Gearánach

Freagróir

Páirtithe

Seanán  Ó Coistín

Údarás Sábháilteachta Bia na hÉireann

Ionadaithe

Peadar Ó Maolain BL a fhaigheann treoracha ó

Paul Gough Beauchamps LLP

Acht

Uimhir Thagartha an Ghearáin/an Aighnis.

Dáta Fála

Gearán ag lorg breithnithe ón gCoimisiún um Chaidreamh san Áit Oibre faoi Alt 8 den Acht um Dhífhostú Éagórach, 1977

CA-00069687-001

03/03/2025

Dúirt an Gearánach gur briseadh as a phost go héagórach é nuair a cuireadh ar shaoire riaracháin é ar an 11 Nollaig 2024 i ndiaidh scaipeadh ríomhphoist maidir le heaspa cumais sa Ghaeilge laistigh d’eagraíocht an Fhreagróra. Dhearbhaigh sé gur mheicníocht a bhí sa tsaoire riaracháin, i ndáiríre, chun é a bhaint den ionad oibre gan nósanna imeachta cothroma agus gur naimhdeas do na tuairimí a léiríodh ina ríomhphost a spreag gníomhaíochtaí an Fhreagróra.

Dúirt an Gearánach gur dífhostaíodh é go héagórach tar éis ríomhphost a sheol sé chuig beagnach gach fostaí de chuid an Fhreagróra ar an 11 Nollaig 2024 maidir le stádas na Gaeilge laistigh den eagraíocht. Dhearbhaigh sé gur cuireadh in iúl dó, níos déanaí an lá céanna, go raibh sé á chur ar shaoire riaracháin ar an mbonn go raibh gearáin déanta faoina ríomhphost agus go raibh líomhaintí faoi chiapadh ciníoch ardaithe. Dúirt sé nár cuireadh in iúl dó roimh ré go raibh a leithéid de ghníomh á beartú, nár tugadh deis dó freagra a thabhairt ar na líomhaintí agus nár tugadh dóthain mionsonraí faoi na gearáin dó sula ndearnadh an cinneadh.

Dúirt an Gearánach go raibh an cinneadh é a chur ar shaoire riaracháin éagórach ó thaobh nós imeachta de agus go raibh sé contrártha le prionsabail an cheartais nádúrtha. Dhearbhaigh sé gur úsáid an Freagróir saoire riaracháin mar bhealach chun é a chur as an ionad oibre agus gur tugadh “bata agus an bóthar” dó, go bunúsach, seachas é a chur ar fhíorshaoire riaracháin. Dhearbhaigh an Gearánach gur leithscéal amháin a bhí sa mhéid a luaigh an Freagróir maidir le líomhaintí faoi chiapadh ciníoch. Líomhain sé gurbh í an fhíorchúis a bhí le gníomhaíochtaí an Fhreagróra ná a nochtadh don fhoireann nach raibh aon chumas sa Ghaeilge laistigh den eagraíocht agus a cháineadh ar an bhFreagróir, mar chomhlacht poiblí, maidir leis an gcás sin. Dhearbhaigh sé go raibh fearg ar an lucht bainistíochta de bharr ábhair a ríomhphoist agus d’fhéach sé lena chur as an eagraíocht chomh tapa agus chomh ciúin agus ab fhéidir. Dúirt an Gearánach freisin go raibh tionchar suntasach pearsanta ag an tsaoire riaracháin air, rud a chruthaigh anacair, imní, deacrachtaí codlata agus a d’éiligh tacaíocht leighis agus comhairleoireachta. Dhearbhaigh sé gurbh ionann gníomhaíochtaí an Fhreagróra agus dífhostú éagórach.

