This website contains decisions and determinations of both the Labour Court and the WRC. It also contains decisions and recommendations of the Equality Tribunal since 1996 and post 2007 determinations of the Employment Appeals Tribunal. For more information click here

ADJ-00049248

ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

 

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00049248

Parties:

 

Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Gerry  Burke

Magellan Aviation Services

Representatives

Ercus Stewart SC and Tom McGowan BL, instructed by

Melvyn Hanley Melvyn Hanley Solicitors

Peter O’Brien BL instructed by

Edward Kelly Holmes O'Malley Sexton Solicitors LLP

 

Complaints:

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00060524-001

13/12/2023

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00060524-002 WITHDRAWN ON 19 MARCH 2026

13/12/2023

 

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  14/11/2024; 25/06/2025; 19/03/2026; 20/03/2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Ewa Sobanska

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  14/11/2024; 25/06/2025; 19/03/2026; 20/03/2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Ewa Sobanska

Procedure:

In accordance with section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977, as amended, following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.

 

At the adjudication hearing, the parties were advised that the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 grants Adjudication Officers the power to administer an oath or affirmation. The legal perils of committing perjury were explained. All participants who gave evidence were sworn in. The parties were offered the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence.

The parties were also advised that, in accordance with the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, hearings before the Workplace Relations Commission are held in public and, in most cases, decisions are no longer anonymised. The parties are named in the heading of the decision. For ease of reference, the terms of Complainant and Respondent are used throughout the body of the decision and the Respondent’s employees are also referred to by their job titles.

I have taken the time to carefully review all the submissions and evidence both written and oral. I have noted the respective positions of the parties. I am not required to provide a line for line rebuttal of the evidence and submissions that I have rejected or found superfluous to the main findings. I am required to set out ‘such evidential material which is fundamentally relevant to the decision’ per MacMenamin J. in Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63.

Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties under statute. Both parties confirmed that they had been given a full opportunity to present their respective case.

The Complainant was represented by Mr Ercus Stewart SC and Mr Tom McGowan BL instructed by Mr Melvyn Hanley, solicitor, Melvyn Hanley Solicitors. Ms Geraldine Burke; Mr John McDonnell; Mr Mark Reardon, and Mr Karl Brunjej attended the hearing for the Complainant.

 

The Respondent was represented by Mr Peter O’Brien BL instructed by Mr Edward Kelly, solicitor, Holmes O'Malley Sexton Solicitors LLP. Mr Niall Duggan, Director and Mr Donnacha Dowling, CFO attended the hearing for the Respondent.

 

Background:

The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent on 15 October 1990. His employment terminated on 8 August 2023.

 

On 13 December 2023, the Complainant referred his claims against the Respondent to the Director General of the WRC. The Respondent rejects the claims.

 

At the adjudication hearing on 25 June 2025, the Complainant withdrew his claims and authorised the WRC to close the file on 24 July 2025, if he has not specifically countermanded this in writing. The Complainant subsequently wrote to the WRC countermanding the withdrawal.

 

At the adjudication hearing on 19 March 2026, Mr Stewart SC, on behalf of the Complainant, withdrew the claim pursuant the Payment of Wages Act 1991 bearing the reference number CA-00060524-002.

 

Summary of Respondent’s Case:

On 6 November 2024, the Respondent furnished the following written submission.

Background

The Respondent is an Irish registered subsidiary of a Japanese conglomerate, Marubeni Corporation. It is involved in the provision of services to the international commercial aviation sector including airframe and aero-engine sales, leasing and management.

The Complainant was a founding partner/shareholder of the Respondent and served as its Managing Director from 1998 until 2013. Marubeni acquired 50% of the shares in the Respondent in 2012 and ultimately the balance of the shares thereafter in consideration for a significant eight-figure sum. The Complainant received a significant seven-figure sum for the purchase of his shares in the Respondent.

The Complainant emigrated to Malta in 2013 for (legitimate) tax avoidance purposes in connection with the sale of his shareholding in the Respondent and the further payment of wages thereafter.

Following the acquisition of the Complainant’s shares in the business and his emigration to Malta, it was mutually agreed that the Complainant would continue to work for the Respondent in a new international position created for him as a former MD – Director of Special Projects – where he would be in a position to utilise his industry experience, connections and knowledge for the benefit of the Respondent and which included representational / ambassadorial duties on behalf of the Respondent. The Complainant continued in his employment under the extant contract of employment.

In recent times, the Respondent received tax advice that the continuing payment of wages to the Complainant without deduction of either Irish or Maltese tax was unlawful. In 2022, the Respondent sought to regularise the Complainant’s tax status by offering him an updated contract of employment which would have provided that the Complainant become liable for Maltese income tax thereafter. Such contract would also have provided for a (backdated) increase in his wages. The Complainant elected not to execute such contract and from 6 March 2023 ceased work and remained on an extended period of sick leave thereafter. An attempt to mediate the dispute was wholly unsuccessful.

In reliance on the provisions of clause 6(a)(ii) of the Complainant’s contract of employment, which provided that in circumstances where the Complainant remains out of work for a period in excess of 60 days, he is automatically deemed permanently incapacitated, the Complainant’s employment was terminated on 8 August 2008 following in excess of 154 days continuous absence from work on sick leave. Although the Respondent’s handbook makes provision for only 2 weeks of sick pay in any 12-month period, the Complainant continued on full pay until the date of his termination in August 2008. In addition, notwithstanding the 30-day notice period provided for under the contract of employment, the Complainant was paid an ex-gratia notice period of 3 months amounting to €22,000 on the termination of his employment, together with other termination payments including bonus amounting to a total of €51,777.57.

It is submitted that there are three issues for consideration in the within hearing; (1) jurisdiction / applicability of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended), (2) fairness of dismissal and (3) remedies.

(1)    Jurisdiction / applicability of Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended)

Payment of Wages claim

The Complainant has initiated separate High Court plenary proceedings (Rec. No. 2024 / 307P) in connection with the alleged non-payment of the proposed (backdated) wages increase. Section 6(3) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (as amended) provides as follows;

“(a) A rights commissioner shall not give a decision under this section in relation to a deduction or payment referred to in subsection (2) at any time after the commencement of the hearing of proceedings in a court brought by the employee concerned in respect of the deduction or payment. As such, pursuant to the provisions of s.6(3)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 the WRC is precluded from determining the Employee’s claim.”

As such, pursuant to the provisions of section 6(3)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991, the WRC is precluded from determining the Complainant’s claim.

Unfair dismissal claim

It is submitted in the first instance that the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) has no application to the circumstances of the within case.

Section 2(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) provides as follows;

(a)    (a) This Act shall not apply in relation to the dismissal of an employee who, under the relevant contract of employment, ordinarily worked outside the State unless—

(i)                  (i) he was ordinarily resident in the State during the term of the contract, or

(ii)                (ii) he was domiciled in the State during the term of the contract, and the employer—

(I)                  (I)in case the employer was an individual, was ordinarily resident in the State, during the term of the contract, or

(II)                (II) in case the employer was a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons, had its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract.

(b)     

(c)     (b) In this subsection “term of the contract” means the whole of the period from the time of the commencement of work under the contract to the time of the relevant dismissal.

 

While it is accepted that the Respondent is a body corporate having its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract, it is submitted that the Act does not apply in the present case in circumstances where;

·       the ordinary work carried out by the Complainant since 2014 (when he ceased to be MD and took up duties as a Director of Special Projects in sourcing and inspecting aviation assets for purchase on behalf of the Employer) was carried out entirely outside of the State

·       the Complainant benefitted from a certificate of exclusion from Irish PAYE tax on this basis so that his wages were paid without deduction of Irish taxes.

·       the Complainant has since 2013 been wholly resident and domiciled in Malta. It is notable that the Complainant was unable to provide an Irish address in his application to the WRC.

The Complainant emigrated to Malta in 2013 for tax avoidance purposes in connection with the sale of his shareholding in the Employer company and the further payment of wages thereafter. By taking up residence and domicile in Malta over 10 years ago and thereafter working outside of the State, the Complainant has thereby lost the benefit of the protections of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended).

 

(2)    Fairness of dismissal

Without prejudice to the foregoing preliminary submission, the Employer relies wholly on the express written terms of the contract between the parties in justifying the decision to terminate the employee’s contract dated 20 August 2008 and in particular the definition of “disability” in clause 1, “Definitions” as follows;

“‘Disability’ means if Executive becomes permanently incapacitated by accident or ill health from performing his duties under this Agreement and for the purpose of this definition incapacity for 60 consecutive days or any 120 aggregate days in any 12 month period shall be deemed to be permanent incapacity.”

when considered in conjunction with the provisions of clause 6(a)(ii) of the contract which provides as follows;

“Executive’s Disability

 During the Term, the Company may terminate the employment of Executive due to Executive’s Disability upon 30 days written notice to Executive.”

While this contractual provision might initially be considered harsh or severe, it is submitted that in fact it is reasonable here in all of the circumstances of the case. Specifically, this Complainant is a former MD who took the very substantial benefits of significant remuneration, the sizeable Irish GCT-free multi-million rewards consequent upon the sale of his shares in the Respondent and a step-down employment role created specifically for his needs. The Complainant had ceased to act as MD as of the date of his dismissal but equally had refused to execute an amendment to his contract of employment which would have acknowledged this and also would have regularised his tax status and required him to pay income tax in Malta. In circumstances where the Complainant, a continuing senior executive, insisted on taking the benefit of his existing contract (in order to avoid the costs of regularising his tax status), he must also take the burden of the provisions concerning deemed permanent incapacity and resultant termination.

It is submitted that the contractual provisions of the contract which deem a significant period of absence due to ill-health to automatically amount to permanent disability within the meaning of the contract obviates the requirement for consultation with a doctor that might otherwise or ordinarily arise. An employee benefitting from a senior executive contract takes the benefit of substantial remuneration and rewards but with that comes the burden of automatic deeming provisions concerning disability.

Ultimately it is submitted that the decision to dismiss was reasonable in the particular and unusual circumstances of the present case.

(3)    Remedies

Without prejudice to the above submissions of the Respondent, it is submitted that the remedy of reinstatement now sought is not appropriate. The Complainant has not occupied the role to which he seeks reinstatement since he went out on sick leave in March 2023 and such tasks as it encompassed have been distributed amongst other employees. It appears that the Complainant has remained incapacitated by reason of ill-health for a prolonged period of time as evidenced by the fact that a previous June 2024 hearing was adjourned on the Complainant’s application on grounds of ill-health.

Entirely without prejudice to the submissions made by the Respondent, it is further submitted that in the event that the WRC holds that (i) the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) applies to the present claim and (ii) the termination of the Complainant’s employment was unfair, then the appropriate remedy here is compensation and not reinstatement. Furthermore, the calculation of any such award of compensation to have regard to the fact that the Complainant appears to have been unavailable for work by reason of ill-health for the majority of the 15 months since the termination of his employment in August 2023.

It is submitted that the option of reinstatement is neither appropriate nor reasonable in the present case. In the first instance, the relationship of mutual trust and confidence necessary for a continuing employment relationship does not exist and cannot be re-established. It is submitted that it is entirely unreasonable to require an employer to re-employ a disgruntled former MD (with his own strong and differing views on how the employer’s business should be run) particularly in circumstances where;

·       The role occupied by the Complainant and which had been created specifically for him as a former MD is no longer available and such tasks as were associated with the role have been fully distributed amongst other employees;

·       The utmost necessity for a continuing relationship of trust and confidence, having regard to the particular nature of the employment role previously occupied by the Complainant with it representational and ambassadorial duties on behalf of the Respondent;

·       The circumstances where the Respondent has good reason to believe that the Complainant has since the termination of his employment been operating in the industry sector to advance the interests of competitors of the Respondent (in respect of which, no criticism of the Complainant is made);

·       The Complainant occupied a senior executive role within what is ultimately a relatively small organisation in terms of employee / executive numbers; The Complainant remains in litigation with the Respondent irrespective of the outcome of these proceedings (High Court Rec. No. 2024 /307P).

·       The Complainant is unwilling to cooperate with the Respondent in respect of the regularisation of his tax status so as to ensure income tax is paid on his future income and that the Respondent is fully tax compliant in all jurisdictions in which it operates.

The Supreme Court in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Department of Education [2024] IESC 38 has recently provided an authoritative consideration of the circumstances where the remedy of reinstatement will be appropriate following a finding of unfair dismissal. In particular, the Supreme Court held that the remedy of reinstatement was only to be available in exceptional circumstances / extremely rare circumstances. Furthermore, the following matters were significant; size of the employer (smaller businesses less amenable to reinstatement), seniority of the employee (more senior employees less amenable) and whether the role has been filled subsequently (generally unavailable where risk of displacement of new employee). At para. 103 the Supreme Court quoted with approval from Redmond on Dismissal Law in the following terms;

“The same author notes at paragraph 24.24:-

“In all cases, regard will be had to the industrial relations realities of the situation. It is improbable that either of the primary remedies will be awarded where shop floor feeling will be against it or if strikes or industrial action would follow. The size of the business will have an important influence on industrial relations aspects. Where the enterprise is small, the Workplace Relations Commission will probably conclude that compensation is the more appropriate remedy. On the other hand, if a complainant had worked for a large company in a relatively impersonal employer/employee relationship, particularly in a less senior position, either of the primary remedies might be appropriate. In contrast, the primary remedies are unlikely to be appropriate for a senior employee”.

Before concluding at para. 110;

“As set out in the extract from Redmond on Dismissal Law (op. cit.) at paragraph 103 above, it is extremely rare, even in those cases in which a claim for unfair dismissal succeeds, for an order for reinstatement to be made. It is not reasonable to expect that businesses would remain in limbo pending the outcome of protracted legal proceedings.”

It is submitted that on no basis could an award of reinstatement be appropriate in the present circumstances where a discontented senior executive of a small organisation seeks reinstatement.

Conclusion

In the first instance, it is submitted that the Unfair Dismissal Act 1977 (as amended) has no application to the Complainant’s claim. It is further submitted at the outset that the WRC has no jurisdiction to hear or determine the Complainant’s claim for alleged unpaid wages. It is submitted that these matters of dispute will require to be heard and determined as discrete preliminary issues.

It is further submitted that the Respondent’s decision to terminate the Complainant’s employment was made strictly in accordance with the provisions of the contract of employment between the parties. In circumstances where the Complainant took the benefit of the very significant remuneration and rewards consequent upon such contract of employment, it is reasonable that he also to bear the burden of the onerous provisions concerning deemed permanent incapacity.

Without prejudice to the foregoing, it is submitted that the Complainant in this case falls entirely outside of those “extremely rare” circumstances where it would be appropriate to order reinstatement of an employee and that the appropriate remedy therefore would be limited to compensation limited to the Employee’s actual losses having particular regard to his unavailability for employment until recent times.

Supplemental submission of 3 December 2014

The Respondent furnished some 21 appendices and made the following legal submissions.

Payment of Wages claim

It is submitted that, in the first instance the Complainant’s claim is precluded having regard to the provisions of section 6(3) of the Act. The High Court is the proper forum for the determination of such dispute.

Without prejudice, the Complainant’s claim for any alleged areas is largely if not completely outside the statutory time limit in this forum.

In 2016, the Complainant unambiguously rejected the 2016 pay increase offer made to all executives in circumstances where he was unwilling to enter into a new contract.

A dispute arises as to the terms of the 2023 offer made by the Respondent to pay a back-dated increase. At all times, the Respondent’s offer was clearly and unambiguously conditional upon the Complainant’s agreement to enter into a new and tax compliant contract of employment with the Respondent. The Respondent’s offer was an inducement to secure the cooperation of eth Complainant in regularising his tax affairs. In circumstances where the Complainant was entirely unwilling to regularise his tax affairs in accordance with the tax advice received by the Respondent, the Respondent was under no obligation to make any additional payments to the Complainant.

The Irish Courts have consistently held that a contract of employment which has the effect of unlawfully avoiding tax obligations is void and enforceable and further the unlawful element could not be severed; per Barron J in Hayden v Sean Quinn Properties Limited [1994] ELR 45. In the present case, the Respondent had received express legal and tax advice to the effect that the continued payment of the Complainant’s wages pursuant to the extant contract of employment without registration for and deduction of Maltese tax was unlawful. The WRC should not give effect to the Complainant’s claim for payment of wages in a manner as to continue the unlawfully evasion of tax.

Unfair dismissal claim

The Complainant has at all times since 2013 been wholly resident and domiciled in Malta and carried out the entirety of his work outside of the State. It is submitted that section 2(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Act applies such that the Complainant does not have the benefit of those statutory protections.

The starting point is the observation in Redmond on Dismissal Law, Ryan, 3rd Ed) Dublin 2017 at para. 23.99 that;

“The 1977 Act endorses the generally recognised principle that an employee cannot seek the protection of the laws of a state as regards a contract which is performed outside of it.”

The issue has arisen in a cross-channel sea-farer cases Roche & ors v Sealink Stena Line Ltd. 1993 ELR 89 where seafarers were ostensibly working out of the UK. However, it was established in evidence that the employees were “ordinarily resident” in Ireland and so the Act applied - a situation entirely at odds with the Complainant’s situation here.

It is accepted that the previsions of regulation 1215/2015/EU – the Recast Brussels I Regulation concerning jurisdiction. This provides rules of “special jurisdiction” to the effect that an employee may sue his employer in the jurisdiction of the employer.

