UDD2615

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00049950 (CA-00060839-006)

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the Decision of the Adjudication Officer to the Labour Court on 12 January 2025 in accordance with Section 8A of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 to 2015. A Labour Court hearing took place on 14 April 2026.

The following is the Decision of the Court.

DECISION:

1. Background to the Appeal

This is an appeal by Sinead Plunkett of a decision of an Adjudication Officer made under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (“the 1977 Act”). The Adjudication Officer held that the complaint was lodged to the Workplace Commission outside the statutory time limits and that he did not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

For ease, the parties are referred to in this Decision as they were at first instance. Hence, Sinead Plunkett is referred to as “the Complainant” and Little Bunnies Montessori Ltd as “the Respondent.”

A hearing of the Labour Court was held in Dublin on 14 April 2026. The Court heard submissions and witness testimony from both parties. The Court heard a linked appeal of a decision made under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 on the same day. The Complainant withdrew six appeals of decisions made under other employment rights statutes at the hearing.

The Respondent is a Montessori School, which was established by the Complainant in 2016. Ownership of the business transferred from the Complainant, via an asset purchase agreement, to the Respondent on 30 June 2022. The parties agreed that the Complainant would remain on as an employee of the Respondent on a one-year fixed term contract.

2. Preliminary Matters

Preliminary matters addressing the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the complaint arise in this case.

The date of termination of the Complainant’s employment with the Respondent is in dispute. The Respondent contends that the Complainant resigned her employment on 13 December 2022. The Complainant contends that her employment with the Respondent ended on the 3 or 4 January 2023.

The Court’s jurisdiction to hear the complaint on appeal having regard to the statutory time limits are set down at Section 41(6) and 41 (8) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015, provides as follows:

“(6) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.”

“(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

The Complainant in this case seeks an extension of the timeframe for lodging her complaint to twelve months. Should the Court decide that the Complainant’s employment ended in January 2023, and should the Court find a reasonable cause for the delay in lodging the claim, the timeframe for considering the complaint under the 1977 Act can be extended from six months to twelve months and, in those circumstances, the January 2023 termination date would fall within the extended cognisable period for consideration of the complaint.

Should the Court decide that the Complainant’s employment ended on 13 December 2022, then the complaint under the 1977 Act was lodged to the WRC outside the statutory timeframe allowed and the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

Rule 34 of the Labour Court Rules provides that: -

“The Court may, in its discretion, give a preliminary ruling on any aspect of the case where it is satisfied that time and expense may be saved by the giving of such a ruling and/or where it has the potential to be determinative of the case.”

By agreement with the parties, the Court proposed that it would hear and decide the above preliminary matters in the first instance. It advised the parties if it decided that the complaint was lodged to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) within time, a further hearing would be scheduled to consider the substantive appeal. If the Court decided that the complaint was lodged outside the time limits set down in the Act, the appeal would be out of time and statute barred.

3. Preliminary matter - summary position of the Respondent

The Complainant resigned from her employment on 13 December 2022 and left the Respondent WhatsApp group on the same date. The Complainant attended the workplace on 3 January 2023 and handed her letter of resignation, dated 13 December 2022, to the Respondent owner, Ms Walsh

On 29 December 2023, more than one year after she resigned, the Complainant lodged her complaint to the WRC.

Ms Aisling Walsh, a director with the Respondent company, gave evidence that the Complainant contacted her on 13 December 2022 to say that she could not work anymore. The Complainant then left the WhatsApp group. The Complainant was unable to provide a letter of resignation at that time, as she had Covid. They met on 3 January 2023, and the Complainant gave her letter of resignation. The meeting was friendly and Ms Walsh thought they parted on good terms. They exchanged messages back and forth about a draft of a post for the school Facebook page. The Complainant posted the message, as Ms Walsh did not have access to the page at that time. The Complainant attended a Tusla meeting at the school on 4 January 2023 as she was still listed as the designated person in charge.

Under cross examination, Ms Walsh denied that the resignation letter was a falsified document. She did not retain the original copy and accepted that no one witnessed the Complainant handing over a letter of resignation. Ms Walsh could not comment on the Complainant’s assertion that the signature on the letter was false. Ms Walsh accepted that the Complainant attended the workplace on 4 January 2023 but refuted the Complainant’s assertion that she was working on that day. Ms Walsh said that the Complainant was still listed on the paperwork as the designated person-in-charge, as she was the previous owner of the business. Ms Walsh said that she would not describe a handover of documents on 4 January as a working day.

4. Preliminary matter - summary position and evidence of the Complainant

The Complainant never resigned from her employment. She was absent from work on sick leave and is still registered as an employee of the Respondent with the Revenue Commissioners. The Complainant returned to work from sick leave on 3 January 2023 and was dismissed by Ms Walsh that day. The Complainant attended a Tusla inspection at the workplace on 4 January 2026, as she was the designated person-in-charge. She was not paid to attend the meeting.

Under cross-examination, the Complainant refuted resigning her employment on 13 December 2022 or advising Ms Walsh, the Respondent owner, that she could not cope anymore. She denied giving Ms Walsh a letter of resignation on 3 January 2023, dated 13 December 2022. The Complainant said that the letter was falsified.

The Complainant accepted that she exchanged WhatsApp messages on 15 December 2022 with named individuals about her departure from the school. She accepted that she engaged in a WhatsApp conversation message with Ms Walsh on 6 January in which they agreed proposed wording of a Facebook post announcing the Complainant’s departure from the Montessori school. The Complainant said that she was stepping back from duties in the school but never said that she was leaving. She accepted that she published the Facebook post on 6 January 2023, as she retained control of the Facebook page. She denied that the complaints she made to Tusla and An Garda Síochána were vindictive.

5. Deliberations

The first matter for consideration by the Court is whether the contravention of the Act alleged falls within the statutory time limits set down at Section 41(6) and 41 (8) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015, in circumstances where the date of termination is in dispute.

The Court heard sworn testimony from the Complainant and from Ms Walsh, the Respondent director, in relation to that matter. WhatsApp messages, a social media post on Facebook, and a disputed resignation letter were opened to the Court.

The Court found the Complainant to be inconsistent in her evidence about when her employment ended. Initially, at the outset of the hearing, the Complainant stated that her employment relationship with the Respondent never ended. When asked why in that case she was pursuing a complaint under the unfair dismissal legislation, the Complainant put forward different dates when she asserts her employment terminated.

The Complainant’s evidence was that she did not resign her employment on 13 December 2022, albeit she accepted that she left the Respondent WhatsApp group on the same date. She said that she never advised Ms Walsh that she could not cope anymore; she merely said that she was stepping back from duties in the school, as she planned to work independently alongside the school providing other support services.

The Complainant put forward several possible termination dates in her evidence.  She contends that Ms Walsh dismissed her on 3 January 2023 when she returned to work after sick leave. She subsequently asserted that her employment terminated on 4 January 2023, which was the date of the Tusla inspection. She cited 10 January 2023 as the date of termination of her employment on the WRC complaint form. The Court found that the lack of clarity from the Complainant regarding when her employment ended poses questions about her credibility as a witness.

Several WhatsApp messages were opened to the Court. The Complainant accepted that she exchanged WhatsApp messages on 15 December 2022 with named individuals who messaged her to say that they had heard that the Complainant was leaving. The Complainant accepted that she did not dispute or correct their understanding of the situation.

The Complainant accepted that she engaged in a WhatsApp conversation message with Ms Walsh on 6 January 2023 in which they discussed and agreed proposed wording for a Facebook post announcing the Complainant’s departure from the Montessori school. The Complainant further accepted that the tone in the WhatsApp exchange suggested that she and Ms Walsh were still on good terms at that point. The Complainant’s evidence was that she did not want to escalate matters, as there were unresolved financial matters outstanding from the sale of the business.

The Complainant controlled the Facebook page at that time and published the post issued on 6 January 2023, which stated that the Complainant was no longer working with the Respondent. While the Complainant strongly disputed the veracity of the resignation letter submitted by the Respondent, the social media messages which were opened to the Court strongly support the contention that the Complainant had left the employment of the Respondent in December 2022.

Overall, the Court found Ms Walsh to be a credible witness and, on balance, preferred her testimony. Having regard to the evidence tendered, the Court accepts the evidence tendered by Ms Walsh that the Complainant contacted her by phone on 13 December 2022 to resign her position.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the employment relationship ended on 13 December 2022.

The Complainant lodged a complaint under the 1977 Act to the WRC on 29 December 2023, over 12 months after her employment ended. The relevant period for consideration by the Court in assessing a contravention under the 1977 Act is the period from 30 June 2023 to 29 December 2023. The time limit can be extended from six months to twelve months, i.e. from 30 December 2022 to 29 December 2023, for reasonable cause.

As the Complainant’s employment ended on 13 December 2022, the alleged contravention falls outside the statutory time limits for considering the complaint. As a result, the Court has no jurisdiction to hear the within complaint.

In linked decision RPD262, the Court considered an application by the Complainant to extend the time limit for lodging a complaint under that Act. While the statutory timelines for lodging a complaint are different in the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967, the Court determined that that Complainant had failed to establish any reasonable cause for the delaying in lodging her appeal in relation to that Act. The same reasoning as set out in that decision applies here in this case.

Having regard to the evidence tendered and submissions made, the Court finds, for the reasons set out above that the within claim was out of time when the Complainant presented it to the Workplace Relations Commission and is accordingly statute barred.

In these circumstances, the Court cannot proceed to hear the substantive matter.

6. Decision

The Court finds that the within claim was out of time when the Complainant presented it to the Workplace Relations Commission and is accordingly statute barred.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the complaint is not well founded and that the Decision of the Adjudication Officer is upheld.

The Court so decides.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Katie Connolly
AM	______________________
11/05/2026	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Ms Áine Maunsell, Court Secretary.