Shéan an Freagróir go raibh an Gearánach dífhostaithe. Luaigh siad go raibh an Gearánach fostaithe trí Orange Recruitment Limited ar shocrú gníomhaireachta ar théarma seasta agus go raibh deireadh leis an riachtanas dá ról sealadach. Dúirt an Freagróir gur cuireadh in iúl don Ghníomhaireacht an 18 Samhain 2024 go dtiocfadh deireadh leis an sannadh an 31 Nollaig 2024 agus gur cuireadh in iúl don Ghearánach go mbeadh deireadh lena fhostaíocht ag deireadh an téarma sheasta. Mhaígh an Freagróir nár eascair gearán an Ghearánaigh as aon dífhostú ach as an gcinneadh é a chur ar shaoire riaracháin ar an 11 Nollaig 2024 tar éis do thriúr fostaithe gearán a dhéanamh faoi ríomhphost a scaip sé ar bheagnach gach ball foirne. Dhearbhaigh siad nár chuir saoire riaracháin deireadh leis an gcaidreamh fostaíochta agus gur fhan an Gearánach i bhfostaíocht agus gur lean sé de phá iomlán a fháil go dtí an 31 Nollaig 2024. Mhaígh an Freagróir go ndeachaigh an conradh fostaíochta in éag de réir a théarmaí agus gur cinneadh neamh-athnuachan an chonartha sular seoladh ríomhphost an 11 Nollaig 2024.

Dhiúltaigh siad do dhearbhú an Ghearánaigh go raibh baint ag dul in éag an chonartha le hábhar an ríomhphoist sin. Bhí an Freagróir ag brath ar alt 2(2)(b) den Acht um Dhífhostú Éagórach, 1977 agus d’áitigh sé go raibh an Gearánach fostaithe faoi chonradh téarma sheasta ina raibh clásal eisiaimh ar choinníoll nach mbeadh feidhm ag na hAchtanna um Dhífhostú Éagórach i gcás go ndeachaigh an conradh in éag gan athnuachan. Dhearbhaigh siad gur tháinig deireadh leis an bhfostaíocht trí dhul in éag an téarma sheasta amháin agus, dá bharr sin, nach raibh feidhm ag cosaintí an Achta um Dhífhostú Éagórach.

Luaigh an Freagróir freisin, tar éis na ngearán maidir leis an ríomhphost, go ndearnadh imscrúdú. Cinneadh san imscrúdú sin gur sháraigh an Gearánach Beartas Ríomhphoist agus Úsáide Idirlín an Fhreagróra ach nár aimsigh sé sárú ar an mBeartas Comhionannais agus Éagsúlachta. Leis an imscrúdú thángthas ar an gconclúid gur chosúil go raibh dea-rún ag an nGearánach agus nach ndearna sé aon mholadh i bhfianaise go raibh a chonradh imithe in éag cheana féin. D’áitigh an Freagróir, dá bhrí sin, go raibh míthuiscint ar an ngearán, nár tharla aon dífhostú éagórach, agus, in aon chás, gur tharla aon fhoirceannadh fostaíochta mar thoradh amháin ar dhul in éag conartha ar théarma seasta a thagann faoin eisiamh atá in alt 2(2)(b) den Acht.

D’ardaigh an Freagróir réamhagóid go bhfuil an gearán eisiata ó raon feidhme an Achta um Dhífhostú Éagórach, 1977 de bhua alt 2(2)(b) den Acht.

Ní raibh díospóid ann i bhfianaise go raibh an Gearánach fostaithe faoi shocrú ar théarma seasta a bhí le dul in éag an 31 Nollaig 2024 nó gur cuireadh in iúl don ghníomhaireacht fostaíochta, an 18 Samhain 2024, go mbeadh deireadh leis an sannadh an 31 Nollaig 2024 agus gur cuireadh in iúl don Ghearánach ina dhiaidh sin go dtiocfadh deireadh lena fhostaíocht ar an dáta sin.

D’áitigh an Freagróir go raibh foráil shainráite i gconradh fostaíochta an Ghearánaigh nár cuireadh na hAchtanna um Dhífhostú Éagórach i bhfeidhm sa chás gur chríochnaigh an fhostaíocht mar gheall ar dhul in éag an téarma sheasta gan athnuachan. Cuireadh ar aghaidh mé chuig an doiciméadacht chonarthach agus chuig na húdaráis a bhfuil an Freagróir ag brath orthu maidir le hoibriú alt 2(2)(b).

