ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00062161
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | John Burke | Tks Design Limited The Kitchen Shop |
Representatives | Adam Elebert BL instructed by BHSM LLP Solicitors | Stephen Moran BL instructed by Geoghegan Solicitors |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00075443-002 | 16/09/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00075443-003 | 16/09/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00075443-004 | 16/09/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994. | CA-00075443-005 | 16/09/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00075443-006 | 16/09/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00075443-007 | 16/09/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 13/02/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Orla Jones
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints
In deference to the Supreme Court ruling, Zalewski V Ireland and the WRC [2021] IESC 24, the parties were advised that, in accordance with the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, hearings before the WRC are now held in public and, in most cases, decisions are no longer anonymised save where an application is made that special circumstances exist. No application was made in this case.
The parties were also advised that the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 grants Adjudication Officers the power to administer an oath or affirmation. All participants who gave evidence were sworn in. Both parties were offered, and availed of, the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence.
Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties under statute.
I heard a substantial volume of evidence during the hearing days and was provided with a considerable quantity of documents and submissions. I have taken time to review all the submissions and evidence both written and oral. I am not required to provide a line for line rebuttal of the evidence and submissions that I have rejected or found superfluous to the main findings. I have adopted the direction provided in Faulkner v. The Minister for Industry and Commerce [1997] E.L.R. 107 at p.113 where O'Flaherty J in the Supreme Court noted that minute analysis or reasons are not required to be given by administrative tribunals, but that the duty on administrative tribunals to give reasons in their decisions is not a particularly onerous one. Only broad reasons need be given:
“I would reiterate, what has been said on a number of occasions, that when reasons are required from administrative tribunals, they should be required only to give the broad gist of the basis for their decisions. We do not service to the public in general, or to particular individuals, if we subject every decision of every administrative tribunal to minute analysis.”
The Complainant was represented by Adam Elebert BL instructed by BHSM LLP Solicitors. The Respondent was represented by Stephen Moran BL instructed by Geoghegan Solicitors. The following witnesses appeared on behalf of the respondent Mr. Gary Bourke (Mr. G), Mr. Peter Bourke (Mr. P) and Mr. Tom Murray (Mr. T).
Background:
The complainant submitted the within claims under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998, section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 and section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991, on 16th of September 2025.
The complaints under the Employment Equality Acts are submitted on grounds of family status and on the disability ground.
All matters were heard together on 13th of February 2026. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent as a Joiner and Timber Furnisher on the 06 January 2025 until he was dismissed on 13 August 2025. The Complainant’s employment was subject to a 6-month probationary period which ended on or about 6 July 2025. The Complainant was given a pay rise from 10 July 2025. On 05 August 2025, the Complainant returned to work after the Respondent respondent’s ‘builder’s holiday’. The following day on 06 August 2025, the Complainant became unwell and subsequently tested positive for Covid-19 he notified the respondent that morning that he would be unable to attend work because of his illness. On 11 August 2025, the Complainant returned to work. Upon his return, management informed the Complainant that they were ‘not happy’ that he had been sick and that he would not be paid for his sick leave. On 11 August 2025 the Complainant became aware that his own role (joiner and timber finisher) was being advertised on the job search website ‘Indeed’. On the same day the complainant was informed by his manager that he would not be paid for the sick days he had taken as the Respondent had “spent €10,000 on builders’ holidays and didn’t have the money to cover sick days”. The Complainant’s manager also stated that he should have come to work with Covid-19, and the Complainant was asked to provide a medical certificate for his sick leave. On 12 August 2025 the Complainant raised the matter of taking Paternity Leave with his manager. The Complainant informed his manager that, although he needed to confirm exact dates with his partner, he wished to take two weeks accrued annual leave plus two weeks’ statutory paternity leave at the appropriate time. The Complainant’s manager replied that the Complainant had only three holiday days left The Complainant’s manager also referred to his own anecdotal experience, stating that when himself became a father, he only took three days off work. In this way the Respondent was pressuring the Complainant not to avail of his statutory entitlements. The following day on 13 August 2025, the Complainant arrived to work to find his work tools gathered at the front door. The Complainant’s manager then told him that he “wasn’t getting through the work fast enough”, cited poor performance, and stated that it “wasn’t working out”. The Complainant was therefore dismissed from his employment with no notice, no adequate reasons, and in spite of consistent high performance. The Complainant submits that he was unfairly and discriminatorily dismissed from his employment on the spot and without notice on 13 August 2025. In addition, the Complainant was not paid for any accrued and unused annual leave and was not paid in lieu of his notice or given any termination payment at all. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent submits that The complainant was employed as a timber finisher/joiner commencing on 6 January 2025 The Respondent accepts that it did not provide the Complainant by way of a single written statement within five days of the commencement of his employment but that he was provided with all of these relevant particulars verbally and/or variously in writing within his first week of employment having received a pay slip in his first week The Respondent accepts that it did not provide the Complainant with a written statement of the terms of his employment within one month The respondent also submits that this claim is out of time The respondent submits that the complainant’s tenure with the business was marked by absences and performance issues almost from the outset. The respondent states that the complainant was late on 27 January 2025. On 10 February 2025, the Complainant was sick and paid annual leave in lieu and at his request. On 26 February 2025, the Complainant was absent. On 6 March 2025, the Complainant was late and arrived at 1pm following a hospital scan. On 19 March 2025, the Complainant was absent. On 2 April 2025, the Complainant communicated that he was in the process of looking for a new house (to rent) and asked for a reference together with proof of salary, this was provided immediately by the complainant’s manager On 4 April 2025, the Complainant confirmed that he had secured a home and thanked his manager Mr. G for his assistance. On 17 April 2025, the Complainant’s supervisor was required to work until 11pm to rectify serious issues in the quality of the Complainant’s work… Twenty cabinet doors needed to be completely refinished urgently as they were scheduled to be dispatched the following day. The Complainant took a paid day off on 18 April 2025 On 22nd April 2025, the Respondent gave the Complainant a verbal warning (This followed a conversation that was had about performance by the Respondent and Complainant on the 3rd of April) and communicated that he was close to dismissal based on continuous poor performance. The Respondent submits that it was agreed that he would have a week to show significant improvement. The Complainant was provided with a written statement of his terms of employment dated 23 April 2025. On 30 April 2025, the Complainant left work for approximately four hours (apparently to attend a funeral). On 8 May 2025, the Complainant was late owing to a puncture and had to take the bus. On 19 May 2025, the Complainant was absent due to sudden illness (“sick as a dog”) and paid. He sent a text message at 6:57 am. On 13 June 2025, the Complainant was late again, this time due to the DART. On 25 June 2025, he was late again. On 10 July 2025, the Complainant was late (“on the way hospital was a shitshow”). On 5 August 2025, the Complainant left work early (at 12:30pm) after giving 30 minutes notice as his partner was unwell. The following morning, 6 August, the Complainant communicated that he had a positive covid test and he did not attend work that day or the following days (Thursday 7 and Friday 8 August 2025). The Complainant did not present for work on Saturday 9 August 2025. On 11 August 2025, the Complainant returned to work but did not produce a medical certificate. The same say the Complainant was observed browsing on Indeed looking at job advertisements and away from his workstation for extended periods. While the Respondent had posted an advert, it was entirely unrelated to the Complainant’s position. The Complainant was tasked with priming and preparing a three-door wardrobe which was subject to a deadline of the following Wednesday. At the end of day inspection, the Complainant was found not to have completed his assigned tasks. The Complainant and his supervisor had a (brief) conversation about paternity leave towards the end of the day on 11 August 2025 and the Complainant was advised that he would need to provide details of the dates he had in mind and give at least four weeks’ notice both to his Respondent and to the Department of Social Protection. The Respondent asked what dates were in mind and the Complainant’s reply was that he had not thought about it and need to talk to his partner On Tuesday 12 August, the Complainant was late to work (a train broke down) did not complete his assigned task of painting the three-door wardrobe which caused the Respondent to miss a client deadline. That day the Complainant was observed clearing his work area and packing up his own tools. He was also observed scrolling on Indeed and reviewing employment positions instead of completing his assigned tasks. At this point, it is the Respondent’s view that the Complainant already had his own head out of the door. On Wednesday 13 August 2025, the Complainant was summarily dismissed. He was then observed working at a neighbouring business by 9.30am that day. By the Respondent’s calculations, the Complainant was overpaid the sum of €984.79 over the course of his employment It is submitted that any award to the Complainant, including for the admitted breach of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act ought to be offset in whole or in part by these overpayments. |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00075443-002 | 16/09/2025 |
Findings and Conclusions:
6.—F14(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where— (a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which— (i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned, (b) a person who is associated with another person— (i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and (ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination. (2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are— (a) … (c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”), The complainant submits that he was dismissed because he had a discussion about paternity leave this claim is taken on the ground of family status asserting that he had exercised his entitlement to paternity leave and was dismissed for doing so. The Employment Equality Act 1998 prohibits discrimination as between any two persons in employment on the following nine grounds as contained in Section 6 (2) of the Act as follows: (c) That one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”). Section 85A (1) of the Act provides: - 85A.— (1) Where in any proceeding’s facts are established by or on behalf of a Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary. It is clear from Section 85A (1) of the Act above that the burden of proof is on the Complainant. If the case meets the threshold set out above, then the burden of proof shifts and it is on the Respondent to rebut the presumption of discrimination. This view is consistent with the decision of the Labour Court in Mitchell v. Southern Health Board [2001] ELR 201, where it was held thar: “The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.” Section 85A (1) provides as follows: —(1) “Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.” In Margetts v. Graham Anthony & Company Limited [EDA038] the evidential burden which must be discharged by a complainant before a prima facie case of discrimination can be said to have been established was outlined by the Labour Court as follows: “The law requires the complainant to establish facts from which it may be inferred that discrimination has taken place. The appellant must, on the balance of probabilities, prove those facts from which such inferences can be drawn. When these facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, the onus shifts to the respondent to show, on the balance of probabilities, that it did not discriminate against the appellant. The mere fact that the complainant falls within one of the discriminatory grounds laid down under the Act is not sufficient in itself to establish a claim of discrimination. The complainant must adduce other facts from which it may be inferred on the balance of probabilities that an act of discrimination has occurred.” The Labour Court in the case of Melbury v. Valpeters [EDA0917] held as follows in its consideration of section 85(A): “…provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts, which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculations, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.” This requires a complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him. If he succeeds in so doing, then, and only then, is it for the respondent to prove the contrary. The Labour Court has consistently held that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of “sufficient significance” before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to a respondent. “Prima facie” evidence is evidence which in the absence of any contradictory evidence would lead any reasonable person to conclude that a discrimination had occurred. The Complainant advised the hearing that he had told Mr. G on 12th of August that he would be applying to take time off after his child was born, he stated that this would be a combination of paternity leave and annual leave. The complainant stated that Mr. G told him that when his own child was born he himself had only taken 3 days off. The complainant stated that Mr. G had told him that he would have to give advance notice of the paternity leave and that he would also have to apply to the Department of Social protection in respect of same. The complainant submits that Mr. G also asked him when he would expect to be taking the leave, and the complainant advised him that he would have to solidify dates with his partner and would get back to him. The complainant submits that the respondent in stating that he only took three days off for the birth of his own child was trying to prevent him availing of his statutory rights and amounts to a refusal of his paternity leave rights. The complainant submits that he was discriminatorily dismissed because he had a discussion about paternity leave. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant had not exercised any entitlement to paternity leave but had merely discussed the possibility of proposing to exercise paternity leave rights at some unspecified future point. The respondent stated that the complainant had merely alluded to the fact that he would be taking paternity leave after his child was born. Witness for the respondent Mr. G advised the hearing that the complainant was advised to that he would have to submit an application in writing 4 weeks in advance to avail of paternity leave and that he would also have to notify the Department of Social protection in order to receive payment for same. The respondent submits that the complainant in this discussion was being given advice as to how to go about exercising his rights. In examining this matter, I note that Section 7 of the Paternity Leave and Benefit Act 2016 require an employee who is a relevant parent to provide their employer with notification in writing as soon as reasonably practicable and not less than four weeks before the expected day of placement or week of confinement. In addition, a relevant parent must notify their employer of the expected day of confinement. The respondent in its submissions adds that the complainant neither told the Respondent when his partner was due nor did he formally notify of when he intended to take paternity leave despite being asked by the respondent. The complainant has submitted a claim that he was subjected to discriminatory treatment based on his family status. The complainant in his evidence has failed to establish that he was treated less favourably on grounds of his family status. The complainant also submits that he was subjected to a discriminatory dismissal on grounds of family status. The complainant submits that he was dismissed from his employment on 13th of August and submits that this was due to his discussion about his intention to avail of paternity leave entitlements. The respondent submits that the complainant was dismissed following persistent issues with punctuality, attendance and performance and for not doing any work at all in what would turn out to be the final two days of his employment. The complainant advised the hearing that on the 5th of August 2025 he returned to work after the respondent’s annual builder’s holidays but stated that he took a half day at short notice as his partner contacted him while at work to say that she was not well. The complainant advised his manager Mr G and was given permission to go home immediately. The complainant told the hearing that later that night he advised the respondent that his partner had tested positive for covid and that he was after testing negative but that he would test again in the morning before work. The complainant advised the hearing that the respondent replied telling him that there was no need to test again in the morning unless he felt unwell. The respondent advised the hearing that HE advised the complainant that there was no need to test himself before work given that he would be wearing a mask and a respirator all day while working in isolation and not in contact with anyone but told him just to keep his distance from his colleague Mr. T so he could attend work as normal unless he was not well enough to attend. The complainant stated that the following morning he was unwell and tested positive for COVID and advised the respondent that he would not be attending work. The complainant advised the hearing that on the following day on 06 August 2025, he was unwell and subsequently tested positive for Covid-19. He contacted management that morning to notify them that he would be unable to attend work because of his illness. The complainant advised the hearing that he returned to work on 11 August 2025. The complainant submits that on that same day he became aware that his own role (joiner and timber finisher) was being advertised on the job search website ‘Indeed’ which prompted the Complainant to speak to his manager, at which time he was informed by his manager that he would not be paid for the sick days he had taken as the Respondent had “spent €10,000 on builders’ holidays and didn’t have the money to cover sick days”. He submits that he was also then asked to provide a medical certificate for his sick leave. The complainant submits that on the following day the 12 August 2025 he took the opportunity to discuss his upcoming Paternity Leave with his manager Mr. G as outlined above. The complainant advised the hearing that the following day on 13 August 2025 he arrived to work to find his work tools gathered at the front door and his manager then told him that he “wasn’t getting through the work fast enough”, cited poor performance, and stated that it “wasn’t working out”. Witness for the respondent Mr. G advised the hearing that the complainant had not carried out any of the work assigned to him on 11th and 12th of August and that this was the final straw after a number of issues with his performance as well as with punctuality and absences from work outlined in the respondent submission above. Witness for the respondent Mr. G advised the hearing that the complainant at interview had stated that he was experienced in the skills needed for the position but that it became clear very soon that he did not have the stated experience. The respondent stated that it decided to train the complainant in the relevant techniques needed and to give him a chance. The respondent stated that there were a number of occasions when the complainant had made mistakes and jobs needed to be redone by Mr. G himself or where jobs were returned by the fitter as not completed correctly. Witness for respondent, Mr. G stated that he had spoken to the complainant about these matters a number of times, the first of which was on the 3rd of April, and he had to remind the complainant to do things like spray the edges of the doors. Mr. G advised the hearing that the complainant even had a note stuck up on his work area saying “spray edges” to remind himself of this. The respondent stated that the complainant had been late for work on a number of occasions as outlined and had also been absent a number of days but stated that he still passed his 6 month probation as the respondent stated that there had been some improvement and the respondent wanted to give him a chance to get better as he stated it is very difficult to find people at the time. Mr. G advised the hearing that he had given the complainant a verbal warning later in April after he had himself was required to work until 11pm on the 17th of April to rectify serious issues in the quality of the Complainant’s work. Mr. G advised the hearing that twenty cabinet doors needed to be completely refinished urgently as the complainant had left dusty fingerprints all over them and they were scheduled to be dispatched the following day. Mr. G stated that the complainant took a paid day off on 18 April 2025 and on 22nd of April Mr. G gave him a verbal warning and told him he had a week to show an improvement. The respondent stated that it had given the complainant every opportunity to improve but the final straw came on the 11th and 12th of August when the complainant did not do any of the work assigned to him but spent the day on his phone and the respondent noticed him scrolling through Indeed. The respondent Mr. G advised the hearing that the complainant had been late in again on the 12th of August and on this day had removed all of his tools from their pegs above his work bench and had put them in a tool box and had even removed all of the pegs he had put up to hold his tools. The respondent stated that it appeared to them that the complainant was intending to leave, especially when added to the fact that he did not carry out any of the work assigned to him for those two days. The complainant in response to this stated that he had removed the pegs and tools as he was going to put them up in his shed at home. The complainant in response to the assertion that he was scrolling on his phone and looking at Indeed instead of doing his assigned work stated that he had seen his job advertised by the respondent on 11th of August and so he knew they were going to dismiss him. The respondent advised the hearing that it had advertised a role as they needed a person to join a more junior role but stated that this was not the complainant’s role. The respondent stated that it was the complainant who had packed up his tools the day beforehand. The complainant did not dispute this. Witness for the respondent Mr. G conceded that he had moved the tools closer to the door of the workshop as he was sure the complainant was leaving anyway after seeing him taking down his tools and pegs and packing them away coupled with the fact that he did not carry out any of his assigned work for two days. Mr. G stated that he made the final decision to dismiss him as the complainant had not done any of his work in the previous two days. Mr. G stated that the complainant had done a maximum of two hours work during this time and so it seemed to Mr. G that the complainant was intending to leave, that this coupled with the fact that Mr. G had seen him scrolling on Indeed on his phone for a lot of the day and the on 12th of August he had continued to ignore his assigned work but also packed up all of his tools and removed all of the widgets he had attached to the wall for his tools. Mr. G stated that he had moved the complainant toolbox closer to the workshop door and that he had the next day asked the complainant why he had packed away all his stuff and Mr. G put it to him that he had done no work the day before but had spent the whole day on his phone. Mr. G stated that the complainant denied this, and Mr. G told him that he clearly had his head out the door so he told the complainant to take his things and go and referred to the fact that the complainant had not done any work the day before. Mr. G stated that the complainant became irate at this and began punching his hand and so Mr. G held the door open and waited for him to leave. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant was seen working about 20 feet away from the premises an hour later where he worked for the rest of the week. Having considered the circumstances and the totality of the evidence added I am satisfied that the complainant in this case was not subjected to discriminatory dismissal on grounds of his family status. It has also been asserted that the complainant was dismissed on disability grounds or that he was subjected to an unfair dismissal due to the fact that he sought to assert his rights under the paternity leave act. This is being asserted in circumstances where the complainant does not have the required 12 months’ service to make a claim under the Unfair Dismissal Act, and it is submitted that he can avail himself of an exemption from the 12-month requirement in this regard. Having considered this matter and the totality of the evidence adduced I am satisfied from the evidence adduced that the complainant did not submit an application under Section 7 of the paternity leave and benefit act 2016 and was not refused any such application. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the complainant cannot avail of the exclusion/exemption to the 12 months prescribed under the Unfair Dismissals Act. |
Decision:
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
I am satisfied that the complainant was not discriminated against by the respondent and was not dismissed by the respondent on the grounds of his family status. |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00075443-003 | 16/09/2025 |
Findings and Conclusions:
6.—(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where— (a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which— (i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned, (b) a person who is associated with another person— (i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and (ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination. (2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are— (a) …… (g) that one is a person with a disability and the other either is not or is a person with a different disability (in this Act referred to as “the disability ground”), This is a claim of discriminatory dismissal on grounds of disability the complainant submits that he was dismissed due to the fact that he had COVID-19 for three days and that this was the reason for his dismissal which amounts to a discriminatory dismissal on grounds of a disability. “Disability” is a defined term under the Employment Equality Act 1998 and means: (a) the total or partial absence of a person’s bodily or mental functions, including the absence of a part of a person’s body, (b) the presence in the body of organisms causing, or likely to cause, chronic disease or illness, (c) the malfunction, malformation or disfigurement of a part of a person’s body, (d) a condition or malfunction which results in a person learning differently from a person without the condition or malfunction, or (e) a condition, illness or disease which affects a person’s thought processes, perception of reality, emotions or judgement or which results in disturbed behaviour, and shall be taken to include a disability which exists at present, or which previously existed but no longer exists, or which may exist in the future or which is imputed to a person; The complainant submits that he was dismissed due to the fact that he had COVID-19 for three days and that this was the reason for his dismissal. The complainant submits that this amounts to a discriminatory dismissal. The complainant advised the hearing that the disability ground relied upon is due to his having taken time off work due to having COVID from 6th to 10th of August 2025. The respondent submits that that any suggestion that labouring under the effects of Covid-19 for up to three days amounts to a “disability” stretches the bounds of rational statutory interpretation to breaking point. If the Complainant’s argument is accepted, it would follow that the estimated 1.7 million confirmed cases of Covid-19 in Ireland up to August 2025 resulted in a permanent or temporary “disability” of the approximately one third of the Irish population such that the Employment Equality Act protections were engaged. It is the Respondent’s submission that, on the facts, the Complainant has not produced a medical certificate to evidence his claimed disability and that on the law, a short temporary dose of flu-like symptoms simply does not fall within the ambit of legislation designed to protect people with actual physical, mental or psychological impairments which hinders their participation in professional life. The complainant advised the hearing that on the 5th of August 2025 he returned to work after the respondent’s builders’ holidays, but he took a half day as his partner was not well and later tested positive for covid. the complainant told the hearing that he had advised the respondent the that his partner had tested positive for COVID and that later that night he advised them that he himself was currently negative but he would test in the morning before work the complaint advised the hearing that the respondent replied telling him that there was no need to test again in the morning unless he felt unwell. The respondent advised the hearing that they told the complainant that there was no need to test himself for COVID before work given that he would be wearing a mask and a respirator all day while working in isolation and not in contact with anyone and so he could attend work as normal unless he was not well enough to attend. The complainant stated that the following morning he was unwell and tested positive for COVID and advised the respondent that he would not be attending work and he sent a picture of a positive covid test. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant advised them that he had COVID-19 and sent a picture of a positive test asserting that it was his but did not submit any medical certificate to evidence this. The respondent submits that a short temporary dose of flu like symptoms does not fall within the definition of a disability and accordingly it was not on notice of any disability, the respondent further adds that the complainant was paid for these three days of sick leave despite the fact that he had not submitted the medical certificate in respect of same. The respondent at the hearing was asked why it had paid the complainant for previous sick absences without requesting a medical cert and replied that it was only when the sick absences had been happening more frequently that it became an issue. The respondent added that a few hours here and there or a half day was not something it had been concerned with but that it was only when the absences became more frequent and lengthier that it became an issue. The respondent in its evidence stated that the complainant was dismissed for issues relating to performance punctuality and absences with the final straw being the complainant’s failure to carry out any of the work assigned to him on what later became his final two days in the job. The complainant at the hearing did not provide any documentary evidence in respect of a diagnosis of any disability. In considering this matter I must first consider whether the complainant has established the existence of a disability and whether such disability was notified to the respondent before proceeding to look at whether such disability contributed or was the reason for his dismissal. Having considered the evidence adduced in this regard I am satisfied that the complainant has failed to establish that he is covered by the disability ground. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the complainant was not discriminated against on grounds of a disability and was not dismissed on grounds of a disability. |
Decision:
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
I am satisfied that the complainant was not discriminated against by the respondent and was not dismissed by the respondent on the grounds of a disability. |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00075443-004 | 16/09/2025 |
Findings and Conclusions:
Section 3 of the 1994 Act provides: “(1) An employer shall, not later than one month after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing . . . (1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1), an employer shall, not later than 5 days after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing . . . . ” The complainant submits that he had not received his five-day written notice of key terms employment. The respondent accepts that it did not meet its statutory obligations in this regard and advised the hearing that the employment commenced on the 6th of January 2025 and acknowledges that it was thus it was obligated to provide a written statement of key terms not later than five days after commencement i.e. on or before the 11th of January 2025. The respondent submits however that this claim is out of time as it was submitted to the WRC on the 16th of September 2025 and is therefore outside of the six months within which claims may be referred. The respondent in the alternative submits that although the complainant did not receive a written statement of his terms within 5 days, he did receive a text message setting out the bones of the contract. I am satisfied having regard to the evidence adduced that he respondent in this case failed to provide the 5-day statement and I declare this claim to be well founded. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
I declare this claim to be well-founded. Accordingly, I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation in the amount of €1,000 in respect of the breach. |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994. | CA-00075443-005 | 16/09/2025 |
Findings and Conclusions:
Section 3 of the 1994 Act provides: “(1) An employer shall, not later than one month after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing . . . (1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1), an employer shall, not later than 5 days after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing . . . . ” Section 3(1) of the Act places an obligation on employers to furnish an employee with a written statement of specified terms and conditions of employment within one month of commencement of employment. The complainant submits that he did not receive a full statement of his terms of employment within one month of employment as he did not receive a contract until 16th of April 2025. The respondent accepts that it did not meet its statutory obligations, in this regard the respondent stated that the complainant was provided with a contract of employment April 2025 which was late and was not entirely in compliance with Section 3 of the 1994 act however the respondent submits that it had provided the complainant with information verbally and when requested to do so prior to this. The respondent stated that the complainant had also received pay slips from the start of his employment and so he was well aware of his rate of pay etc. I am satisfied having regard to the evidence adduced that he respondent in this case failed to provide the complainant with a full statement of his terms of employment within one month of employment. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
In all the circumstances I find that the complaint is well founded. Accordingly, I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation in the amount of €1,000 in respect of the breach. |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00075443-006 | 16/09/2025 |
Findings and Conclusions:
Section 4 of the 1973 Act provides: “(1) An employer shall, in order to terminate the contract of employment of an employee who has been in his continuous service for a period of thirteen weeks or more, give to that employee a minimum period of notice calculated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section. (2) The minimum notice to be given by an employer to terminate the contract of employment of his employee shall be— (a) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for less than two years, one week . . . The complainant advised the hearing that this claim relates to the respondent’s failure to pay him one week's wages as his minimum period of notice following his dismissal. The respondent’s position is that the employment was terminated for misconduct and that the exemption provided for by Section 8 of the minimum notice in terms of employment act 1973 arises in this regard. The respondent in the alternative asserts that it has overpaid the complainant in other respects and has therefore at least paid the complainant for any minimum notice entitlement. In considering this matter I note that the Act provides that employees are entitled to at least one week's notice once they have been employed for a period greater than 13 weeks and less than 2 years. I am satisfied from the evidence adduced that this claim is well founded and that the complainant in this case is entitled to one week’s notice. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
I am satisfied from the evidence adduced that this claim is well founded and that the complainant in this case is entitled to one week of minimum notice which he was not given or paid in lieu. Accordingly, I direct the respondent to pay the complainant the equivalent of 1 week’s remuneration in respect of his statutory notice period. |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00075443-007 | 16/09/2025 |
Findings and Conclusions:
This claim relates to an allegation that the complainant has not been paid for untaken annual leave the complainant submits that he has only taken 2 out of 12 days accrued annual leave. The respondent advised the hearing that this claim has arisen out of the complainants misunderstanding of his annual leave entitlements. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant has an annual leave entitlement of 20 days per year. The respondent advised the hearing that the complainant has been provided with and paid for all twelve of his accrued annual leave days respond advised the hearing that the complainant had taken 2 days of paid leave and that he had also availed of the two weeks builder’s holidays. During which the respondent complainants take annual leave, at which time the respondent business is closed during the last week of July and the first week of August. The complainant confirmed that he had taken the 12 days annual leave but asserted that he was not aware that the two weeks of builder’s holidays which he was forced to take when the business was closed would be taken out of annual leave. Witness for the respondent Mr. G advised the hearing that this was set out clearly in the complainant’s contract which he received in April 2025, the relevant extract was shown in the contract. Mr. G went on to state that he had in fact offered the complainant the opportunity to continue to work during one of those two weeks while the business was closed but that the complainant refused as he already had plans to work for someone else at an upcoming festival. The complainant did not dispute this. Having considered the totality of the evidence adduced in relation to this matter I declare this claim to be not well founded. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
I declare this claim to be not well founded. |
Dated: 26th May 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Orla Jones
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