Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Security Worker

Security Services Provider

Representatives

A Workplace Colleague

Lisa Moloney IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00072455-002

15/06/2025

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a security officer on a part-time contract. Her employment commenced in or around late 2023. The Respondent is a provider of security services operating across multiple sites and the Complainant was assigned to duties involving both onboard and station-based security work for a public transport provider. There was a subsequent transfer of undertakings to a new employer. The Complainant earned €16.00 per hour and was working an approximate 40-hour week at the material time.

The complaint arises from a series of events occurring in early 2025, including disputes concerning rostering and the handling of a complaint of sexual harassment. The Complainant also contends that she was subjected to victimisation following the raising of complaints.

The Respondent denies all allegations of wrongdoing. It submits that the Complainant was at all times treated in accordance with her contract of employment and that her hours were not reduced but varied only in accordance with operational requirements and her own stated availability. The Respondent contends that any limitations on the Complainant’s hours arose from her refusal to work certain shifts, including night work and certain locations.

Regarding the complaint of sexual harassment, the Respondent accepts there was a delay in referring the complaint to HR, attributing this to how it was initially communicated and the lack of clarity about its nature. It states that once identified as a sexual harassment complaint, it was promptly escalated and investigated in line with procedures. The complaint was upheld, but no disciplinary action was taken as the employee had already left. The Respondent further submits that it had appropriate policies and procedures in place, including grievance and dignity at work policies, that these were made available to employees, and that multiple avenues existed for raising complaints.

The Complainant gave sworn evidence with the assistance of an interpreter.

In relation to the alleged inappropriate conduct, the Complainant stated that she had received messages of a suggestive sexual nature from a colleague, Mr B, over a period of time (exhibited).  She described these as distressing and very graphic and explained that the conduct had been ongoing before she made any formal complaint.  When asked why she did not report the matter earlier, she stated that she was afraid of the consequences and indicated that, following earlier concerns, her working arrangements had changed. In that context, she stated that she was scared.

The Complainant said that she raised the matter formally with a supervisor, Mr A. She stated that he advised her to put her complaint in writing, which she did to the operations manager Mr C on 21 March 2025. She further indicated that there was a delay of several months before any formal investigation took place, which she understood to have occurred in or around June or July 2025.

The Complainant stated that she participated in an investigation process at a later stage but maintained that she did not receive clear information regarding the outcome. She said that she understood that her complaint had eventually been taken seriously. However, she was not informed whether any disciplinary action had been taken against the colleague concerned, nor was she given clarity as to how the matter had been resolved.

Turning to the issue of working hours, the Complainant stated that although she was engaged on what she understood to be a part-time basis, she frequently worked additional hours and had sought to obtain more consistent, full-time work. She said that she repeatedly made herself available for additional shifts but that these were not always offered to her. In her words, “everybody was given their hours… but I got those hours only if somebody had refused.” She further stated that work which she was available to perform was, at times, given to new employees or subcontractors instead.

The Complainant also gave evidence that, following her complaints, she was moved from duties she preferred, from one location, to what she regarded as less favourable duties. She linked this change to the raising of her concerns.

In describing the workplace environment, the Complainant stated that she was, for most of her employment, the only woman in her role. She indicated that she had limited contact with management and found it difficult to access support. She described instances where she felt she was treated dismissively and said that she was sometimes spoken to in a rude manner.

The Complainant also addressed a disciplinary process which had been initiated against her on 4 March. She stated that she received notification of the process and that there were delays in the provision of documentation. She indicated that the process ultimately concluded that there was no merit in accusations from work colleagues, and no sanction was imposed. She contrasted the speed with which that process was initiated with what she described as the slower response to her own complaints.

In relation to the question of victimisation, the Complainant asserted that, following her complaints, she experienced adverse treatment. She stated that her hours were restricted, and she was reassigned to less favourable duties.  She felt isolated within the workplace. She attributed this treatment to the fact that she had raised concerns.