Foráiltear le halt 2(2)(b) den Acht um Dhífhostú Éagórach,1977 nach mbeidh feidhm ag an Acht i gcás ina bhfuil an fhostaíocht faoi chonradh téarma sheasta agus nach bhfuil sa dífhostú ach dul in éag an téarma sin gan athnuachan, ar choinníoll gur comhlíonadh ceanglais reachtúla an ailt sin.

Chun críocha an ghearáin seo, táim sásta glacadh leis, gan cinneadh a dhéanamh, gurbh ionann deireadh a chur le fostaíocht an Ghearánaigh agus dífhostú de réir bhrí an Achta.

Fiú amháin ar an mbonn sin, is deimhin liom go raibh an Gearánach fostaithe faoi chonradh téarma sheasta scríofa ina raibh clásal sainráite eisiaimh de réir bhrí alt 2(2)(b), go ndeachaigh an téarma seasta in éag an 31 Nollaig 2024 agus gur tháinig deireadh leis an bhfostaíocht mar gheall ar dhul in éag an téarma seasta sin gan athnuachan agus mar gheall air sin amháin.

Níor cuireadh ina choinne mar fhianaise go ndearnadh an cinneadh gan an fostú a athnuachan nó a shíneadh roimh imeachtaí an 11 Nollaig 2024. Tá mé sásta nár athraigh na himeachtaí sin an fíoras gur tháinig deireadh leis an bhfostaíocht ar dháta éaga comhaontaithe an chonartha ar théarma seasta agus gur tharla deireadh leis an gcaidreamh fostaíochta de bharr imeacht aimsire agus dá bharr sin amháin.

Ní ghlacaim leis go bhfuil socrúchán an Ghearánaigh ar shaoire riaracháin an 11 Nollaig 2024 in ann oibriú alt 2(2)(b) a chur as áit in imthosca an cháis seo. Is beart de chineál difriúil ar dhífhostú é saoire riaracháin go dtí go ndéanfar an t-imscrúdú: ní chuireann sé deireadh leis an gconradh fostaíochta, fanann an fostaí i bhfostaíocht go foirmiúil agus, mar atá anseo, ag fáil pá iomlán, agus is féidir é a aisiompú gan aon ghníomhaíocht eile ar thaobh an fhostóra. Dá bhrí sin, lean caidreamh fostaíochta an Ghearánaigh ar aghaidh ar feadh na tréimhse saoire riaracháin agus suas go dtí an 31 Nollaig 2024, d’ainneoin nár fhreastail sé ar an ionad oibre le linn na tréimhse sin. In Iarnród Éireann Irish Rail v Albert Kelly UDD2453, bhreithnigh an Chúirt Oibreachais an raibh foirceannadh conartha fostaí ar théarma seasta bunaithe go hiomlán ar scor an chonartha sin chun críocha alt 2(2)(b), agus dhearbhaigh sí go raibh easnaimh sa phróiseas a bhain le himeacht fostaí — sa chás sin, easpa próisis scoir fhoirmiúil agus láithreacht leanúnach an fhostaí ar an róta oibre tar éis dá chonradh dul in éag go teicniúil — nár shuigh siad féin go raibh toisc éigin seachas dul in éag an téarma sheasta i bhfeidhm chun deireadh a chur leis an bhfostaíocht. Agus an cur chuige sin á chur i bhfeidhm agam anseo, táim sásta nach fianaise é an modh a bhain an Gearánach den ionad oibre an 11 Nollaig 2024, cibé dearcadh a d’fhéadfaí a ghlacadh ar chothroime an phróisis sin, go raibh deireadh lena fhostaíocht an 31 Nollaig 2024 inchurtha i leith aon ní seachas dul in éag an téarma sheasta. Mínítear in imeachtaí an 11 Nollaig 2024 an fáth nár fhreastail an Gearánach ar an ionad oibre le linn na seachtainí deiridh dá fhostú; ní shuíonn siad gurbh iad na himeachtaí sin, seachas dul in éag an chonartha ar théarma seasta, ba chúis feidhme le foirceannadh a fhostaíochta.