While it is fully accepted that by operation of Brussels I Regulation, an Irish Court has jurisdiction in respect of any claim made by an employee against their employer, any court or tribunal seized of such jurisdiction must nevertheless apply Irish law to the determination of such dispute in circumstances where the contract between the parties is expressly subject to Irish law and the Irish statutory regime in respect of a claim for unfair dismissal applies. The statutory regime which this forum is obliged to apply to the Complainant’s claim for unfair dismissal is and remains the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended in all its provisions.

The Irish legislature has expressly chosen to exclude certain claimants from the scope of the Act and despite amendments to the Act subsequent to the commencement of the Brussels I Regulation, expressly chose to maintain the non-applicability of the Act to claimants where they resided abroad and the work was performed entirely abroad.

Accordingly, it is submitted that the provisions of Brussels I Regulation apply to jurisdiction only and do not alter or interfere with the application of the Irish law to any such hearing. Irish law clearly and unambiguously disapplies the provisions of the Unfair Dismissals Act to the Complainant’s claim for reasons set out herein which are wholly supported by the documentary evidence.

Fairness of the dismissal

Entirely without prejudice to the Respondent’s primary submission as to the non-applicability of the Act to the termination of the Complainant’s employment, the Respondent submits that termination of the Complainant’s employment was fair within the meaning of section 6(4) of the Act as being one far which their substantial grounds were having regard to all the circumstances. In particular, having regard to the express contractual provision which provides for an automatic deeming of disability in cases of objective measured periods of extended absence from work by reason of ill health, it is submitted that there was in the instant case “other good reason” for the termination of the Complainant’s employment.

Remedy of reinstatement or reengagement

Entirely without prejudice to the previous submissions that even if the WRC were to determine that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed, it is submitted that the only appropriate remedy here is damages. For the reasons set out in earlier submissions and supported by documentary evidence the remedies of reinstatement or reengagement are entirely inappropriate.

Again, the starting point is the observation in Redmond at para 24.18 that;

“A fundamental point about the legislation in both jurisdictions is that there is no right to insist on keeping one’s job – the award of one or other of the primary remedies (reinstatement/ reengagement) must be appropriate in all of the circumstances.”

The Supreme Court in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court [2024] IESC 38 has recently held authoritatively that the remedy of reinstatement only to be available in exceptional and/or extremely rare circumstances.

It is submitted that on no basis could an award of reinstatement be appropriate in the present circumstances where discontented executive of a small organisation seeks reinstatement, all the more so where there remains continuing litigation and an unresolved and entrenched dispute concerning the legality of the Complainant’s tax status qua employee.

Finally, it is submitted that the behaviour of the Complainant since the termination of his employment with the Respondent in acting for or on behalf of a competitor of the Respondent or, at the very least, having held himself publicly as doing so, is entirely irreconcilable with an order for the reinstatement or reengagement of the Complainant. Further such commercial benefits as obtained by the Complainant in this regard must be weighted n the balance in respect the Complainant’s obligation to mitigate his losses in considering the Complainant’s actual loss.

Supplemental submission of 17 April 2025

These submissions and supporting documentation are supplemental to the Respondent's submissions of November 2024 and are made in response to the Complainant's submissions with which the Respondent joins issue in full.

The Respondent joins issue with the allegations now made that the Complainant remained working during the period when he was on certified sick leave between March and August 2023. The Respondent’s Managing Director, Niall Duggan, to whom the Complainant directly reported, will give evidence that the Complainant was not working whilst on certified sick leave, that there was no regular work-related communication between the parties and that no expense claims were made for work-related travel that would have arisen in the ordinary course of the Complainant's employment had he been working.

The Respondent further joins issue with the submission made by the Complainant that it is in the Respondent's best interest that the Complainant be reinstated to his former employment. It was and remains the Respondent’s fundamental position that there has been a complete breakdown in trust and confidence between the parties (on both sides), as evidenced by the Complainant's behaviour pre and post termination of his employment. The Respondent relies on demands in writing made by the Complainant that the Board of the parent company of the Respondent resign (email 15/12/2023,) and that the Complainant has recently represented himself with a competitor of the Respondent which competitor has poached three key employees from the Respondent in recent months.

The Respondent entirely rejects the contention now made that the Complainant is irreplaceable and/or uniquely qualified in respect of his employment. The Respondent submits that the termination of the employment of the Complainant has had no detrimental effect on the performance or profitability of the Respondent in circumstances where other staff are now successfully carrying out the employment functions formerly undertaken by the Complainant.

Strictly without prejudice to the foregoing and the submissions previously delivered, even if it is held that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed, which is denied, it is submitted that the Complainant has failed to mitigate his loss in circumstances where the Complainant has not provided any evidence to the WRC in respect of alternative employment obtained and/or efforts made in respect of same.

In Wrobel v Haccius Logistics Ltd ADJ-00035911 (2022), the Adjudicator determined that it "is well established that a Claimant must make every effort to mitigate loss in the event of a termination.

This accords with Section 7(2)(c) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 which makes it clear that in determining the amount of any compensation, consideration must be given to “the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid".

The test for a complainant to mitigate their loss is set out in the decision of the Labour Court in Smith v Leddy UDD 1974 (2019). In that case, the Labour Court determined that "the court expects to see that employees who are dismissed spend a significant portion of each normal working day, while they are out of work, engaged actively in the pursuit of alternative employment" and stated that if this test is not met, then this had to be reflected in the compensation awarded to the claimant.

This also accords with Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Ltd. UD 858/1999 within which the Employment Appeals Tribunal considered an employee's efforts to mitigate and held:

"A Claimant who finds himself out of work should employ a reasonable amount of time each weekday in seeking work It is not enough to inform agencies that you are available for work nor merely to post an application to various companies seeking work. The time that a Claimant finds on his hands is not his own, unless he chooses it to be, but rather to be profitably employed in seeking to mitigate his loss.”

More recently in Cityjet v Gil UDD215 (2021), the Labour Court cut an award of compensation made by the WRC to four weeks’ pay where the employee was unable to produce evidence to substantiate his claimed losses and was unable to demonstrate efforts to mitigate his losses.

Equally in McGuire Haulage Limited v O'Farrell UDD2324 (2023), the Labour Court held that subsequent efforts made by an employee to mitigate his losses were inadequate where the efforts were "infrequent and largely informal rather than structured in nature " and limited "to a very restricted geographical area”. These findings reduced the initial WRC compensatory award from €70,000 to €20,000 to reflect a more just and equitable amount, having regard to the overriding duty to mitigate.

In N Smith & Sons Ltd t/a Ford Smiths of Drogheda v Ragelis UDD2332, the Labour Court held that the unfairly dismissed employee fell "very far short of the obligation placed by the Act" despite the employee having applied for multiple jobs and speaking "by telephone with six contacts in an eight-month period". The level of compensation awarded by the WRC was reduced to zero.

In the present case, the Complainant has now provided no evidence of efforts he has made to seek employment subsequent to his dismissal from the Respondent. The failure of the Complainant to demonstrate any efforts to obtain employment represents a failure to mitigate as required by statute and the above authority.

Accordingly, it is submitted that the Adjudication Officer should have regard to the failure of the Complainant to mitigate his loss to the required standard and if unfair dismissal is found to have occurred, (which is denied), the Complainant should only be awarded the minimum compensation of four weeks wages.

Entirely without prejudice to the Respondent’s position that the Complainant’s dismissal was fair and/or that he has failed to mitigate his losses such that he should only be awarded the minimum payment, the Respondent makes the following submissions concerning the Complainant’s remuneration for the purposes of any redress under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977.

Section 7(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) provides:

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances.

Section 17(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) provides:

17.- (1) The Minister may make regulations for the purposes of sections 7 (1) (c) and (8) of this Act and for the purpose of enabling any other provisions of this Act to have full effect

Section 7 of S.I. No. 287/1977 - Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations, 1977, which was enacted in exercise of the powers conferred on the Minister by Section 17 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended), states:

7. (a) In -the case of an employee who is paid remuneration in respect of the relevant employment wholly or partly at piece rates, or whose remuneration includes commissions (being piece rates or commissions related directly to his output at work) or bonuses, and in the case of any other employee whose remuneration in respect of the relevant employment varies in relation to the amount of work done by him, his weekly remuneration shall be the amount obtained by dividing the amount of the remuneration to be taken into account in accordance with paragraph (b) of this Regulation by the number of hours worked in the period of 26 weeks mentioned in the said paragraph (b) and multiplying the resulting amount by the normal number of hours for which, at the date of the dismissal of the employee, an employee in the relevant employment was required to work in each week

(b) The remuneration to be taken into account for the purposes of paragraph (a) of this Regulation shall be the total remuneration paid to the employee concerned in respect of the employment concerned for all the hours worked by the employee in the employment in the period of26 weeks that ended 13 weeks before the date on which the employee was dismissed, adjusted in respect of any variations in the rates of pay which became operative during the period of 13 weeks ending on the date of dismissal of the employee....

Section 9 of S.I. No. 287/1977 - Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations, 1977 states:

9. Where, in a particular week, an employee qualifies for a payment of a bonus, pay allowance or commission which relates to work the whole or part of which was not done in that particular week, the whole or the appropriate proportionate part of the payment as the case may be, shall, for the purposes of Regulations 4 and 7 (b) of these Regulations, be disregarded in relation to that particular week and shall for those purposes, be taken into account in relation to any week in which any of the work was done.

As the Complainant's remuneration includes bonus, his weekly remuneration for the purposes of any award of compensation which may be ordered under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) must be calculated in accordance with Regulation 7 of S.I. No. 287/1977 Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations, 1977 (as amended).

14. The relevant time period in accordance with Section 7(b) of S.I. No. 287/1977 is from 8 November 2022 to 9 May 2023, being the 26 weeks up to the date 13 weeks prior to the date of dismissal on 8 August 2023.

15. The Complainant's weekly remuneration for the purposes of the above referenced legislation is €1,701.78. The relevant calculations are set out below.

16. Remuneration excluding bonuses:

Month

Reckonable days

Remuneration

Reckonable Pay

May 2023

6/23

€7,333.33

€1,913.04

April 2023

20/20

€7,333.33

€7,333.33

March 2023

23/23

€7,333.33

€7,333.33

February 2023

20/20

€7,333.33

€7,333.33

January 2023

22/22

€7,333.33

€7,333.33

December 2022

22/22

€7,333.33

€7,333.33

November 2022

17/22

€7,333.33

€5 666.66

Total

 

 

€44,246.35

 

Bonuses:

Month

Reckonable days

Remuneration

Reckonable Pay

May 2023

6/23

€0.00

€0.00

April 2023

20/20

€0.00

€0.00

March 2023

23/23

€0.00

€0.00

February 2023

20/20

€0.00

€0.00

January 2023

22/22

€0.00

€0.00

December 2022

22/22

€0.00

€0.00

November 2022

17/22

€0.00

€0.00

Total

 

 

€0.00*

 

*Although customarily paid bonuses dependant on company profitability, the Claimant was not paid any bonus during the relevant period. The Claimant was paid a bonus in August 2023 in respect of the period 1 April 2022 — 31 March 2023 of €19,233.66

Total Remuneration:

Remuneration + Bonuses = Total

€44,246.35       €0.00          €44,246.35

 

Total

Number of hours worked in 26-week period x

Normal number of hours for which, at the date of dismissal of the employee, an employee was required to work each week =

Weekly remuneration

€44,246.35

975

37.5

€1,701.78

 

On 19 March 2026, copies of documentary evidence including the termination letter date 8 August 2023, the Complainant’s reply to the letter; copies of the Complainant’s medical certificates

Summary of direct evidence and cross-examination of Mr Niall Duggan, Managing Director of the Respondent

Mr Duggan said that he has been with the Respondent since 1997 and is the Director of the Respondent. Mr Duggan outlined the background to the Respondent.

Mr Duggan said that the Complainant’s contract defines a “disability”, and the clause 6(a)(ii) of the contract provides for the eventuality of an Executive’s disability. He said that there is no requirement to have a medical advice.

Mr Duggan said that the Amendment No. 1 to the Employment Contract dated 29 June 2012 removed the non-compete clause.

Mr Duggan said that Marubeni acquired initially 50% of the shares in the Respondent and subsequently the balance of the shares. At that time, the Complainant moved to Malta. He was well regarded and experienced and he was made a Director of Special Projects. The Complainant did not work in Ireland but primarily in Europe.

Mr Duggan said that an issue arose regarding the Complainant’s tax status. The Respondent applied for a PAYE exclusion order.

Marubeni would have preferred the staff to stay and offered inducements in that context. New contracts were presented to all executives which offered a 15% pay increase but had to be signed with restricted covenants. The Complainant was unhappy with the contract. Marubeni agreed for him not to sign the contract; however, he would not get the pay increase.

In April 2023, the Complainant was happy with the prepared draft of the contract, which contained a clause regarding termination due to incapacity. However, he did not sign the document.

Mr Duggan referred to the Respondent’s letter to the Inspector of Taxes dated 24 October 2013. He said that the Complainant indicated that he wanted to move and that he would seek a PAYE exclusion. The Respondent had to satisfy itself that any conditions regarding a PAYE exclusion were met.

Mr Duggan said that the Respondent sought an accountant / tax advice and tried to regularise the tax situation. The Complainant’s contract was not executed at that stage, and the Respondent had to establish the tax implications of the Complainant’s residence in Malta. It was suggested that if the Complainant worked and resided in Malta, he had to pay his tax in Malta; he has not paid any tax in Ireland. In December 2022, the Complainant said that he would talk to his accountant when he was back in Malta. Mr Duggan said that he and the CEO met with the Complainant in Zurich and the Complainant suggested that he would move to Dubai.

Regarding the Complainant’s evidence that he divided his time equally between Malta, Ireland and other countries, Mr Duggan said that it was an informal agreement, there were no timesheets, no evidence where the Complainant was or what he was doing. Mr Duggan said that he would have thought that the Complainant spent less than 1/3 of his time in Ireland and, if he was in the country, he was not working.

Mr Duggan said that on 1 July 2016, it was agreed that the Complainant would be awarded the 15% pay increase but he had to sign his contract. Mr Asano would have reported the matter to Mr Takechi, who in turn emailed the Complainant on 22 March 2023. An attempt was made to put the contract in place.

Mr Duggan referred to an email from the Complainant dated 22 March 2023 where the Complainant said that he was not willing to sign the contract and threatened to sue the Respondent over the backpay he was not entitled to.

Mr Duggan referred to an email to the Complainant dated 21 April 2023, where he stated that the Respondent is attempting to regularise the tax and payroll issue. The Respondent retained a firm in Malta to process the Complainant’s payroll and it was in the process of registering as an employer in Malta due to the Complainant’s decision to live in this jurisdiction. Mr Duggan explained how sharing of the Complainant’s information with the firm would make the procedure more efficient but noted that the Complainant’s requested the Respondent not to divulge his personal information to a third party. He further noted that the Complainant intended to sue the Respondent if it took action to ensure that it complied with tax legislation of a jurisdiction in which the Complainant has chosen to live.

Mr Duggan said that some two months were spent trying to establish if the Complainant’s residence in Dubai could be accommodated, but it was determined that it could not.

Mr Duggan said that on 27 April 2023 he emailed the Complainant with an offer of mediation. He said that the Complainant indicated that he had a tax position in Malta, but no details were provided, the Complainant proposed to move to Dubai.

Mr Duggan said that matters became increasingly fractious. The Complainant initiated a High Court action, and he tried to escalate the matter to Japan. Mr Duggan referred to the Complainant’s email of 20 March 2023, where he noted the personal effect a court action would have on Mr Duggan and Mr Dowling, and on working relationships. He noted that the relationship with his colleagues would be damaged irreparably and would end up becoming toxic.

Mr Duggan said that the Complainant forwarded his email exchange to him, Mr Dowling and Mr Spaulding. He was giving them heads up regarding the legal action. Given that and the events since, it would be difficult to work together.

Regarding the Complainant’s solicitor’s letter of 2 August 2024 which addressed files on the Respondent’s system and which threatened the Respondent with An Garda Siochána, Mr Duggan said that the Respondent conducted a search and made available to the Complainant all records that were located.

Regarding the Complainant’s email to President Kakinoki calling for the entire board to resign, Mr Duggan said that the Complainant was pursuing his vendetta because of the termination of his employment.

Mr Duggan said that notwithstanding 20 years of working together, any future relationship was impossible. He said that in light of the actions the Complainant took against the Respondent, he could not see how the Complainant could come back to work for the Respondent.

Mr Duggan said that 2024 financial year was a record year on revenue and profits; in 2025 the revenue was down but record profit was achieved. The Complainant’s work was divided between others and profitability increased. Mr Duggan said that he worked with the Complainant for some 25 years, but everyone is replaceable.

Regarding the mediation between the parties, Mr Duggan said that the Respondent could not see a way forward, there was an impasse regarding the Complainant’s contract and the backpay issues. Given where the relationship was, the Respondent relied on the clause in the Complainant’s contract in the context of his sick certificates.

Regarding the Complainant denying that he was out sick, Mr Duggan said that the Complainant handed over his work and then Mr Duggan was getting his medial certs in connection with his surgery and then with stress. The last expenses claim was for March 2023. Because the Complainant’s work involved exclusively travelling, there would be ongoing expenses; If there were no expenses, he did not work.

Mr Duggan said that several employees left to work for a named competitor. He said that while he was not making any criticism of the Complainant working for the competitor, it seemed that the Complainant was trying to damage the Respondent. If the Complainant was to return to the Respondent, damage would be much easier to be caused.

In cross-examination, Mr Duggan confirmed that the Complainant joined the Respondent before him and at that time relationships were good.

