Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Jamie  Powell

Eamonn Gray Fingal Steel Limited

Representatives

Self-Represented

Eamonn Gray

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

CA-00077322-001

08/11/2025

The Complainant contended that he was verbally dismissed by his manager on 28 October 2025. The Respondent denied that any dismissal occurred and maintained that the Complainant was sent home pending a disciplinary process.

The Complainant was subsequently invited to a disciplinary meeting on 6 November 2025, which he did not attend. He referred his complaint under the 1977 Act to the WRC on 8 November 2025.

The fact of dismissal is therefore in dispute and must be determined before any issue as to the fairness of the alleged dismissal arises.

The Complainant submitted that his employment was terminated by the Respondent on 28 October 2025.

The Complainant stated that he commenced work at 8.00 a.m. on that date and that at approximately 3.00 p.m. he went to use the bathroom. He said that while he was standing outside the bathroom, his manager approached him, cornered him and shouted at him. The Complainant described the interaction as intimidating and stated that the manager roared at him to “F off out of the factory before he would do something he would regret”. He also stated that the manager told him that he was “done”.

The Complainant accepted that the manager did not expressly use the words “dismissed” or “dismissal”. However, he maintained that, having regard to what was said to him and the manner in which it was said, he understood that he had been verbally dismissed. He said that he was intimidated by the manager, that he was told to leave and that he therefore left the workplace without answering back.

The Complainant stated that nothing of significance had occurred earlier that day that could explain the manager’s reaction. He acknowledged that the Respondent’s position was that he had been using his mobile phone while outside the bathroom.

The Complainant also relied on the fact that he had been removed from a WhatsApp group. He accepted, however, that this was a group used principally by colleagues for social purposes outside work and that it was not an official Respondent communication channel.

The Complainant received a letter at his home on 31 October 2025 inviting him to attend a disciplinary meeting on 6 November 2025. He did not attend that meeting. He stated that on 31 October 2025 he emailed the Respondent’s Managing Director explaining that he felt intimidated by his manager and asking that the meeting take place on neutral ground or in a solicitor’s office. He stated that he did not receive a response to that request.

The Complainant also alleged that his manager had regularly shouted at him during his employment. He accepted that he had not previously raised a formal or informal grievance or complaint concerning that alleged behaviour.

He stated that he commenced seeking alternative employment after receiving the disciplinary correspondence.

The Respondent denied that the Complainant was dismissed on 28 October 2025 or at any subsequent time.

The Managing Director gave evidence that he was in the yard outside the workshop when he observed the Complainant and his manager speaking. He was approximately 30 to 40 feet away. He did not hear any screaming or shouting and observed the Complainant subsequently leave the premises.

The Managing Director stated that he asked the manager what had occurred and was informed that the Complainant had been using his mobile phone for the third time that day and had been sent home because the manager considered the use of the phone in the work environment to present a safety concern.

The Managing Director said that, having been informed of the incident, he decided that the matter should be addressed through the Respondent’s disciplinary process. He therefore wrote to the Complainant inviting him to attend a disciplinary meeting on 6 November 2025.

The Managing Director maintained that he did not dismiss the Complainant, did not tell the Complainant that he was dismissed and had no intention at that stage of dismissing him. He stated that he was the person within the Respondent who had authority to dismiss an employee and that the manager did not have such authority.

The Managing Director accepted that he received the Complainant’s email requesting that the disciplinary meeting take place at a solicitor’s office or another neutral location. He did not consider that request appropriate. He stated that the meeting was to be conducted by him, that no allegation of intimidation had ever been made against him and that he would not have permitted the Complainant to be intimidated during the disciplinary process.

The Respondent also disputed the significance of the Complainant’s removal from the WhatsApp group, describing it as a social group which was unrelated to the formal operation of the workplace.

In relation to the allegation that the manager regularly shouted at the Complainant, the Managing Director stated that this had never been raised with him, either formally or informally, during the Complainant’s employment. He said that the manager had worked as a foreman for approximately 20 years and that he had not previously encountered such an allegation.

