ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00061407
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Joseph Lynch | Dublin City Council |
Representatives |
| David Colgan BL instructed by Bradley of Dublin City Council |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 | CA-00074153-001 | 07/08/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 23/06/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: David James Murphy
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 25 of the Equal Status Act, 2000 the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
At the outset of the hearing it was noted that there was an error in the Respondent’s name as provided on the Complainant’s complaint form. The parties agreed that it should be changed to Dublin City Council.
Background:
The Complainant has been a tenant of Dublin City Council for over ten years. He lives in a terraced cottage. Six years ago the Complainant suffered a serious injury which resulted in a permanent mobility disability. At the time his cottage had an accessible shower room which DCC saw as the only necessary adaptation.
In May 2024 the Complainant submitted an HMD Form 1 to DCC applying to be given priority for allocation of a new home that would be suitable to his needs. His application was supported by an occupational therapist who noted that his accommodation was impacting negatively on his medical condition and disability and that the Complainant’s movement within the accommodation was restricted. The house is small and the Complainant cannot store his mobility scooter on the street.
DCC refused this application and the Complainant appealed to the Chief Medical Officer (“CMO”) in December 2024. The CMO issued their decision in May 2025 was that the Complainant was relatively suitably accommodated and did not recommend he be given priority for rehousing. This may not have been communicated to the Complainant until early June.
The Complainant submitted an EE1 form challenging this decision on the 30th of June 2025. The EE1 set out that DCC was discriminating against him and failing to provide him with reasonable accommodation. He set out that the grounds of discrimination are disability and housing assistance. The allegation outlined in the EE1 centered on the decision of the CMO to refuse his appeal without making any home inspection and for DCC generally failing to accept that he should be rehomed.
A WRC Complaint form was lodged on the 7th of August 2025 referencing the EE1 and selecting the following tick box statements: I say the respondent treated me unlawfully by discriminating against me in Provision of goods/services, I say the respondent treated me unlawfully by discriminating against me in Provision of Accommodation I say the respondent treated me unlawfully by discriminating against me in Failing to give me 'reasonable accommodation' for a disability, I say the respondent treated me unlawfully by Direct Discrimination, I say the respondent treated me unlawfully by Indirect Discrimination,
The complaint form referenced the above mentioned EE1. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant attended the hearing and gave evidence under oath. He was supported by Ms. Nikita Lynch his sister. The Complainant believes he has been discriminated against by the Respondent on the grounds of disability. He has not had reasonable accommodations made for his disability and lives in a house that is unsuitable for his needs. DCC have failed to properly engage with this and the reports of the Council in this matter were unfair and referred to his home being cluttered. The Complainant’s evidence was that his home is not cluttered but instead he had been confined to certain parts of the cottage and he has property and medical equipment which is necessary and in regular use around those parts. He applied to DCC to be given preference for housing that would be suitable for his needs but DCC assessed the house as meeting his needs. He appealed the decision to the Chief Medical Officer who carried out a desktop review and did not attend his home. Their conclusion was that he was relatively suitably accommodated. This was directly opposed to the views of the medical professionals treating the Complainant. In addition the Complainant submits he is being harassed by a neighbouring resident who is submitting complaints against him. DCC is facilitating this harassment by referring the complaints to him. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent’s barrister Mr Colgan made oral and written submissions on behalf of the Respondent. The Respondent denies discriminating against the Complainant. His case for priority housing was considered in line with DCC’s internal policies and procedures. That the Complainant is unhappy with the outcome is in no way discriminatory. Mr Colm Gallagher gave evidence under affirmation. He is an engineer with DCC who provided evidence on the works the Complainant has requested. Many of the requested changes would not be feasible. A number of specific works are feasible but would be costly. Ms Sandra Barry Flood gave evidence under oath. She is an allocations officer for DCC. As per the process adopted by the elected councillors housing applicants are placed in band. Band 1 is the priority band which includes people with specific medical or welfare grounds for priority. Band 2 includes people housed in overcrowded housing. Band 3 is everyone else. Allocation is quite limited for people with disabilities, in particular one bedroom accommodation. |
Findings and Conclusions:
The Scope of the Complaint Section 21 of the Equal Status Acts (“ESA”) sets out the process by which the WRC can consider a complaint under the ESA. This section requires the Complainant to first write to the Respondent and outline the nature of their allegation. The Complainant did this in their EE1 form dated the 30th of June 2025. However, this means that the scope of the complaint I can deal with is the allegation set out in that form. I note that the same section 21 provides that the above requirement can be waived exceptionally however I see no exceptional circumstances which would justify me doing so. As such in dealing with the Complainant’s complaint I am only addressing the allegation as set out in the EE1 referred to in the complaint form, that the decision of the CMO to refuse his appeal was discriminatory in the provision of accommodation on the grounds of disability and that it constituted a failure to provide reasonable accommodation. The other allegations referred to by the Complainant in the hearing and his submissions are outside the scope of this process. I note that the complaint form and EE1 also refer to general complaints of discrimination in the provision of goods and services generally, both indirectly and directly. The Complainant has also listed housing assistance payment as a ground of discrimination. However, the Complainant hasn’t identified any actual allegation in his EE1 detailing these complaints. The Law Section 6c of the ESA provides that A person shall not discriminate in providing accommodation or any services or amenities related to accommodation or ceasing to provide accommodation or any such services or amenities. Section 6.1A sets out that this is without prejudice to any enactment or rule of law regulating the provision of accommodation. The Respondent has not made any submissions on whether the CMO appeals process had a statutory basis and I note the forms reference a scheme and not by-laws, in the circumstances I do not think this exemption applies. Section 3 of the ESA prohibits discrimination which is defined as: where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’… Section 3(2) sets out the discriminatory grounds and provides that: As between any two persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are: ….(g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (the “disability ground”), Section 4 of the ESA expands the prohibited discrimination on ground of disability to include: a refusal or failure by the provider of a service to do all that is reasonable to accommodate the needs of a person with a disability by providing special treatment or facilities, if without such special treatment or facilities it would be impossible or unduly difficult for the person to avail himself or herself of the service. Section 4(2) limits the Respondent’s obligations in stating that: A refusal or failure to provide the special treatment or facilities to which subsection (1) refers shall not be deemed reasonable unless such provision would give rise to a cost, other than a nominal cost, to the provider of the service in question. Conclusions The Complainant alleges that the decision-making process to deny his application for priority was discriminatory. I do not see how this is the case and the Complainant has not explained how he believes might have been treated differently in this process if he wasn’t disabled or had a different disability. The Complainant also alleges that the Respondent has discriminated against him by failing to provide reasonable accommodation. He has set out clearly that his home is unsuitable and that the Respondent should reasonably accommodate him by providing a different more suitable home. The Respondent disputes this and stands over their decision that, in all the circumstances, the Complainant is relatively suitably accommodated. As outlined at 4(2) of the ESA above, even if I was to agree with the Complainant and disagree with the Respondent’s assessment, I cannot find that it constitutes a failure to provide reasonable accommodation as rehousing the Complainant would give rise to a cost which is not a nominal cost. |
Decision:
Section 25 of the Equal Status Acts, 2000 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 27 of that Act.
I find that the complaint is not well founded. |
Dated: 03 September 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: David James Murphy
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