Mr Duggan confirmed that he signed the letter to the Complainant dated 8 Augst 2023. He said that he was provided with information for the letter. He said that legal advisors drafted the letter.

Mr Duggan said that he kept the management aware of how the matter proceeded. He said that he did not follow up on the medical status as he had medical certs.

Mr Duggan confirmed that the dismissal was effective immediately and the Complainant’s access to the Respodnent’s system was removed.

Regarding the Complainant’s personal property, Mr Duggan said that there was some 2.5 years of correspondence alleging that the Respondent was holding the Complainant’s property. Mr Duggan said that, after the DPC request, there was a comprehensive search of the Respondent’s IT system. The Respondent made every effort to find everything.

It was put to Mr Duggan that he did not seek a medical assessment of the Complainant. He said that the Respondent took the advice of his medical certs.

It was put to Mr Duggan that the Complainant was emailing him about work matters. He said that the emails were about the handover before his surgery.

It was put to Mr Duggan that after 33 years, the Complainant was dismissed because he was sick. Mr Duggan said that there was a contract between the parties which provided for this.

Mr Duggan confirmed that he calculated the Complainant’s absence to justify his dismissal. He said that the advice he got was to calculate calendar days as the contract did not specify “working days”. As the contract was not explicit, he included all calendar days.

It was put to Mr Duggan that an employer would always check in with an employee in similar circumstances. Mr Duggan said that the Respondent did not as the relationship was broken down.

It was put to Mr Duggan that the Complainant worked even while on certified leave, he dealt with issues worth millions of dollars and that there could be 150 emails either directly to Mr Duggan or copied to him. Mr Duggan said that he did not recall that, and recalled only that there were some handover emails. It was put to Mr Duggan that the Complainant’s view was that he sent emails on 44 days, so he did work on these days. It was suggested that the Complainant was working and sent some 15 emails on Saint Patrick’s Day. Mr Duggan said that his recollection was that the only emails were those regarding the dispute and the handover. He said that he was relying on the medical certificates. The Respondent did not expect the Complainant to work while on certified sick leave. Mr Duggan said that he did not recall receiving emails regarding the purchase of an engine or about an issue with Airbus.

It was put to Mr Duggan that another employee of the Respondent was sent to the Respondent’s doctor for a medical review while on long terms absence. Mr Duggan said that he was not familiar with the employee’s contract in that case.

Mr Duggan disagreed that the dismissal was grossly unfair and said that if circumstances were the same as they were in August 2023, he would do the same again.

Mr Duggan said that the Respondent’s tax adviser in Malta raised an issue, he then emailed the Complainant, he tried to communicate but the Complainant questioned the manner in which the tax matter was dealt with. The Complainant threatened litigation at that point. It was put to Mr Duggan that the Complainant has a constitutional right to sue.

In redirect, Mr Duggan said that, notwithstanding the Complainant’s absence, the Respondent had significant assets acquisitions.

Regarding the assertion that the Complainant was paid less than he was entitled to, Mr Duggan said that the Complainant had an issue with others getting an increase of 15%.

Mr Duggan confirmed that sick certs were received until August 2023, he had no reason to doubt them. He reiterated that travel would generate expenses and there were no expenses claims post March 2023.

Regarding the employee who was allegedly referred to the Respondent’s doctor, Mr Duggan said that he could not recall the medical issue but the person in question was a junior employee and had a contract different to an executive one.

Mr Duggan said that while the Complainant was entitled to 30 days’ notice, he was paid for three months.

Mr Duggan said that the tax advice was communicated to the Complainant and the Complainant did not provide any contradictory advice.

Mr Duggan agreed that the Complainant has lawful entitlement to litigate. However, he said that it would make the relationship difficult. He said that, as it was, he wasn’t sure if he could go back to prior relationship.

Mr Duggan was recalled to give further evidence regarding the emails furnished by the Complainant’s representative on 19 March 2026.

Mr Duggan said that on the basis of medical certs, he understood that the Complainant was sick. The Complainant explained previously that he had a surgery in March - April 2023. He then emailed that he needed another surgery. The Complainant’s recovery took longer than expected. From the end of April 2023 until August 2023, the Complainant was absent due to stress related issues.

It was noted that the Complainant furnished some 183 pages of emails; pages 1-175 contained emails from the beginning of March to 27 March 2023. Most emails after that were either emails from other parties that were forwarded or emails advising if the Complainant’s absence. There were no more than 3-4 emails that were work related. Mr Duggan said that typically managers would spend 15-20 minutes in the morning to check emails even when on leave, but nobody considers it work. It was not something that was expected of them; rather, they did so of their own accord.

Mr Duggan said that he recalled the emails on pages 152-153 where the Complainant stated that he was “powering down completely”. After that, up to the end of March, the Complainant was forwarding any emails he had received. Mr Duggan said that his understanding was that the Complainant did not work on anything other than the dispute.

Mr Duggan said that all certs bar one were issued by the Complainant’s Irish doctor, one was issued by a doctor in Malta.

Mr Duggan said that there was one or two other matters that arose, but he was not involved. Mr Duggan disagreed that the Complainant was bringing money; he said that the Complainant did not work to the same extend. There were no expense claims which meant that the Complainant did not work.

In cross-examination, it was put to Mr Duggan that the Complainant worked fully until 27 March 2023. Mr Duggan said that he would not interpret sending email as working full-time.

Mr Duggan was asked if the CEO, Mr Spaulding directed him to dismiss the Complainant with the CEO’s agreement. Mr Duggan said that the CEO was aware of the dismissal. Mr Duggan confirmed that he made the decision to dismiss the Complainant. He reported to the CEO; the CEO was copied on the correspondence; and the CEO was involved in the mediation. Mr Duggan said that the HR department is based in the USA and only this month a HR manager was hired in Shannon. Any HR matter would have previously been dealt with by an immediate manager.

Mr Duggan confirmed that there was a staff handbook, a disciplinary policy and a sick leave policy in place.

Mr Duggan confirmed that he did not seek to review the Complainant’s absence; he did not seek a return-to-work date. He said that sick leave, even prolonged is not a disciplinary matter. He agreed that there was no forewarning regarding the Complainant’s dismissal before the dismissal letter was issued. He also confirmed that there was no right to appeal the decision to dismiss. He said that the dismissal was related to contractual absence and was not misconduct.

Concluding remarks

Mr O’Brien BL reiterated the Respondent's position that the Complainant is excluded from the protections afforded by the Act.

In relation to the fairness of the dismissal, it was submitted that the termination of the Complainant's employment was carried out in accordance with the relevant contractual provisions. Mr O’Brien asserted that while senior employees enjoy significant benefits and privileges, they are equally bound by the obligations and restrictions contained within their contracts of employment.

With regard to the redress sought, it was submitted that the Complainant himself had acknowledged that the Respondent is a small company and that he occupied a senior position within it. While the Respondent recognised the Complainant's emotional investment and commitment to the business, it was argued that, where an employment relationship deteriorates, the working environment can become toxic and untenable. Although the Complainant stated that he could recover from the events in question, the Respondent maintained that it had lost trust and confidence in him.

Mr O’Brien further noted that there remains ongoing litigation concerning the Complainant's remuneration and that additional tax-related litigation may arise. He submitted that the essential relationship of trust and confidence had irretrievably broken down.

In response to the Complainant's position regarding his work for competing businesses, it was argued that, while the Complainant sought to distinguish between the ownership structures of those entities, the issue went to the core concern of employee poaching and competition.

Regarding the Complainant's alleged losses, it was submitted that he had made a conscious decision not to seek alternative employment and had instead focused on pursuing reinstatement. While the witnesses called on his behalf suggested that he would have difficulty securing employment, it was argued that this could only be established if he had actively applied for positions. The only witness from within the industry indicated that he would employ the Complainant "in a heartbeat". It was further submitted that the Complainant could have undertaken contract work and had therefore failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate his loss.

In summary, the Respondent submitted that the Complainant was not domiciled in Ireland and was therefore excluded from the protections of the Act. In the alternative, it was contended that the dismissal was not unfair. In the further alternative, the Respondent opposed any order for reinstatement.

 

 

 

 

Summary of Complainant’s Case:

On 25 October 2024, the Complainant furnished the following written submission.

The Complainant has been in continuous employment since 15 October 1990. It is not in issue that on 8 August 2023 the Complainant was dismissed without any prior notice or warning, or any proper, fair, in fact no, procedures, and his employment “will terminate from today’s date [8 August 2023]” and his access to IT, etc., was “immediately withdrawn”. This dismissal, and in such a manner, has caused the Complainant serious damage and was unfair.

The onus is on the Respondent to justify the dismissal by establishing substantial grounds, and fair procedures, in accordance with the legislation. It has not done so.

On 27 July 2023 the Complainant and the Respondent entered into mediation. After the mediation concluded on Friday 4 August, the Complainant received a letter dated Tuesday 8 August 2023, out of the blue and without any prior notice or warning that his “employment will terminate effective from today’s date”.

There was no compliance with fair procedures or natural justice, no opportunity to defend himself and his employment, no opportunity to make representations or to be represented, no opportunity to appeal, his protected disclosures were ignored, and it is clear that the Respondent has behaved and acted in breach of his rights and in breach of the legislation, regulations and code of conduct. This is an unfair dismissal which the Respondent has not even attempted to defend, justify or substantiate. It has treated the Complainant with contempt.

Notwithstanding the treatment of him, the Complainant seeks reinstatement to his employment and to his lifetime career to which he devoted his working life.

Supplemental submission of 19 December 2024

NEW ASSERTION BY RESPONDENT EMPLOYER – November / December 2024

The Complainant submits that the Respondent is attempting to further damage, delay and prejudice him, in the belated approach to this case and now purports to challenge his valid claim before the appropriate forum, the WRC.

In this case before the WRC, the Respondent, outside the WRC guidelines, and 15 months after the unfair dismissal of the Complainant, raised an objection which the Respondent had never mentioned at any time in the Complainant’s 33 years employment, and, more particularly, at any time since the Respondent dismissed him unfairly in August 2023.

The Respondent purports to object to the jurisdiction of the Irish courts, in particular the WRC/Labour Court. It purports to claim that the Complainant, an Irish citizen, domiciled in Ireland, employed by, and who served, an Irish company for 33 years, has no rights to seek redress from the courts of Ireland. The Respondent’s contention is that he should be compelled now to walk away from this unfair dismissal and allow the Respondent to behave as it has done, in totally disregarding his rights and fair procedures, and now, belatedly, that he cannot have this dismissal adjudicated upon in the appropriate forum, the WRC (and also the Labour Court and the High Court).

The Respondent makes this claim without any proper basis, without any precedent and totally ignoring the Complainant’s constitutional and legal rights, including his rights under European law, EU regulations and the European Social Charter of Fundamental Rights.

This belated objection by the Respondent is without any merit and does not stand up. The Complainant submits that the WRC should dismiss this unmeritorious objection, proceed to determine and confirm that the dismissal was unfair, and award the appropriate redress of reinstatement.

After his dedicated and loyal service of 33 years, the Complainant is entitled to this, particularly when having regard to the totality of the circumstances, the complete unfairness, the total lack of fair (or any) procedures and the manner of his dismissal. The Complainant would then be able to return to his employment and would commit himself to continue the good work he was doing on behalf of this company he served so long.

The Complainant is entitled to bring his complaint before the WRC and has the locus standi to do so with particular reference to Irish and European law and relies, inter alia, on Brussels Recast Regulations, European Social Charter, etc.

Article 21(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels 1a Regulation)

The Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, was pre-Brussels 1 Regulations (Recast) EU Number 1215/2012, and European Law takes precedence, has direct effect, is binding on all, binding in this case.

Section 2(3)(a) of the 1977 Act cannot therefore be relied upon. This is apart from, and without prejudice to, the late submissions of the Respondent, which should not be accepted, as being in breach of the WRC guidelines, and in particular where the Respondent was on notice from the Complainant’s solicitors that they were under a duty to furnish their submissions and, at no stage, whatsoever, during the employment, and, more particularly, since the dismissal and the claim to the WRC, have ever raised the issue of jurisdiction, or their new argument that the WRC does not have jurisdiction.

The Respondent had ample opportunity, and fair procedures require that it put the Complainant on notice where they were relying on such technical matters to his detriment. The Respondent should have informed and put the WRC (and him) on timely notice at the outset.

The Respondent relies on section 2(3)(a) 1977 Act –

This Act shall not apply in relation to the dismissal of an employee who, under the relevant contract of employment, ordinarily worked outside the State unless—

(i)                  he was ordinarily resident in the State during the term of the contract, or

(ii)                (ii) he was domiciled in the State during the term of the contract, and the employer—

(I)                  in case the employer was an individual, was ordinarily resident in the State, during the term of the contract, or

(II)                 in case the employer was a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons, had its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract.

 

(b) … term of the contract means the whole of the period from the time of the commencement of work under the contract to the time of the relevant dismissal.

 

It is submitted that the Complainant is domiciled in Ireland; the Respondent is a body corporate that has its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract.

 

This is accepted by the Respondent in its late submissions (received 4/5 November 2024).

 

3. – 2(2)(b) … term of the contract means the whole of the period from the time of the commencement of work under the contract to the time of the relevant dismissal.

 

This is from October 1990 until August 2023, 33 years.

 

The relevant / operative contract of employment

 

In the summary dismissal letter and in the Respondent’s submissions, the Respondent relies wholly on the express written terms of the contract between the parties dated 20 August 2008.

How can they claim / rely on – … ordinarily worked outside the State.

The Respondent required the Complainant to work anywhere they determined, their call, their decision. Unlike most of the employment in earlier years, remote working became common and required or agreed by the employer as circumstances arose. The Respondent never informed or put the Complainant on notice that working for the Respondent as it required might, in the Respondent’s opinion, deprive him of his rights. The Respondent cannot do so now, 15 months after his dismissal and, after his claim to the WRC.

 

Further, para 12 of the contract (prepared by the Respondent) which the Respondent expressly relies upon states that any dispute shall be referred to and dealt with in the jurisdiction of the courts of Ireland. In its written submissions, the Respondent expressly relies on this contract, it expressly relied on it when dismissing the Complainant and the Respondent is bound by this paragraph. That should be the end of this.

 

The Complainant submits that nowadays there are many Irish employees, thousands, who work remotely, but they cannot be, and are not, deprived of their rights under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. The Complainant should not be.

It is submitted that the Respondent, in the operative contract drafted by the Respondent, included a provision that the employment contract “shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the Republic of Ireland and the parties hereto submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the Republic of Ireland”. The Respondent only very belatedly purport to raise this new technical issue to deprive the WRC of its proper jurisdiction, in breach of European law, Irish law and the Constitution. The Complainant could not and does not agree with this improper attempt to deprive him of his rights, and this Irish employer, albeit owned and controlled by a Japanese corporation, cannot, and should not be, allowed to do so, to try to deny or usurp the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, rights of the employee. The Respondent has provided no basis, no justification and no precedent, for this. The protective provisions of community law are applicable and Article 30 of the European Social Charter of Fundamental Rights states unambiguously that-

‘Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.’

Brussels 1a Regulation states “In relation to insurance, consumers and employment contracts, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules”.

The provisions of European law prevail over any other jurisdiction including the procedural rules of any Member State.

Owusu v Jackson and Others, ECJ C-281/02, 1 March 2005 [CJEU].

The ECJ's judgment in the Owusu case C-281/02 made it clear that domestic rules of personal jurisdiction (in this case on declining jurisdiction) must be disapplied if they interfere with the jurisdictional scheme laid down in the Brussels I Recast Regulation 1215/2012 (at that time the Convention).

1. Brussels 1 Regulations (Recast) EU No 1215/2012 and

2. the Rome 1 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (17th June 2008)

3. European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”/ CJEU) decision Owusu v Jackson (trading as Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas (Case C281/02 [2005] E.C.R.-1 383).

4. Abama v Gama Construction (Ireland) Limited [2015] IECA 179, Court of Appeal

 

It is submitted that the Complainant as an employee is entitled to rely on European and Irish law to protect his position and to assert his rights and rely on the European Social Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Brussels 1 Regulations (Recast) EU No 1215/2012 and the Rome 1 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 (17th June 2008) which contains the law applicable to contractual relations and has special provisions applicable to individual contracts of employment. Brussels 1 Regulations (Recast) and Rome 1 protect the Complainant.

 

In disputes between the employee and employer, the Regulations aim to prevent proceedings from being brought in multiple jurisdictions and being determined under multiple applicable laws.

 

Brussels 1 Regulations (recast) provides that in the case of a claim by the employee against the employer the employee can sue the employer:

 

·       At the place of domicile of the employer (or of a deemed domicile of a branch), or

·       At the place where the employee habitually carries out his/her work, or

·        Where the place of habitual work is not situated in any one country the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated

 

Rome 1 Regulation Art. 8 covers situations where there is no choice of law clause.

 

Article 8

Individual employment contracts

 

1.       An individual employment contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice of law may not, however, have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.

2.       To the extent that the law applicable to the individual employment contract has not been chosen by the parties, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract. The country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed to have changed if he is temporarily employed in another country.

3.       Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraph 2, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated.

4.       Where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other country shall apply.

 

The Complainant is entitled to rely on European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”/ CJEU) decisions, including Owusu v Jackson (trading as Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas) Case C281/02 [2005] E.C.R.-1 383 and Irish superior court cases, including Abama v Gama Construction (Ireland) Limited [2015] IECA 179.

 

SUMMARY OF FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 

The Complainant worked in the aircraft industry for forty-four years. The Complainant started his career in the Irish Aer Corps before joining Airmotive Ireland and since 1990 the Complainant has been employed with the Respondent company, or predecessors, which became Magellan Aviation Services.

 

The Complainant was a key figure in the setting up of the new company in exceptionally difficult trading conditions. Under the stewardship of the Complainant, the company’s operation in Shannon and the U.S.A. made a profit in the first year of operation and continued to thrive.

 

The Complainant’s new role in 2013 as “Special Projects” involved travelling, inspecting, and purchasing aircraft and aircraft engines worldwide. The new role involved extensive travel on the company’s behalf. It was anticipated that the Complainant would work 50% less time within the company and as a result his basic salary was reduced from €110,772.00 to €55,380.00.

 

In 2016 upon a review, it was found that in fact the Complainant was working 80% of his previous hours and his salary was adjusted to reflect this, increased to €80,000 at that time.

 

Excluding the Complainant from the pay increase in 2017 was not a once off matter, for the next six years, the Complainant was excluded from the pay increases received by other members of the management. Indeed, the Complainant’s base salary has not increased since 2008.

 

The Complainant is of the view that that the manner and methods adopted by persons within Marubeni and Magellan in 2016 onwards have caused him much angst and adversely affected his relationship with the company that he was and is tremendously fond of particularly in the way the company dealt with its valued employees.

 

In 2022, the Complainant took the decision to contact the compliance department at Marubeni as he was of the view that issues regarding serious matters were not in compliance with best practice and procedures. The Complainant made a protected disclosure to Marubeni concerning the sale of the company and various practices engaged in by senior management. Based on the recommendation of the Complainant, Marubeni made a decision to investigate the pay and contract aspects of the complaint and to address the other matters once the pay and contract issues were settled. The findings of the investigation were not disclosed but the parent company Marubeni directed that the Complainant receive a 15% pay increase and that the increase be backdated. Regretfully the payment was not processed by the Respondent.

 

The Complainant underwent serious surgery in March 2023 and the actions of the Respondent in further demeaning his position and reputation within the company and the community delayed his recovery and added to the stress and strain which he was already under.

 

Within one working day after mediation concluded, and without any prior warning or notice, he received the letter of immediate dismissal dated 8 August 2023 which letter purported that:

·       the Company has decided to invoke clause 6(ii) of your Employment Contract …

·       Your employment will terminate effective from today’s date.

·       Your access to the Company’s IT systems will be immediately withdrawn.

·       May I take this opportunity on behalf of the Company to thank you for your past service and wish you every success in your future endeavours.

 

These words of the company, which, if sincere must mean something, should assist the WRC in determining that the fair and appropriate redress is reinstatement.

 

The letter of dismissal was totally incorrect. The Complainant was not absent from work for a period of 154 days from 6 March 2023 to 8 August 2023 as alleged. The Complainant continued to work after 6 March 2023. Up until the day of his unfair dismissal, 8 August 2023. At all material times the Complainant continued to act in the role set out in 2013 and the Complainant in that role acted in the best interests of the company without ever having any problem or issue raised concerning his work or ability to perform his role.

 

The Complainant has always remained an Irish citizen, domiciled in Ireland, holding an Irish passport, paying PRSI in Ireland throughout his entire employment.

 

Summary of legal arguments

 

It is the Complainant’s position that after 33 years working for the Respondent that his purported dismissal was both substantively unfair and entirely lacking in fair procedures within the meaning of the Unfair Dismissals Acts (in fact absolutely no procedures at all). The WRC, Labour Court and the courts of Ireland are obliged to protect the weaker party, namely the Complainant, including by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests, than general rules, in accordance with European law.

 

The letter of dismissal states the Respondent was relying upon the contract of employment dated 20 August 2008. The Respondent further relies on the provisions of this document to justify the reason for the Complainant’s dismissal which is based on what is termed a “disability” which it further states renders an Executive permanently incapacitated by accident or ill health from performing his duties.

 

The Complainant was not permanently incapacitated by accident or ill health from performing his duties. There was, and is, no basis for this unilateral and sudden decision taken, in his absence, without any hearing, consultation, prior warning or notice, or any procedure whatsoever, including medical assessment, consultation and examination.

 

The question of disability/incapability was explained / defined by the Employment Appeals Tribunal in the case of Reardon v Saint Vincent’s Hospital UD 74/1979 as “long term illness”. The employer must take all reasonable steps to have the employee’s medical condition evaluated and not to make an assumption as to the health of the employee. This was further affirmed by the Employment Appeals Tribunal in Hetherington v Sonnencrest Limited UD/1089/2002. In the case of Bolger v Showerings Ireland Limited [1990] 1 ELR 184, the High Court set out the key requirements for a dismissal on grounds of incapacity to be deemed fair. The onus is on the employer to show that –

I.                     It was incapacity which was the reason for the dismissal

II.                   The reason was substantial

III.                 The employee received fair notice that the question of his dismissal for incapacity was being considered: and

IV.                The employee was afforded an opportunity of being heard.

These principles were further considered by the High Court in the case Baile Átha Cliath Dublin Bus v Mc Kevitt [2018] IEHC 78. The High Court endorsed the test set out in determining dismissal on the grounds of incapacity and went on to highlight the fact that the employee ought to be given adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.

The courts have clearly set out that it is the duty of the employer to ensure that the dismissal is not unfair. In a case where a judgement call has to be made as to whether or not a person’s medical history renders them unfit for work the courts have established that the judgement call be made by suitably qualified and experienced medical personnel.

In the Complainant’s case it is clear and irrefutable that in this case –

I.                     Alleged incapacity cannot be said to be the reason for, and is not justification for, his dismissal.

II.                   The alleged defence of incapacity does not apply in this case (which having regard to the facts is clearly not so).

III.                 The Complainant received no notice or any warning whatsoever that the question of his dismissal, or dismissal on the grounds of incapacity, was being considered.

IV.                The decision to dismiss the Complainant on the grounds of alleged incapacity was not justified, not confirmed or based on, or backed up by, the judgement of suitably qualified and experienced medical personnel, nor any medical examination, consultation, or advice.

V.                  The Complainant was not afforded the opportunity to be heard, or to present any evidence, prior to the immediate dismissal decision being made.

VI.                The Complainant was working and continued to deal with complex and difficult matters, including a number of projects valued in millions of dollars which he was entrusted with, up to the dates he was unilaterally, unceremoniously, and unfairly, dismissed.

Contrary to the submissions advanced on behalf of the Respondent, it is abundantly clear that the Complainant does have locus standi to present his case for unfair dismissal. He is entitled to all the protections of the Unfair Dismissals Act. The operative contract, relied on (and drafted by) the Respondent expressly provides, para 12, that Irish law applies to disputes under that contract.

It is submitted that due regard must also be had to Article 25 of Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (“Brussels Recast”).

The effect of the use of a choice of law and venue clause in the context of an unfair dismissal claim is demonstrated in the decision of the WRC dated 12 April 2017 in A Regional Claims Manager v An Insurance Company (ADJ-00000680).

The Recast Regulations sets down rules for matters relating to employment contracts. They state an employee may sue an employer domiciled in a Member State in the courts of the Member State where (a) the employee habitually carries out her or his work, or (b) the business which engages the employee is or was situated.

This provision clearly entitles the Complainant to present his case pursuant to the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. Even under the Respondent’s own drafted contract of employment, he clearly comes within the protection of the Unfair Dismissals Acts. There should be no dispute on this. This should not have been raised, to delay or distract the WRC from exercising its proper statutory jurisdiction and its duty. In that case it is noted that the employee only worked in the Republic of Ireland some 3.8% of his time. The Adjudication Officer held:

“Plainly the Recast Regulations take precedence over the Section of the 1977 Act relied upon by the Respondent, as they were enacted (long) after the Section of the 1977 Act relied upon by the Respondent, and as European Regulations are binding on all member states, they take precedence over domestic law”

The Complainant refers to the decision of the WRC in The Wife of a now deceased Head of Product Manager v Investment Management Company ADJ-00021992 where the Adjudication Officer held:

“Section 2(3) Dismissals Act of 1977 stipulates that the Act cannot apply to an employee working outside the state unless he or she was resident or domiciled in the state for the term of the Contract of Employment. However, the provision has to be read now in light of the EU Regulation 1215/1212 of the European Parliament – commonly referred to as the Brussels Re-Cast - and which deals with jurisdiction issues and the recognition and enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial matters. In effect this EU directive means that a Contract of Employment can operate so as to explicitly confer jurisdiction upon the Courts of Ireland for the purposes of any matter arising therefrom. The Employee only needs to habitually carry out work in the jurisdiction and the Employer business needs to be situate in the jurisdiction...”

“I am satisfied that the European Directive gives full effect to the Contractual intention of the parties herein and as set out in Clause 29 of the Contract of Employment. I am further satisfied that the fact that the Complainant was paid through sterling is not of itself detrimental to his entitlement to have the complaint heard in this jurisdiction and accept the findings in A Meat Factory Operative and A Meat Processor (ADJ 16246 19th of July 2019) in this regard. The mechanics of how an Employee is paid cannot, of itself, give rise to an implied rejection or acceptance of jurisdiction for the purpose of litigation. Employees are paid in many different ways and the manner and mechanisms of payment are chosen for many different reasons”.

Caselaw on jurisdictional issue - WRC / Labour Court

Cathy Moore v Charles Shiels Charity ADJ-00037669

Complainant worked and lived in Northern Ireland, brought a claim against the Respondent claiming a contract of employment among other things. Respondent was a charity registered in Ireland with some premises in Northern Ireland.  Jurisdictional issue was raised re whether the complainant could bring the claim before the WRC.

The Adjudication Officer found that the WRC did have jurisdiction.

Summary of relevant reasoning:

·       The alternative remedy open to the Complainant was statute barred (remedy through a similar body in Northern Ireland).

·       The Charity was domiciled in Ireland.

·       While the Complainant was ordinarily resident in Northern Ireland, she provided evidence to the fact that she was not domiciled as interpreted according to Keogan, Mee and Wylie, The Law and Taxation of Trusts and other relevant legal definitions. This evidence included visiting family in Ireland every weekend, intending to buy a house in Ireland, voting exclusively in Ireland and never in Northern Ireland, attending courses in Ireland and more. The AO was therefore satisfied that she was domiciled in Ireland for the purposes of the Unfair Dismissals Act.

·       Based on Brussels 1 (Recast), the AO considered that the interpretation of the jurisdictional issue must be one that is more favourable to the weaker party to the proceedings (the Complainant). This was a consideration despite the UK no longer being in Brussels 1

In Orla Sheehy v Megagen Implants UK Ltd. ADJ-00032606 the issue of jurisdiction arose as the respondent was based in UK and Brussels 1 no longer holds in UK since Brexit. The Adjudication Officer held that the WRC had jurisdiction to hear complaint. The respondent in earlier submissions and correspondence had accepted the Irish legislation and Revenue / PRSI regulations as applicable. The complainant was resident in Ireland during her employment and the bulk of her duties took place in Ireland. The Wife of a now Deceased Head of Product Manager v Investments Management Company was cited.

In Infosys Ltd v Tabish Shahid Shaikh UDD2224 the complainant employed by Infosys India. In November 2018 he commenced a temporary assignment to Ireland to work for the respondent. While in Ireland, the complainant’s employment was terminated. The complainant lodged a complaint with the WRC under the Unfair Dismissals Acts. The respondent argued that the complainant’s employment was not governed by Irish law as, at all times, he remained an employee of Infosys India. The Adjudication Officer decided that he did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. However, the Labour Court held that it did have jurisdiction to hear the matter.

The Court relied on:

·        McIlwraith v Seitz Filtration (GB) Ltd. 

·       Zimmerman v Der Deutsche Schulverein EAT, UD 373/1998, even if a contract is stated to be subject to the laws of another jurisdiction, an employee who meets the requirements of the Act is entitled to bring proceedings under the Act.

·       Article 3 makes clear that rights which cannot be derogated from by agreement continue to apply even if the parties agree that the laws of a different country are to be applicable’

The Court held:

“Again, put simply, even where parties choose to agree that the laws of a state that is not a member state of the EU should apply, the protective provisions of community law are applicable. Article 30 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights states unambiguously that-

‘Every worker has the right to protection against unjustified dismissal, in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices.’”

The Complainant seeks reinstatement to his position within the company. The question of reinstatement was recently addressed in the Supreme Court in An Bord Banistíochta, Gaelscoil Moshíológ v The Labour Court [2024] IESC 38. In this case O’Donnell CJ stated that reinstatement would only be applicable in “clear cut cases” and imposing a personal contractual relationship on an unwilling party, can only be properly granted where the court or tribunal has “assessed the interests of both parties to the arrangement and where, having done so, it provides clear coherent reasons for the appropriateness of the remedy in the particular case”.

In this particular matter it is submitted that it is in the best interests of the Respondent and the Complainant that the Complainant be reinstated to his position. The role that the Complainant has performed has generated (and was generating) millions of dollars for the Respondent. His role is unique and it appears no other one person within the Respondent has similar, or the necessary skills, know how, contacts, connections or experience to fulfil the role. Indeed, this is acknowledged by the Respondent in its submission where it states that the position of Director of Special Project was created so as he, the Complainant, “would be in a position to utilise his industry experience, connections and knowledge for the benefit of the Employer and which included representational/ ambassadorial duties on behalf of the employer.”

This is a case where the contact between the management of the Respondent and the Complainant is usually by email and by phone, etc. Personal contacts as in attendance at the Respondent’s office in Shannon by the Complainant were less than / approximately six times on average per year. This places the Complainant in a unique position and one which clearly meets the criteria set down by the Supreme Court in considering reinstatement.

The words of the Respondent in the letter of 8 August 2023 cannot be hollow, and the Respondent must have meant something when expressly stating this.

Since his unfair dismissal the Complainant has not engaged in any activity that would have any adverse impact upon the Respondent. The Complainant did not, and did not want to, interfere or harm the business. His ultimate aim is to return as soon as possible to his work and continue to contribute to the growth of the Respondent. Any breakdown in communication or personal relationships which may have been affected throughout this process, does not take away that it is in the best interests of the Respondent and all parties that the Complainant be reinstated to his position by the WRC.

Response to certain matters raised in the submission delivered to the WRC on behalf of the Respondent

The Complainant refutes and challenges the late submission of the Respondent which contest his valid claim for redress under the Unfair Dismissals Act, in particular his reinstatement. The Respondent correctly acknowledges that the Complainant moved into the role as Director of Special Projects. In 2022 instructions issued from Marubeni for a pay increase backdated to January 2017 and to make to be paid by October 2022. It is abundantly clear that the Complainant is greatly valued by the Respondent and that he contributed in no small way to the success of the company. At no stage since his termination has he acted in any fashion that could or would adversely affect the Respondent.

It is submitted that the words of the Respondent in the letter of 8th August 2023 – “May I take this opportunity on behalf of the Company to thank you for your past service and wish you every success in your future endeavours” must mean something and should assist in deciding on appropriate redress.

The Complainant asks the Adjudication Officer to determine that the dismissal was unfair, and that he be awarded reinstatement.

WRC JURISDICTION TO DEAL WITH THIS COMPLAINT OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL

The Respondent contends that the WRC does not have jurisdiction to deal with the unfair dismissal. The Complainant has, and will, demonstrate that he has locus standi under the European Union, and Irish, law on a number of grounds.

The Complainant clearly comes within the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977, from the wording of the legislation and from the express wording of the Respondent’s own contract that it relies upon in the dismissal letter and in the written submissions to WRC. The Respondent is domiciled in Ireland. The Complainant is domiciled in Ireland. The Respondent expressly provided in the operative contract for Irish law and Irish courts. That should be the end of this, and there should be no further delay or obstruction in determining the dismissal unfair and granting reinstatement.

Development of European Law on Jurisdiction

The question of jurisdiction in matters of European Law has been addressed in, inter alia, the Brussels Convention (1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters (consolidated version), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 299, 31/12/1972, P.0032-0042 (hereinafter Brussels Convention)). It is of note that the original Convention did not contain any provisions regarding jurisdiction on employment contracts. The absence of such provisions at that time can be said to have been delayed pending the deliberations of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). (Jenard Report on the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 59/1, 5/3/1979 (hereinafter the Jenard Report), Chapter IV, Articles 5 and 6 n. 1 where it is stated as follows “In matters relating to contracts of employment in the broadest sense of the term, the preliminary draft of the Convention contained a provision attributing exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts of the Contracting State either in which the undertaking concerned was situated, or in which the work was to have been or had been performed. After prolonged consideration, the Committee decided not to insert in the Convention any special provisions on jurisdiction in this field”).

As such the general rules  of the Brussels Convention would therefore also apply to contracts of employment (Specifically, in litigation between employers and employees the following courts have jurisdiction: a) the courts of the State where the defendant is domiciled (Article 2), b) the courts for the place of performance of the obligation, if that place is in a State other than that of the domicile of the defendant [Article 5 (1)], c) and any court on which the parties have expressly or impliedly agreed (Articles 17 and 18)).

The first special provision regarding jurisdiction in individual contracts of employment was set out in the Lugano Convention (Convention on jurisdictional enforcement and judgements in commercial matters Lugano 16 September 1988, Official Journal of the European Communities, L 319/9, 25/11/1988 (hereinafter Lugano Convention).)

