ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00058288
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Katarina Baraba | Sysco Foods Ireland Unlimited Company |
Representatives | N/A | Ms. Leah Moriarty of RDJ LLP Solicitors, instructing Mr. Jason Murray BL. |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00070840-001 | 15/04/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 24/10/2025; 13/02/2026; and 14/09/2026.
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Elizabeth Spelman
Procedure:
In accordance with section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and / or section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the Parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
This matter was heard remotely, pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and S.I. 359/2020, which designates the Workplace Relations Commission (the “WRC”) as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.
Ms. Katarina Baraba (the “Complainant”) attended the Hearing. A WRC-appointed interpreter attended to assist the Complainant. The rules of evidence; the principles governing cross-examination; and the cognisable period relevant to a complaint, were all, inter alia, explained to the Complainant.
Sysco Foods Ireland Unlimited Company (the “Respondent”) attended the Hearing. Ms. Leah Foley, the Respondent’s HR Business Partner; and Mr. Stephen McQuaid, the Respondent’s Group Head of Supply Chain and the Complainant’s Line Manager, attended for the Respondent. Mr. McQuaid also gave evidence for the Respondent. Ms. Isabelle Mannix and later Ms. Leah Moriarty of RDJ LLP Solicitors, instructing Mr. Jason Murray BL, represented the Respondent.
The Hearing was held in public. Evidence was provided on oath or affirmation. The legal perils of committing perjury were explained.
Hearing Dates:
The Hearing commenced on 24 October 2025. At the outset of the Hearing, it was noted that the Respondent had filed approximately 225 pages of submissions and evidence on 21 October 2025. The Respondent apologised for the late filing of submissions. The Complainant indicated that she had used A.I. to review and translate the Respondent’s submissions and that she had filed a further 18 pages the day before the Hearing, however they had not yet been uploaded to the WRC file. The Complainant also indicated that she did not have the opportunity to consider meeting minutes dated 15 September 2025. I sought submissions from the Parties concerning an adjournment.
Following my consideration of the submissions, I ruled that the matter be adjourned in order to provide the Complainant with sufficient time to consider the Respondent’s papers. I gave directions, including a timeline, concerning the filing of further final submissions by both Parties.
The Hearing recommenced on 13 February 2026, when Opening Statements and the Complainant’s case was heard in full. At the conclusion of the Complainant’s evidence, the Respondent made an application for the complaint to be dismissed, which is addressed below.
The Hearing recommenced and concluded on 14 September 2026.
The Respondent’s Name:
The Respondent’s correct name was noted at the Hearing and is set out above.
Submissions regarding Additional Complaint:
At the outset of the Hearing, I noted that while the Complainant had referred to alleged breaches of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015 (the “EEA”) in her WRC Complaint Form dated 15 April 2025, she had also referred to “a formal remote work request under the Work-Life Balance and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 2023” in the narrative of the same WRC Complaint Form.
In the circumstances, I referred to inter alia, County Louth Vocational Educational Committee v. The Equality Tribunal [2016] IESC 40, which upheld the flexibility of WRC procedures. I heard submissions from the Parties on whether there was an additional complaint before me. I reserved my position on the matter.
I note that the Complainant stated in her WRC Complaint Form dated 15 April 2025:
“Formal Complaint: Disability Discrimination, Harassment, Victimisation, and Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation.
I submit this complaint under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015, citing discrimination based on disability, harassment, victimisation, and my employer’s failure (Sysco Ireland) to provide reasonable accommodation in accordance with Irish employment law and the WRC Code of Practice.”
I also note that while the Complainant refers to submitting a remote working request in the narrative of her WRC Complaint Form, I am satisfied that her complaint clearly concerns the Respondent’s alleged discrimination and alleged failure to accommodate her disability, rather than any standalone complaint regarding remote working. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that there is no second complaint before me.
