Complainant

Respondent

Parties

John  Egan

Rathfarnham Golf Club

Representatives

Self-Represented

Alan Doyle

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act 1973

CA-00079478-001

13/01/2026

The complaint relates to an alleged contravention of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973. The Complainant resigned from his employment with immediate effect on 11 April 2025. The complaint was referred to the WRC on 13 January 2026. The Respondent submitted that the complaint is statute-barred, having been presented to the WRC outside the six-month time limit prescribed by section 41(6) of the 2015 Act.

The Complainant confirmed that he commenced employment with the Respondent on 16 April 1992. He tendered his resignation and his employment ended with immediate effect on 11 April 2025.

The complaint form was received by the WRC on 13 January 2026. The Complainant accepted that this was outside the applicable six-month statutory time limit and sought an extension of time.

The Complainant stated that, when he resigned from the Respondent, he had intended to take a break from employment. However, during the week in which he resigned, he was offered employment with another golf club and commenced that employment on or around 23 April 2025.

He stated that, while working for the Respondent, he had responsibility for seven members of staff, whereas in his new employment he had only two members of staff. He consequently worked very substantial hours in his new role, although he was enjoying the employment.

The Complainant initially stated that he had attempted to submit a complaint to the WRC approximately two months after his employment ended. When questioned, he was unable to recall the date of that attempt and confirmed that he had no documentary evidence of it.

In the course of his further evidence, however, the Complainant referred to an email which he received from the WRC on 2 September 2025. He stated that the email advised him that a WRC complaint form which he had commenced had been saved as a draft and that the draft would remain available for 30 days. The Complainant stated that, because of the demands of his new employment, he did not return to complete the complaint form during that 30-day period. He subsequently attempted to access the draft but found that it was no longer available.

When questioned, the Complainant described himself as having been “locked out” but clarified that he had not been locked out of the WRC system itself but rather the draft complaint which he had previously commenced was no longer available.

The Complainant further acknowledged that he had not read the email of 2 September 2025 in full. He stated that he had scrolled through the beginning of the email but had not appreciated that the saved draft would expire after 30 days.

The Complainant said that he did not get an opportunity to recommence and complete the complaint form until January 2026. He stated that he waited until he had what he considered sufficient time to sit down and properly complete the form.

He acknowledged that the complaint ultimately submitted on 13 January 2026 was outside the six-month statutory time limit.

The Respondent submitted that the complaint was presented outside the statutory limitation period and that the WRC therefore has no jurisdiction to investigate the substantive complaint unless the Complainant establishes reasonable cause justifying an extension of time.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant had failed to satisfy that test.

The Respondent’s representative relied in particular upon the Complainant’s own evidence that he had commenced completing a WRC complaint form during the statutory period and had received an email from the WRC on 2 September 2025 advising him that the form had been saved as a draft and would remain available for 30 days.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant accepted that he had not read that correspondence fully and therefore failed to appreciate the significance of the 30-day period.

It was further submitted that while the Complainant relied on the demands of his new employment as an explanation for the delay, it was his own choice not to prioritise completion of the WRC complaint form. The Respondent emphasised that the Complainant ultimately waited until January 2026, when he considered that he had sufficient time available, before submitting his complaint.

The Respondent submitted that neither a demanding workload nor a failure to read correspondence from the WRC constituted reasonable cause for failing to comply with a statutory limitation period.

The Respondent accordingly submitted that the Complainant had not demonstrated reasonable cause for the delay and that the complaint could not be entertained, having been referred outside the statutory time limit.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the parties, the oral evidence adduced at the hearing summarised above and the oral and written submissions made by and on behalf of the parties at the hearing.

Preliminary Decision

In Brothers of Charity (Roscommon) Ltd. v. Marian Keigher (EDA1014), the Labour Court considered the determination of an issue by way of preliminary decision. The Labour Court referred to the judgments of Kenny J. in Tara Explorations and Development Co. Ltd v. Minister for Industry and Commerce [1975] IR 242 and Hardiman J. in B.T.F. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 367. In the latter case Hardiman J. found:

"It is often a difficult and delicate decision as to whether to try a particular issue as a preliminary matter. In a case where a point is raised which in and of itself and without regard to anything else may terminate the whole proceedings, clearly a strong case can be made for its trial as a preliminary issue. The classic example is where the Statute of Limitations is pleaded."

In Donegal Meat Processors v. Donal Gillespie t/a Foyle Donegal (UDD2114), the Labour Court noted that seeking to have the substantive issue and the jurisdictional issue dealt with together was:

"akin to asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction before it determines whether or not it has jurisdiction in the first instance. […] Only if the court determines that it has jurisdiction to do so can it go on to consider the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal itself".

Following the case law outlined above, I find that there is a "strong case" for determining the time-limit issue by way of preliminary decision.

Preliminary Issue: Time Limits

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 16 April 1992. It is not in dispute that he resigned from his employment with immediate effect and that his employment ended on 11 April 2025. The complaint was received by the WRC on 13 January 2026.

