Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Marcos  Pena

Tallon Farm

Representatives

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00073976-001

31/07/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00073976-002

31/07/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

CA-00073976-003

31/07/2025

The Complainant alleges that he did not receive training on a specific piece of equipment when he commenced employment with the Respondent. He further alleges that he was forced to work in excess of 60 hours per week. Both complaints are contested by the Respondent.

The Complainant took the affirmation and gave his evidence as follows:

The Complainant withdrew CA 00073976 - 002

CA 00073976 – 003

The Complainant noticed that all of his colleagues were trained on the quad bikes, and he was not. He did not ask for training as it was not his responsibility to do so. The quad bikes were used to move the animals around the farm. The complainant did receive his terms of employment during the visa application process.

CA 00073976 – 001

The Complainant worked over 65 hours per week. The Respondent should be able to provide a spread sheet showing that he worked over the 40 hrs per week stated on his working visa. They have an obligation to keep the records. The Complainant did receive his holidays and breaks in line with the statute.  The only issue was the hours worked per week. These working hours improved following an inspection in or around 2022. The Complainants complaint is mainly in relation to the first two years he worked with the Respondent.

Angela Mc Donnell took the affirmation and gave her evidence as follows:

CA 00073976 -003

The Complainant was given his terms of employment on the 29.08.2019 as part of his visa application process. As a result, he actual received it prior to commencing employment.

CA 00073976 -001

The Respondent pays its employees every two weeks. For the six months prior to the Complainant ceasing his employment with the Respondent he was paid as follows:

05.05 2024 -  89.8hrs  (44.5 per week)

19.05.2024 -  88.20hrs  (44.1 hours week) ( paid one bank holiday)

02.06.2024 -  87.96hrs  (43.98 hours per week)

16.06.2024 -  86.95hrs ( 43.47 hours per week)

30.06.2024 -  60.00 hrs (30 per week) ( sick 3 days and paid for them)

14.07.2024 -  38.12hrs ( 19.06 per week)  ( paid holidays six days)

28.07.2024 -  86.40 hrs (  43.20 per week)

11.08.2024 -  88.38hrs (44.19 per week) ( bank holiday paid for )

25.08.2024 -  78.72hrs ( 39.36 per week) ( paid one day for holiday)

08.09.2024 - 78.08hrs  (39.04 per week) ( paid one day for holidays)

22.09.2024 -  74.38hrs  (37.19 per week)  ( paid one days holidays)

06.10.2024 -  75.76hrs (37.88 per week) ( paid one days holidays)

20.10.2024 - 75.99 hrs (37.99 per week)  ( paid one days holidays)

The Complainant handed in his notice on 13 October 2024. He received his last pay cheque on 3 November.  That was made up of 70 hours ( 35 hours per week) together with .66 days of a holiday and one bank holiday.

The Respondent uses a clock in and clock out system that uses face recognition software and that is how the Respondent keeps the time logs for each employee. It is very accurate.

CA 000 73976 – 001

The Complainant alleges that during the first two years of his employment with the Respondent he was made to work in excess of 65 hours per week. He commenced his employment in 2019. At some date in or around 2022 there was an inspection and the hours of work improved after that. The Complainant filed his Complainant on the 31.07.2025. It is clear from the evidence of the Complainant that there were no issues for the six months prior to filing of his complaint as he was no longer in the employment of the Respondent having resigned 13. 10.2024.

Section 41(8) of the 2015 Act empowers an adjudication officer to extend the initial six months limitation period by no more than a further six months, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint within the initial period 'was due to reasonable cause'.

Without prejudice to the above argument “reasonable cause” has been considered in a number of cases. In Salesforce.com v Alli Leech   the Labour Court set out in detail the legal principles to establish whether reasonable cause has been shown for an extension of time.  The Court stated “The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska v Carroll.  Here the test was set out in the following term;

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.  The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.  In the context of which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Claimant at the material time.  The Claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon.  Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability that had those circumstances had not been present he would have initiated the claim on time.”

In that case, and in subsequent cases in which the question arose the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the superior Courts in considering whether time should been enlarged for “good reason” in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.   That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU and others .   The test formulated in Cementation Skanska v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dunlaoghaire Corporation  .  Here Costello J (as he then was) stated as follows; “The phrase “good reasons” is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely.    However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the Court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved Plaintiff believed that he or she were justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.  What the Plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under Order 84 Rule 21 is on the Plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.

It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Applicant on an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay.   Secondly, the onus is on the Applicant to establish a causal link between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time.   Thirdly, I must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause.  It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Finally, while the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an Applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account.”   In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in the passage quoted above, a Court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the Applicant subjectively believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.

No evidence was adduced by the Complainant that could allow me to exercise my discretion to extend the time by a further six months. In any event, it is clear from the evidence that the Complainants only issue in relation to hours worked was back in 2019 – 2022.  

I find that I do not have jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

 ADJ 00073976 -003

The Complainant brought this claim pursuant to S7 of the Terms of Employment (information) Act 1994 however from his evidence, it would seem that he did not have any complaint in relation to  not receiving his written terms of employment. It was accepted that he did receive his written terms as part of the visa application process which took place prior to him commencing his employment. He did have concerns in relation to not being trained on a quad bike that he was asked to drive around the farm, in order to move the animals. That issue is outside of the scope of the Act. On that basis I find that the complaint is not well founded and accordingly fails. 

The Complaint is not well founded and accordingly fails.

CA 00073976 – 002 was withdrawn.

CA 00073976 – 001 The Complaint fails.

CA 00073976 – 002 The Complaint was withdrawn.

CA 00073976 – 003 The Complaint fails