Article 5(1) of the Lugano Convention states “A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued: 1. … in matters relating to individual contracts of employment, this place is that where the employee habitually carries out his work, or if the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one country, this place shall be the place of business through which he was engaged”

The same provision was adopted by the Donostia – San Sebastian Convention (Article 4) (Convention on the accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial matters etc. Official Journal of the European Communities, L 285/1, 2/10/1989).

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was of the view that disputes in employment law contracts were best resolved in the jurisdiction where the contract was principally executed (Case C-266/85 Hassan Shenavai v Klaus Kreischer, ECLI:EU:C:1987:11: Case C-125 /92 Mulox IBC Limited v Hendrick Geels, ECLI:EU:C:1993:306; Case C-426/06 Glaxosmithkline v Jean-Pierre Rouard, ECLI:EU:C:2008:299).

The foregoing provisions provide guidance on jurisdiction and are relevant to this matter but the provisions which are contained in the Brussels Convention (Section: Articles 7-12a (jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance) and Section 4: Articles 13-15 (jurisdiction over consumer contracts) on jurisdiction on insurance and consumer matters were expanded to cover employment contracts with the introduction of Regulation 44/2001 (Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, Official Journal of the European Communities, L12/1,16/1/2001, referred to as Brussels 1 Regulation).

Section 5 in Articles 18-21 introduced provisions dealing with jurisdiction in employment contract (The aim of Section 5 was stipulated in recital No 13 of Brussels 1).

Currently, Regulation 1215/2012 has at section 5 (Articles 20-23) special provisions which deal with jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment which limit the procedural party autonomy in favour of the employees on the basis that the person obliged to deliver the contracted service is an employee according to European labour law (The case of Sandra Nogueira and Others v Crewlink Ireland LTD and Miguel Jose Moreno Osacar Ryanair Designated Activity Company: Court of Justice of the European Union (Second Chamber), judgement of 14 September 2017, Case C-168/16, European Law Journal (ELLJ) XX(X), 2018, page 2).

This submission examines the issue of jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment according to Articles 20-23 of Brussels 1a Regulation with reference to the CJEU judgement in Cases C-168/16 and C-169/16.

Jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment according to Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels 1a Regulation)

Articles 20-23 (Articles refers to Articles of Brussels 1a Regulation) are identical in many respects to Articles 18-21 of Brussels 1 Regulation which also deal with the question of jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment. According to recital No 18 of Brussels 1a Regulation, “In relation to insurance, consumers and employment contracts, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules” (It is identical to recital No 13 of Brussels 1 Regulation. See also Case C-47/14 Holterman Ferho Exploitiate BV v Friedrich Leopold Freiherr Spies Von Bllesheim, ECLI:EU:C:2015:574, par43; Case C-1/17 Petronas Lubricants Italy Spa v Livio Guida, ECLI:C:2018:478, par. 23).

The CJEU in arriving at this position had regard for and considered the Brussels Convention, Brussels 1 Regulation and Brussels 1a Regulation (Sandra Nogueria etc v Crewlink Ireland LTD and Miguel Jose Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company, ECLI:EU:C:2017:688, par, 45; Case C-603/17, Peter Bosworth, Colin Hurley v Arcadia Petroleum Limited ECLI:EU:C2019:310,par. 22).

In accordance with the provisions of Brussels 1a Regulation the employee may sue her/his employer not only in the courts of the Member State where the latter is domiciled. Furthermore, the employer may be sued in the courts for the place where (or from where) the employee carries out his work (This place may also be the employee’s domicile).

The employee may be sued by his employer only in the courts of the Member State in which the employee is domiciled. The enhanced protection of the weaker party, i.e. the employee, indicate that the provisions of Articles 20-23 apply exclusively (Sandra Nogueria etc v Crewlink Ireland LTD and Miguel Jose Moreno Osacar v Ryanair Designated Activity Company, ECLI:EU:C:2017:688, par 51: Case C-1/17 Petronas Lubricants Italy Spa v Livio Guida, ECLI:C:2018:478, par. 25).

The same interpretation is applicable to Section 5 of Brussels 1a Regulation. Therefore, the provisions of Articles 20-23 prevail over any other jurisdiction including the law or procedural rules of any Member State. As an indication of the strict interpretation of these provisions where an employee is a defendant, and the court of a Member State violates the provisions of Articles 20-23 the recognition of any decision or the enforcement of any judgement may be refused.

The Complainant carried out his duties and responsibilities in a number of different jurisdictions including many jurisdictions outside the EU. The Complainant carried out his work in the United States, Asia and the European Union. In the case where an employee does not carry the performance of his contract of employment in one country, the employer may be sued in the courts for the place of business which engaged the employee or where the business was situated, Article 21(1)(b)(ii) which is identical to Article 8(3) of Rome 1 Regulation which the CJEU states as “must be understood as referring exclusively to the place of business which engaged the employee and not to that which the employee is connected by his actual employment.“

In this instance, the Complainant was engaged by a contract of employment signed and executed in 2008 with the Respondent. The CJEU has stated that where the identification of a habitual place of work is impossible, the employee may sue his employer in the place where he was hired, and the employer’s business is situated. In addressing these issues, it could be said that the ECJ enforces the equality principle, as established in Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and also Article 30.

Having regard to all of the foregoing, the Complainant is entitled to bring his complaint before the Workplace Relations Commission and he has the locus standi to do so with particular reference to European Law, incl. Article 21(1)(b)(ii) of Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels 1a Regulation).

At the hearing on 19 March 2023, the Complainant exhibited a four-page document which included the following:

·       A table entitled “Gerard Burke Remuneration Calculations Based on Pre-Covid Figures from 2019/2020”. The table stated that the Complainant’s salary was €80,000 gross per year; in addition he received €3,400 in a VHI benefit; and a payment of €8,000 towards his pension. The Complainant also asserted that he received a bonus of $305,000 which equated to €278,396.

·       A table entitled “Unpaid Bonus Calculation” asserting that the Complainant was owed €39,279 in a “Final Unpaid Bonus”

·       “Unfair Dismissal Claim” – the Complainant sought €1,246,431.00

·       A breakdown of payroll and benefits expenditure for staff and management and a breakdown of average expenditure per staff/management member for the period from 2018 to 2025.

At the hearing on 19 March 2026, the Complainant also furnished copies of his Employment Detail Summary issued by the Personal Division, PAYE Services, Revenue Commissioners. The documents showed the following gross pay by the Respondent:

·       2020 – gross pay of €209,907.62

·       2021- gross pay €83,172.00

·       2022 – gross pay €93,811.11

·       2023 (30 insurable weeks) – gross pay €53,316.69

 

The Complainant also furnished a copy of a payslip dated 27 March 2023 showing gross pay of €7,616.67 / €6,905.68 net for the month of May 2023.

A copy of a document “Gerry Burke Compensation Summary 2014-2023” was also furnished. It showed the following figures:

 

Salary €

Bonus USD $

2014

55,386

99,000

2015

55,940

125,000

2016

74,123

145,000

2017

80,000

125,000

2018

80,000

205,000

2019

80,000

305,000

2020

80,000

-

2021

80,000

-

2022

90,667

-

2023

83,897

21,600

 

On 19 March 2026 further correspondence was received from the Complainant containing some 180 pages of copies of email communications.

On 20 March, a copy of a document was furnished which summarised the days on which the Complainant sent/replied to work emails, sent personal emails from work email address, and the time of mediation. It was asserted that from 1 March 2023 to 8 August 2023, the Complainant worked (sent work emails) on 44 days and was absent on 102 workdays.

 

Summary of direct evidence and cross-examination of Mr Burke, the Complainant, regarding the preliminary issue of the application of the Unfair Dismissals Act

The Complainant in his sworn evidence said that he was born in Ennis and is domiciled in Ireland. He retained his Irish passport.

The Complainant said that due to a family member’s health issues and for other family reasons, as part of his semi-retirement plan, he moved to Malta. However, he has a family home in County Clare, where he grew up and where his parents, grandparents and great-grandparents lived. The Complainant’s GP is located in County Clare; his medical procedures were conducted in Ireland, and he maintained his private health insurance in Ireland.  The Complainant said that in March and in November 2023, he had surgeries in a hospital in Galway. The Respondent was aware of the surgeries.

The Complainant said that he is an active member of the Inland Waterways Association of Ireland (IWAI) of which he was a Safety Officer for 20 years. He is also a founding member of the Heritage Boat Association, in which he has remained actively involved for over 20 years, and he is a member of an Anglers Club.

The Complainant said that he is registered to vote in the local and the EU elections in Ireland.

The Complainant said that all his family and friends are based in Clare. It was always his intention to retire in Ireland, and he has been building a house in Clare during his time in Malta. He said that since 1979 his PRSI has always been paid in Ireland and he is tax compliant both in Ireland and in Malta. The Complainant said that in 2013 when he moved to Malta, the Respondent contacted the Revenue Commissioners in Ireland. The Complainant denied that there was any tax issue.

The Complainant said that when in the Respondent’s employment, he would have spent 1/3 of his time in Ireland, 1/3 in Malta, and 1/3 travelling to other countries. This remained roughly the same after his dismissal, albeit his travels now include both business and personal trips.

The Complainant said that he was working remotely for the Respondent before it became commonplace. He was always under the direction from Ireland or, on corporate level, from the CEO in the USA.

In cross-examination, the Complainant confirmed that he has lived in Ireland since birth, that he now divides his time between Ireland and Malta, and that he retains an address in Malta.

The Complainant was referred to his email of 20 June 2016 to his solicitor where he stated that “I have since worked reduced hours and re located from Ireland to Malta”. The Complainant confirmed that he moved his residence to Malta.

The Complainant was referred to the Respondent’s letter dated 24 October 2013 to the Inspector of Taxes where the Respondent stated: “Our above named employee took up fulltime residence in Malta on 1 April 2013 and he has advised us that it is his intention to remain there indefinitely.” The Complainant agreed that it was a fair reflection and that he did move full-time.

The Complainant was further referred to the Respondent’s letter dated 9 November 2016 to Pricewaterhouse Coopers where it stated that “None of these duties are performed in Ireland”. The Complainant confirmed that this was correct.

The Complainant was referred to the Respondent’s letter of 26 November 2020 to the Revenue Commissioners, in which it was stated that he remained resident in Malta and did not perform duties in Ireland. The Complainant accepted that he was resident in Malta but stated that this was not the case at all times.

The Complainant confirmed that he was not the registered owner of the property in Clare and that he did not own any property registered in his name in Ireland. He stated, however, that he had an ownership interest in the Clare property by virtue of his marriage. He further confirmed that he was the registered owner of a property in Malta.

The Complainant confirmed that he has a GP in Malta, and that he has friends in Malta. He reiterated that his intention was always to retire to Ireland. While he semi-retired in 2013 and moved to Malta at that time, he visited Ireland. He said that, as a family, they hold two homes.

It was put to the Complainant, with no criticism, that he wanted to protect himself in the context of tax matters and that was why he did not own a property in Ireland. The Complainant said that while tax was consideration, it was not a significant factor, there were other factors as well.

The Complainant confirmed that he did not take up a job to date. He said that he conducted some work on an unpaid consultancy basis but working for a competitor would preclude him from being reinstated.

In redirect, the Complainant said that his son currently lives in the family home. In 2008, the Complainant started works on an old cottage next to the family home, it was liveable in 2016/2017 and subsequently, some extensions were built. He said that previously he would have stayed with his son, brother or on his boat.

Summary of direct evidence and cross-examination of the Complainant on the substantive issue

Mr Burke outlined his career from his apprenticeship in the Irish Air Corps in 1979 to successfully building the Respondent company. Mr Burke explained in detail the background to the industry and the setting up of the company. He said that he was very proud of his achievements.

The Complainant said that the timing of the takeover by Marubeni seemed right. Combined with his personal/family circumstances, it drove the Complainant to take the back seat and semi-retire. The Complainant said that it was portrayed as a Machiavellian move, but it was not, his daughter’s health was the reason behind it.

The Complainant said that he always had a problem to disengage from work. He was still concerned about the Respondent. The Complainant said that he would not clock in /out. There would be no surprise if emails came at weekends etc. This was also due to working in different time zones.

The Complainant said that on 17 March 2023, which was a public holiday and while on sick leave, he sent some 16 emails. On 15 March 2023 he sent an email regarding a purchase in excess of 50 million dollars. On 13 March 2023, he received direct email from Mr Duggan with a query regarding some commercial activity.

The Complainant stated that the Respondent was seeking to downplay the matters raised in the correspondence, but he had tried to address serious issues, including alleged blacklisting by Airbus.

The Complainant said that his business card had no title, so a title was made up to cover his brief. He said that he did not think there was anyone, even now, in the Respondent organisation who had the level of technical expertise and on the job experience as he did.

The Complainant said that he would have dealt with purchases/acquisitions in Egypt, Greece, Brazil, Turkey, France, and USA. 

The Complainant said that in 2013 Mr Duggan stepped into his position, but when the Complainant was around, people would still come to him with queries, which would undermine Mr Duggan. The Complainant decided to remove himself and work remotely. He has been working remotely for over 13 years.

The Complainant said that relationships were strained but they were professionals. His departure was immediate and his return could be equally immediate. It would be no different to Mr Spaulding (CEO) and Mr Rush who left and came back.

The Complainant said that mediation was ongoing, there was a public holiday and then the dismissal letter from Mr Duggan arrived, while Mr Duggan was on holidays. He said that his access was cut off immediately. He said that he used his work email for everything. The Complainant said that he offered to send someone in to show where the data could be retrieved.

The Complainant stated that his dismissal has cast a shadow over his professional reputation. He explained that, when he tells people he was dismissed after becoming ill, it creates a negative and suspicious impression. The Complainant further stated that the only effective means of restoring his reputation is through reinstatement.

The Complainant said that the pay increase and contract issues were smokescreens. He was dismissed for sickness.

The Complainant said that he was extremely upset, he took a few days before he told his children that he was dismissed, and weeks before he told his siblings. There were no heads up and no due process.

The Complainant said that he logged in every day, it was a general practice. He was looking after the company every day. The Complainants said that, when he took out weekends and public holidays, his calculations show that he was out sick 102 days but on these days, he would have actioned emails that needed to be actioned. He was not working 100% but as much as he could.

The Complainant said that Mr Dowling would have had more correspondence from/to the Complainant as they close a deal at that time. There was a lot going on.

The Complainant said that the issues regarding the alleged tax evasion had nothing to do with his dismissal. It was thrown in to discredit the Complainant and put a cloud over his reputation. He said that he was tax compliant in Ireland and in Malta.

Regarding the pay increase, the Complainant said that he didn’t really have a problem with what he was paid, he did it for the love of his job. However, he felt excluded. He did not have a pay increase in 10-15 years. It was more about recognition. The Complainant said that Marubeni decided that he should get the increase and then, in 2016, that he did not need the new contract. He was dismissed on the basis on 2008 contract.

The Complainant said that some disparaging inference was made about his involvement with the third party, Cloud Investment Partners and its affiliation with Aeronautical Support International (ASI). He said that he was dismissed while he was just coming out of recovery. He knew he needed another surgery in November 2023. He knew that he could not get a job before the surgery as his recovery would take a number of months. He could not work for competitors as the Respondent would have grounds to not to take him back. He started looking for a job in the spring 2024. While he could have gone stocking shelves, he hoped to continue his career. The Complainant said that he approached a colleague and learned that they lost a rep in Europe. It was agreed that the Complainant would become a rep with no pay other than expenses. He would receive some pay if a deal was closed.

The Complainant stated that it had been suggested he was attempting to poach members of the Respondent’s staff. He strongly denied this allegation, describing it as completely untrue. He explained that he wished to return to work with the Respondent and, in those circumstances, would have no desire to see any employees leave the organisation.

The Complainant said that he was in San Diego last week and met some of the Respondent’s employees, they are still colleagues.  Some people in ASI he worked with for 20 years, he hangs out with them. The Complainant said that Cloud and ASI are not the same company. The Complainant said that, equally, he meets Mr Dowling at conferences, they are cordial, have general discussions.

The Complainant said that his mission since 2023 was to regain his position with the Respondent. His sole focus was to return to work and show that his dismissal was unfair.

Regarding the success of the Respondent in his absence, the Complainant said that aviation business boomed since Covid-19 pandemic, the industry bounced back. He said that the Respondent sold some portfolios, but revenue was down by 15% last year. While profits were up, it was due to two years gestation. The Complainant said that his experience and knowledge certainly would help the business.

The Complainant said that he was on a salary of €80,00 which was increased to €88,000.

In cross-examination, the Complainant did not dispute that the Employment Agreement dated 20 August 2008 was executed. He did not dispute that an amendment was executed on 29 June 2012. He did not dispute the disability clause was in the document. The Complainant also did not dispute that the Amendment No. 1 changed the non-compete clause.

It was put to the Complainant that in 2015/2016 attempts were made to get him to sign a new contract, but he was not prepared to sign it. The Complainant said he did not sign it because it was contrary to public policy and the Irish law. He did not dispute that at the relevant time the 2008 contract was in place.

It was put to the Complainant that in his email of 9 April 2023, he indicated his willingness to execute the contract which detailed Termination due to Incapacity for a total of 120 or more days in any twelve calendar months.

It was put to the Complainant that he must be resident in Ireland to vote, he said that he was not aware of that requirement.

It was put to the Complainant that reinstatement would require the existence of a relationship founded on trust and confidence. He disagreed with the suggestion that the employment relationship had broken down irretrievably. The Complainant was referred to an email in which he had threatened to seek an injunction after the Respondent sought to regularise his tax affairs. In response, he stated that he had been informed there was an issue but that the Respondent had failed to explain the nature of the problem or disclose the advice it had received. He said that his understanding was that the issue related to the Respondent rather than to him personally. The Complainant maintained that, until he was provided with details of the advice obtained, he could not reasonably be expected to agree to the proposed course of action. He accepted that circumstances may have changed but contended that the Respondent put a gun to his head without sharing any information.