The Complainant was also asked about reporting mechanisms within the organisation. She stated that she was not adequately informed about HR procedures and did not feel comfortable using formal channels. She explained that she was fearful of losing her job and stated, “I was really afraid of losing the job… I am a single mother.”

In cross-examination, the Respondent’s representative put it to the Complainant that she was employed on a part-time contract and that she had no contractual entitlement to full-time hours. The Complainant accepted that she was on a part-time contract but maintained that she regularly worked significant hours and had made herself available for additional work. She reiterated her position that she was overlooked for additional hours and that others, including less experienced staff and subcontractors, were allocated work instead.

It was further put to her that the allocation of hours could depend on operational requirements and business needs. The Complainant stated that she did not have knowledge of the contractual arrangements of other employees but did not accept that this fully explained the differences in allocation.

The Respondent also suggested that appropriate HR channels were available to her for raising complaints. The Complainant stated that she had not been provided with sufficient information about these channels and that she was reluctant to use them due to fear of repercussions.

In relation to the investigation of her sexual harassment complaint, it was put to the Complainant that the matter had been investigated and that an outcome had issued. The Complainant accepted that a process had taken place but maintained that she did not receive sufficient information about the outcome and did not know what action, if any, had been taken.

Questions were also put to her regarding her contract and employment documentation. The Complainant stated that she had not seen or signed certain documentation until later in her employment and that there had been confusion regarding whether she was part-time or full-time.

Evidence of Mr A, Supervisor.

The witness gave sworn evidence on behalf of the Complainant. He confirmed that he was employed by the Respondent and that he had been appointed to a supervisory role in or around January 2025. He stated that this was the first time he had managerial responsibility in respect of the Complainant and that, prior to his appointment, he understood that she had limited interaction with management.

The witness described his role as supervisory in nature and clarified that he did not have responsibility for rostering decisions, which were managed centrally by a separate function within the organisation.

He stated that the Complainant approached him shortly after he assumed his role and raised concerns regarding her working hours. He said that she expressed dissatisfaction that she was not receiving sufficient hours and that she wished to obtain additional shifts. He indicated that he explained to her that the allocation of hours was an operational matter and that he did not have direct control over rostering. He stated that, based on his understanding, hours were allocated by a rostering office having regard to availability and operational requirements.

The witness further gave evidence that the Complainant raised issues with him regarding alleged inappropriate conduct by a colleague, Mr B.  He stated that she informed him of messages she had received and that she was upset by the situation. He recalled asking her whether she had raised the matter previously and advised her to put her concerns in writing so that they could be formally addressed.

He stated that the Complainant subsequently provided him with a written account of her complaint. He confirmed that he forwarded this document to her line manager in late March 2025 and to other members of management. He further stated that he followed up to ensure that the complaint had been received and was informed that it had been escalated to HR for further handling. He indicated that this occurred shortly after he received the written complaint, which he believed was over a weekend, and that he received confirmation of receipt on the following working day.

In relation to what occurred thereafter, the witness stated that his understanding was that an investigation process would be initiated by HR. However, he did not have direct involvement in that process and was not in a position to give detailed evidence as to how or when it progressed. He stated that, from his perspective, there appeared to be a delay in the handling of the complaint.

The witness also gave evidence regarding complaints made about the Complainant by other employees. He stated that he became aware, through communication from his line manager, that complaints had been made by colleagues concerning the Complainant’s conduct. He indicated that these matters were escalated to management and that a disciplinary process was subsequently initiated. He stated that this information came to him by way of a telephone call from his line manager.

He further stated that the Complainant had asked him to attend a disciplinary meeting as her representative. He indicated that he sought permission to do so but was informed by management that, due to his supervisory position, it would not be appropriate for him to act in that capacity. He accepted that this was consistent with general procedure rather than being specific to the Complainant.

