ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00065396
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Gearóid Wrafter | Polar Express Refrigerated Logistics |
Representatives | Self-Represented | Warren Parkes Warren Parkes Solicitors |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00078593-001 | 14/12/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 23/07/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Dónal Moore, BL
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
I have carefully reviewed all of the evidence, both written and oral, and I have considered the respective positions advanced by the parties. I am not required to provide a line-by-line analysis of every submission made, nor to expressly address evidence which I have rejected or deemed immaterial to my findings. I am guided by the judgment of Faulkner v Minister for Industry and Commerce [1997] E.L.R. 107, in which it was held that administrative tribunals are not required to provide a minute analysis of every aspect of the evidence and that broad reasons are sufficient. I am, however, required to identify and address the evidential material that is fundamentally relevant to my decision, as set out by MacMenamin J. in Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63. Accordingly, I will focus on those facts, submissions and issues that are material to the determination of the complaints before me.
The parties were put under notice of the decision in the Zalewski case, that their evidence would be heard under oath or affirmation and of the penalty for perjury. Accordingly, the witnesses were advised of the penalty for perjury. Additionally, the parties were informed that they would be afforded an opportunity to cross examine witnesses and the hearing was to be held in public; the parties offered me neither objection nor reason to have the hearing held in private.
For the Complainant, the hearing was attended by, the Complainant and they gave evidence under affirmation and were made available to be cross examined. No other witnesses were produced.
For the Respondent, the hearing was attended by Mr Parkes, Solicitor for the Respondent. No witnesses were produced.
I allowed the parties present to make representation to me and, where appropriate, I made my own enquiries. Having asked the attendees, and having satisfied myself, that I had heard all the relevant submissions put to me I formally closed the hearing.
Background:
The complainant was employed by the respondent as a truck driver from 24 April 2025 until 23 May 2025. He claims that following his resignation the Respondent unlawfully withheld wages due to him in respect of alleged damage to a vehicle. The Complainant disputes liability for the damage and further disputes the authenticity of a contract relied upon by the respondent to justify the deduction. The Respondent submits that the complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 was lodged outside the statutory time limit and is therefore out of time. In the alternative, the respondent contends that the deduction was lawful, arising from damage caused to the respondent's vehicle and made pursuant to a contractual deduction clause contained in the complainant's terms and conditions of employment. The Respondent further submits that the matter is res judicata, contending that a previous WRC decision had already considered the complainant's written statement of employment, including the contractual deduction clause upon which the respondent now relies. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant states that he resigned from his position as a truck driver on 23 May 2025. He asserts that, following his resignation, the respondent informed him that he was liable for alleged damages exceeding €7,000 and subsequently withheld his wages, valued at €5,000, to offset those alleged losses. The complainant contends that no provision for such deductions had previously been discussed or communicated to him. He further alleges that a contract of employment later produced by the respondent, which included a clause permitting deductions for damage or losses, was fabricated and that his signature on the document was forged. The complainant has submitted the invoice for the alleged damages and the disputed contract in support of his claim |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent submits that the complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 is out of time and should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Complainant's employment commenced on 24 April 2025 and ended on 23 May 2025. The complaint was received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 14 December 2025, more than six months after the date of the alleged contravention. The Respondent submits that the statutory time limit expired on 23 November 2025. In support of this preliminary objection, the Respondent relies on the principles set out in Cementation Skanska v Carroll (DWT0338), which established that a complainant seeking an extension of time must provide reasons that both explain and excuse the delay. The Respondent also relies on Patrick Murphy v Coca-Cola HBC Ireland Limited t/a Coca-Cola (ADJ-00034007), Leon Kinsella v Anson Friend (DWT209), and A Driver v A Fuel Provider (ADJ-00026250), in which illness or personal circumstances were found insufficient where they did not adequately account for the delay in presenting a complaint. The Respondent further submits that the Complainant had previously engaged with the WRC process by lodging a claim under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 on 4 June 2025 and had consulted a solicitor in relation to employment matters. Evidence given by