It was put to the Complainant that it was shared with him that as he lived in Malta, he had to pay tax in Malta. The Complainant was referred to an email dated 12 December 2022 from Mr Duggan where the accountant’s advice was shared with him.

The Complainant said that in his replying email of 12 December 2022, he explained his position and sought clarification. He said that he was concerned that he was pushed in a direction without being given information.

The Complainant was referred to his email of 23 March 2023 to Mr Duggan, Mr Dowling and Mr Spaulding where he stated:

…while I am driving the Bus, I am coming down the road with my horn blowing, my lights flashing and I am doing everything in my power not to plough into you. This is in the vein hope that if (or when) you end up under the Bus you will see that it is Mitch that pushed you there knowing fully the consequences of his actions.”

It was put to the Complainant that the email shows a toxic relationship. He rejected that suggestion, stating that the email reflected the very opposite. He explained that he had apologised to the individuals concerned, whom he regarded as friends, for having to pursue his legal rights. According to the Complainant, the purpose of the email was to convey a willingness to resolve the matter and to ask whether a solution could be reached.

It was put to the Complainant that in his email of 20 March 2023 to Marubeni he used the word “toxic” to describe the relationship. The Complainant said that he stood over it. It was not his relationship with Mr Duggan or Mr Dowling but with the CEO, who was now gone. It was put to the Complainant that he did not mention the CEO in his email but said that “my working relationship with my many of my colleagues will be damaged irreparably”, “…I understand that this could easily end up with some of my working relationships becoming toxic and I must live with that”.

It was put to the Complainant that after he left, there were threats of An Garda Síochána involvement. The Complainant replied that it was due to the material/records the Respondent had on its system which was not provided to the Complainant. If he was to return to his employment, one problem would be sorted for him.

It was put to the Complainant that in his email of 17 April 2025 he alleged illegality. He accepted that he had made such an allegation. It was put to him that reinstatement would require him to have trust and confidence in his employer and that, given his views, this trust no longer existed, particularly as he had called for the Board to resign. The Complainant disagreed with that characterisation. He stated that his correspondence with the Board was motivated by his belief that he should not have been dismissed. He said that he was stonewalled by management, the Board, and the parent company. The Complainant further stated that, if reinstated, he would have no dealings with the Respondent’s Board.

The Complainant agreed that the term of the contract was applied; that he had surgery in March 2023; that he could not fly back to Malta and remained in Ireland for a while. The Complainant said that he could not fly for 60 days. He said that he was on sick cert but working. It was put to the Complainant that he was precluded from working in Ireland as a result of his tax-exempt status.

The Complainant agreed that majority of the emails he referred to were sent in the period between 6 and 23 March 2023. The Complainant stated that, although he had arranged the handover of his duties on 27 March 2023 and believed he should then have taken a break, he continued to work. It was put to him that the Respondent had accepted his medical certificates at face value. He was also referred to an email in which he described his condition as requiring a “complete power down.” The Complainant said that he continued to work; Mr Duggan was copied on 150 emails, Mr Dowling on 70-80, Ms Dunne on a lot. He said that they were aware that he was working.

In relation to the calculation of his absence, it was put to the Complainant that as a matter of custom and practice Saturdays, Sundays, and public holidays were treated as normal days for that purpose. The Complainant responded that, where he worked on a Saturday, he was entitled to take the following Monday off in lieu.

Regarding his loss, the Complainant confirmed that he did not check his social welfare entitlements and never sought any benefits. He said that he knew he would not be available for work between 8 August and 15 November 2023 due to his surgery and then due to his recovery. After three months of unavailability, he started looking for a job. He agreed that there was no contractual restriction to work for anyone.

The Complainant agreed that he had significant industry knowledge, an extensive network of contacts and was geographically mobile. He accepted that, had the circumstances surrounding his departure been normal, it would have been relatively straightforward for him to secure another well-paid position. He maintained, however, that the manner of his dismissal adversely affected his ability to do so. The Complainant further stated that, at his level of seniority, positions were not generally obtained through applications; rather, individuals were approached regarding suitable opportunities.

The Complainant disagreed that he “put all eggs in one basket” i.e. reinstatement.

The Complainant said that he was working for Cloud from March 2024 at 30-50% of his time. He was paid some $50,000 gross for some 18 months.  It was put to the Complainant that he elected to work for Cloud for bad return even though he could have found another job. He said that if the deals came through, he could have earned more. The Complainant confirmed that Cloud is affiliated with ASI. He said that some shareholders in Cloud are also shareholders in ASI. He did not dispute that in the market they would be perceived as the same company. It was put to the Complainant that it raises the issue of trust and confidence. He disagreed and said that he did not work for ASI and if it was seen as that, it could be clarified. The Complainant disputed that he had poached a number of significant employees from the Respondent. He stated that he had not spoken to those employees about ASI prior to their departure from the Respondent and maintained that, had they sought his advice, he would have advised them to remain with the Respondent.

The Respondent said that it was concerned about the relationship between Cloud, ASI, the Complainant and the departures of its employees. The Complainant said that he was honourable and he would not compromise it.

The Complainant noted that Mr Rush left the Respondent but was brought back and took over some of the Complainant’s job. Another employee would have taken some of the Complainant’s job, but he left the Respondent for ASI.

The Complainant said that his income was hugely based on bonus which was paid once a year in July / August based on previous financial; year e.g. bonus for 2023 for financial years from March 2022 to March 2023.

The Complainant asserted that for the purposes of this claim, his average monthly pay should be calculated in line with his contract which states:

“Average Monthly Compensation” means and amount determined by dividing (i) the sum of all amounts set forth on the Company’s records as paid to Executive by the Company for the two calendar years immediately preceding the year in which Executive’s employment terminates, including, without limitation, Salary and bonuses, by (ii) 24 (by way of example only, if Executive’s employment terminates in 2011, the Average Monthly Compensation would be the 1/24th of the sum of such amounts for 2009 and 2010).

Summary of direct evidence and cross-examination of Mrs Geraldine Burke, the Complainant’s wife

Mrs Burke said that the house in Clare is what she calls her family home. While it is registered in her name, it is a family home. She said that works started in the house in 2008, a huge extension was built, and she moved out for 12 months, but she moved back in 2019.

Mrs Burke confirmed that ownership was transferred into her name, although she could not recall exactly when the transfer took place. She said that it was a personal decision. She was worried about the Complainant’s travels, and it would make it easier for her if anything happened to him. She said that the property in Malta is shared between them. Mrs Burke confirmed that there are two properties jointly owned in Malta. She said that the Complainant owned possibly three boats in Ireland.

Mrs Burke said that she is not registered to vote in Malta; she is registered and tried to vote in Ireland.

Summary of direct evidence and cross-examination of Mr John McDonnell

Mr McDonnell was a founding partner of the Respondent. He and the Complainant were colleagues and friends for the last 40 years.

Mr McDonnell said that aviation industry is global but close; people are well known to each other. He stated that the Complainant was highly regarded within the industry and had an excellent professional reputation.

Mr McDonnell said that the Complainant’s personal and work life were closely intertwined, he was always available, even on holidays the Complainant would always be on his phone or laptop. Mr McDonnell said that after having a major spinal injury in 2007, the Complainant was hooked up to his laptop and worked from home on the day he came out of the hospital.

Mr McDonnell said that the Complainant did not tell him immediately about the dismissal.

Mr McDonnell said that when he worked as the General Manager in the Respondent there was an employee with a long-term illness and the handbook was modified at the time to allow for some discretion to extend the absence. The witness said that in this particular case, there was suspicion that the illness might not have been genuine, so a medical review was arranged.

Mr McDonnell said that any dismissal could have a significant impact on an individual’s reputation, particularly in the type of business in which the Complainant operated, which involved transactions and the sourcing of assets and depended on a high degree of trust. To have on record that one has been dismissed has huge effect on the ability to engage in transactions. Once the dismissal is rescinded and re-instatement is awarded, the Complainant’s reputation would be rebuilt.

Mr McDonnell said that the Complainant worked remotely since 2013. Prior to that, he had an office in the building but was rarely there.

Regarding the benefit to the Respondent arising from the Complainant’s return, Mr McDonnell stated that the Complainant initially had a team of 11 employees and subsequently built a team around him. He described the Complainant as a phenomenal worker with a strong ability to build relationships with people across the industry. Mr McDonnell further stated that the Complainant was the principal driving force.

In cross-examination, Mr McDonnell agreed that he retired in 2013 and had no knowledge of the Respondent or of the Complainant’s work for some 12 years.

It was put to Mr McDonnell that the term of “disability” applied to higher management only. He was not aware of that. He could not recall the “deemed disability” concept, he said that his contract was from 1997. He confirmed that the person on long-term illness he referred to was part of the Respondent’s middle management.

Mr McDonnell replied that he had no idea whether the Complainant could have secured alternative employment, given his strong reputation. 

Summar of direct evidence and cross-examination of Mr Karl Brunjej

Mr Brunjej explained that his role is in the financial side of the aviation industry since 1990. He was elected the Chairman of The Aviation Club of the UK in 2018 but is Emeritus now.

Mr Brunjej said that when investing money, it was important to have confidence in the people involved. He confirmed that the Complainant was a person in whom he had trust and confidence.

In addressing the Complainant’s employability in the circumstances, Mr Brunjej stated that questions would inevitably arise as to whether there had been a dispute, what it concerned, and why the Complainant had left the Respondent. He noted that the Complainant’s departure had been sudden, which was likely to prompt further speculation. Mr Brujej said that if a person was dismissed, it is a red flag.

Regarding the reinstatement, Mr Brunjej said that he had seen people gone and back; it would clear the matter for the industry.

In cross-examination, Mr Brunjej agreed that relationships between competitors, internal and external are fundamental. He said that he would employ the Complainant without hesitation and that Cloud employed him because it trusted him. It was put to Mr Brunjej that it could only be tested if the Complainant applied for a job.

Concluding remarks

Mr Stewart SC submitted that the Complainant clearly falls within the protection of the Act. He further argued that the Complainant did not waive his statutory rights by accepting a substantial bonus.

Referring to section 13 of the Act, Mr Stewart remarked that he had never encountered a contract providing for automatic dismissal on the grounds of illness. He submitted that any such provision would be inconsistent with section 13 of the Act.

It was submitted that the dismissal was plainly unfair, as no process, procedure, or warning had preceded the termination. Mr Stewart argued that even an employee with significantly less than the Complainant’s 33 years of service could not reasonably be informed, without notice, that their employment was being terminated with immediate effect.

Mr Stewart suggested that a number of issues raised by the Respondent were “smokescreens”, to distract from the central issue, namely the alleged unfair dismissal and the contents of the letter dated 8 August 2023. He emphasised that the Complainant did not attribute responsibility for the letter to Mr Duggan, maintaining that it had been drafted by another individual.

Mr Stewart acknowledged that reinstatement is an infrequently granted remedy but submitted that it remains available in the present case. He referred to the evidence of Mr McDonnell and Mr Brunjej, both of whom had outlined why reinstatement was the most appropriate remedy. It was submitted that the Complainant was not seeking compensation; however, if compensation were considered appropriate, the full reality of his circumstances should be taken into account. Mr Stewart argued that, although compensation would ordinarily be capped at two years’ remuneration, consideration should also be given to future loss, calculated up to the Complainant’s anticipated retirement date. Furthermore, he submitted that an award of up to 260 weeks’ remuneration could be made on the basis that the dismissal arose from the making of a protected disclosure.

Mr Stewart further submitted that, although Mr Brunjej, a personal friend of the Complainant, had indicated a willingness to employ him, the wider industry would be reluctant to do so, given the circumstances of his dismissal. He argued that the Complainant was effectively unemployable and that his personal decision not to seek employment with competitors should not operate to reduce any compensation awarded.

 

 

Findings and Conclusions:

Preliminary issue - jurisdiction

At the adjudication hearing on 14 November 2024, the Respondent raised a preliminary issue concerning the application of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 in this case.

The Respondent accepted that it is a body corporate having its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract. However, the Respondent submitted that the Act does not apply in the present case in circumstances where:

·       the ordinary work carried out by the Complainant since 2014 (when he ceased to be MD and took up duties as a Director of Special Projects in sourcing and inspecting aviation assets for purchase on behalf of the Employer) was carried out entirely outside of the State – the Complainant benefitted from a certificate of exclusion from Irish PAYE tax on this basis so that his wages were paid without deduction of Irish taxes.

·       the Complainant has since 2013 been wholly resident and domiciled in Malta.

 

The Complainant submitted that the operative contract, relied on by the Respondent, expressly provides that Irish law applies to disputes under that contract. It was further submitted that while the Complainant resides in Malta and conducts his work from outside the State, he is an Irish citizen, domiciled in Ireland, holding an Irish passport, paying PRSI in Ireland throughout his entire employment; and the Respondent is a body corporate that has its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract.

Given the circumstance of the case, I referred the parties to the European Commission’s Practice Guide on the ‘Jurisdiction and applicable law in international disputes between the employee and the employer’, and the applicable law, for guidance on whether the WRC had jurisdiction to hear these complaints.

Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) (“Brussels 1a”) and Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (“Rome 1”) contain special provisions to determine which Member State courts have jurisdiction over disputes relating to individual contracts of employment and the applicable law of the employment contract, respectively. 

Brussels 1a on jurisdiction

Brussels 1 Regulation (recast) provides the rules for determining jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. Notably, Regulation 18 of the Preamble provides: “In relation to insurance, consumer and employment contracts, the weaker party should be protected by rules of jurisdiction more favourable to his interests than the general rules.” Section 5 provides for jurisdiction in respect of individual contracts of employment as follows:

SECTION 5

Jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment

Article 20

  1. In matters relating to individual contracts of employment, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Article 6, point 5 of Article 7 and, in the case of proceedings brought against an employer, point 1 of Article 8.
  2. Where an employee enters into an individual contract of employment with an employer who is not domiciled in a Member State but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the Member States, the employer shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that Member State.

Article 21

  1. An employer domiciled in a Member State may be sued:

(a)    in the courts of the Member State in which he is domiciled; or

(b)    in another Member State:

(i) in the courts for the place where or from where the employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for the last place where he did so; or

(ii) if the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country, in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated.

  1. An employer not domiciled in a Member State may be sued in a court of a Member State in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 1.

Article 22

  1. An employer may bring proceedings only in the courts of the Member State in which the employee is domiciled.
  2. The provisions of this Section shall not affect the right to bring a counter-claim in the court in which, in accordance with this Section, the original claim is pending.

Article 23

The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement:

(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or

(2) which allows the employee to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Section.”

There is no dispute that the Complainant was an individual employed under a contract of employment.

Pursuant to Article 21 of Brussels 1a, an employee may sue their employer in the Member State in which the employer is domiciled or in another Member State where or from where the employee habitually or the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated.  I am satisfied that there is no issue as to my jurisdiction under Brussels 1a in circumstances where the Respondent is domiciled in Ireland.

Rome 1 on the law applicable

Rome 1 establishes rules for determining the law applicable to individual employment contracts.  One of the key principles of Rome 1 is the freedom of contracting parties to choose the applicable law.  Where there has been no choice of law, it is clear from Recital 19 of Rome 1 that the applicable law should be determined in accordance with the rule specified for the particular type of contract.   The particular type of contract in this case is an individual employment contract therefore the applicable law should be determined by reference to the hierarchical structure out in Article 8.

The full text of Article 8 is as follows:-

1. An individual employment contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with Article 3.  Such a choice of law may not, however, have the result of depriving the employee of the protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated from by agreement under the law that, in the absence of choice, would have been applicable pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article.

2.  To the extent that the law applicable to the individual employment contract has not been chosen by the parties, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country in which or, failing that, from which the employee habitually carries out his work in performance of the contract.  The country where the work is habitually carried out shall not be deemed to have changed if he is temporarily employed in another country.

3.  Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraph 2, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the place of business through which the employee was engaged is situated.

4. Where it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with a country other than that indicated in paragraphs 2 or 3, the law of that other country shall apply.

There was no dispute that the parties choose the Irish law to govern the contract within the meaning of Article 8(1).

The choice is, however, subject to an important limitation. Under Article 6(1) of the Rome Convention, it cannot deprive the employee of the protection afforded by the mandatory rules of the law which would have applied in the absence of choice. The equivalent mechanism is now found in Article 8(1) Rome I.

Recital 23 of Rome I provides:-

“As regards contracts concluded with parties regarded being weaker, those parties should be protected by conflict-of-law rules that are more favourable to their interests than the general rules”

There was nothing put forward to suggest that adequate protection for the Complainant as the weaker contracting party would require consideration whether the remaining provision of Article 8 would be more favourable to the Complainant’s interests. I must conclude that I do have jurisdiction to hear the Complainant’s claim of unfair dismissal as referred to the Director General.

Unfair Dismissal Act and Domicile:

Section 2(3) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 as amended provides in relevant parts as follows.

(3)(a) This Act shall not apply in relation to the dismissal of an employee who, under the relevant contract of employment, ordinarily worked outside the State unless—

(i) he was ordinarily resident in the State during the term of the contract or,

(ii) he was domiciled in the State during the term of the contract, and the employer—

(I)                  in case the employer was an individual, was ordinarily resident in the State, during the term of the contract, or

(II)                in case the employer was a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons, had its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract.