In his evidence, the witness was asked about the allocation of hours and whether he had any insight into why the Complainant did not receive additional shifts. He stated that he did not have direct knowledge of the decision-making process and could not provide a definitive explanation. He indicated that, from his perspective, the allocation of hours appeared to be based on operational considerations and that he had no evidence to suggest that gender played a role.

When asked directly whether he believed that the Complainant had been treated less favourably on the ground of her gender, the witness stated that he did not consider gender to be a factor. However, he expressed the view that the handling of her complaints appeared to be slow. He stated that his impression was that, once a complaint was made, the response from management was delayed rather than prompt, and that this contributed to the Complainant’s dissatisfaction.

In relation to the Respondent’s response to the Complainant’s complaints more generally, the witness stated that he had been informed that an investigation would take place but that he was not aware of the detail of that investigation or its outcome at the time. He indicated that he did not observe any immediate or visible measures being taken following the initial complaint.

In cross-examination, the witness was questioned regarding the timing of events and the extent of his involvement.

He confirmed that he had been appointed to his supervisory role in January 2025 and that his interaction with the Complainant began shortly thereafter. He reiterated that he did not have responsibility for rostering decisions and that he had no role in determining the allocation of hours.

He was asked to clarify when he became aware of complaints made by colleagues about the Complainant. He stated that he understood these complaints to have arisen in or around mid-2025 and that he became aware of them through communication from his line manager. He acknowledged that he did not have exact dates but believed that the information was conveyed to him around that time.

He was further asked about his role in forwarding the Complainant’s complaint. He confirmed that he had transmitted the written complaint to management promptly and that he had followed up to ensure that it had been received. He reiterated that he was informed that the matter had been escalated to HR.

In relation to his inability to act as the Complainant’s representative at the disciplinary hearing, he confirmed that this was due to his supervisory position and that it reflected standard practice rather than any specific decision relating to the Complainant.

The witness accepted that his knowledge of subsequent events, including the conduct and outcome of any investigation, was limited. He stated that he did not have direct involvement in those processes and could not provide detailed evidence in that regard.

Complainant Argument:

The Complainant submits that she was subjected to unfair treatment in the course of her employment, including in relation to the allocation of working hours, the handling of complaints, and her treatment following the raising of protected complaints.

The Complainant states that while she was initially engaged on a part-time basis, her circumstances changed, and she sought additional hours and full-time employment. While some additional hours were provided, she contends that she was required to repeatedly request these and was not afforded the same consistency of hours as other employees. She maintains that other colleagues were given set rosters and greater access to hours, while she was overlooked and, at times, replaced by external subcontractors despite her availability to work.

The Complainant further submits that, following complaints about her treatment and the conduct of colleagues, she experienced adverse treatment. She contends that she was removed from preferred duties and assigned to less desirable locations. She asserts that this amounted to penalisation for raising concerns.

Central to her case is a complaint of sexual harassment made against a colleague. The Complainant submits that this complaint was of a serious nature and was communicated to management on 23 March 2025. She contends that there was an unjustified delay of approximately two months before the matter was escalated to HR, despite the seriousness of the allegations. She further argues that the complaint was only investigated after it was sent to the WRC. She argues that this delay demonstrates a failure on the part of management to take appropriate action and to provide her with a safe working environment.

The Complainant further submits that, during this period, she received little or no communication regarding the status of her complaint, despite making repeated requests for updates. She contends that she was left without clarity as to whether her complaint was being addressed, which caused her distress.

While she accepts that an investigation was ultimately carried out and that her complaint was upheld, she submits that this only occurred after she escalated matters further to the WRC. She contends that no meaningful action was taken following the outcome of the investigation and that the process was inadequate.

Evidence of Mr C – Operations Manager:

The witness gave evidence that he was employed as an Operations Manager with responsibility for approximately 400 employees. He stated that his role involved overseeing the day-to-day operations of the contract, including rostering, handling complaints, liaising with clients and general operational matters. He confirmed that he had recruited the Complainant.

