her doctor described her – albeit retrospectively in May 2026 - as having been unwell during the relevant time for submission of the complaint, and that she  had mental health issues. But it cannot cancel out the fact that the complainant advised in May 2025 that she was in receipt of legal advice on the dismissal from her employment.

For these reasons I am unable to accept that but for her mental health issues she would have been able to submit a complaint under the Employment Equality Act, 1998 within the statutory time limits.

I accept that the course of events had a distressing effect for the complainant and her mother’s statements on that point were convincing, but that doesn’t allow me to ignore the fact that the complainant was sufficiently competent to engage with the WRC during the statutory period for the submission of another complaint.

Based on the evidence submitted, I am obliged to find that the reasons advanced by the complainant for the failure to comply with the statutory time limits do not afford an excuse for the delay.

Lack of legal advice.

In Galway & Roscommon ETB v Josephine Kenny UDD1624, the Court in dealing with that complainant’s misunderstanding of the statutory time limits relied on the decision of the Minister for Finance v CPSU and Ors[2007] 18 ELR 36 where the High Court held that ignorance of one’s legal rights, as opposed to the facts giving rise to those rights, cannot be accepted as an excuse for not observing a statutory time limit.

I find that I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint.

Failure to identify the statutory grounds upon which the complaint is based.

The Act at section 6(2) sets out the grounds under which a complaint of discrimination can be submitted.

The complainant listed none of those grounds, instead, identifying that she was dismissed because she was new, and that she had been scapegoated. None of these causes are comprehended by section 6(2) of the Act.

I understand that the dismissal was extremely distressing, but this complaint requires the complainant to present facts demonstrating that that she was subject to less favourable treatment based on the grounds found at section 6(2) of the Act, relative to a fellow employee, as opposed to unfair treatment.

I find that the complainant has failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory dismissal contrary to the provisions of the Act.

I find that I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint.

I decide that I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint.

No discriminatory grounds identified. Time limits.