The Managing Director stated that when the Complainant failed to attend the disciplinary meeting on 6 November 2025, he did not know how the Complainant intended to proceed. The Complainant subsequently referred his complaint to the WRC on 8 November 2025. The Respondent’s position was that the Complainant was not dismissed and that he remained on the payroll until December 2025.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the parties, the oral evidence adduced at the hearing summarised above and the oral and written submissions made by and on behalf of the parties at the hearing.

The first matter I must determine is whether a dismissal within the meaning of the 1977 Act occurred. The existence of a dismissal is a jurisdictional precondition to the consideration of a complaint under the Act. Where the fact of dismissal is in dispute, the burden rests on the Complainant to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that his employment was terminated by the Respondent.

Section 1 of the 1977 Act defines “dismissal”, insofar as relevant, as:

“the termination by his employer of the employee’s contract of employment with the employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employee”.

There is a direct conflict in the evidence as to what occurred between the Complainant and his manager on 28 October 2025. It is common case that an interaction occurred following which the Complainant left the workplace. The Complainant maintains that he was told that he was “done” and was ordered to leave the factory and that he understood this to mean that he had been dismissed. The Respondent maintains that he was sent home following concerns regarding his use of a mobile phone and that no dismissal took place.

The Complainant accepted that the manager did not expressly tell him that he was dismissed. He nonetheless maintained that he was told that he was “done” and was ordered to leave the factory. I accept that the words attributed to the manager, together with the manner in which the Complainant says they were delivered, may have led him to form an immediate impression that his employment had been terminated. However, that immediate impression was based on his own interpretation of the exchange and is not determinative of whether a dismissal in fact occurred on 28 October 2025. The question is whether, viewed objectively and having regard to all of the surrounding circumstances, the Respondent terminated his employment. In determining that question, regard must be had to the events which followed the exchange.

Of particular significance is the Respondent’s letter of 31 October 2025 inviting the Complainant to attend a disciplinary meeting on 6 November 2025. In my view, that correspondence is inconsistent with the proposition that the Respondent had already terminated the Complainant’s employment on 28 October 2025. Rather, it demonstrates that the Respondent continued to regard the employment relationship as subsisting and intended to address the incident of 28 October 2025 through its disciplinary process. The Complainant received and responded to that correspondence, requesting that the disciplinary meeting take place at an alternative location. On the evidence before me, there is no indication that in his response of 31 October 2025 he asserted that he had already been dismissed on 28 October 2025 or informed the Respondent that he regarded his employment as having terminated on that date. Rather, his response, as described in his evidence and submissions, concerned his objection to attending the meeting at the Respondent’s premises and his request that it take place at a neutral venue or a solicitor’s office. This is also relevant when considering his evidence that he understood, on 28 October 2025, that his employment had already been terminated.

I also note the Managing Director’s evidence that he was the person with authority to dismiss employees on behalf of the Respondent and that he neither dismissed the Complainant nor authorised his dismissal. I consider that evidence to be consistent with the Respondent’s subsequent conduct in inviting the Complainant to a disciplinary meeting.

I do not consider the Complainant’s removal from the WhatsApp group to establish that a dismissal occurred. The Complainant accepted that the group was social in nature and was not an official means by which the Respondent communicated employment decisions.

Similarly, the Complainant’s allegation that his manager had regularly shouted at him does not determine whether a dismissal occurred on 28 October 2025. I note that no complaint or grievance concerning such alleged behaviour had previously been made.

Taking the evidence as a whole, I find that the Complainant was directed to leave the workplace on 28 October 2025. I am satisfied, having regard in particular to the Respondent’s subsequent conduct and the disciplinary correspondence of 31 October 2025, that the direction to leave the workplace did not amount to a termination of the employment relationship and that the incident was thereafter to be addressed through the Respondent’s disciplinary process.

In those circumstances, I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Complainant’s contract of employment was terminated by the Respondent on 28 October 2025.

I therefore find that the Complainant has not established that he was dismissed within the meaning of section 1 of the 1977 Act. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to consider the substantive fairness or otherwise of the alleged dismissal and the complaint is not well-founded.

For the reasons set out above, I decide that no dismissal took place within the meaning of the 1977 Act. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate on the substantive unfair dismissal complaint and the complaint is not well-founded.