Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Lorna  Healy

Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance

Representatives

Mark Curran BL instructed by  Mason Hayes & Curran LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act 1998

CA-00078837-001

19/12/2025

The Complainant referred a complaint to the WRC on 19 December 2025 under the Employment Equality Act 1998. The complaint was issued against an entity described as “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance”.

The Respondent raised preliminary objections that the complaint had not been brought against the correct legal entity, that the majority of the complaints were out of time and that the matters alleged within the cognisable period did not disclose facts capable of amounting to unlawful treatment within the meaning of the 1998 Act.

The Respondent submitted that the issue regarding the naming of the incorrect Respondent was determinative of the proceedings.

The Complainant stated that following the return of correspondence issued by the WRC in relation to her earlier complaint (ADJ-00062837), she obtained legal advice and thereafter referred the present complaint under the 1998 Act on 19 December 2025.

In relation to the identity of her employer, the Complainant accepted that her contract of employment and payslips identified “Resolute Management Limited” as her employer. However, she maintained throughout her evidence that “Resolute Management Limited” dealt with payroll matters and that she was employed by “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance Limited”.

The Complainant stated that, based on her own enquiries, including online searches, she understood that “Resolute Management Limited” was connected to or a subsidiary of the Berkshire Hathaway Insurance group. She also stated that she believed that the entities shared the same address.

The Complainant accepted that the WRC complaint form did not name “Resolute Management Limited”, the entity identified on her contract of employment and payslips as her employer.

The Complainant maintained that the entity named in the WRC complaint form was the appropriate Respondent.

The Complainant also made submissions in relation to time limits and maintained that her complaint should proceed to substantive hearing.

The Respondent raised preliminary objections that the complaint was issued against an incorrect legal entity and that the majority of the allegations contained within the complaint were out of time.

It was submitted that the Complainant was at all times employed by “Resolute Management Limited”, which was clearly identified on her contract of employment and payslips.

The Respondent submitted that the WRC complaint form did not identify “Resolute Management Limited” and that the entity named by the Complainant did not correspond to her employer or to any registered legal entity. In particular, no entity by the name of “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance” is registered in Ireland.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant accepted that her contract and payslips identified “Resolute Management Limited” as her employer and that the name “Resolute Management Limited” did not appear on the WRC complaint form. It was further submitted that the Complainant had obtained legal advice prior to referring the present complaint and nevertheless did not issue proceedings against “Resolute Management Limited”.

The Respondent submitted that “Resolute Management Limited” did not consent to any amendment or substitution of the Respondent’s name and that there was no statutory power available under the 1998 Act to amend or substitute the name of a respondent so as to identify a different legal entity.

Reliance was placed on Lawlor’s Hotel v Deborah McMahon (EDA2555), A Civil Engineer v A Concrete Manufacturing Company (ADJ-00027348)and Wimsey v Abbvie (ADJ-00055335) and the case law referred to therein.

The Respondent submitted that the authorities establish that the WRC does not have the statutory power to amend, edit or substitute the Respondent’s name.

The Respondent further submitted that the sharing of a registered address or any corporate connection between entities did not alter the requirement to identify the correct legal employer and that separate corporate entities remain legally distinct notwithstanding common ownership or address.

The Respondent also submitted that no application had been made by the Complainant to amend or substitute the name of the Respondent.

While the Respondent also made detailed submissions in relation to time limits and the substantive merits of the complaint, it maintained that the issue of the incorrectly named Respondent was determinative and that the complaint could not proceed.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the parties, the oral evidence adduced at the hearing summarised above and the oral and written submissions made by and on behalf of the parties at the hearing.

Preliminary Decisions:

In Brothers of Charity (Roscommon) Ltd. v. Marian Keigher (EDA1014), the Labour Court considered the determination of an issue by way of preliminary decision. The Labour Court referred to the judgments of Kenny J. in Tara Explorations and Development Co. Ltd v. Minister for Industry and Commerce [1975] IR 242 and Hardiman J. in B.T.F. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 367. In the latter case Hardiman J. found:

"It is often a difficult and delicate decision as to whether to try a particular issue as a preliminary matter. In a case where a point is raised which in and of itself and without regard to anything else may terminate the whole proceedings, clearly a strong case can be made for its trial as a preliminary issue. The classic example is where the Statute of Limitations is pleaded.”