It is accepted that the complaint was referred to the WRC outside the statutory six-month time limit. The issue I must determine is whether the Complainant has established reasonable cause for an extension of time pursuant to section 41(8) of the 2015 Act.

The relevant statutory time limits are contained in section 41 of the 2015 Act.

Section 41(6) of the 2015 Act provides, insofar as relevant:

"Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates."

Section 41(8) of the 2015 Act provides:

"An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause."

The well-established test for granting an extension of time for reasonable cause is set out in the Labour Court decision of Cementation Skanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v. Carroll (DWT0338), wherein the Court held:

"It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant's failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time."

In O'Donnell v. Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] 1 ILRM 301 at 315, Costello J. in the High Court construed the term "good reasons" as follows:

"The phrase 'good reasons' is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under O. 84 r. 21 is on the plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay."

The test is therefore an objective one. The onus rests on the Complainant to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon both explains the delay and affords a justifiable excuse for it. Crucially, there must be a causal link between the circumstances relied upon and the failure to present the complaint within time.

I have considered the evidence and submissions of both parties.

The Complainant stated that, when he resigned from his employment with the Respondent, he had intended to take a break from work. However, he was offered employment with another golf club during the week in which he resigned and commenced that employment on or around 23 April 2025.

The Complainant's evidence was that his new employment was extremely demanding. He stated that, whereas he had seven members of staff while employed by the Respondent, he had only two members of staff in his new employment and consequently worked very substantial hours.

I accept the Complainant's evidence that his new employment involved a significant workload and that he was working considerable hours. However, a heavy workload does not, of itself, establish reasonable cause. The issue is whether those circumstances both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for it.

Of particular significance is the Complainant's evidence concerning the steps he took during the six-month period.

The Complainant initially stated that he had attempted to submit a complaint to the WRC approximately two months after his employment ended. When questioned, he was unable to recall when this occurred and confirmed that he had no evidence of such an attempt.

However, it subsequently emerged from his evidence that he had commenced completing a complaint form and that, on 2 September 2025, he received an email from the WRC advising him that the form had been saved as a draft and would remain available for 30 days.

Accordingly, by 2 September 2025, the Complainant was aware of the WRC complaints process and had taken steps to initiate a complaint within the statutory period.

The Complainant accepted that he did not complete the complaint during the following 30-day period. He further accepted that he did not read the email of 2 September 2025 in full. His evidence was that he had only scrolled through the beginning of the email and therefore did not appreciate that the draft would cease to be available after 30 days.

When he subsequently attempted to access the draft, it was no longer available.

The Complainant initially described himself as having been "locked out". However, when questioned further, he clarified that he had not been locked out of the WRC system. Rather, it was the particular draft complaint which was no longer available; he remained able to access the WRC system.

I am therefore satisfied that the expiry of the draft did not prevent the Complainant from presenting a complaint to the WRC. He remained able to access the complaint system and could have commenced and submitted a fresh complaint form.

I am also not satisfied that the Complainant's failure to read the email of 2 September 2025 in full constitutes reasonable cause. The information concerning the 30-day lifespan of the draft was communicated to him by the WRC. His failure to acquaint himself fully with the contents of that correspondence does not amount to a circumstance which prevented the complaint from being presented within time.

The Complainant's evidence concerning the period thereafter was that, because of the demands of his employment, he did not have an opportunity to recommence the complaint form until January 2026. He stated that he waited until he knew he would have sufficient time to sit down and complete the form properly.

I accept that the Complainant was busy and that completing a complaint form may have had to compete with significant demands upon his time. However, the evidence does not establish that those demands prevented him from submitting a complaint. His evidence was, rather, that he deferred doing so until he considered that he had sufficient time to complete the process.

There is a material distinction between circumstances which explain a delay and circumstances which afford a justifiable excuse for that delay. In this case, the Complainant had accessed the WRC complaint process and commenced a complaint form within the statutory period. Although that draft subsequently expired, he remained able to access the WRC system and to commence a fresh complaint.

While I accept that the demands of the Complainant's new employment provide an explanation for why he did not prioritise completion of the complaint, I am not satisfied that they afford a justifiable excuse for the delay or, either alone or together with his failure to read the WRC correspondence in full and the expiry of the draft, establish the necessary causal link required by the test in Cementation Skanska.

In particular, the evidence establishes that the Complainant was in a position to pursue his complaint within the statutory period but chose to defer completion until he considered that he had sufficient time to do so.

I am therefore not satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the Complainant’s failure to refer the complaint within the statutory six-month period was due to the circumstances relied upon within the meaning of section 41(8) of the 2015 Act. Those circumstances do not, either individually or cumulatively, satisfy the statutory test of reasonable cause.

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant has not established reasonable cause for the purposes of section 41(8) of the 2015 Act.

I therefore find that I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into the substantive complaint under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973.

For the reasons set out above, I find that the complaint was submitted to the WRC outside the six-month time limit prescribed by section 41(6) of the 2015 Act and that the Complainant has not established reasonable cause for extending that period pursuant to section 41(8) of the 2015 Act. The complaint cannot therefore be entertained.