Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Vanessa Maria  Corral Fernandez

Sheridan’s Cheesemongers Limited

Representatives

Self-Represented

Kevin Sheridan

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act 2000

CA-00073124-001

04/07/2025

The complaint arises from an incident on 6 June 2025 at the Respondent’s retail concession.

The Complainant, who is vegetarian, approached a food-sampling display after observing signage referring to hummus, pesto and olives. She took a sample from the display and, before consuming it, was informed by a member of staff that the sample was pâté.

The Complainant subsequently complained about the signage and the response she received from staff. She contends that the incident constituted direct discrimination on the religion ground.

The Respondent denies that any discrimination occurred.

The Complainant stated that she approached the Respondent’s tasting display because she had seen signage referring to hummus, pesto and olives. She took a sample and was informed by a staff member, before consuming it, that it was pâté.

She stated that she is vegetarian and considered that the signage deprived her of the opportunity to make an informed choice about the food being offered. She maintained that the signage should have accurately reflected the samples available.

At the hearing, the Complainant sought to connect her vegetarianism with her spiritual beliefs. She stated that her spiritual beliefs are aligned with Hinduism and that vegetarianism was the basis of her complaint.

The Complainant accepted that she did not consume the pâté. She stated, however, that the thought that she might have consumed meat caused her to feel sick to her stomach.

When asked to identify the unlawful treatment which she said occurred because of her religion, the Complainant referred to the absence of an informed choice arising from the signage. Her position was that the sign should have accurately reflected the product being offered and that the Respondent should have taken reasonable steps to enable a vegetarian customer to make an informed choice.

The Respondent denied that the Complainant was subjected to discrimination on the religion ground.

It stated that the relevant tasting board contained samples of pâté served on crackers and that containers of pâté were positioned beside the tasting area. The signage referring to hummus, pesto and olives related to a separate promotional offer and was not intended to describe the pâté samples.

The Respondent stated that a member of staff intervened before the Complainant consumed the sample and expressly informed her that it was pâté. It further stated that it was only thereafter that the Complainant informed staff that she was vegetarian.

The Respondent submitted that the display was available to customers generally and was not presented differently to the Complainant or to any other customer.

It further submitted that no member of staff knew or believed that the Complainant held any particular religious belief before the interaction, that no religious belief was attributed to her, and that no comparator has been identified.

The Respondent’s position was that the complaint concerned, at most, the clarity of promotional signage and the Complainant’s dissatisfaction with the manner in which her concerns were addressed. It submitted that neither matter constituted discrimination on the religion ground.

At the hearing, the Respondent’s Managing Director stated that he could not identify any evidence that the Complainant had been discriminated against because of religion. In questioning the Respondent, the Complainant principally raised matters concerning food-sampling requirements, signage and food regulation rather than treatment on the religion ground.

In making these findings I have considered the documentation submitted by the parties, the oral evidence adduced at the hearing and the oral and written submissions made by and on behalf of the parties.

Scope of the Complaint

During the hearing, clarification through questioning was required in order to identify the matters properly before me.

The Complainant’s complaint is one of direct discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the religion ground. While the religion ground was selected on the WRC complaint form, the factual narrative contained in that form focused on the Complainant’s vegetarianism, the presentation of the food samples and the signage associated with the display. No particular religion or religious belief was identified in the complaint form and it did not identify any connection between her vegetarianism and any religious or spiritual belief.

In written submissions emailed on 10 August 2026, shortly before the hearing, the Complainant stated that her vegetarianism was directly related to her spiritual beliefs and practices and referred to Hinduism. She maintained that position at the hearing, describing her spiritual beliefs as aligned with Hinduism.

However, a significant part of the Complainant’s evidence and submissions concerned the accuracy of the signage at the food-sampling display, the presentation of food samples and her contention that she had not been afforded an informed choice as to the food being offered. In questioning the Respondent, she also raised matters concerning food-sampling and food-regulation requirements.

The Complainant was afforded a number of opportunities to explain the particular treatment which she alleged amounted to direct discrimination on the religion ground. Her evidence principally concerned her vegetarianism, the signage associated with the display and her contention that she should have been provided with sufficient information to make an informed choice.