In relation to rostering, the witness outlined that the Complainant was initially engaged to work one shift per week (Sunday), later increased to two set days (Sunday and Monday). He described the rostering system as partly fixed and partly dependent on operational requirements such as annual leave, sick leave and client requests. He stated that he endeavoured to allocate additional hours when available but had to ensure fairness to other employees. He further stated that the Complainant had declined certain shifts, including night work and work at a specific location, which limited the hours available to her.

The witness maintained that the Complainant’s hours were not reduced and that she received additional hours where possible, stating emphatically that her hours were “never affected” and that she could have full-time hours when available. He explained that rostering was primarily prepared by a rostering department, though he occasionally completed rosters himself. He described the Complainant’s two set days as fixed and unaffected, with any additional hours subject to operational variables.

Regarding complaints, the witness stated that his general approach was to resolve issues locally where possible and escalate to HR where necessary. He indicated that he would involve HR in more serious matters or where local resolution was not feasible. In respect of the March complaint concerning rosters, he stated that he would typically copy senior management on communications. However, he was unable to recall specific dates or responses, noting that he no longer had access to his emails and could not confirm the timeline.

Turning to the sexual harassment complaint, the witness accepted that he became aware of its nature at some point and stated that he forwarded it to HR “as soon as [he] noticed the nature of the complaint”. He was unable to clearly recall when he first read the email, stating that he received “around 300–400 emails per day” and could not confirm when the complaint came to his attention. He denied recalling any prior confirmation to another manager that he had seen the complaint earlier and stated that he could not place conversations within a clear timeline. The witness also gave evidence that he had received training, including training relating to sexual harassment, though he was unable to specify when such training occurred. He described sexual harassment in general terms as improper behaviour or communication of a sexual nature.

In relation to workplace practices, he outlined the expected duties of security staff, including following patrol plans and recording activities, though he accepted limited recollection of specific operational details. He further stated that he was not aware of complaints concerning alleged inappropriate conduct by a colleague and that, had such complaints been made, they would ordinarily have been reported. He emphasised that he did not recall any such complaint being raised with him. He denied that any interpersonal conflict influenced the Complainant’s roster and stated that “personal conflicts didn’t affect her roster.”

On the handling of the sexual harassment complaint, the witness confirmed that once he became aware of its nature, he escalated it to HR, after which HR assumed responsibility for the investigation. He stated that he was not the investigating manager and had no further involvement beyond forwarding the complaint.

Under cross-examination, the witness repeatedly stated that he could not remember specific dates, timelines or details, attributing this to the passage of time and the volume of matters he dealt with. He accepted that he could not recall when he first read the March email containing the complaint, nor why there was a delay until late May before it was forwarded to HR. While maintaining that he acted promptly once aware of its contents, he could not explain the intervening period.

It was put to him that he had received the complaint in March but only acted in May. He responded that he could not confirm when he saw the email and suggested it may not have been immediately apparent due to the volume of emails and the absence of a clear subject line indicating its seriousness.

When questioned on his assertion that the Complainant had refused night work, the witness accepted that he could not recall the reason for this refusal, though he maintained that such refusal affected her available hours. He was also questioned regarding alleged earlier complaints about a colleague’s conduct. The witness stated that he had no recollection of such complaints and reiterated that, had they been made, they would ordinarily have come to his attention.

In relation to the Complainant’s removal from certain duties, he denied that any such change was linked to conflict, maintaining that rostering decisions were based solely on operational needs and availability.

Regarding his recollection of training the witness said that while he had asserted in his evidence that he received training on dignity at work, he was unable to identify when such training took place. He was further questioned regarding complaints made against the Complainant. While he accepted that such complaints existed, he was unable to state whether they arose before or after the Complainant’s own complaint, again citing lack of recall. In relation to the handling of the March complaint email, it was put to him that it was unusual that both he and another manager failed to act on it for a period of approximately two months. The witness reiterated that he could not recall when he became aware of the email and that, once he did, he forwarded it immediately.

