Complainant

Respondent

Parties

David  Tyrrell

Workplace Relations Commission

Representatives

Self-represented

Audrey Cahill, Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission.

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00075368-001

12/09/2025

The background to this complaint is that the Complainant filed a previous complaint (ADJ-00055438) under the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended), on ‘the disability ground.’

That matter was assigned by the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission to an Adjudication Officer to enquire into the matter. A hearing date was set, and a remote hearing was convened on 08/04/2025, in accordance with The Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, along with the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020.

As per the requirements of the Supreme Court case of Zalewski v Adjudication Officer & Ors [2021] IESC 24, the hearing was held in public.

There is no indication from the complaint made herein (ADJ-00062639) that any members of the press or public were present.

There is no indication from the complaint made herein (ADJ-00062639) that any application in respect of the hearing being held ‘other than in public’ due to the presence of ‘special circumstances’ was made by either party.

A decision by the Adjudication Officer in the original case (ADJ-00055438), dated 01/05/2025 was issued to both parties. Both parties to the action were named and the decision was published on the WRC’s website.  The Complainant lost his case.

As per the published decision in ADJ-00055438, that complaint pertained to the Complainant being a person with a disability who drives a car that is modified. He applied for and received a Disability Toll Exemption Scheme (DTES) disc which is attached and visible on the right lower side of his front windscreen. It was his case that there should not have been a conversation with a member of the Respondent staff about his exempted status and that this disclosed his disability to his passenger which he did not want; and further that that this caused him to be delayed by the Respondent which would not have happened but for his disability which does not happen to non-disabled drivers. He further alleged harassment, on the basis of the manner in which he alleged the Respondent dealt with him.

The Adjudication Officer held, inter alia, under the ‘Findings’ section of her decision, that:  

‘I accept that the Complainant did not know all this at the time of the incident and believed instead that he was being discriminated against. However, had he read the DTES guidelines he would have learned that using a manned toll lane was for his benefit, not to his detriment.

Unsubstantiated beliefs or assertions that discrimination has occurred are not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. In Melbury Developments Ltd v. Valpeters EDA [2010] ELR 64 the Labour Court stated as follows: “This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn.”

The complaints that the Complainant was discriminated by (a) the operation of the Respondent’s automated system and or (a) how the Respondent staff dealt with him, are not proven.’

The Adjudication Officer’s ‘Conclusion’ held:

‘I am satisfied that the Complainant has not discharged a prima facie proof that he was treated adversely because of his disability. I am satisfied that no prohibited conduct took place.

I find this complaint is not well founded.’

Appeal

Either party (or both) can appeal a decision under the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended) made by a Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer to the Circuit Court, within the prescribed timeframe under the applicable legislation, i.e. within 42 days of the date of the decision.

This complaint (ADJ-00062639)

On 07/08/2025, received by the WRC on 11/08/2025, the Complainant submitted an ES1 form to the WRC in respect of how the hearing had been conducted. Specifically, he submitted that he had been asked about the nature and the extent of his disability by the Adjudication Officer at the hearing, and he was objecting to same, which he submits constitutes discrimination ‘on the disability ground’ under the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended), which is the subject matter of the complaint herein (ADJ-00062639).

On 12/09/2025, the Complainant submitted the WRC complaint form pertaining to this complaint herein (ADJ-00062639) on foot of the ES1 form he had sent a month earlier.

By letter dated 09/10/2025, the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission wrote to the Complainant setting out her view of this complaint (ADJ-00062639). She expresses the view that his complaint is misconceived under s.22(1) of the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended), and that it should be dismissed on that basis.

ADJ-00062639 was assigned to me for consideration on 07/04/2026.

The Complainant’s case is that he submitted a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission under the Equal Status Act 2000 on ‘the disability ground’, and when his case was assigned a hearing date and a hearing convened by a WRC Adjudication Officer to enquire into his complaint, that she enquired of him, as to the nature and extent of his disability as part of the exercise of her function in chairing the hearing.