The jurisdiction conferred upon me under the Acts is not a general jurisdiction to determine compliance with food-labelling or food-sampling requirements or the adequacy of customer service. The complaint properly before me is whether the Complainant was subjected to direct discrimination in the provision of goods and services on the religion ground.

I therefore turn to consider whether the facts established are sufficient to raise a presumption of discrimination within the meaning of section 38A of the Acts.

Legal Framework and Burden of Proof

Section 3(1) of the Acts provides, in relevant part, that discrimination occurs where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on one of the statutory discriminatory grounds. Under section 3(2)(e) of the Acts, the religion ground arises where persons have different religious beliefs, or where one person has a religious belief and the other does not.

Section 5(1) of the Acts prohibits discrimination in the disposal of goods to the public or in the provision of services.

Section 38A of the Acts provides for the allocation of the burden of proof and requires the Complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which prohibited conduct, including discrimination, may be presumed. Only where such a prima facie case has been established does the burden shift to the Respondent to rebut that presumption.

In Pierce Parker v Office of the President and University Advocate and University of Limerick DEC-S2013-004, the Equality Officer confirmed that section 38A of the Acts is analogous to section 85A of the 1998 Act and that it is appropriate to have regard to Labour Court jurisprudence developed under that provision when applying the burden of proof. In that decision, reliance was placed on the Labour Court’s reasoning in Dyflen Publications Limited v Spasic (ADE/08/7), adopting the approach in Madarassy v Nomura International plc [2007] IRLR 246, that the primary facts relied upon by a complainant must be assessed in their proper factual context and in light of all of the evidence.

The Labour Court further clarified in Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters (ADE/09/16) that the complainant must establish primary facts on credible evidence which are of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination and that mere speculation or assertion, unsupported by evidence, cannot ground such an inference.

Accordingly, the issue at the first stage is whether the facts established, viewed cumulatively, objectively and in the context of the totality of the evidence, are sufficient to permit an inference that the treatment complained of occurred because of the Complainant’s religion or religious beliefs. Only if that threshold is met does the evidential burden shift to the Respondent, which must then rebut the prima facie case by cogent evidence.

Discrimination on the Religion Ground

At the hearing, the Complainant sought to associate her vegetarianism with Hinduism and stated that her spiritual beliefs were aligned with Hinduism. I accept that vegetarianism may, in particular circumstances, form part of a person’s religious or spiritual practice. That fact is not, however, sufficient of itself to establish discrimination under the Acts. The issue for determination is whether facts have been established from which it may be presumed that the Complainant was treated less favourably because of her religion or religious beliefs.

I am not satisfied that the Complainant has established facts from which such treatment could be inferred. In reaching that conclusion, I have regard in particular to the following matters.

The Complainant accepted that the Respondent’s employee informed her that the sample was pâté before she consumed it. She further accepted that she did not consume the sample.

There is no evidence that the Respondent knew, before the relevant interaction, that the Complainant held any particular religious or spiritual belief. There is no evidence that any religious belief was attributed to her. Indeed, the evidence was that she identified herself as vegetarian only after the member of staff had informed her that the sample was pâté.

There is also no evidence that the tasting display, the signage or the food samples were presented to the Complainant differently because of her religion or religious beliefs or differently from the manner in which they were presented to customers generally.

As set out above, when afforded opportunities to identify the treatment which she said constituted discrimination on the religion ground, the Complainant’s evidence remained focused on her vegetarianism, the accuracy of the signage and her contention that she had been deprived of the opportunity to make an informed choice about whether to take the sample.

The Complainant considered the signage to be misleading and was dissatisfied with the response she received when she raised her concerns. However, those matters do not, without more, establish prohibited conduct under the Acts.

For the purposes of this complaint, there must be a sufficient evidential nexus between the treatment complained of and the protected ground relied upon. No such nexus has been established.

I therefore find that the Complainant has failed to establish facts from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct occurred on the religion ground. Accordingly, the burden of proof under section 38A of the Acts does not shift to the Respondent.

Having regard to the totality of the evidence, I find that the Complainant has not established a prima facie case of discrimination on the religion ground. Accordingly, the complaint is not well founded.

For the reasons set out above, I decide that the complaint of discrimination on the religion ground is not well founded.