Evidence of Ms D, HR Manager.

The witness gave evidence that she was Head of HR for the Respondent’s Ireland division since 2021. She outlined that the Respondent had a range of training and policies in place, including online training modules available through the company’s internal academy for managers, covering topics such as equality, diversity, and prevention of sexual harassment. She stated that additional workshops were periodically delivered to managers. In terms of policies, the witness explained that employees had access to policies via an internal portal, received an induction on commencement, and were provided with a handbook. She stated that these included grievance procedures and policies relating to dignity at work.

Addressing the Complainant’s evidence that she did not know how to contact HR, the witness stated that there were multiple avenues available, including an HR email address and a confidential hotline. She confirmed that the Complainant had, in fact, contacted HR on a number of occasions. The witness gave evidence that HR had received “numerous communications” from the Complainant, but stated that prior to the relevant complaint, these did not contain any allegation of sexual harassment and instead related to general workplace issues and alleged behaviours.

She explained that the Respondent’s normal approach was for line managers to attempt to resolve issues locally, but once a sexual harassment allegation arose, it was considered appropriate to appoint an independent manager to investigate. She stated that, upon the sexual harassment allegation becoming known, a formal process was initiated. The witness outlined the Respondent’s procedure in such cases. She stated that HR would gather all relevant evidence, notify the employee against whom allegations were made, and seek a response. She described this as involving two parallel processes: a grievance process for the complainant and a disciplinary investigation in respect of the respondent employee.

She acknowledged that delays could occur in investigations due to operational constraints, including the need to appoint an independent manager from another location. In relation to the specific complaint, the witness confirmed that once the matter was brought to her attention, she recognised it as serious and took steps to progress it. She stated that an investigation was initiated promptly thereafter and that the Complainant was invited to participate. She further stated that the investigation into the sexual harassment complaint was upheld. However, she explained that no disciplinary sanction issued because the employee concerned had resigned during the process.

On the issue of working hours, the witness stated that employees could request additional hours and that such requests would be accommodated where possible, but availability was dependent on operational needs.

Cross-Examination of the Witness

In cross-examination, the witness was questioned regarding the timing and handling of the sexual harassment complaint. It was put to her that there had been a delay in progressing the complaint. She accepted that delays could arise but maintained that, once the allegation was identified as one of sexual harassment, it was acted upon and an investigation commenced. She was asked whether the investigation process was initiated promptly in this instance and agreed that a meeting was arranged within a short period once HR became aware of the nature of the complaint. It was suggested that the Complainant had repeatedly sought updates and received little communication. The witness acknowledged that the Complainant had made requests for information but maintained that communication had issued, including an email in July outlining the investigation outcome.

She was challenged on the classification of the complaint as a grievance. The witness explained that, from the Respondent’s perspective, a complaint of sexual harassment was treated as a grievance for the complainant and as a disciplinary matter for the respondent employee. She accepted that this approach was not expressly set out in the written policy, stating that this was “how we managed it in the process.”

The witness was further questioned as to whether the employee accused of harassment had been suspended. She stated that she could not definitively confirm whether the individual had been suspended or had resigned but asserted that it would not have been appropriate for that individual to continue working alongside the Complainant once the allegation became known. She was also questioned regarding training. While she confirmed that managers received specific training, she accepted that she could not confirm whether non-managerial staff received dedicated training specifically on sexual harassment, beyond elements contained within induction materials.

It was put to her that the Respondent’s procedures were unclear and that there was no explicit policy provision stating that sexual harassment complaints were to be processed as grievances. She accepted that this was not explicitly stated in the policy documentation. In relation to earlier complaints made by the Complainant, the witness stated that she could not confirm precise timelines without reviewing records but maintained that HR had received multiple communications from the Complainant.

The Respondent’s Argument.