Dá réir sin, déanaim amach go dtagann an foirceannadh faoin eisiamh a fhoráiltear le halt 2(2)(b) den Acht um Dhífhostú Éagórach, 1977. Ós rud é gur comhlíonadh na coinníollacha reachtúla a cheanglaítear leis an bhforáil sin, ní bhaineann cosaintí an Achta le foirceannadh fhostaíocht an Ghearánaigh.

Níl aon dlínse agam i leith an ghearáin seo toisc go bhfuil foirceannadh fostaíochta eisiata ó raon feidhme an Achta um Dhífhostú Éagórach, 1977 trí oibriú alt 2(2)(b) den Acht.

Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Seanán  Ó Coistín

Food Safety Authority of Ireland

Representatives

Peadar Ó Maolain BL instructed by

Paul Gough Beauchamps LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00069687-001

03/03/2025

The Complainant stated that he was unfairly dismissed when he was placed on administrative leave on 11 December 2024 following the circulation of an email concerning the absence of Irish-language capacity within the Respondent organisation. He asserted that the administrative leave was, in reality, a mechanism to remove him from the workplace without fair procedures and that the Respondent's actions were motivated by hostility to the views expressed in his email.

The Complainant stated that he was unfairly dismissed following an email that he sent to almost all employees of the Respondent on 11 December 2024 concerning the status of the Irish language within the organisation. He asserted that, later that same day, he was informed that he was being placed on administrative leave on the basis that complaints had been made about his email and that allegations of racial harassment had been raised. He stated that he was not informed in advance that such action was being contemplated, was not given an opportunity to respond to the allegations, and was not provided with sufficient details of the complaints before the decision was made.

The Complainant stated that the decision to place him on administrative leave was procedurally unfair and contrary to the principles of natural justice. He asserted that the Respondent used administrative leave as a means of removing him from the workplace and that, in substance, he was given "a baton and the road" rather than being placed on genuine administrative leave. The Complainant asserted that the Respondent's stated reliance on allegations of racial harassment was merely a pretext. He alleged that the real reason for the Respondent's actions was his disclosure to staff that there was no Irish-language capacity within the organisation and his criticism of the Respondent, as a public body, for that position. He asserted that management were angered by the contents of his email and sought to remove him from the organisation as quickly and quietly as possible. The Complainant further stated that the administrative leave had a significant personal impact on him, causing distress, anxiety, sleep difficulties and requiring medical and counselling support. He asserted that the Respondent's actions amounted to an unfair dismissal.

The Respondent denied that the Complainant had been dismissed. They stated that the Complainant was engaged through Orange Recruitment Limited on a fixed-term agency arrangement and that the requirement for his temporary role had ceased. The Respondent stated that the agency had been informed on 18 November 2024 that the assignment would end on 31 December 2024 and that the Complainant was advised that his employment would cease at the end of the fixed term. The Respondent submitted that the Complainant's complaint arose not from any dismissal but from the decision to place him on administrative leave on 11 December 2024 after three employees complained about an email he had circulated to almost every member of staff. They asserted that administrative leave did not terminate the employment relationship and that the Complainant remained in employment and continued to receive full pay until 31 December 2024. The Respondent contended that the contract of employment expired in accordance with its terms and that the non-renewal of the contract had been determined before the email of 11 December 2024 was sent.

They rejected the Complainant's assertion that the expiry of the contract was linked to the contents of that email. The Respondent relied upon section 2(2)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 and submitted that the Complainant was employed under a fixed-term contract containing an exclusion clause providing that the Unfair Dismissals Acts would not apply where the contract expired without renewal. They asserted that the employment ended solely through the expiry of the fixed term and, consequently, that the protections of the Unfair Dismissals Act did not apply.

The Respondent further stated that, following the complaints concerning the email, an investigation was undertaken. That investigation found that the Complainant had breached the Respondent's Email and Internet Usage Policy but did not find a breach of the Equality and Diversity Policy. The investigation concluded that the Complainant appeared to have had good intentions and made no recommendations in light of the fact that his contract had already expired. The Respondent therefore submitted that the complaint was misconceived, that no unfair dismissal had occurred, and that, in any event, any termination of employment resulted solely from the expiry of a fixed-term contract falling within the exclusion contained in section 2(2)(b) of the Act.

The Respondent raised a preliminary objection that the complaint is excluded from the scope of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 by virtue of section 2(2)(b) of the Act.

It was not disputed in evidence that the Complainant was employed under a fixed-term arrangement which was due to expire on 31 December 2024 or that, on 18 November 2024, the employment agency was informed that the assignment would cease on 31 December 2024 and that the Complainant was subsequently notified that his employment would end on that date.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant's contract of employment contained an express provision disapplying the Unfair Dismissals Acts where the employment ended by reason of the expiry of the fixed term without renewal. I was referred to the contractual documentation and to the authorities relied upon by the Respondent concerning the operation of section 2(2)(b).

Section 2(2)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 provides that the Act shall not apply where the employment is under a fixed-term contract and the dismissal consists only of the expiry of that term without renewal, provided the statutory requirements of that section have been satisfied.

For the purposes of this complaint, I am prepared to assume, without deciding, that the ending of the Complainant's employment constituted a dismissal within the meaning of the Act.

Even on that basis, I am satisfied that the Complainant was employed under a written fixed-term contract containing an express exclusion clause within the meaning of section 2(2)(b), that the fixed term expired on 31 December 2024 and that the employment ended solely by reason of the expiry of that fixed term without renewal.

It was not disputed in evidence that the decision not to renew or extend the engagement had been made prior to the events of 11 December 2024. I am satisfied that those events did not alter the fact that the employment terminated on the agreed expiry date of the fixed-term contract and that the ending of the employment relationship occurred solely by reason of the effluxion of time.

I do not accept that the Complainant's placement on administrative leave on 11 December 2024 is capable of displacing the operation of section 2(2)(b) in the circumstances of this case. Administrative leave pending investigation is, by its nature, a measure of a different character to dismissal: it does not terminate the contract of employment, the employee remains formally in employment and, as here, in receipt of full pay, and it is capable of being reversed without any further act on the part of the employer. The Complainant's employment relationship therefore continued in being throughout the period of administrative leave and up to 31 December 2024, notwithstanding that he did not attend the workplace during that period. In Iarnród Éireann Irish Rail v Albert Kelly UDD2453, the Labour Court considered whether the termination of a fixed-term employee's contract was based solely on the cessation of that contract for the purposes of section 2(2)(b), and held that shortcomings in the process surrounding an employee's departure — in that case, the absence of a formal exit process and the employee's continued presence on the work rota after his contract had technically expired — did not of themselves establish that some factor other than the expiry of the fixed term was operative in ending the employment. Applying that approach here, I am satisfied that the manner of the Complainant's removal from the workplace on 11 December 2024, whatever view might be taken of the fairness of that process, is not evidence that the ending of his employment on 31 December 2024 was attributable to anything other than the expiry of the fixed term. The events of 11 December 2024 explain why the Complainant did not attend the workplace for the final weeks of his engagement; they do not establish that those events, rather than the expiry of the fixed-term contract, were the operative cause of the termination of his employment.

Accordingly, I find that the termination falls within the exclusion provided by section 2(2)(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. As the statutory conditions required by that provision have been satisfied, the protections of the Act do not apply to the termination of the Complainant's employment.

I have no jurisdiction in respect of this complaint because the termination of employment is excluded from the scope of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 by operation of section 2(2)(b) of the Act.