the Complainant at a previous WRC hearing on 5 December 2025 indicated that legal advice had also been obtained in relation to the present Payment of Wages complaint. The Respondent contends that the Complainant was therefore aware of both the alleged deduction and the WRC process but failed to lodge the present complaint within the statutory timeframe. The Respondent also relies on Iarnród Éireann v Stephen Lynch (UDD1825) and submits that no mistaken belief regarding the filing of the complaint can arise in this case, particularly as the Complainant had previously submitted a separate complaint without nominating legal representation. Accordingly, the Respondent submits that, unless reasonable cause is established, the complaint is statute-barred and must fail. Without prejudice to the jurisdictional objection, the Respondent submits that the deduction complained of was lawful under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 and was expressly authorised by the terms of the Complainant's written statement of employment, specifically Clause 10. The Respondent contends that the deduction of €4,405.44 related to considerable damage caused to the Respondent's lorry and trailer during the course of employment. It is submitted that the relevant contractual provision authorised deductions arising from excessive damage to property and negligence, and that the deduction was made in accordance with the requirements of the Payment of Wages Act 1991. The Respondent relies on the written statement previously considered in proceedings under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, together with supporting documentation including an invoice detailing the repairs undertaken and the amount deducted. It is submitted that, even after the deduction, an outstanding balance remained due to the Respondent. The Respondent further notes that the Complainant resigned by text message on 23 May 2025. Finally, the Respondent submits that a previous WRC decision has already considered the written statement of employment and confirmed the existence of the contractual deduction clause. The Respondent argues that the present complaint is therefore without merit and that the deduction was contractually authorised and lawfully applied. For these reasons, the Respondent submits that the complaint should be dismissed, both on jurisdictional grounds and, alternatively, on its substantive merits. |
Findings and Conclusions:
There are a number of issues raised by the Respondent in this matter. The most important matter is the objection on time limits and it necessary that I deal with this before considering any of the other issues raised and the substantive complaint. Time Limits The Complainant identifies 25 May 2025 as the date on which the alleged unlawful deduction from wages occurred. The Complaint was received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 14 December 2025. This is approximately six months and nineteen days after the date of the alleged contravention and therefore falls outside the six-month time limit provided for by section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Accordingly, before the substantive complaint can be considered, it will be necessary to determine whether the complaint was presented within time or whether an extension of time under section 41(8) of the 2015 Act is sought and can be justified on the basis of reasonable cause for the delay. Reasonable Cause Offered The case law on the matter of time limits has been well rehearsed by the Respondent and at their core is if the Complainant can adequately explain and excuse their delay in referring their case. The Complainant offered and explanation and excuse for his delay on two factors. The first being the professional legal advice he had sought previously and secondly that he had been informed by the Commission as to his complaint under this heading could be considered under a separate complaint. The established test for deciding if an extension of time should be granted for reasonable cause is set out in the Labour Court determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska v Carroll. The Complainant has made their complaint outside the required statutory six-month period and there are a multitude of authorities on this matter, some of which are outlined by the Respondent in their submissions. The Complainant has not provided any adequate explanation or excuse for his delay to amount to reasonable cause for his failure to make the claim within this period. Conclusion The complaint was presented outside the six-month statutory time limit. I have considered whether the period should be extended pursuant to the relevant statutory provision. Applying the test set out by the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska v Carroll, I am not satisfied that the complainant has established reasonable cause for the delay. The explanation advanced does not adequately explain the failure to present the complaint within time, nor does it establish the requisite causal connection between the matters relied upon and the delay. Accordingly, I find that the complaint is out of time and I have no jurisdiction to inquire into its substantive merits. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
I find that this complaint was not presented within the time limit prescribed by the Act. As the statutory requirements for an extension of time have not been met, I have no jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint. Accordingly, the complaint fails. |
Dated: 17/09/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Dónal Moore, BL
Key Words:
Payment of Wages Act 1991 Time Limits, Reasonable Cause, Jurisdiction, Statute-Barred |