The Respondent’s case, as advanced in both its written submission and closing statement, is that the complaint is fundamentally misconceived in fact and in law. It is asserted that the Complainant was at all times employed on a part-time contract, received her contracted hours, and in practice worked additional hours—often amounting to full-time hours—where operationally available. Any fluctuation in hours is said to have arisen from legitimate rostering considerations, including the Complainant’s own restrictions on night work and certain locations, rather than any retaliatory or discriminatory motive.

The Respondent rejects the allegation that the Complainant was subjected to adverse treatment following her complaints. In particular, it argues that the disciplinary process invoked in respect of the Complainant cannot constitute victimisation, as it was triggered by a separate complaint dated 4 March, predating the sexual harassment complaint of 23 March. On this basis, the Respondent submits that the essential causal link required for victimisation under the Employment Equality Acts is absent. It is further emphasised that the disciplinary process concluded without sanction, and therefore no detriment arose.

In relation to the sexual harassment complaint, the Respondent accepts that the allegations were serious but maintains that once the nature of the complaint came to its attention, it acted promptly and in accordance with its procedures. The delay between March and May is attributed to operational factor, including the volume of emails received by management and the absence of any clear indication of the complaint’s nature in the subject line. Once identified, the complaint was immediately referred to HR, investigated, and upheld. The Respondent stresses that no further disciplinary action could be taken against the alleged perpetrator due to his resignation at the commencement of the investigation.

A central plank of the Respondent’s legal defence is reliance on the statutory defence under section 14A (2) of the Employment Equality Acts, namely that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent harassment and to address complaints. In support of this, the Respondent points to the existence of a dignity at work policy, a grievance procedure contained in the employee handbook, accessibility of policies through an employee portal, induction training covering equality and harassment, and additional training for managers. It also emphasises that multiple reporting avenues were available to employees, including direct contact with HR and a confidential hotline.

The Respondent further submits that, although the Complainant contended, she did not know how to escalate her complaint, the evidence demonstrates that she had previously engaged with HR on other matters and therefore had knowledge of the appropriate channels. It is argued that any failure to utilise those channels in respect of the sexual harassment complaint cannot be attributed to the Respondent.

The Respondent submitted that victimisation requires a causal nexus between a protected act and adverse treatment, and that an employer may avail of a defence where it has taken reasonable steps to prevent and address harassment. In conclusion, the Respondent contends that there was no discriminatory treatment, no victimisation within the meaning of the Acts, and that it responded appropriately once the complaint was identified. It maintains that it has satisfied the statutory defence and that the complaint should therefore be dismissed in its entirety.

Findings and Conclusions

The complaints before me fall to be considered under two distinct headings, namely: (i) sexual harassment, and (ii) victimisation.

I have carefully considered the totality of the oral and documentary evidence, including the evidence of the Complainant, the witness, and the Respondent’s witnesses over both days of hearing, together with the submissions of the parties and the relevant statutory provisions of the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015.

(1)   Sexual Harassment.

Section 14A of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (“the Acts”) state:-

Harassment and Sexual Harassment

(1) For the purposes of this Act, where—

(a) an employee (in this section referred to as “the victim”) is harassed or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is employed (in this section referred to as “the workplace”) or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who is—

(i) employed at that place or by the same employer,

(ii) the victim's employer, or

(iii) a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to prevent it, or

(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a)—

(i) such harassment has occurred, and

(ii) either—

the victim is treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or

(II) it could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated,

the harassment or sexual harassment constitutes discrimination by the victim's employer in relation to the victim's conditions of employment.

If harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable—

(a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and

(b) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies, to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the victim's employment and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred, to reverse its effects.

(2) If harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable—

(a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and

(b) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies, to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the victim's employment and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred, to reverse its effects.

(3) A person's rejection of, or submission to, harassment or sexual harassment may not be used by an employer as a basis for a decision affecting that person.

