Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Warren  Boles

Aldi Stores (Ireland) Limited

Representatives

Self-Represented

Ms Lorna Lynch SC instructed by Mr Walter Beatty Flynn O’Driscoll LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00077904-002

24/11/2025

The Complainant is employed by the Respondent at its warehouse facility in Mitchelstown, County Cork. He commenced employment with the Respondent in 2017 and subsequently became a Deputy Section Leader within the Goods In function.

The Respondent operates a warehouse business on a seven-day basis. The Complainant's contract of employment provided for a specified number of weekly working hours and contained no provision limiting his working pattern to Monday to Friday. Supplementary agreements issued during the course of his employment amended his weekly contracted hours and remuneration arrangements from time to time.

The complaint before me arises from organisational changes within the warehouse operation, including the integration of the Recall function into the Inventory Control Team ("ICT"). Following those changes, the Respondent required Deputy Section Leaders within the ICT structure to participate in weekend rostering arrangements.

The Complainant contends that this represented a change to his terms and conditions of employment and that he should have received written notification pursuant to section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994. The Respondent disputes that contention and submits that no change occurred in any of the particulars required to be furnished under the Act.

The Complainant submitted that, notwithstanding the wording of his contract of employment, he had worked a predominantly Monday to Friday pattern for a prolonged period. He maintained that this arrangement had become established through custom and practice and formed part of his terms and conditions of employment. The Complainant contended that the Respondent's decision to require participation in weekend working represented a fundamental alteration to his established working arrangements. He submitted that this amounted to a change to a core term of his employment.

The Complainant accepted that his written contract did not expressly provide for Monday to Friday working. However, he argued that employment relationships evolve over time and that longstanding arrangements may become part of an employee's terms and conditions through custom and practice. The Complainant maintained that because the Respondent altered what he regarded as an established term of his employment, it was obliged to provide him with written notification of that change pursuant to section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.

During the hearing, the Complainant submitted that his complaint was based upon the practical reality of how he had worked over a number of years rather than solely upon the wording of the original contract documentation.

The Respondent submitted that the complaint was fundamentally misconceived and arose from a misunderstanding of the purpose and scope of section 5 of the 1994 Act.

The Respondent stated that it had complied fully with its statutory obligations by providing the Complainant with written statements of his terms and conditions of employment. Those statements specified his weekly hours of work and other statutory particulars required by the legislation.

It was submitted that the warehouse has always operated on a seven-day basis and that neither the Complainant's contract of employment nor any subsequent contractual documentation restricted his working pattern to Monday to Friday.

The Respondent contended that section 5 of the Act is only engaged where there is a change in one of the particulars contained in the written statement furnished under sections 3, 4 or 6 of the Act. It was submitted that there had been no such change.

The Respondent further argued that even if the Complainant were correct in asserting the existence of an implied contractual term arising from custom and practice, such a matter falls outside the scope of section 5. The legislation concerns changes to the statutory particulars which an employer is required to furnish in writing and does not operate as a mechanism for determining disputes concerning alleged implied contractual terms.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant's weekly hours remained unchanged and that no amendment had been made to any of the particulars contained within his written statements of employment. Accordingly, it argued that section 5 had no application to the circumstances complained of.

The complaint before me concerns section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994. Section 5 states:

Notification of changes

(1) Subject to subsection (2), whenever a change is made or occurs in any of the particulars of the statement furnished by an employer under section 3, 4 or 6, the employer shall notify the employee in writing of the nature and date of the change as soon as may be thereafter, but not later than—

(a) the day on which the change takes effect, or]

(b) where the change is consequent on the employee being required to work outside the State for a period of more than 1 month, the time of the employee's departure.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in relation to a change occurring in provisions of statutes or instruments made under statute [other than a registered employment agreement or employment regulation order] or of any other laws or of any administrative provisions or collective agreements referred to in the statement given under section 3 or 4.

Section 5(1) provides that where a change is made in any of the particulars contained in a statement furnished under sections 3, 4 or 6 of the Act, the employer shall notify the employee in writing of the nature and date of that change. The issue for determination is therefore a narrow one. It is not whether the Complainant had the benefit of an implied contractual term arising from custom and practice. Nor is it whether the Respondent was entitled to alter rostering arrangements. Those issues fall outside the scope of the complaint before me. The question which must be addressed is whether there was a change in any of the statutory particulars contained in the written statement furnished to the Complainant and, if so, whether the Respondent failed to notify him of that change in writing.

The Complainant accepted during the hearing that his written contract did not provide for a Monday to Friday working pattern. The contractual documentation furnished by the Respondent specifies weekly hours of work but does not limit those hours to particular days of the week. Indeed, the documentation was issued within the context of a warehouse operation that functions on a seven-day basis.

The essence of the Complainant's case is that, through custom and practice, he acquired a term entitling him to work predominantly Monday to Friday and that the Respondent subsequently altered that arrangement. Even if I were to assume, for the sake of argument, that such an implied term existed, that would not establish a contravention of section 5 of the 1994 Act.

Section 5 is concerned with changes to the particulars which an employer is required to furnish in writing under the legislation. It is not a vehicle through which disputes concerning implied contractual terms, custom and practice, or alleged unilateral changes to contractual arrangements are to be determined.

The Complainant was unable to identify any particular contained within his written statement of employment which had changed. His weekly hours remained unchanged. His rate of pay remained unchanged. No amendment was made to any of the statutory particulars contained within the documentation furnished to him.

In substance, the Complainant seeks to use section 5 of the Act to litigate a broader dispute concerning rostering arrangements and an alleged custom and practice. While that dispute may be capable of consideration in another forum, it does not give rise to a complaint under section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.

I am therefore satisfied that the complaint is not well founded. The circumstances relied upon by the Complainant do not fall within the scope of section 5 of the Act and no breach of the statutory obligation has been established.

CA-00077904-002: For the reasons outlined above I find that the complaint was not well founded.

Section 5 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.