Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Marie  O’Dea

St.Joseph’S Secondary School  Tulla

Representatives

Self Represented

Mason Hayes & Curran LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00074765-001

25/08/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00074765-002

25/08/2025

The Complainant is employed as a Teacher and alleged that the Respondent changed her terms of employment without her agreement and that they breached the Health and Safety Act in relation to her being asked was she returning to work while medically not diagnosed by a competent person following her allegation she had been incorrectly placed on Administrative Leave.  

The employer acted in breach of the Provisions of the 1994 Act.

The school failed to provide a written statement of terms or failed to notify of changes to terms (I was returned to work with less favourable terms following Administrative Leave) within a two month period of same.

The complaint was not out of time.

The school acted in breach of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005, namely the following provisions of said Act: 8(1) Every employer shall ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, the SHW at work of his/her employees.

The Principal failed in her duty towards me, returning me to work in full knowledge that I had not been medically assessed ,despite referring me for fitness to teach. and obtaining, where necessary ,the services of a competent person for the purpose of ensuring, so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety, health and welfare at work of his/her employee.  Services of a doctor involve the full assessment of the patient. The doctor informed my employer twice that he had never assessed me. The Principal therefore failed in her duty to ensure my safety ,health and welfare at work  (as did the Board:I wrote to the Chairman referencing this).

I was not notified of changes to my terms of employment either prior to my returning to work or in the two months following my return to work date.

My employer did not provide me with a written statement re.changes of terms of employment. In 2024, I was employed in a Wholetime Capacity. In Irish secondary education a whole time teaching contract (WTC) refers to a position where a teacher is employed for the maximum number of teaching hours allowed, which is 22 hours per week

I was given a timetable with 17 hours on it. There were NO RESOURCE HOURS ON IT.(I haven’t taught resource classes in quite some time now).There  were no Senior Classes. I have always had Senior classes. I wasn’t on the Detention Rota either. The time table that the Principal provided is not the one that I was given. It is not time stamped or date stamped at the time of the creation of the document. It has no validity therefore. I am supplying a verifiable e-mail to my Union representative on the first week of September, an e-mail which details the contents of the timetable I actually received on returning to work.

I was also placed on Admin.Leave re.fitness to teach. This was a highly egregious referral for me. I note that the school made several attempts to negate this aspect of the referral. The school had no more consultation with Medmark than an e-mail from the doctor saying that I had not yet been assessed. Dr.X informed the Principal twice that I had not been assessed. I note too that I was actually assessed as unfit for work the following month.

The school provided me with 17 hours of work when I returned. I specify that the breach occurred when the school made sweeping changes to my employment and conditions of employment on my return to work from Sept.2024 and failed at any stage to notify me of same. It was made within twelve months due to extenuating circumstances, therefore within the time limit. The timetable provided by the respondent is not the one given to me. The resource hours were added at a later date.  It is highly unusual to get a timetable of anything less than 21 hours when you are on a wholetime contract. It is common to get over 21 hours (if class periods are 40 mins).In our school the class periods are of a one hour duration, therefore if you are a wholetime teacher you will get 22 hours or if you are lucky enough, perhaps 21 hours. The Department will utilise it’s teaching resources to the maximum degree possible. I state again emphatically that this IS NOT the timetable provided to me on my return to work in Sept.2024. This is a dishonest later fabrication.

 I have already demonstrated clearly how the school breached my rights under the S H W W Act 2005. The specific sections of the Act are 8.1 and 8(l) The complaint was submitted within a 12 month period due to extenuating circumstances. The school acted in breach of provisions in relation to the two Acts. I was referred to Medmark for ‘fitness to teach ‘ also.I was not deemed fit as I had not yet been assessed. I should not therefore have been returned to work at this stage. I note too that I was deemed unfit in October by a different Medmark physician.

The complainant is not outside of the statutory timeframe to bring a claim against the school. The Complainant has identified a genuine basis for proceeding with a claim against the school under each Act The complainant should therefore be permitted to proceed with each claim.

The Complainant has referred a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission (“WRC”) against St Joseph’s Secondary School (the “School”) under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 (the “1994 Act”). This complaint was submitted on 25 August 2025 and a copy of the complaint form dated 25 August 2025.

The complaint form submitted by the Complainant does not provide any detail on how or when the School is said to have acted in breach of the provisions of the 1994 Act. The School submits that the complaint is without merit and in any event, is out of time. 

The Complainant has also made general references to the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and has alleged that the School has also acted in breach of that legislation. The School also rejects this claim in full on the basis set out below.

Claim under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

The Complainant has alleged in her complaint form that she was not notified by the School of a change to her terms of employment. The requirement on an employer to notify an employee of such changes is set out under section 5 of the 1994 Act.

The complaint form does not provide sufficient detail on this alleged breach of the 1994 Act but it does state as follows:

“I was returned to work by my employer (following being incorrectly placed on Administrative Leave) when my employer was fully aware that:

1.1 I was never deemed fit for return to work by the Occupational Health Services.

1.2 The substantive issue that my employer had placed me on Admin Leave for was never resolved.

Note: My employer had referred me to Occupational Health services due to a concern they had in relation to my fitness to teach.

I suffered a profound adverse health reaction to being returned at this stage as I was not able for a return to work. In addition to this my timetable was altered significantly, with less hours and a timetable well at odds with my usual timetable.”

The Complainant was not “incorrectly placed on administrative leave.” The Complainant was placed on administrative leave by the School with effect from 23 May 2024 following her refusal to agree to occupational health assessment as required under section 4.4 of Department of Education Circular 13/2024. The School wrote to the Complainant at this time to inform her of the basis of her being placed on administrative leave and to inform her that she could challenge the School’s decision.

On 29 August 2024, the School wrote to the Complainant to inform her that her administrative leave would end with effect from Saturday 31 August 2024. The School had reached this decision following consultation with Medmark and requested that the Complainant return to work from Monday 2 September 2024. The Complainant did not return to work at this time and instead went on certified sick leave.

The Complainant has not specified in her complaint form when the School is said to have acted in breach of the 1994 Act by failing to inform her in writing of changes to her terms of employment. If the Complainant is seeking to allege that this alleged breach of the 1994 Act occurred in September 2024, then it is submitted that this complaint is now out of time as this complaint was submitted to the WRC in August 2025.

Under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015,a complaint regarding an alleged breach of section 5 of the 1994 Act must be made to the WRC within 6 months of the date of the alleged breach of that provision. It is therefore submitted that this complaint is out of time and should not be considered by the WRC.

Notwithstanding the above argument, the School further submits that no changes were made to the Complainant’s terms and conditions of employment in September 2024 when she was requested to return to work following her absence on administrative leave.

The Complainant was engaged under a contract of indefinite duration (“CID”) and was entitled to be paid on a full-time permanent basis in accordance with the relevant Department of Education circular which applied at the time (Circular 0011/2009) and to be afforded a timetable of up to 22 hours per week. The Complainant would have remained subject to this Circular on her return to work in September 2024 and therefore, no change was ever made to her working hours or her timetable.

A copy of the timetable which was to be provided to the Complainant on her return to work in September 2024, along with her timetable for the previous year, was provided. A copy of Circular 0011/2009 was also provided.  This timetable is the same as that which applied to the Complainant prior to her absence on administrative leave from May 2024 and demonstrates that no changes were proposed to the Complainant’s terms of employment following her return from administrative leave in September 2024.

It is therefore submitted that the Complainant’s claim under the 1994 Act is without merit and should be dismissed.

Additional Claims of the Complainant

The Complainant has also alleged in her complaint form that the School has breached her rights under the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 (the “2005 Act”).

It is submitted that this complaint is not valid and should not be considered by the WRC. The complaint form does not identify any specific section of the 2005 Act which the School is said to have breached, nor does it clarify when this alleged breach is said to have occurred.

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provides that a complaint under section 27 of the 2005 Act must be submitted within 6 months of the date of the alleged breach of that act. Given that this complaint was submitted in August 2025, any complaint relating to the Complainant’s proposed return to work in September 2024 following her absence on administrative leave is out of date and should not be considered by the WRC.

Notwithstanding the above, it is also submitted that the School did not act in breach of any of the provisions of the 2005 Act in relation to the Complainant’s absence from work on administrative leave or her proposed return to work in September 2024.

During the Complainant’s absence on administrative leave, she had not been deemed medically unfit for work by occupational health assessment. The School acted in accordance with Department of Education Circular 13/2024 and consulted with Medmark throughout the duration of the Complainant’s absence on administrative leave to determine whether she was fit to return to work.

The letter which issued to the Complainant on 29 August 2024 was prepared by the School following appropriate consultation with Medmark and the School denies any allegation that it acted contrary to any of its obligations under the 2005 Act in seeking the Complainant’s return to work. At all times, the School complied with its legal obligations owed to the Complainant as an employer and further evidence on this point can be provided at hearing. 

In these circumstances, it is submitted that the Complainant has not submitted any evidence which indicates that the School has acted in breach of any provisions of the 2005 Act. The Complainant is therefore not entitled to proceed with a complaint under the 2005 Act and this complaint should also be dismissed.

The Complainant is outside of the statutory timeframe to bring a claim against the School under either the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 or the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005.

Notwithstanding this, the Complainant has also failed to identify a genuine basis for proceeding with a claim against the School under either act.

The School therefore rejects the claims made by the Complainant and submits that the Complainant should not be permitted by the WRC to proceed with either claim.

The Complainant went on certified sick leave on September 1st 2024 and has remained on sick leave since that time.  The complaints was submitted to the WRC on August 25th 2025. The Complainant did not specify the dates of the alleged infringements in her complaint form. The Respondent raised a preliminary objection to the Adjudicators jurisdiction to hear the complaint on the basis it was out of time due to being submitted after six months had elapsed since the alleged infringements of the Acts. The Complainant maintained there was a reasonable cause for the delay in not submitting her complaints within six months and that the Adjudicator had jurisdiction to hear the complaints.

The 2015 Workplace Relations act Section 41 states;  

(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

“Reasonable cause” has been considered in a number of cases. In Salesforce.com v Alli Leech   the Labour Court set out in detail the legal principles to establish whether reasonable cause has been shown for a extension of time.  The Court stated “The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska v Carroll”.  Here the test was set out in the following term;

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.  The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.  In the context of which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Claimant at the material time.  The Claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon.  Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability that had those circumstances had not been present he would have initiated the claim on time.”

In that case, and in subsequent cases in which the question arose the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the Superior Courts in considering whether time should been enlarged for “good reason” in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.   That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU and others .   The test formulated in Cementation Skanska v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dun laoghaire Corporation  .  Here Costello J (as he then was) stated as follows; “The phrase “good reasons” is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely.    However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the Court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved Plaintiff believed that he or she were justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.  What the Plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under Order 84 Rule 21 is on the Plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.”

It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Applicant on an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay.   Secondly, the onus is on the Applicant to establish a causal link between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time.   Thirdly, I must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause.  It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Finally, while the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an Applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account.”   In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in the passage quoted above, a Court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the Applicant subjectively believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.  

The Complainant herein argued at the Hearing that she failed to file her complaints within the timeframe of six months from the alleged dates of infringement as she was on medical leave. The Complainant filed her complaint after approximately 11 months while she was still on medical leave. Based on the discussion at the Hearing  I conclude that the same medical circumstances existed before the six months elapsed and existed on the date the Complainant did submit the complaint, so the cause put forward by the Complainant for the delay in submitting the complaints, being on medical leave,  does not explain the delay nor provide an excuse for the delay. Based on this, I decide that I have no statutory jurisdiction to decide on the substantive complaint as it is out of time.

At the Hearing the Complainant did not have a copy of her contract of employment but did have a copy of a CID circular. A discussion took place regarding how the Complainant might get a copy of her contract and a possible new Hearing but given that I have decided that I do not have jurisdiction to decide on the substantive complaints this is no longer relevant and there is no requirement for the Complainant to submit her contract to the WRC.

I find that the complaints were submitted out of time and I have no jurisdiction to decide on the substantive complaints.

Time Limits