The Complainant objects to this and submits, as per his ES1 form:- ‘On 8.4.2025, at 13.30 – 14.30 approx, WRC Adjudication Officer Emile Daly while addressing me at the start of the meeting asked me the following questions:

1. What was the extent of my disability and

2. How does my disability affect me.’

He further submits: ‘None of the five other strangers on Zoom call including Ms. Daly were asked such a personal and private question. I was shocked and stunned to be asked to reveal my private and personal information in front of total strangers. I told her I did not think it was relevant as to what as the extent of my disability. Despite this she continued to ask me how my disability affected me. This questioning caused me severe embarrassment, humiliation and distress. Part of my original complaint of being discriminated on the grounds of disability included that I had to disclose my disability to the passenger in my car who was unaware of it. This line of questioning caused me extreme stress and anxiety for the remaining adjudication process. I feel like my ability to participate in the adjudication process was compromised and I was made to feel like a second-class citizen due to my disability.’

At Question 6 on the ES1 Form (where a Complainant can seek additional information from the recipient of the ES1 form), he has asked:-

1.       Why did you ask me the extent of my disability

2.       Why did you ask me how my disability affected me

3.       The extent of my disability had no bearing on my case, and I find it difficult to believe why you would question me on it in front of total strangers.

As per the Complainant’s WRC complaint form, he submits (as per his selections on the complaint form):

‘I have been discriminated against by a person, organisation/company who provides goods/services or facilities. I say I have been discriminated against by reason of my disability. I say the Respondent treated me unlawfully, in the provision of goods/services.’ He further submits that he was the subject of unlawful ‘direct discrimination.’

By letter dated 25/09/2025, an acknowledgement of receipt of the Complainant’s complaint was sent to the Complainant by the WRC, by the Information and Customer Services Unit of the WRC:

1.       It acknowledged receipt of his complaint on 12/09/2025 and further communication received on 17/09/2025.

2.       It informed him that the complaint has been allocated a complaint reference number

3.       It drew to his attention the notification requirement under the Equal Status Act stating:

‘Under the Equal Status Act, a complainant must notify the respondent regarding the alleged prohibited conduct under the Act prior to referral of the complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission.

Under the Act the notification must;

(i)      be in writing

(ii)     provide details of the nature of the complaint / alleged prohibited conduct by the respondent

(iii)   state the complainant's intention to seek redress under the Equal Status Act if there is no satisfactory response and

(iv)   be sent to the respondent within 2 months of the alleged occurrence of the prohibited conduct or the last occurrence where there is more than one incident.

The 2 month deadline may be extended by the Director General to not more than 4 months, where a complainant sets out in writing, reasonable cause why the respondent was not notified within 2 months.

Where

-          notification was sent more than 4 months after the alleged prohibited conduct

-          or no notification was sent to the respondent,

the Director General may, where exceptional circumstances are shown in writing by the complainant, direct that the requirement to notify the respondent shall not apply.

From the papers submitted by you, it appears that the notification you sent to the respondent on 07/08/2025 was sent outside the 2 month statutory requirement but within 4 months of the alleged prohibited conduct. [Adjudication Officer’s Note: The date, 07/08/2025, was highlighted in red ink.]

In order to progress your complaint, you must now set out in writing the reasons you feel that an extension (permitting notification of the respondent within 4 months) should be granted. Your written application setting out the reasons should be forwarded to the Workplace Relations Commission within fourteen days of the date of this letter. Should a response not be received by the Commission within that time, the Commission may assume that you no longer wish to proceed with this complaint.’

4.       The correct address for the electronic submission of documentation was set out.

5.       It drew the Complainant’s attention to the Commission's “Procedures in the Investigation and Adjudication of Employment and Equality Complaints”, and that they were available for download from the WRC’s website.

The Complainant responded on the same day, 25/09/2025, by email, setting out:

‘To ATT. the Director General

Dear Sir Madam

I now set out in writing the reasons I feel that an extension to my complaint (permitting notification of the respondent within 4 months) should be granted.

The actions of the adjudicator during the adjudication process affected my mental health due to my neurological condition been questioned in front of complete strangers by a state official. This affected me for a period of time before I spoke with members of my family who encouraged me to hold that person to account.

I contacted the labour court on the 9/6/25/ to attempt to appeal the original decision and including your adjudicators action as part of the grounds for my appeal as per the information on your website as below.’

Appended was an email from the Labour Court, dated 10/06/25 informing him that:

1.       ‘It would appear that this matter has not been received in the Labour Court.’

2.       ‘Also, please note that it is not possible to appeal the Equal Status Act 2000 to the Labour Court.’

A Data Subject Access request dated 3/7/25 was also appended seeking a copy of any data held by the WRC, in relation to the Adjudication File Ref: ADJ-00055438, along with interim correspondence in relation to it and the outcome, which stated: ‘As noted in the decision letter issued to you yesterday 30/07/2025, the decision letter provided within bundle is the official, and only transcript of the hearing which is held by the WRC. It is the position of the WRC that the requested data cannot be released, as no such data exists.’

The Complainant submitted that: ‘I spoke with my neurologist in the first week in August about the matter and how it was affecting me. He encouraged me to continue with my complaint. I then made a complaint to the Data protection commission re the failure of the WRC to provide my data access.’

Also appended to the correspondence was an acknowledgement of the receipt of the Complainant’s complaint by the DPC, which set out: ‘I refer to your correspondence to this office dated 04 September 2025, and thank you for providing the requested information to this office. Your complaint is now being transferred to our Complaint Assessment and Early Resolution Unit (CAERU)…Once this assessment has been carried out, a substantive response will be issued to you in due course.’

By letter dated 09/10/2025, the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission, Ms. Audrey Cahill wrote to the Complainant, setting out, the position on behalf of the Respondent, in response to the complaint herein, as follows:

‘Re: David Tyrrell v Workplace Relations Commission - CA-00075368

A Chara,

I write in relation to the above matter which concerns a complaint issued under Section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000 as amended which concerns a hearing held by Ms Emile Daly a former Adjudication Officer of the WRC.

I refer to your correspondence dated 25th September 2025 enclosing a complaint form dated 12th September 2025 with ES1 form attached.

As the respondent I consent to receive communications by email.

Considering the nature of the complaint as outlined in the ES1 form, I am applying to have the complaint dismissed further to Section 22 of the Equal Status Act, 2000. Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000-2018 (“Equal Status Act”), provides the WRC with the power to “dismiss a claim at any stage if of opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter.”

In light of the substance of the complaint which relates to a hearing held by remote means on the 8th April 2025 where Ms Emile Daly, the Adjudication Officer questioned the complainant regarding the extent of his disability in circumstances where the complaint related to alleged discriminatory treatment by a service provider against the complainant on the grounds of his disability, I am of the view that the complaint is “misconceived” as defined by Section 22.

The WRC takes its duties to make reasonable accommodations for service users with disabilities very seriously and continues to have due regard to the need to promote equality of access and opportunity. However, the independent Adjudication Officer is statutorily charged with administering justice under Article 37 of the Constitution and must progress complaints for adjudications impartially and be conscious of affording fair procedures and natural justice to both the complainant and the respondent.

The Adjudication Officer is charged with investigating complaints under Section 21 of the Equal Status Acts and as part of her statutory remit is required to question both parties regarding factual/evidential matters relating to the case which is an adjudicative matter and as a result is not properly justiciable under the Equal Status Act, as the claim is related to the conduct of the hearing particularly the type of questions posed by the Adjudication Officer in the exercise of her quasi-judicial adjudicative powers.

By way of recent case example, see the matter of Barry [2023] IECC 8 decided by the Circuit Court in December 2023 summarising the position as follows:

“6. I am further satisfied that the Third Named Respondent was exercising a quasi judicial decision-making function in conducting a statutory investigation and that performing its quasi-judicial decision-making function does not come within the definition of “service” as provided in section 2 of the Equal Status Acts.

7. That is sufficient to dispose of the appeal herein. However, if I were required to go further, I am also satisfied having regard to the decision of the Supreme Court in Beatty v The Rent Tribunal & Another [2005] IESC 66, [2006] 2 IR 191 that a statutory adjudicative body exercising statutory adjudicative duties in the public interest such as the Third Named Defendant in considering complaints about professional misconduct, enjoys immunity from suit on the basis of judicial immunity unless there is an express countervailing provision in the statutory process which does not apply in this case.

8. In this case, it therefore follows that the Third Named Respondent in exercising its PPC functions and in making decisions in relation to professional conduct is exercising a function as a statutory adjudicative body which enjoys immunity from suit on the basis of the principle of judicial immunity and that is absolute immunity and it is therefore not amenable to a complaint under the Equal Status Acts.”

Accordingly, I am of the view that the entirety of the complaint should be dismissed as being misconceived in accordance with Section 22(1) of the Equal Status Act 2000.

Kind regards,

Audrey Cahill

Director General

Workplace Relations Commission’

The Law

Section 2 of the Equal Status Act 2000, as amended, defines a service as:

“service” means a service or facility of any nature which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, includes—

(a) access to and the use of any place,

(b) facilities for—

(i) banking, insurance, grants, loans, credit or financing,

(ii) entertainment, recreation or refreshment,

(iii) cultural activities, or

(iv) transport or travel,

(c) a service or facility provided by a club (whether or not it is a club holding a certificate of registration under the Registration of Clubs Acts, 1904 to 1999) which is available to the public generally or a section of the public, whether on payment or without payment, and

(d) a professional or trade service,

but does not include pension rights (within the meaning of the Employment Equality Act, 1998) or a service or facility in relation to which that Act applies;”

Disposal of goods and provision of services is dealt with by Section 5 and section 5(1) of the Act sets out that:- “(1) A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public.”

Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000 provides for the dismissal of complaints to the Workplace Relations Commission, at any stage in the proceedings, where such complaints are deemed to be made in bad faith, frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relating to a trivial matter, setting out as follows:-

“22. (1) The Director of the Workplace Relations Commission may dismiss a claim at any stage if of opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter.

(2) Not later than 42 days after the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission dismisses a claim under this section, the complainant may appeal against the decision to the Circuit Court on notice to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission specifying the grounds of the appeal.

(3) On appeal the Court may affirm or quash the decision.

(4) No further appeal lies, other than an appeal to the High Court on a point of law.”

In Kemmy V. Ireland [2009] IEHC 178 the principle of judicial immunity and its purpose was addressed, as follows:- “This freedom from action and question at the suit of an individual is given by the law to the judges, not so much for their own sake as for the sake of the public, and for the advancement of justice, that being free from actions, they may be free in thought and independent in judgment, as all who are to administer justice ought to be.”

As per the dicta of O’Donnell J in Zalewski v. Adjudication Officer and WRC, Ireland and the Attorney General [2021] IESC 24: “In my view, the function of the W.R.C., and the Labour Court on appeal, is the administration of justice.  It is not coincidental that the parallel jurisdiction in the U.K. is conferred upon a tribunal understood to be performing a judicial function and part of the judicial system.” Zalewski also determines that hearings must be held in public, save in ‘special circumstances’, the requirement to take evidence on oath or affirmation, and that the justice produced by a Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer (under Article 37 of Bunreacht na hÉireann) cannot be lower or less demanding than that administered in Courts (under Article 34 of Bunreacht na hÉireann).

The extension of judicial immunity to statutory tribunals was clarified by the Supreme Court in Beatty v The Rent Tribunal & Another [2006] 2 IR 191 wherein Mr. Justice Geoghegan’s (for the majority) held: “even though the respondent is a Tribunal which essentially determines rent disputes as between private parties, it is a statutory body exercising statutory duties in the public interest. In the circumstances, I am quite satisfied that, provided it is purporting to act bona fide within its jurisdiction, it enjoys an immunity from an action in ordinary negligence.... In this respect it is in no different position from Court whether such Court be traditionally categorised as superior or inferior”. He further expressed ‘considerable doubt’ that an action for misfeasance in public office would lie ‘in circumstances where the Court or Tribunal was acting within jurisdiction.’

In Beatty, Mr Justice Geoghegan also explained that any immunity must be removed by statute and that the absolute immunity on the basis of judicial immunity for statutory adjudicative bodies was a matter for the legislature who created the body. There is no such countervailing statutory provision.

This is also consistent with the approach of the UK Supreme Court in the case of P (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 65, wherein at para 37, Lord Hughes describes the purpose of judicial immunity: “I add only that the principle of judicial immunity serves a legitimate end and generally achieves a proportionate and useful purpose. It exists for the protection not only of tribunal members, but also of witnesses, against further litigation inspired by what may well be deep disappointment on the part of those who have not been successful in contested proceedings before the tribunal. It also prevents most collateral challenges to the decisions of tribunals which have been set up, usually by legislation, with the task of making a final decision. The proliferation of litigation is not generally in the public interest, which is best served by a single, final, decision after due process, appealable in the event of demonstrated error of law or principle.”

Jurisdiction

First, I must consider whether I have jurisdiction to consider this complaint.

There is no general exemption for the Workplace Relations Commission as an organisation under section 2 of the Equal Status Act 2000. In many instances, the organisation may be providing a service which is available to the public generally.

Therefore, on its face, the complaint is properly before me, and I have jurisdiction to enquire into it.  

Judicial Independence, ‘Administration of Justice’ and Immunity from Suit

The complaint herein submits that the Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer was hearing a case under the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended), in her capacity as a Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer. The case pertained to disability and an allegation of discrimination on ‘the disability ground’ in relation to the provision of a service. Taking the Complainant’s complaint at its height – the making of enquiries of the Complainant, as alleged, by the Adjudication Officer in relation to the nature and extent of his disability at an adjudication hearing convened to hear a case pertaining to disability and alleged discrimination on ‘the disability ground’, falls squarely within her adjudicative function as a WRC Adjudication Officer. The WRC is a quasi-judicial decision-making body. A WRC Adjudication Officer is in a judicial decision-making role. She is involved in ‘the administration of justice’ in the public interest. Thus, the contents of the complaint herein (ADJ-00062639) are non-justiciable.

I find that the ‘administration of justice’ as per Zalewski v Adjudication Officer & Ors [2021] IESC 24 in which Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officers are engaging is not a service within the meaning of s. 2 of the Equal Status Act 2000.

I further find, consistent with the swathe of jurisprudence in this area, that Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officers who are in the performance of their adjudicative functions are engaging in ‘the administration of justice’ and are consequently, immune from suit/litigation.

I am satisfied that Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officers enjoy judicial immunity in the performance of their function and duties, consistent with the dicta of Mr. Justice George Birmingham (for the majority) in Beatty v The Rent Tribunal & Another [2005] IESC 66, which explained that statutory adjudicative bodies enjoy immunity from suit on the basis of the principle of judicial immunity unless there is an express provision countervailing against this in any statutory provision. There is no such countervailing provision.

Section 22 of the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended)

Section 22(1) Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended) provides the WRC with the power to ‘dismiss a claim at any stage if of opinion that it has been made in bad faith or is frivolous, vexatious or misconceived or relates to a trivial matter.’

Frivolous and Vexatious

Birmingham J. in J O’N V. S McD & Ors [2013] IEHC 135 at para 18 states that: ‘…The words ‘frivolous’ and ‘vexatious’ are terms of art, they are legal terms and they are not used in a pejorative sense. They merely mean that the plaintiff has no reasonable chance of succeeding and that, because there is no reasonable chance of success, it is frivolous to bring the case. By the same token, it imposes a hardship on the defendant if he has to expend time, effort and money in defending an action which cannot succeed and that is regarded as vexatious.’

There are many descriptions of what constitutes a frivolous and vexatious complaint or claim, but at its essence, it is one that ‘attempts to invoke the jurisdiction of the Court [or in this instance Tribunal] on a basis that is confused or manifestly untenable’, as per the Australian High Court inRe Young (2020) 94 ALJR 448, at page 451.

In the article, ‘Frivolous and Vexatious Litigation in the Irish Courts: Challenges, Remedies, and Reform’(2025) Irish Judicial Studies Journal Vol 9(1) 173,Adam McCarthy BL, details comprehensively the case law in this area.

In line with the provisions of s. 22(1) of the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended), I deem this claim to be frivolous and vexatious.

This complaint involves a fundamental miscomprehension of what is involved in litigation, and of the differing roles of the Complainant, the Respondent, and the decision-maker - in this instance a WRC Adjudication Officer. Judicial immunity provides immunity from suit in order to facilitate the decision maker’s ability to perform their function, carry out their duties and exercise their discretion independently and impartially. The Complainant having lost his case before the WRC is seeking to trigger some sort of lateral enquiry through an oblique route in a bid to revisit the hearing of his original case (ADJ-00055438), by the filing of this complaint (ADJ-00062639). ADJ-00055428 is res judicata and the jurisdiction of the Workplace Relations Commission in relation to that case is functus officio. The attempted end-run around the procedures underpinning the proper administration of justice, which includes the option of an appeal to the appropriate appellate body (by either side or both sides in relation to the original case within the prescribed time frame under the applicable legislation), is entirely inappropriate. It is also legally incorrect. If allowed, it would create the effect of a ‘hall of mirrors.’

I am also guided, in my approach, by the recent High Court decision of Nowak V. Moorehill Disability Services (T/A Moorehill Living) [2025] IEHC 758, wherein Mr. Justice Micheál O’Higgins set out at paragraph 36 that: ‘There cannot be one set of rules for represented parties and a wholly different set of rules for those who represent themselves.’; and further set out at paragraph 37, quoting Mr. Justice Simons in the High Court case of Hosford v. Ireland and the AG [2021] IEHC 133, with approval, wherein he stated at para 21: ‘The constitutional right of access to the courts is not the prerogative of one side alone. It also entails a right to fair procedures in the defence of proceedings. Whereas a court may show some indulgence to a party, such as the applicant, who chooses to represent themselves in proceedings, this cannot be done to the detriment of the rights of the other parties. A Court must protect the procedural rights of the opposing parties, and, relevantly must uphold the principle of the finality of litigation. This is so even in proceedings brought by a litigant in person.’

Decisions of Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officers are appealable to the appropriate appellate body within the prescribed timeframe set out in the applicable legislation, in this instance the Circuit Court as the initial complaint was under the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended) within 42 days of the date of the WRC decision. They may also be subject to judicial review in the High Court.

An attempt at a parallel system or process of appeal is actually an impediment to the proper administration of justice, as described by Lord Hughes in P (Appellant) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Respondent) [2017] UKSC 65, wherein he explained that these types of collateral challenges to the decisions of Tribunals, often arising out of the ‘deep disappointment’ of having lost a case, are inappropriate and generally ‘not in the public interest’ which ‘is best served by a single, final, decision after due process, appealable in the event of demonstrated error of law or principle.’

Misconceived

A misconceived claim is one which is fundamentally flawed and bound to fail i.e. it has no prospect of success because it is fundamentally flawed – often based on a misapprehension of the law or of facts - as opposed to a weak case, which is a different thing.

In line with the provisions of s. 22(1) of the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended), I deem this claim to be misconceived.

CA-00075368-001: In line with the provisions of 22(1) of the Equal Status Act 2000 (as amended), I therefore dismiss this claim as both ‘frivolous and vexatious’, and misconceived, for the reasons outlined above.

Parameters of Jurisdiction; Judicial Immunity; Equal Status Act; Provision of a Service; Disability; Discrimination; Administration of Justice; Frivolous and Vexatious; Misconceived;