Interim Applications:
Evidence of a Covertly Recorded Meeting:
The Complainant made an application to play a covert recording that she had made of the meeting with the Respondent dated 3 December 2024. She said that it was important for the Adjudication Officer to hear the content of the meeting and the “tone” of the meeting.
The Respondent objected to the application. The Respondent submitted that it had asked the Complainant for a copy of the recording and had not received it. The Respondent further submitted that the Complainant had already given her evidence concerning this meeting and that the recording had no relevance and would be of no benefit.
I considered the Parties’ submissions and ruled that I would not allow the recording. I stated that I was satisfied that the Complainant had addressed the meeting dated 3 December 2024 during the course of her evidence. Moreover, I noted that the Complainant had failed to refer to the recording during the first Hearing day and that she had also failed to provide a transcript of the recording.
The Complainant sought to revisit this ruling on the third Hearing day, however, I repeated the ruling that I had made, as outlined above.
Application for Dismissal of the Complaint:
Respondent Submissions:
At the conclusion of the Complainant’s evidence, the Respondent made an application pursuant to section 77A of the EEA for the dismissal of the claim on the basis that it was misconceived and / or trivial.
The Respondent submitted that the complaint concerns the period of 7 October 2024 until 24 February 2025. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant had accepted that at all material times during this period, she was on certified sick leave; that she presented to the Department of Social Protection (the “DSP”) as such; and that she received illness benefit from the DSP. The Respondent further submitted that it was the Complainant’s evidence that she submitted two contradictory medical certificates (insofar as one medical certificate indicated that she was unfit for work, while the other medical certificate indicated that she could work remotely) on the same day, 27 January 2025. The Respondent submitted that there was no reasonable accommodation available to the Complainant as the Respondent would have to look behind the medical certificates. The Respondent submitted that, in the circumstances, it was making an application pursuant to section 77A of the EEA for the claim to be dismissed on the basis that it was misconceived.
In the alternative, the Respondent submitted that the complaint could be dismissed insofar as it related to a trivial matter given that, at its highest, the period during which the Complainant may have been considered fit for remote working extended to only a few hours on 27 January 2025, when she sent two contradictory medical certificates to the Respondent.
Complainant Submissions:
The Complainant confirmed that she did not ask for a reasonable accommodation in the form of working from Croatia. She submitted that she has been discriminated against and that the dates do not matter. She said that she tried to comply with Respondent’s company policy. She said that she did not navigate the situation very well. She said that the Respondent should have given her guidance. She said that she wants the same treatment as others.
Conclusion:
On the third day of the Hearing, I raised questions concerning the threshold for a claim being deemed as “made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter” pursuant to section 77A of the EEA. I also queried whether there were relevant decisions on the matter. The Respondent indicated that it was in attendance to run its case and not to press the application any further. In the circumstances, there was no need for me to make a ruling on this application as I considered the WRC Complaint and evidence before me, as outlined below.
Background:
The Complainant worked for the Respondent from 11 October 2021 to 13 March 2026. She most recently held the position of Primary Logistics Lead, earning approximately €47,000 gross per annum plus a bonus. The Complainant suffered an injury in September 2024 and did not subsequently return to work. The Complainant alleges that the Respondent breached the EEA insofar as it: discriminated against her on the ground of her disability; failed to provide reasonable accommodation; victimised her; harassed her; and discriminated against her under “other”. The Respondent denies the allegations in full. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant provided detailed written and oral submissions. The Complainant submitted that she was treated unfairly by the Respondent during a difficult period. She submitted that she sought reasonable accommodation and that she could have worked remotely. She stated that the Respondent did not carry out a meaningful individual assessment of her duties, or, of what duties could be performed remotely. She took issue with the Respondent not seeking further information from her doctor. She submitted that she also offered to provide further documentation to the Respondent. She submitted that the facts are supported by evidence. She submitted that she is seeking a restoration of her dignity. Complainant – Evidence: The Complainant submitted that in September 2024, she sustained an injury to her left leg. She sought medical help and got x-rays and MRI scans, which showed a cyst. She then worked for three weeks from home before experiencing symptoms in her right leg. She submitted that the medical process in Ireland was slow and she applied for illness benefit and travelled to Croatia for a diagnosis and treatment. In Croatia, she saw a rheumatologist and an orthopaedic specialist. After two weeks in Croatia, her Line Manager informed her that she was on unpaid leave. She said that she did not understand this development as she had provided him with the relevant medical documentation. She stated that she returned to Ireland on 1 December 2024 and that she wanted to return to work and work remotely. She was informed that she could not work remotely. The Complainant outlined that she had an online meeting with her Line Manager and HR on 3 December 2024. She said that her friend also attended. She said that she covertly recorded the meeting. During the meeting, she said that she was referred to the Respondent’s company policy. She was informed that the medical certificates that she had provided were invalid, as they had no stamp or signature. She was told that there would be an investigation. She stated that she was “accused ofemotional blackmail”. The Complainant said that she did not ask to work from Croatia. She also said that she felt that her working relationship had changed once she was in receipt of extended illness benefit. She said that the Respondent’s treatment of her was too harsh and should not be allowed. She said that she was sick and stressed as a result. The Complainant stated that she was very ill and wheelchair bound. She said that she sought legal advice from an Irish lawyer. She then sent working from home requests dated 5 December 2024 and 27 January 2025 to the Respondent. She also provided a medical certificate which indicated that she was fit to work remotely. She said that did not get a response. The Complainant stated that her diagnosis was subsequently confirmed and that she emailed the Respondent in February 2025 with further details. She returned to Croatia on 24 February 2025 and has not returned to Ireland since. She filed a complaint with the WRC in April 2025. The Complainant outlined that she could not attend two Occupational Health (“OH”) assessments with “Medmark” that were arranged for her to attend in person. She stated that she obtained approval for an online OH meeting in July 2025. The Complainant stated that she did not ask to work from Croatia and that she never mentioned working from Croatia. She said that all of her remote working requests concerned remote working while based in Ireland. The Complainant stated that she recently had a “capacity meeting” with the Respondent when she was asked about being indefinitely unfit for work. She stated that no one can give her a timeline and that she cannot say when she can come back to the office. She plans on coming back to Ireland. [Note – at the Hearing on 14 September 2026, the Complainant confirmed that she had ceased working for the Respondent on 13 March 2026]. Complainant – Cross-Examination: The Complainant confirmed that she was injured on 8 September 2024 and that she was unable to attend the workplace. She stated that she then worked from home for four weeks before travelling to Croatia. The Complainant confirmed that she obtained a letter from her doctor dated 7 October 2024 which said that she was unfit for work. The Complainant accepted that the Respondent would not look behind that same letter. The Complainant confirmed that once her two weeks’ paid sick leave ended, she received illness benefit from the DSP. She said that she applied for the illness benefit online. She said that after those two weeks when she was paid by the Respondent, she wanted to work remotely for the Respondent. She confirmed that between 7 October 2024 and 13 February 2026, she never told the DSP that she no longer required illness benefit. She accepted that the DSP only pays illness benefit when a person is unfit to attend work. The Complainant stated that she had approval from the DSP to move to Croatia. She stated that she has no immediate plans to return to Ireland. The Complainant accepted that she was not permitted to work for the Respondent from Croatia. She said that she never asked to work remotely from Croatia. The Complainant confirmed that her WRC complaint concerned the period from 7 October 2024 to end February 2025. The Complainant accepted that from 7 October 2024 until 1 December 2024, she was certified as unfit to work. She also accepted that her doctor had later indicated that she could not work until 3 February 2025. She stated that she did not know that she could obtain a medical certificate which indicated that she could work remotely. The Complainant also stated that she was not sure if she was allowed to work. She said that at the time, she was in a wheelchair and did not know if she could walk again. The Complainant confirmed that on 27 January 2025, she provided two medical certificates to the Respondent – one medical certificate which indicated that she could work remotely and one medical certificate which indicated that she was unfit for work. The Complainant stated that her doctor was not incorrect. She said that she agreed with all of the medical certificates. The Complainant confirmed that being deemed “unfit to work” covers both working in the workplace and working remotely. The Complainant confirmed that during the meeting on 3 December 2024 with her Line Manager and HR, she was informed that her medical certificates had to be stamped and signed and submitted, one week at a time. She confirmed that she was not told to state that she was unfit for work. She was told to go to the doctor to be assessed, on the basis of her hybrid contract. The Complainant was asked when she was certified as unfit for work, what did she want the Respondent to do. The Complainant said that she was doing the best that she could. She said that the Respondent breached the EEA. The Complainant confirmed that in or around 26 November 2025, she sent text messages to her Line Manager and stated that she was being “pushed out” of the company after how good she had been to him. She said that during the meeting on 3 December 2024, it was put to her that the tone of her text messages was inappropriate. The Complainant accepted that she was not accused of emotional blackmail. The Complainant confirmed that she was in receipt of legal advice during this period. It was put to the Complainant that she was fully aware of her rights and obligations and that if she was fit to return to work, she should have informed the Respondent and that she should have requested reasonable accommodation. The Complainant said that she was aware of the Respondent’s treatment of her before and after her illness. The Complainant said that when she sent the Respondent two medical certificates on 27 January 2025, which indicated both that she could work remotely and that she was unfit for work, she was not aware that she was contradicting herself. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent provided detailed written and oral submissions. The Respondent conceded that the Complainant has a disability for the purposes of the EEA, however the Respondent denied all of the Complainant’s complaints in full. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant had not established a prima facie case of discrimination and that her complaints were unsubstantiated. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant provided medical certificates to the Respondent which indicated that she was not fit to work and that she claimed illness benefit from the DSP. In the circumstances, the Respondent submitted that the complaints were without merit. Mr. Stephen McQuaid – Evidence: Mr. McQuaid outlined that he is currently the Respondent’s Group Head of Supply Chain. In late 2024 and early 2025, Mr. McQuaid stated that he was the Respondent’s Head of Supply Chain. In that role he managed the Complainant, initially via one of her direct reports; and later as her Line Manager. He outlined that he had a good working relationship with the Complainant and that he had recommended her for promotion. He said that she was a real asset and he had no issue with her output. Mr. McQuaid outlined that the Complainant commenced sick leave in October 2024 and that she was not certified as fit to work thereafter. He said that the medical certificates that the Complainant provided were not in compliance with the Respondent’s company policy in that they were not signed or stamped by her doctor and / or the medical certificates were backdated. Mr. McQuaid referred to two of the Complainant’s medical certificates which she had emailed to him on 27 January 2025. The first medical certificate dated 15 January 2025 indicated that the Complainant “is currently fit to work remotely (from home), but unfit to attend work due to ongoing foot/ankle issues (not able to commute to / from work).” The second medical certificate dated 27 January 2025 indicated that the Complainant “is unfit to attend work”. Mr. McQuaid stated that there was a conflict between the two medical certificates. He stated that the Complainant cannot work if she is deemed unfit to work, regardless of whether she is at home or in the office. Mr. McQuaid stated that the Complainant texted him a number of times from October to the end of November 2024. He stated that on 26 November 2024, he received three messages from her within minutes. On 3 December 2024, Mr. McQuaid and Ms. Leah Foley had an online meeting with the Complainant to check in with her and to address the nature of the text messages which Mr. McQuaid had received from her. The Complainant was informed that her text messages could be seen as “emotional blackmail”. He said