EDA267

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00049725 (CA-00061053-001).

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the decision of the WRC Adjudication Officer under Section 83 (1), Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2015 on 6 January 2025.

A Labour Court hearing took place on 9 April 2026.

The following is the Determination of the Court:

DETERMINATION:

Background to the Appeal

This is an appeal by Ms Hazera Begum (‘the Complainant’) from a decision of an Adjudication Officer (ADJ-00049725, dated 26 November 2024) under the Employment Equality Act 1998 (‘the Act’). Notice of Appeal was received in the Court on 6 January 2025. The Court heard the appeal in Limerick on 9 April 2026.

The Factual Background

The Complainant was employed by Arlington Novas (Ireland) Limited (‘the Respondent’) as a Locum Worker/Night Project Worker between 1 January 2017 and 23 January 2025, on which date she was dismissed with pay in lieu of one month’s notice.

The Complainant alleges that she was discriminated against and victimised by the Respondent on grounds of religion arising from a request she had made to be facilitated with prayer times while at work and having been subsequently disciplined for raising the issue.

The disciplinary process which forms the basis of her complaints was commenced on 13 December 2022 and concluded in November 2023. The Complainant was absent from the workplace on full pay between December 2022 and 11 December 2023.

The Complainant referred her complaints under the Act to the Workplace Relations Commission on 17 January 2024. The Complainant has not identified a comparator in support of her claims of less favourable treatment on the grounds of religion.

At the within hearing, the Complainant withdrew the victimisation element of her complaint.

Cognisable Period Applicable to the Complainant of Discrimination

As the complaint was received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 17 January 2024, the applicable cognisable period is 18 September 2023 to 17 January 2024. The Complainant, as noted above, was absent from the workplace on full pay until 11 December 2023 i.e. for the greater part of the cognisable period. The disciplinary process had concluded in November 2023.

Asked by the Court to specify what constituted the alleged acts of discrimination that formed the basis of the Complainant’s case under the Act, her Representative repeatedly referred, in a non-specific way, to the findings of the disciplinary process.

Burden of Proof

Section 85A(1) of the 1998 Act provides as follows in relation to the burden of proof on a Complainant who alleges discriminatory treatment contrary to the Act:

“Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

This Court – in its determination in Southern Health Board v Mitchell [2001] ELR 201 – considered the extent of the evidential burden imposed on a Complainant by section 85A and held:

“The first requirement is that the claimant must establish facts from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination.

It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

It follows that a complainant has to establish both the primary facts upon which he or she relies and also that those facts are of sufficient significance to raise an inference of discrimination. In Cork City Council v McCarthy EDA 21/2008, this Court stated in this regard:

“The type or range of facts which may be relied upon by a complainant may vary significantly from case to case. The law provides that the probative burden shifts where a complainant proves facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination. The language used indicates that where the primary facts alleged are proved it remains for the Court to decide if the inference or presumption contended for can properly be drawn from those facts. This entails a consideration of the range of conclusions which may appropriately be drawn to explain a particular fact or a set of facts which are proved in evidence. At the initial stage the complainant is merely seeking to establish a prima facie case. Hence, it is not necessary to establish that the conclusion of discrimination is the only, or indeed the most likely, explanation which can be drawn from the proved facts. It is sufficient that the presumption is within the range of inferences which can reasonably be drawn from those facts.”

In Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters [2010] ELR 64, however, the Court stated that “mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn”.

Discussion and Decision

The Court finds that no facts have been established by the Complainant from which an inference could be drawn to the effect that she had been discriminated against on the grounds of religion during the cognisable period. For this reason, the Court finds that the claim is not well-founded, that the appeal fails and that the decision of the Adjudication Officer is upheld.

The Court so determines.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Alan Haugh
TH	______________________
21/05/2026	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Determination should be in writing and addressed to Ms Therese Hickey, Court Secretary.