In Donegal Meat Processors v. Donal Gillespie t/a Foyle Donegal (UDD2114) the Labour Court noted that, seeking to have the substantive issue and the jurisdictional issue dealt with together was:

“akin to asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction before it determines whether or not it has jurisdiction in the first instance. […] Only if the court determines that it has jurisdiction to do so can it go on to consider the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal itself”.

Having regard to the authorities outlined above, I am satisfied that there is a strong basis for determining this matter by way of preliminary issue.

Preliminary Issue

The Respondent raised a preliminary issue that the complaint was not brought against the Complainant’s employer or any correct legal entity.

It is not in dispute that the Complainant’s contract of employment and payslips identified her employer as “Resolute Management Limited”. The Complainant accepted this in evidence.

The Complainant’s position was that “Resolute Management Limited” dealt with payroll matters only and that she believed she was employed by “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance Limited”. She stated that, based on her own enquiries, she understood the entities to be connected entities. The Complainant did not submit documentary evidence concerning the asserted connection between the entities and did not file written submissions addressing the preliminary issue. Her submissions on that issue were made orally at the hearing.

I note that, while the Complainant maintained in evidence that she believed she was employed by “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance Limited”, that entity was not identified on the WRC complaint form before me.

The Respondent submitted that no entity by the name of “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance” is registered in Ireland.

The WRC complaint form did not identify “Resolute Management Limited”, the entity identified on the Complainant’s contract of employment and payslips as her employer. Nor was it issued against “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance Limited”, the entity which the Complainant stated she believed employed her. Rather, the complaint was issued against “Berkshire Hathaway European Insurance”.

I note that the present complaint was referred to the WRC after the Complainant had obtained legal advice following the return of correspondence issued by the WRC in relation to her earlier complaint.

I further note that no application was made by the Complainant to amend or substitute the name of the Respondent.

I am satisfied that this is not a case involving a minor typographical error, omission or mere misdescription. The correct legal entity does not appear on the WRC complaint form.

I have considered the authorities relied upon by the Respondent including Lawlor’s Hotel v Deborah McMahon (EDA2555), A Civil Engineer v A Concrete Manufacturing Company (ADJ-00027348)and Wimsey v Abbvie (ADJ-00055335) and the case law referred to therein.

In particular, I consider the reasoning in Lawlor’s Hotel v Deborah McMahon to be directly relevant to the present case. In that case, the Labour Court held that where the complainant named a trading name rather than the correct legal employer, notwithstanding that the correct employer appeared on the contract and payslips, the Court had no statutory basis to rectify that error.

I have also considered the analysis in Wimsey v Abbvie concerning section 88 of the 1998 Act and the discussion therein regarding section 39 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. While those statutory provisions arise in different legislative contexts, I accept the Respondent’s submission that they demonstrate that where the Oireachtas intended to provide a statutory mechanism concerning errors in the naming of employers, it did so expressly and in limited circumstances. I am satisfied that section 88 of the 1998 Act does not confer jurisdiction to substitute one legal entity for another as respondent to proceedings.

I also accept the Respondent’s submission that the fact that entities may share a registered address or have a corporate connection does not alter the requirement that proceedings be brought against the correct legal entity.

I accept that the Complainant may have intended to pursue her complaint against the entity by whom she believed she was employed and that she took steps to submit a second complaint following the return of correspondence in respect of the first. However, neither intention nor belief can confer jurisdiction where it does not otherwise arise, particularly where the legal entity which the Complainant stated employed her was not itself named on the WRC complaint form and was not the entity identified on her contract of employment and payslips as her employer.

Having regard to all of the foregoing, I find that the complaint has not been brought against the correct legal entity and that I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint.

In light of that finding, it is neither necessary nor appropriate for me to consider the Respondent’s further submissions in relation to time limits or the substantive merits of the complaint.

For the reasons set out above, I decide that the complaint has not been brought against the correct legal entity. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint.