Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

Child via Parent

Creche Manager

Representatives

Parent , Ms A

Ms X, Centre Manager /Owner.

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00072767-001

24/06/2025

The issues in contention concerned the withdrawal, on alleged Victimisation, Grounds of a Creche facility from a Child – Child D by a Creche facility. The Child had joined the Crèche in 2024 . The placement had ended on the 27th of March 2025.

The complaint via his mother was self-represented. A detailed Oral Testimony was given supported by a comprehensive written submission and an ES1 Form.

The essence of the Complaint was that Child D ,in this case, had been summarily removed by the Creche Respondent on the 27th March 2025 in an act of blatant Retaliation , Victimisation and Indirect Discrimination due to the actions of the Parents in protesting the very disputed removal of his sibling,  Child J , on the 18th of March 2025.

Child D had been perfectly happy in the Creche and had never been the subject of any adverse comments. His removal was completely unjustified and had no basis in any sense of fair play or natural justice. The alleged incidents/difficulties with his sibling ,Child J , had absolutely nothing to do with him. The protests from his Parents regarding Child J, his sibling, were completely separate from Child D. He was clearly being Indirectly Discriminated against by Association with Child J.

The Respondent was self-represented. A detailed Oral Testimony was give supported by a comprehensive written submission . The ending of Child J ( the sibling of Child  D.) ’s time with the Creche on the 18th March was not disputed. This was the ongoing Equal Status Act,2000 complaint -Adj-00060122 being considered by the WRC.

In essence the Crèche manager, Ms X, stated ,under Oath , that following the ending of Child J ‘s time at the Creche the Parents had engaged in a campaign locally of very negative commentary regarding the Creche and the Staff there. It was a semi-Rural community and this type of activity was very detrimental to the Creche and the Staff employed there. There had been a complete breakdown in the relationship between the Parties. In her letter/e mail of the 27th March 2025 Ms X outlined in five points, how the relationship had broken down. These were , a Lack of Trust, Aggressive behaviour towards staff, Multiple complaints about the service provided, Actions being taken to damage the reputation of both the Provider and the service provided and finally a complete Refusal to accept earlier decisions made by the Creche in the best interest of Sibling Child J . In this context Ms X felt that continuing to accept Child D was not in the best interest of either Party.

There was no Discrimination against Child D  ( or against Child J  argued in Adj-00060122) . The basic business relationship between the Parties had broken down and continuing with Child D’s attendance was now an impossibility.

3:1       The Legal position.

Indirect Discrimination was the principal basis of the Complainant’s case. He was the Brother of Child J and was being punished unfairly for this relationship. Put simply if Child J had remained at the Creche Child D would also have remained. Child D was , to be clear, an innocent Party in this unfortunate situation.

Equal Status Act,2000, Section 3 (1) (b) applies

Discrimination (general).

Section 3:    (1)  For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur—

(a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) where a person who is associated with another person—

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination,

or

(c) where an apparently neutral provision would put a person referred to in any paragraph of section 3(2) at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless the provision is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary.

Underline by Adjudication Officer.

Child D has very good grounds under Section 3 (1) (b)

The next issue is what legal merit does the Respondents’ defence of a “ Business/Personal Breakdown” with the Parents , hold as a defence/justification for removing Child D. In the headline Text - Employment Equality Law by Bolger, Bruton and Kimber -Round Hall 2012 the questionof Indirect Discrimination is discussed at length - Sections 7-20 to 7-31. The major UK and later CCJ case of Coleman v Attridge Law –[2008] ECR J-05603 is considered at length.  Suffice to say in summary that Indirect Discrimination is now a well-recognised principle in European Law. However the Authors do caution in the 2012 Editon that there is still a good degree of uncertainty about how this operates on a practical basis.

Legal precedents from all Courts always caution that the context and evidential basis from evidence has to be considered carefully. The Law does not operate in a “vacuum” . The key issue here is the understanding of what was Reasonable -as considered by a “reasonable unconnected observer”.

This has to be considered next in a review of the Oral testimony and written evidence.

 3:2     Consideration of evidence - Written and Oral

From the sworn evidence /Oral testimony including a written statement from another Parent it was clear that the ending of Child J’s time at the Creche was majorly upsetting to the Parents involved. An intervention from TUSLA was requested.

It was very probable as well that the Parents did not spare the Manger, Ms X or the Creche in general from negative local commentary. It was emphasised that it was a semi-rural local area with close knit “networks” in many forums. In an extreme context, fortunately not present here, Civil Actions for Slander might well have had an outing.

To any reasonable observer the business relationship between the Parties , as Adults and Service Providers was irrevocably over.

Unfortunately, Child D could not remain at the Creche  in this context.

3:3        Adjudication Conclusion.

Respondent Manager, Ms X ,although not professionally Represented ,  made a very credible, Section 4 (4) Defence.

(4) Where a person has a disability that, in the circumstances, could cause harm to the person or to others, treating the person differently to the extent reasonably necessary to prevent such harm does not constitute discrimination.

Child D was not in anyway, from the evidence disabled save by sibling association with Child J.  The ending of his time at the Creche was unfortunately “Reasonably Necessary” when the relationship with the Parents and the Creche had gone , effectively “toxic” following the Child J exit.

The Respondent has sound grounds for an Equal Status Act, 2000 Section 4 (4) defence. The continuation of Child D at the Creche in the “toxic atmosphere” would have been in no one’s best interest.

The complaint of Discrimination and Victimisation , in this context, has to be regarded as Unsuccessful.

Equal Status Act. Discrimination by Association ,