that no accusations were made at the meeting. It was an informal meeting and no minutes were taken. Mr. McQuaid denied the Complainant’s allegation that the Respondent’s treatment of her changed after she notified the Respondent of her illness. He said that she notified him of her illness in September 2024 and that it was four months before he had an informal meeting with her in December 2024. Mr. McQuaid referred to the Complainant’s follow-up email dated 5 December 2024. He stated that he never questioned that the Complainant’s medical condition was challenging. He said that the Complainant was not complying with the Respondent’s company policy regarding medical certificates. He stated that he never questioned the Complainant’s eagerness to work or to contribute to the team. He said that she could not work remotely as she was not certified as fit to work. Mr. McQuaid referred to his email to the Complainant dated 8 December 2024 where he stated “To reiterate as we discussed, you are not approved to work remotely. Your doctor has certified you unfit for work at this time and to be considered fit for work you are required for a doctor to certify you fit for work. To confirm this is whether the work takes place from home or the office.” Mr. McQuaid stated that he could not allow the Complainant to work for as long she was submitting medical certificates which indicated that she was unfit to work. He stated that to the best of his knowledge, no employee had ever worked for the Respondent while they were certified as unfit to work. Mr. McQuaid stated that the Respondent has a hybrid working policy under which employees can work from home on Mondays and Fridays. He stated that if the Complainant had been certified as fit to work and had made a reasonable accommodation request to work from home, the Respondent would have accommodated her. However, he stated that she was never certified as fit to work. Mr. McQuaid stated that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the ground of disability. He stated that she had provided medical certificates indicating that she was unfit to work and so no reasonable accommodation could be made for her. He stated that she made no request for a reasonable accommodation such as special equipment or flexible working time. Mr. McQuaid stated that she was never treated differently to any other employee. Mr. McQuaid stated that the Complainant would “100%” have been welcomed back to the team if she was deemed fit for work. He said that she was an asset to the team and that the Respondent was focused on having her back. Mr. McQuaid stated that he would not be privy to anything discussed by the Complainant with the Employee Assistance Programme as it is a confidential service. Mr. McQuaid – Cross-Examination: Mr. McQuaid confirmed that he was the Complainant’s Line Manager and that he never formally raised any performance issues with her and that she was never subject to any disciplinary action. Mr. McQuaid stated that the only matter that changed between September 2024 and October 2024 was that the Complainant started sending in medical certificates which stated that she was unfit for work from October 2024. Mr. McQuaid stated that the Complainant had worked from home in September when her diagnosis was unclear. Mr. McQuaid stated that no employee can work when they are certified as unfit to work. Mr. McQuaid confirmed that the Complainant was permitted to work remotely for a period in 2023. Mr. McQuaid confirmed that he never instructed the Complainant to take sick leave. Mr. McQuaid confirmed that the Complainant told him that she needed to take sick leave as her medical condition was worsening. She said that she needed to travel to Croatia for a medical assessment. She provided information concerning her consultant. She told Mr. McQuaid that she intended to return to Ireland. Mr. McQuaid confirmed that he told the Complainant in November 2024 that she as on unpaid sick leave. He stated that the issue of the Complainant’s medical certificates being unstamped and unsigned were addressed during the meeting on 3 December 2024. He said that he did not believe that the Complainant was told that her doctor needed to assess her in accordance with the Respondent’s requirements. Mr. McQuaid stated that fit to work means being fit to work both onsite and remotely. Mr. McQuaid stated that there was no assessment of the Complainant as she was deemed unfit to work. Mr. McQuaid – Redirect: Mr. McQuaid confirmed that according to the Respondent’s sick leave policy, an employee receives ten working days’ pay while on sick leave. He stated that the Complainant had taken her full allocation of paid sick leave by December 2024. He stated that according to the Respondent’s sick leave policy, if an employee takes unpaid sick leave, they still have to submit a medical certificate. |
Findings and Conclusions:
The Law: Legislation: Employment Equality Act 1998-2015, as amended (the “EEA”): Discrimination: Sections 6 and 8 prohibit employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of disability. For the purposes of the complaint before me, the most relevant parts are: “6(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where— (a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which—(i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned, […] (2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are— […] (g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (in this Act referred to as “the disability ground”), […] 8. (1) In relation to—(a) access to employment, (b) conditions of employment, (c) training or experience for or in relation to employment, (d) promotion or re-grading, or (e) classification of posts, an employer shall not discriminate against an employee […].” Reasonable Accommodation: Section 16 of the EEA addresses the extent of the employer’s obligation to provide reasonable accommodation to an employee. Section 16(3) provides: “(a) For the purposes of this Act a person who has a disability is fully competent to undertake, andfully capable of undertaking, any duties if the person would be so fully competent and capable on reasonable accommodation (in this subsection referred to as ‘appropriate measures’) being provided by the person’s employer. (b) The employer shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person who has a disability— (i) to have access to employment, (ii) to participate or advance in employment, or (iii) to undergo training, unless the measures would impose a disproportionate burden on the employer. (c) In determining whether the measures would impose such a burden account shall be taken, in particular, of— (i) the financial and other costs entailed, (ii) the scale and financial resources of the employer’s business, and (iii) the possibility of obtaining public funding or other assistance.” Section 16(4) addresses what are appropriate measures: “‘appropriate measures’, in relation to a person with a disability— (a) means effective and practical measures, where needed in a particular case, to adapt the employer’s place of business to the disability concerned, (b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), includes the adaptation of premises and equipment, patterns of working time, distribution of tasks or the provision of training or integration resources, but (c) does not include any treatment, facility or thing that the person might ordinarily or reasonably provide for himself or herself.” Harassment: Harassment is defined under Section 14A(7) of the EEA as: “(a) In this section— (i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and (ii) references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person. (b) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.” The test is a subjective one and the intention of the perpetrator of the harassment is largely irrelevant. It is sufficient if it has a negative effect on the victim. Therefore, the conduct should be viewed from the perspective of the victim. Moreover, these provisions must also be read in conjunction with section 15 of the EEA which fixes an employer with vicarious liability under the EEA for the wrongful acts of an employee committed in the course of that employee’s employment. Victimisation: Victimisation is defined in section 74(2) of the EEA as: “dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer” because the employee, inter alia, made a complaint to their employer about possible discrimination; or took proceedings under the EEA; or opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under the EEA. Burden of Proof: Section 85A of the EEA provides for the allocation of the probative burden between a complainant and a respondent as follows: “85A.–(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.” In Southern Health Board v. Mitchell [2001] ELR 201 (the “Mitchell Case”), the Labour Court held: “The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.” In Melbury Developments Limited v. Valpeters [2010] 21 ELR 64 (the “Melbury Developments Case”), the Labour Court found that: “Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn”. What constitutes something of such significance to raise an inference of discrimination varies according to the relevant factual matrix in each case. If the relevant facts are within the exclusive knowledge or near-exclusive knowledge of the Respondent, then the inference or presumption is quickly raised and it falls on the Respondent to show that there was no breach of the principle of equal treatment. Findings and Conclusions: It was common case that the Complainant had a disability within the meaning of the EEA and therefore enjoyed the protections of the EEA. Allegations regarding Discrimination and Failure to Provide Reasonable Accommodation: It was the Complainant’s evidence that her complaints concerned the time period from 7 October 2024 until end February 2025. During this time, the Complainant provided a letter from her doctor dated 7 October 2024 which said that she was unfit for work. She also submitted medical certificates dated 29 November 2024; 4 December 2024; 6 December 2024; 13 December 2024; 23 December 2024; 8 January 2025; 13 January 2025; 20 January 2025; 27 January 2025; 31 January 2025; 10 February 2025; 17 February 2025; and 24 February 2025 to the Respondent. All of these medical certificates, which appear to come from the same medical centre/doctor, indicate that the Complainant “is unfit to attend work” due to “Health related condition”. The only exception to the documentary evidence outlined above was the Complainant’s medical certificate, from the same medical centre/doctor and dated 15 January 2025, which stated that the Complainant “is currently fit to work remotely (from home), but unfit to attend work due to ongoing foot/ankle issues (not able to commute to/from work)”. However, this medical certificate conflicts directly with the later medical certificate dated 27 January 2025, which states that the Complainant “is unfit to attend work” due to “Health related condition”. Notably, the Complainant emailed both of these medical certificates to the Respondent on 27 January 2025. In the course of her evidence, the Complainant confirmed that she applied for, and received, illness benefit from the DSP from 7 October 2024 until 13 February 