(4) The reference in subsection (1)(a)(iii) to a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's employer includes a reference to any other person with whom the employer might reasonably expect the victim to come into contact in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment.

(5) In this section “employee” includes an individual who is—

(a) seeking or using any service provided by an employment agency, and

(b) participating in any course or facility referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 12(1),

and accordingly any reference to the individual's employer includes a reference to the employment agency providing the service or, as the case may be, the person offering or providing the course or facility.

(6) Where subsection (5) applies in relation to a victim, subsection (1) shall have effect as if for “in relation to the victim's conditions of employment” there were substituted “contrary to section 11”, or, as the case may be, section 12.

(7) (a) In this section—

(i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and

(ii) references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature,

(b) being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person's dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.

(c) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.

The applicable law is set above, which provides that sexual harassment consists of any form of unwanted conduct of a sexual nature which has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment.

I accept the Complainant’s evidence that she was subjected to explicit, graphic, and highly inappropriate messages of a sexual nature by a colleague. This evidence was not materially contradicted and was, in substance, borne out by the Respondent’s own processes, which upheld her complaint. I am satisfied that the conduct complained of meets the statutory definition of sexual harassment.

The issue for determination is whether the Respondent can avail of the defence under section 14A (2) of the Acts, namely that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the harassment and to address it appropriately. In assessing the Respondent’s defence, I have considered section 14A (2) together with the standards set out in the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 (Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work) Order 2022. The statutory defence requires the Respondent to demonstrate that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable both to prevent the occurrence of harassment and to respond appropriately where it arose.

I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that the Complainant’s complaint came to the attention of the Respondent’s operations manager on 24 March 2025. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations, I am equally satisfied that there was no prompt or effective response. The evidence of the operations manager was marked by a lack of recall of key dates and actions, which I found to be unreliable. I prefer the evidence of the Complainant and her witness, the supervisor Mr B, that the operations manager was aware of the seriousness of the complaint at that time. On the balance of probabilities, no meaningful action was taken for a period of approximately two months and that a formal investigation did not commence until June or July 2025, and as the evidence showed only after the Complainant had submitted her complaint to the WRC.

Such delay is inconsistent with the requirement for immediate and appropriate intervention in cases of alleged sexual harassment. The complaint was not treated with the requisite seriousness at the outset. The evidence indicates that it was initially processed as a general grievance rather than as an allegation of sexual harassment. This mischaracterisation materially contributed to the delay in escalation and investigation.

There was also a failure to implement appropriate interim measures. There was no evidence that the alleged perpetrator was suspended, nor that any effective steps were taken to separate the parties or otherwise protect the Complainant pending investigation. This represents a significant departure from the standards envisaged by the Code of Practice.

In addition, I am not satisfied that the Respondent had in place effective preventative measures. While policies were referenced in evidence, there was insufficient evidence that such policies were clearly communicated or properly understood by staff. The evidence further indicated gaps in training, particularly at non-managerial level, and an absence of clarity as to how complaints of sexual harassment were to be processed. As is well established, the mere existence of a policy is insufficient; it must be effective in practice.

A further and significant factor in my assessment is the contrast between the Respondent’s handling of the Complainant’s complaint and its treatment of allegations made against her. The evidence establishes that a disciplinary process was initiated against the Complainant in or around April 2025 and progressed with relative promptness, albeit resulting in no sanction. In stark contrast, the Complainant’s complaint of sexual harassment, known to management from 24 March 2025, was not addressed with comparable urgency. This disparity demonstrates that the Respondent was capable of acting expeditiously where it chose to do so and underscores its failure to properly recognise and respond to the seriousness of the Complainant’s complaint.

Finally, while the Respondent did ultimately conduct an investigation and uphold the complaint, such post hoc action does not satisfy the statutory defence, which is preventative in nature.

Taking all of these matters together, I find that the Respondent has failed to establish that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable either to prevent the harassment or to respond to it appropriately once it occurred. Accordingly, the Respondent cannot avail of the statutory defence under section 14A (2) of the Acts.