(b) In this subsection “term of the contract” means the whole of the period from the time of the commencement of work under the contract to the time of the relevant dismissal.

Section 13 of the Act provides;-

13.Voidance of certain provisions in agreements

A provision in an agreement (whether a contract of employment or not and whether made before or after the commencement of this Act) shall be void in so far as it purports to exclude or limit the application of, or is inconsistent with, any provision of this Act.

There was no dispute that the Respondent is a body corporate having its principal place of business in the State during the term of the contract.

It was not disputed that the Complainant’s role required a large amount of travel and the Complainant ordinarily worked outside the State. There was no dispute that the Complainant was ordinarily resident in the State during the vast majority of his contract from 1990 until 2013. The Complainant relocated to Malta in 2013, and the Respondent asserted that the Complainant created a domicile in Malta and, consequently, fell outside of the scope of the Act.

Tax law has provided the greatest clarity regarding determining where a person is domiciled.

I note that in The Law and Taxation of Trusts (Aileen Keogan, John Mee, and J.C.W. Wylie; Bloomsbury Professional Edition; 1st ed., 2006] states:

“Domicile of origin

[23.005]

A person can never be without a domicile; nor can a person have more than one domicile at any one time. A person is born with a domicile of origin. If he is born within marriage, he takes the domicile of his father, even if he was not born in the country of his father’s domicile (at that time) and never sets foot in that country during his minority. If his parents are unmarried, he takes the domicile of his mother. The domicile of origin will change if the individual acquires a domicile of dependence or choice. The presumption is that an individual retains his domicile of origin – it is the most ‘adhesive’ domicile. There is an onerous burden of proof on an individual to argue that a domicile of choice has been acquired when the domicile being abandoned is the domicile of origin. The domicile of origin can re-attach to a person if a domicile of choice is lost and a new domicile of choice is not taken up, even if the person has not returned to the domicile of origin.”

Murdoch and Hunt’s Dictionary of Irish Law (Brian Hunt; Bloomsbury Professional; 6th ed., 2016) defines “domicile” as follows.

“The place in which a person has a fixed and permanent home, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. It depends on the physical fact of residence in addition to the intention of returning.

Every person receives at birth a domicile of origin. However, each person may acquire a domicile of choice by the combination of residence and an intention of permanent or indefinite residence. The domicile of choice may be lost by abandonment and then either a new domicile of choice is acquired or the domicile of origin revives: Proes v Revenue Commissioners [1998 HC] 1 ILRM 333 and 4 IR 174.”

I also note that Law Reform Commission in the Working Paper Series: “Domicile and habitual residence as connecting factors in the conflict of laws” published on 17 September 1981 states:

“CHAPTER 2: THE NATURE OF DOMICILE

6. The concept of domicile (See generally, Dicey and Morris on Conflict of Laws Ch. 7 (10th ed., 1980)) is of considerable importance in a number of areas of law. Domicile is a “connecting factor” or link between a person and the legal system or rules that will apply to him in specific contexts, such as the validity of a marriage, matrimonial causes (including jurisdiction in, and recognition of, foreign divorces, legal separations and nullity decrees), legitimacy, succession and taxation. Thus, for example, the law of the country of the domicile of a person will determine whether, as regards such requirements as age and capacity, he or she may validly be married elsewhere and whether he or she may obtain a divorce that will be recognised elsewhere.

7. The law relating to domicile is complex and in a number of respects uncertain. The domicile of a person is, essentially, the country where he or she intends to reside permanently or indefinitely (Id. P.100 et seq.). Every person must have a domicile, and it is not possible at any time to have more than one domicile. There are three types of domicile: domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile of dependency.”

The Respondent asserted that by relocating and working in Malta, the Complainant had chosen to be domiciled in Malta. The Respondent asserted that all circumstantial facts concerning his residence, absence of property in Ireland, his tax status must affirm that Malta is where he is domiciled. It was asserted further that the Complainant confirmed that he had taken up full-time residence in Malta and intended to remain there indefinitely, which was reflected in the Respondent’s letter dated 24 October 2013 to the Inspector of Taxes.

This was denied by the Complainant who stated that at no time he created a domicile in Malta, albeit he retains an address in Malta. The Complainant gave evidence that he was born and is domiciled in Ireland. He stated that he spends some 1/3 of his time in Ireland. He retained his Irish passport. He is registered to vote in the local and the European elections in Ireland. The Complainant said that he is an active member of the Inland Waterways Association of Ireland (IWAI) of which he was the Safety Officer for 20 years. He is a founder and active in the Heritage Boat Association for over 20 years. He is also a member of an Anglers Club.

The Complainant gave evidence that his intention was always to retire to Ireland and, while residing in Malta, he was building what he considered to be a retirement home in Clare. The Complainant retained his GP in County Clare (albeit he also has a GP in Malta). The Complainant’s medical procedures were conducted in Ireland, and he maintained his private health insurance in Ireland. 

The Complainant said that all his family and friends are in Clare, albeit he agreed that he also has friends in Malta. He said that his PRSI has always been paid in Ireland since 1979 and he is tax compliant both in Ireland and in Malta.

The Complainant’s wife gave evidence that while the property is registered in her name, it is a family home. She also gave evidence that the Complainant owns boats in Ireland.

I note that the Complainant’s business card from Cloud Investment Partners and Vasco, as furnished by the Respondent, both contain the Complainant’s Irish mobile number.

I further note that eight medical certificates covering the period from 6 March 2023 to 16 August 2023 were issued by an Irish Medical Centres/ GPs and contained the Complainant’s address in Ireland. Two certificates were issued by a doctor in Malta, albeit they do not show the Complainant’s address at all. 

Having regard to the legal definition of domicile and the evidence given at the hearing and having regard to all the circumstances of this case, I find that the Complainant did not intend to choose Malta as his domicile of choice. It follows that at the time of dismissal he was legally domiciled in Ireland. As both the Respondent and the Complainant are domiciled in Ireland, I find that the Complainant’s has locus standi to refer his complaint pursuant to the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 as amended to the Director General of the WRC.

Substantive matter

Section 6 of the Act makes provision as follows :

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(2)…….

(3)…….

(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(a) the capability, competence or qualifications of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

(b) the conduct of the employee,

(c) the redundancy of the employee, and

(d) the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position which he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.

(6) In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so—

(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal, and

(b) to the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in section 14(1) of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice referred to in paragraph (d) (inserted by the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993) of section 7(2) of this Act.

The fact of dismissal was not in dispute between the parties. 

The burden of proof lies with an employer to establish not only what the reason for the dismissal was, but also that the reason fits within one of the general categories likely to be regarded as ‘fair’ under section 6(4) of the 1977 Act. If dismissal did not result wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters listed in section 6(4), there must have been other substantial grounds which justified the dismissal as per section 6(6) of the Act.

An employer can only be said to have fairly dismissed an employee if it complied with the requirements of fair procedure and either had valid grounds for the dismissal or was able to show a genuine operational need to dismiss the employee. A dismissal is unfair if no reasonable employer would have dismissed, but it is not unfair if a reasonable employer might reasonably have dismissed.

The ‘band of reasonable responses’ test was articulated by Lord Denning MR in British Leyland UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91:

‘The correct test is: Was it reasonable for the employers to dismiss him? If no reasonable employer would have dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might reasonably have dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair. It must be remembered that in all these cases there is a band of reasonableness, within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take a different view.’

In Bank of Ireland v Reilly [2015] IEHC 241 Noonan J. stated that:

‘the onus is on the employer to establish that there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal and that it resulted wholly or mainly from one of the matters specified in s.6(4), which includes the conduct of the employee or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal. Section 6(7) makes clear that the court may have regard to the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct in relation to the dismissal. That is however not to say that the court or other relevant body may substitute its own judgment as to whether the dismissal was reasonable for that of the employer. The question rather is whether the decision to dismiss is within the range of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer to the conduct concerned—see Royal Bank of Scotland v. Lindsay UKEAT/0506/09/DM.’

in Allied Irish Banks v Purcell [2012] 23 ELR 189, Linnane J commented (at p. 4):

‘Reference is made to the decision of the Court of Appeal in British Leyland UK Ltd v. Swift [1981] IRLR 91 and the following statement of Lord Denning MR at page 93:

“The correct test is: was it reasonable for the employers to dismiss him? If no reasonable employer would have dismissed him, then the dismissal was unfair. But if a reasonable employer might reasonably have dismissed him, then the dismissal was fair. It must be remembered that in all these cases there is a band of reasonableness, within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reasonably take a different view.’”

It is clear that it is not for the EAT or this court to ask whether it would dismiss in the circumstances or substitute its view for the employers view but to ask was it reasonably open to the respondent to make the decision it made rather than necessarily the one the EAT or the court would have taken.’

The Workplace Relations Commission should not substitute its view for that of the employer.

In in Union of Construction and Allied Trades and Technicians v Brane [1981] IRLR 224] it was held that:

‘It is a very sensible approach for Tribunals to put themselves into the position of the employer, informing themselves of what the employer knew at the moment, imagining themselves in that position and then asking the question, “Would a reasonable employer in those circumstances dismiss?” However, Tribunals must not fall into the error of asking themselves the question, “Would we dismiss?”, because there is sometimes a situation in which one reasonable employer would and one would not. It is sufficient that a reasonable employer would regard the circumstances as a sufficient reason for dismissing. The statute does not require the employer to satisfy the Tribunal of the rather more difficult consideration that all reasonable employers would dismiss in those circumstances.’`

In Bunyan v United Dominions Trust [1982] ILRM 404 the Irish EAT held:

‘The Tribunal therefore does not decide the question whether or not, on the evidence before it, the employee should be dismissed. The decision has been taken, and our function is to test such decision against what we consider the reasonable employer would have done and/or concluded.’

The Complainant asserted that he was dismissed due to his illness and that his dismissal was unfair. The Respondent asserted that the Complainant was fairly dismissed on the basis of a contractual provision. The Respondent asserted that the Complainant’s absence was not a disciplinary matter which would require a disciplinary process. It was asserted that the dismissal was fair within the meaning of section 6(4) of the Act and there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal. The Respondent was of the view that it was entitled to trigger the clause in the Complainant’s contract which provided for circumstances where an extended absence by reason of ill health would be deemed a “disability” which in turn gave the Respondent “other good reason” for the termination of employment.

I note that the Complainant’s contract of employment stipulates as follows:

‘6. Termination of Employment

3.       Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, Executive’s employment under this Agreement shall terminate upon the earliest to occur of the following events, as well as Executive’s right to any Salary, bonus, entitlement under the Company Pension Scheme and other benefits which thereafter otherwise would accrue to him hereunder, except as set forth in this Section 6(a):

(i)      [not relevant]

(ii)    Executive’s Disability

During the Term, the Company may terminate the employment of Executive due to Executive’s Disability upon 30 days’ written notice to Executive. …’

“Disability” is defined in Agreement as follows.

‘“Disability” means if Executive becomes permanently incapacitated by accident or ill health from performing his duties under this Agreement and for the purposes of this definition incapacity for 60 consecutive days or any 120 aggregate days in any 12 month period shall be deemed to be permanent incapacity.’

I note that while the Complainant’s contract provides of termination “for good reason”, it only addresses termination of employment by an employee / the Executive for good reason, which is defined in clause 1 Definitions of the Contract. There appears to be no provision for a dismissal “for good reason” by the employer.

It was submitted by the Complainant that at no stage did he waive his rights under the Act by agreeing to the clause above.

While it is open in principle to an employee to waive rights under employment protection legislation, including under the Unfair Dismissals Act, such a waiver will only be effective where it can be demonstrated that the employee entered into the agreement on the basis of informed consent, including awareness of the relevant statutory rights and advice to access appropriate independent advice. There was nothing put before me to suggest that the Complainant waived his rights under the Unfair Dismissals Act. Furthermore, having a contractual right to terminate, in my view, does not automatically make the dismissal fair. Employers must still show a fair reason and follow a fair process.  While the Respondent did exercise its contractual right to terminate the Complainant’s contract of employment, it does not preclude the Complainant from exercising his right to pursue a claim for unfair dismissal.

In reaching the decision to terminate the contract of employment the Respondent should demonstrate that fair procedures were applied in reaching that conclusion.

I note that the Respondent did not assert that the Complainant’s dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from his capability to perform the work she was employed to do. Rather, it was asserted that he was dismissed for “other good reason”, namely, pursuant to an express contractual provision under which an executive is automatically deemed to have a disability following an extended absence from work due to ill health.

I note that the letter from the Respondent to the Complainant dated 8 August 2023 states as follows.

‘Following deliberations regarding your employment with Magellan Aviation Services Limited (the “Company”), the Company has considered its position in light of your incapacity and your inability to perform your duties under the Contract of Employment dated 20 August 2008 and the subsequent written amendments to same dated 29 June 2012 (together the “Employment Contract”).

Given that you have been unable to work by reason of ill health since 6 March 2023, a combined of 154 days, the Company has deemed that you are suffering from a Disability, as defined under clause 1 of your Employment Contract. You will note that the clause 1 of your Employment Contract defines disability as follows:

“Disability” means if Executive becomes permanently incapacitated by accident or ill health from performing his duties under this Agreement and for the purpose of this definition incapacity for 60 consecutive days or any 120 aggregate days in any 12 moth period shall be deemed to be permanent incapacity.”

In light of the above, the Company has decided to invoke clause 6(ii) of your Employment Contract, which allows the Company to terminate your employment due to Disability by giving you 30 days’ written notice…’

It appears to me that the reason to dismiss the Complainant advanced in the above letter was his “incapacity” and “inability to perform” his work due to ill health.

Generally speaking, there is nothing prohibiting an employer dismissing an employee for long-term absenteeism when it can be established that there is no reasonable return date to work. It is important, however, that an employer makes all reasonable efforts to have an employee’s medical condition evaluated and not make an assumption that the employee is unable to return to work.

It is well established that it is not the function of the Adjudication Officer to establish whether the employee was, in fact, incapable of carrying out the duties for which he was employed. If an employee is dismissed for one of the reasons provided for in subsection 6(4) of the Act, it is sufficient that the employer honestly believes on reasonable grounds that the employee was incompetent or incapable.

The requirements in respect of capability arising from ill health were set out by Lardner J. in Bolger v Showerings (Ireland) Ltd.  [1990] E.L.R. 184 as follows:

’In this case it was the ill-health of the plaintiff which the company claimed rendered him incapable of performing his duties as a forklift driver. For the employer to show that the dismissal was fair, he must show that:

(1) It was the ill-health which was the reason for his dismissal;

(2) That this was substantial reason;

(3) That the employee received fair notice that the question of his dismissal for incapacity was being considered; and

(4) That the employee was afforded an opportunity of being heard.’

It is clear that the case law addresses two requirements, one that ill health be wholly or mainly the reason for the termination of the contract and secondly that the requirement for fair procedure and natural justice is necessary for processing such cases.

When an employer is proposing to dismiss an employee, certain procedural steps must be followed by the employer to ensure that that an employee at risk of dismissal is treated with openness and fairness.  This process requires fair notice that the question of dismissal for incapacity was being considered, as set out in Bolger, and the opportunity for an employee to be heard in response to that notice.

In the within case, the Respondent had not engaged with the Complainant in relation to his continued employment and he was not put on notice that his position was at risk. The Respondent made no efforts to inquire as to the Complainant’s health status, potential return to work date or support his return to work. This occurred against the backdrop of ongoing engagement with the Complainant on a number of other issues, including efforts to mediate those matters up to Friday, 4 August 2023, immediately before a long weekend following which the Complainant was summarily dismissed with immediate effect. He was not afforded an opportunity to appeal the decision to dismiss him.

In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Respondent had acted in an appropriate fashion in terms of the manner in which it had managed the Complainant’s sick absence and that it had fully satisfied the requirements in the Bolger v Showerings (Ireland) Ltd. case.

I cannot accept that other matters, some of them still remaining unresolved, had no impact on the Respondent’s decision to dismiss the Complainant. In that context, I note Mr Duggan’s evidence where he stated that matters became increasingly fractious; that the Complainant initiated a High Court action, and he tried to escalate the matter to Japan. Mr Duggan said that at the mediation stage, and it is important to note that it continued up until the Friday 4 August 2023, the Respondent could not see a way forward. It was stated that there was an impasse regarding the Complainant’s contract and the backpay issues. It was further stated that, given where the relationship was, the Respondent relied on the clause in the Complainant’s contract in the context of his sick certificates.

Having considered the oral and written submissions made, together with the evidence adduced I find that the process followed by the Respondent in reaching its decision to dismiss the Complainant was in breach of fair procedures and fell short of what would be expected of a reasonable employer. On this basis alone the Complainant's dismissal was unfair. Moreover, on the facts of the case, I am not satisfied that the Complainant’s dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from his capability.

Consequently, taking all of the above into consideration, I find that the Complainant’s dismissal was unfair.

Remedy

Section 7 of the Act states:

Redress for unfair dismissal

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(ii) if the employee incurred no such financial loss, payment to the employee by the employer of such compensation (if any, but not exceeding in amount 4 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated as aforesaid) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

and the reference in the foregoing paragraphs to an employer shall be construed, in a case where the ownership of the business of the employer changes after the dismissal, as references to the person who, by virtue of the change, becomes entitled to such ownership.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the said financial loss was attributable to an action, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14, and

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

In this section—

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to [2022], or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

Section 17 Regulations

1.The Minister may make regulations for the purposes of sections 7(1)(c) and 8(8) of this Act and for the purpose of enabling any other provisions of this Act to have full effect.

Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations 1977 S.I. No. 287 of 1977 provide the manner in which an average weekly pay for the purposes of the Act should be calculated.

The Complainant sought reinstatement, which he asserted was the only remedy that could restore his reputation. He believed that it would be possible for him to return to the Respondent and work with his former colleagues harmoniously.

The Respondent objected to the Complainant’s reinstatement. The Respondent submitted the trust was broken and not repairable. 

In O’Siurd v. Bord Banistiochta, Gaelscoil Moshlolog 2024 IESC 38 the Supreme Court at paragraph 102 noted:

‘The inadequacy of financial compensation under the 1977 act may be a factor in finding that reengagement or reinstatement is the more appropriate remedy (see Reilly). But it is only one such factor and one of limited significance, and if there are reasons making reengagement or reinstatement inappropriate remedy, then they must also be taken into account.’

I have regard to the findings of the Supreme Court where it was stated that ‘the remedy of reinstatement is exceptional in nature, involving as it does the imposition of a contractual relationship which is not only personal, but involves a high level of mutual trust and confidence, on an unwilling party…. It is wrong to view reinstatement simply as punishment for wrongdoing on the part of the employer’.

The judgment confirmed the longstanding principle that an employer ought not be required to reinstate or reengage an employee other than in exceptional cases. Crucially, neither such remedy ought to be entertained in cases where there is evidence of a breakdown in the relationship or where the fundamental requirement of trust and confidence has been damaged. The Court emphasised that practicability is central. Factors such as the passage of time, changes to the role, workplace relationships, and the impact on third parties must all be carefully weighed.

In Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Ltd UD 858/1999 the Employment Appeals Tribunal set out at some length why it considered neither reinstatement nor re-engagement as being the appropriate remedy.

‘Both these remedies cannot be considered, if, firstly, there exists a very definite possibility that it would result in compelling a reluctant employer to continue a relationship of employer/employee, a relationship which is founded on mutual trust and understanding and secondly, the performance of the returning employee may require consistent supervision to ensure adequate performance of duties. If the Tribunal attaches sufficient importance to the workplace on one hand and the actual position of the employee on the other hand and is conscious of the sensitivities that exists, it will be deterred to award relief which has a potential of creating future friction, disharmony and possibly an acrimonious relationship which could spill over into other areas and cause a disruptive work environment resulting in a decrease in productivity or performance. The more senior the position in the company the greater the care necessitated by the Tribunal in assessing the appropriate remedy.’

The facts of this case do not support reengagement or reinstatement based on the fractious relationships. Notwithstanding the Complainant's willingness to return, it is apparent that there is a huge level of resistance on the part of the Respondent to his return. I note the Complainant’s statement that he did not envisage any difficulties with working for the Respondent. However, it was clear to me from the evidence of the Complainant and the Respondent’s witness that there were tensions between the parties that would lead me to conclude that the mutual trust and confidence required for the resumption of an employment relationship between the parties no longer exists.  I do not share the Complainant’s optimism that he could work harmoniously with colleagues, the management and the Board and vice versa.

I also note the parties’ submission in respect of the changes within the company and the redistribution of the Complainant’s role. The difficulty that would be encountered if the Complainant was to be re-instated is that the position no longer existed and the fact that over three years have passed since his dismissal.

Taking all of the above into account, I find that neither reinstatement nor reengagement are appropriate remedies in this case. I take the view that compensation is the appropriate redress and is the remedy that will do justice between the parties.

 

Determination is the appropriate level of compensation pursuant to Section 7 the Acts. 

Section 7(1)(c) provides that compensation shall be such amount as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances. However, it places a limitation on the amount of compensation a claimant can receive. Section 7(2) (a) – (f) requires that regard be had to specified factors in determining the extent to which financial loss is attributable to the dismissal.

Section 7(3) of the Act defines financial loss as “financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;”

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.”

Regulation 4 of S.I. No. 287/1977 - Unfair Dismissals (Calculation of Weekly Remuneration) Regulations, 1977 (“S.I. No. 287/1977”) provides:

‘In the case of an employee who is wholly remunerated in respect of the relevant employment at an hourly time rate or by a fixed wage or salary, and in the case of any other employee whose remuneration in respect of the relevant employment does not vary by reference to the amount of work done by him, his weekly remuneration in respect of the relevant employment shall be his earnings in respect of that employment (including any regular bonus or allowance which does not vary having regard to the amount of work done and any payment in kind) in the latest week before the date of the relevant dismissal in which he worked for the number of hours that was normal for the employment together with, if he was normally required to work overtime in the relevant employment, his average weekly overtime earnings in the relevant employment as determined in accordance with Regulation 5 of these Regulations.’ 

Regulation 7 states:

(a) In the case of an employee who is paid remuneration in respect of the relevant employment wholly or partly at piece rates, or whose remuneration includes commissions (being piece rates or commissions related directly to his output at work) or bonuses, and in the case of any other employee whose remuneration in respect of the relevant employment varies in relation to the amount of work done by him, his weekly remuneration shall be the amount obtained by dividing the amount of the remuneration to be taken into account in accordance with paragraph (b) of this Regulation by the number of hours worked in the period of 26 weeks mentioned in the said paragraph (b) and multiplying the resulting amount by the normal number of hours for which, at the date of the dismissal of the employee, an employee in the relevant employment was required to work in each week.

(b) The remuneration to be taken into account for the purposes of paragraph (a) of this Regulation shall be the total remuneration paid to the employee concerned in respect of the employment concerned for all the hours worked by the employee in the employment in the period of 26 weeks that ended 13 weeks before the date on which the employee was dismissed, adjusted in respect of any variations in the rates of pay which became operative during the period of 13 weeks ending on the date of dismissal of the employee.

(c) For the purposes of paragraph (b) of this Regulation, any week worked in another employment shall be taken into account if it would not have operated, for the purposes of the First Schedule to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act 1973 (No. 4 of 1973), to break the continuity of service of the employee concerned in the employment from which he was dismissed.

In calculating the “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal, I note that Charleton J in Panisi v JVC Europe Limited [2011] IEHC 279, in assessing loss, stated as follows: 

‘My task is to assess the financial damage which the dismissal has brought about and then to place the measure of that damage against the maximum amount of compensation that is available. In the event that the compensation that is available, amounting to 104 weeks remuneration, is less than that sum, then that is the measure of damages. Where the quantum of damage is more, then the jurisdiction is limited to that maximum and the amount of damages must thus be reduced to that maximum sum. Where the measure of damages on dismissal is more than the maximum but contributory fault is found in respect of the dismissal against the employee, the reduction is on the totality of those damages, and not on the maximum award. If the result is to reduce compensation within the maximum award, that sum is appropriate. Where the reduction in total damages for contributory fault puts the damages above the maximum award, then the maximum award is the correct measure of compensation for unfair dismissal.’

The Labour Court in X Internet Unlimited Company v Rooney UDD2612, determined the correct methodology is to identify the financial loss sustained, assess the extent to which that loss is attributable to the dismissal, and adjust the recoverable loss having regard to the conduct of the parties, including mitigation.

In Brady v Minister for Social Protection [2016] IEHC 553 the High Court has held that: ‘The legislation does not envisage the deciding body being required to always, or perhaps ever, engage in a calculation or mathematical formula by which it determines the extent of the financial loss exclusively by reference to the weekly remuneration of an employee.’

Average weekly pay for the purposes of the Act

The Complainant asserted that the weekly pay with the Respondent was €1,767.25 gross. The Complainant argued that the bonus he could have earned should be included in the award.

The Respondent asserted that, as the Complainant's remuneration includes a bonus, his weekly remuneration for the purposes of any award of compensation which may be ordered under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) must be calculated in accordance with Regulation 7 of S.I. No. 287/1977.

The Respondent argued that, when calculated in accordance with Regulation 7 of the relevant Statutory Instrument, bonus would not form part of the average weekly pay.

At the hearing on 19 March 2023, the Complainant furnished a four-page document which included the following:

·       A table entitled “Gerard Burke Remuneration Calculations Based on Pre-Covid Figures from 2019/2020”. The table stated that the Complainant’s salary was €80,000 gross per year. In addition, he received €3,400 in a VHI benefit and a payment of €8,000 towards his pension entitlements. The Complainant also asserted that he received a bonus of $305,000 which equated to €278,396. The Complainant asserted that the “total annual remuneration package” was €369,786.

 

·       A table entitled “Unpaid Bonus Calculation” asserting that the Complainant was owed €39,279 in a “Final Unpaid Bonus”

 

·       The Complainant sought €1,246,431.00 and provided the following breakdown:

Item

Amount (€)

Notes

2 years remuneration

739,573

Note: as above (€369,786 x 2)

Unpaid bonus

39,279

 

Total claims

778,852

 

 

Subsequent years bonus claim

Average remuneration 2024 & 2025: $797,935

Converted to Euros (@1.15): €693,857

Less: basic salary & benefits x2: -€182,800

Less mitigation $50,000 @ 1.15: -43,478

Subtotal for subsequent years: €467,579

Total claim: €1,246,431

 

·       A breakdown of payroll and benefits expenditure for staff and management and a breakdown of average expenditure per staff/management member for the period from 2018 to 2025.

At the hearing on 19 March 2026, the Complainant also furnished copies of his Employment Detail Summary issued by the Personal Division, PAYE Services, Revenue Commissioners. The documents showed the following gross pay by the Respondent:

·       2020 – gross pay of €209,907.62

·       2021- gross pay €83,172.00

·       2022 – gross pay €93,811.11

·       2023 (30 insurable weeks) – gross pay €53,316.69

 

The Complainant also furnished a copy of a payslip dated 27 March 2026 showing gross pay of €7,616.67 and €6,905.68 net for the month of May 2023. On that basis, the Complainant’s weekly wage would be € 1,757.69 (€7,616.67 x 12 / 52) gross and €1,593.62 net.

The Respondent asserted that the Complainant’s average weekly pay for the purposes of the Act should be calculated in accordance with Regulation 7 of S.I 287 of 1997. The Respondent provided its calculation of the Complainant’s average weekly pay for the period of 26 weeks ending 13 weeks prior to the dismissal, as per S.I. 287 of 1977, resulting in the sum of €1,701.78 gross. At the adjudication hearing the Respondent accepted however the sum of €1,767.25 gross put forward by the Complainant. 

It is for the Complainant to prove his loss. In this case, the Complainant calculated the total value of his claim at €1,246,431.

The only documentary evidence opened at hearing by the Complainant in support of his remuneration was one payslip (March 2023) and the Employment Detail Summary. Neither reflect the range of the salary claimed to have been received.  On the contrary, the payslip shows that the Complainant was in receipt of €88,000 gross salary per annum and some €3,400 in VHI contribution. The monthly net pay on the payslip was €6,905.68.

The Complainant’s calculations rely on “average” salary calculated per a member of management team. The Complainant applied the overall expenditure on payroll and benefits and divided it by the number of people on the management team. For example, in 2022, the Complainant asserted that the expenditure on salaries for four members of management was $579,148. Hence the average pay was $144,787. When calculating the value of his claim, he based it on the average salary he arrived at. According to the Complainant’s own spreadsheet, there was no bonus paid in 2022, and he suggested that it would be a good indication of what his base salary was.

Perhaps the Complainant’s calculations are correct as to the average pay per a member of management team. However, I cannot accept that the average pay matches the Complainant’s salary, or that it would be correct basis for the calculation of the Complainant’s average weekly pay for the purposes of this claim.

The Respondent furnished copies of payslips for the period from November 2022 to December 2022 showing a monthly payment of €7,333.33 gross and a VHI contribution of €287.04 totalling €7,620.37 gross and €6,904.33 net; and for the period from January 2023 to May 2023 showing a monthly payment of salary of €7,333.33 gross and a VHI contribution of €283.34, totalling €7,616.67 gross and €6,905.68 net.

In relation to a bonus, the Complainant’s contract of 20 August 2008, states that the “Salary” has the meaning set in section 5(a). Section 5(a) states that he would be paid “During the Term, the Company agrees to pay to Executive, and Executive agrees to accept, a base salary (as the same may be increased from time to time as determined by the Company Board, the “Salary”) for all his services at the rate effective immediately prior to the date of the Investment of Investment LLC, plus a bonus consisted with past practice.”

The 2012 amendment to the contract does not provide any more clarity on the matter of a bonus. It replaces “at the rate in effect immediately prior to the date of the investment of Investment LLC” with “at the rate in effect immediately prior to the closing of the Transaction”; and replaced “prior to the Investment” with “prior to the closing of the Transaction” in section 5(a).

The Staff Handbook that was furnished by the Respondent is silent on the matter of a bonus.

There was no dispute that at the termination of the employment, the Complainant was paid a bonus of €19,233.66 for the financial year from 1 April 2022 to 31 March 2023. No details of the calculations of the figure paid were provided by either party. 

I accept that the bonus could have formed a material component of the Complainant’s historical earnings. However, there was no documentary evidence opened at hearing in support of the figures relating to the bonus payment.

A bonus was calculated at the conclusion of each financial year, was profitability dependent and variable.  In the absence of reliable documentary evidence, its inclusion in the calculation would be speculative, and not in accordance with S.I. No. 287/1977. 

In those circumstances, financial loss is most appropriately assessed by reference to the Complainant’s base salary together with his pension entitlements i.e. €91,400 gross / €82,868.16 net.

I note that both Regulation 4 and Regulation 7 address the matter of a bonus. However, Regulation 4 deals with an employee who is remunerated at an hourly time rate or by a fixed wage or salary, and in the case of any other employee whose remuneration in respect of the relevant employment does not vary by reference to the amount of work done by him.

Regulation 7, on the other hand deals with an employee who is paid remuneration wholly or partly at piece rates, or whose remuneration includes commissions (being piece rates or commissions related directly to his output at work) or bonuses, and in the case of any other employee whose remuneration in respect of the relevant employment varies in relation to the amount of work done by him.

In my view, the Complainant was paid a fixed salary, which did not vary depending on the amount of work done by him. Terefore, he falls within the Regulation 4.

Loss

The Complainant remained unemployed from 8 August 2023 up to and including the date of hearing on 20 March 2026, a period of approximately 136 weeks. The award under the Act is capped at 104 weeks.

For clarity, while Mr Stewart suggested at the last day of the hearing that any award could be increased to the equivalent of five years’ remuneration on foot of the alleged protected disclosure made by the Complainant, no such claim was pursued before me for determination.

It was submitted by the Respondent that the central issue was whether the Complainant had taken reasonable steps to mitigate his loss. The Complainant, on the other hand contended that it would not be realistic to expect evidence of job applications given the nature of the industry and the level at which the Complainant was employed.

There was very limited information provided regarding the Complainant’s loss and his attempt to mitigate it. At the adjudication hearing, some time was given to the Complainant to provide more detailed information as to his average weekly pay with the Respondent and his alleged losses.

The Complainant confirmed that he was paid in lieu of notice for a period of three months (some 13 weeks) following dismissal. The Complainant gave evidence that he did not take up new employment to date. The Complainant said that he did not seek employment until some 15 weeks after the paid notice period (approximately March 2024, albeit no exact dates were provided) due to his ongoing health difficulties. He anticipated that he would need some recovery time after a medical procedure that was scheduled for November 2023. He commenced his search for new employment in the spring of 2024, albeit no documentary evidence to support this assertion was furnished. From March 2024 the Complainant was working in a part-time capacity on an unpaid consultancy basis and earned some $50,000 gross since. The Complainant asserted that working for a competitor would preclude him from obtaining reinstatement, but he accepted that he was not prohibited to do so.

There was no evidence produced by the Complainant regarding the steps he took to secure alternative employment, and no records were produced of any engagements such as applications, engaging with his professional contacts and networks, head-hunters or recruitment agents, or networking. While I accept that networking forms a legitimate component of job seeking within a relationship-based sector, however, the Complainant’s own oral evidence was only on one engagement which resulted in his role with Cloud.

I find that, having regard to the evidence, the Complainant’s efforts did not meet the standard of reasonableness required under section 7(2)(c). This is consistent with the approach in Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Ltd UD858/1999, where it was held that a complainant is expected to devote a reasonable portion of each working day to seeking employment, and that passive or limited engagement is insufficient.

I appreciate that, while employees, particularly senior employees might not be required to take any job at any salary simply to demonstrate mitigation, they must nonetheless take active and credible steps to obtain alternative employment.  

I have found that the manner in which the termination of the Complainant’s employment as executed fell short of what would be expected of a reasonable employer. I accept that, in a small and relationship driven industry, a sudden dismissal, even if subsequently found unfair is capable of giving rise to adverse inference and may give rise to an initial impairment of the Complainant’s employment prospects.

While I note the specific nature of the industry and the difficulties the Complainant could have faced with securing new employment, the effect of that could only be considered had he attempted to do so more vigorously. I must take into account the Complainant’s inadequate efforts to mitigate his loss, and I reduce the award accordingly.

In circumstances where elements of variable remuneration could not be reliably quantified, the calculation has been confined to base weekly salary of €1,593.62 net.

Decision:

Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.

I declare this complaint to be well founded. I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed.

I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €41,434.08 net which equates to approximately 6 months’ salary which I deem just and equitable in the circumstances. The amount takes into account the Respondent’s conduct in the manner in which the Complainant was dismissed. The award further takes into account the Complainant’s inadequate efforts to mitigate his loss and the earnings of some $50,000 since his dismissal.

 

Dated: 06th of October 2026 

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Ewa Sobanska

Key Words:

Unfair dismissal – Brussels – Rome-