2026 [Note – the second Hearing date, when the Complainant gave her evidence]. The Complainant further confirmed that she knew that the DSP only paid illness benefit to a person when they are unfit for work. In the course of her evidence, the Complainant sought to draw a distinction between being fit to commute to and work in the office as opposed to being fit to work remotely. The Complainant maintained that she was fit to work remotely. However, that distinction is not reflected in the medical certificates which she submitted to the Respondent. With one exception, all of the medical certificates clearly state that the Complainant was unfit to work. As outlined above, the single medical certificate dated 15 January 2025 which was more nuanced, was directly contradicted by a later medical certificate dated 27 January 2025, both of which were sent by the Complainant to the Respondent on the same day. Notably, the documentary evidence demonstrating that the Complainant was unfit to work correlates with the Complainant’s communications with the DSP that she was unfit to work, as per her evidence outlined above. An employer is entitled to rely on a medical certificate which indicates that an employee is unfit for work. It is not for an employer to look behind an employee’s medical certificate which clearly states that an employee is unfit to work. In the circumstances, the Complainant has not demonstrated that she was discriminated against on the grounds of her disability. Moreover, in circumstances where the Complainant was deemed unfit to work, the Respondent could not have been expected to provide reasonable accommodation to facilitate the Complainant’s performance of her role. Finally, I note that in the course of her cross-examination, the Complainant confirmed that she was not “accused” of emotional blackmail during the online meeting dated 3 December 2024. Further, I note that the Complainant received her full allocation of paid sick leave, in line with the Respondent’s company policy. In applying the test outlined above in the Mitchell Case and the Melbury Developments Case, I am satisfied that the Complainant has made only mere speculation or assertions in alleging that the Respondent discriminated against her and in alleging that the Respondent failed to provide reasonable accommodation. Therefore, the Complainant has not established facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her and / or that the Respondent failed to provide reasonable accommodation, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. Harassment: In her WRC Complaint Form dated 15 April 2025, the Complainant indicated that the Respondent discriminated against her in harassing her. The Complainant provided no evidence as to how she was harassed on the ground of disability. Therefore, the Complainant has not established facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination including harassment, in relation to her, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. Victimisation: In her WRC Complaint Form dated 15 April 2025, the Complainant indicated that the Respondent discriminated against her in victimising her. The Complainant provided no evidence of adverse treatment as a reaction to her, inter alia, making a discrimination complaint. Therefore, the Complainant has not established facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination including victimisation in relation to her, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. Other: In her WRC Complaint Form dated 15 April 2025, the Complainant indicated that the Respondent discriminated against her as regards “Other”. As outlined above, the Complainant has not established facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her in any way, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 requires that I make a decision in relation the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of that Act.
For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Complainant has not established facts, from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her in any way as alleged, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. Therefore, I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the ground of disability and these elements of the complaint are not well founded. For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Complainant has not established facts, from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to her concerning the Respondent’s alleged failure to provide reasonable accommodation, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. Therefore, I find that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the ground of disability and this element of the complaint is not well founded. For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Complainant has not established facts, from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination including harassment in relation to her, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. Therefore, I find that the Complainant was not harassed and this element of the complaint is not well founded. For the reasons outlined above, I find that the Complainant has not established facts, from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination including victimisation, in relation to her, pursuant to section 85A of the EEA. Therefore, I find that the Complainant was not victimised and this element of the complaint is not well founded. |
Dated: 24th September 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Elizabeth Spelman
Key Words:
Employment Equality Act 1998-2015, Discrimination, Disability, Reasonable accommodation. |