I find  the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of gender regarding sexual harassment contrary to section 14A of the Acts and that the Respondent has failed to establish a defence under section 14A(2).

Redress.

Section 82 of the Acts dels with redress:

82.Redress which may be ordered

(1) Subject to this section, the types of redress for which a decision of the [Director General] under section 79 may provide are such one or more of the following as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case:

(a) an order for compensation in the form of arrears of remuneration (attributable to a failure to provide equal remuneration) in respect of so much of the period of employment as begins not more than 3 years before the date of the referral under section 77(1) which led to the decision;

(b) an order for equal remuneration from the date referred to in paragraph (a);

(c) an order for compensation for the effects of acts of discrimination or victimisation which occurred not earlier than 6 years before the date of the referral of the case under section 77;

(d) an order for equal treatment in whatever respect is relevant to the case;

(e) an order that a person or persons specified in the order take a course of action which is so specified;

(f) an order for re-instatement or re-engagement, with or without an order for compensation…

…(3) The types of redress for which the Circuit Court may provide on a reference under section 77(3) are such one or more of the following as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case:

(a) an order for compensation in the form of arrears of remuneration (attributable to a failure to provide equal remuneration) in respect of so much of the period of employment as begins not more than 6 years before the date of the referral;

(b) an order for equal remuneration from the date of the referral;

(c) the orders referred to in [paragraphs (c) to (f)] of subsection (1);

(d) and no enactment relating to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court shall be taken to limit the amount of compensation or remuneration which may be ordered by the Circuit Court by virtue of this subsection.

(4) The maximum amount which may be ordered by the [Director General] by way of compensation under subsection (1)(c) or (1)(f) shall be—

(a) in any case where the complainant was in receipt of remuneration at the date of the reference of the case, or if it was earlier, the date of dismissal, an amount equal to the greatest of—

(i) 104 times the amount of that remuneration, determined on a weekly basis,

(ii) 104 times the amount, determined on a weekly basis, which the complainant would have received at that date but for the act of discrimination or victimisation concerned, or

(iii) €40,000.

or

(b) in any other case, €13,000.

(5) Where the case for which the redress is to be provided is referred to the Director General  and arises—

(a) under Part III, or

(b) in any other circumstances (including circumstances amounting to victimisation) to which the Equal Pay Directive or the Equal Treatment Directive is relevant, the Director General may, in addition to making an order for compensation, also order the payment of interest, at the rate which is applicable under section 22(1) of the Courts Act 1981—

(i) in respect of the whole or any part of the amount of the compensation, and

(ii) in respect of the period beginning on the relevant date and ending on the date of the payment,

and, for the purposes of subparagraph (ii), “the relevant date” means the first day of the period (if any) to which the compensation is expressed to be referable or, if there is no such period, the date of the reference under section 77(1).

(6) (a) The maximum amount of compensation specified in subsection (4) applies notwithstanding that conduct the subject of the investigation by the [Director General] constituted—

(i) discrimination on more than one of the discriminatory grounds, or

(ii) both discrimination on one or more than one of such grounds and harassment or sexual harassment.

(b) In paragraph (a) “discrimination” does not include non-compliance with an equal remuneration term.

(7) An order for compensation under this section may not be made in favour of the [Commission] in a case referred by it to the [Director General] under section 85(1).

(8) Where an act constitutes victimisation under both this Act and the Equal Status Act 2000, redress may be provided under only one of them.

(9) Where a delay in referring a case under this Act to the [Director General] or Circuit Court is attributable to the respondent's having misrepresented to the complainant the fact of the case, references in this section to the date of referral shall be construed as references to the date of the misrepresentation.

Having found that the complaint of sexual harassment was well-founded under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015, I must now consider the appropriate form of redress.

In accordance with section 82 of the Acts, redress may include compensation for the effects of discrimination. Such compensation is not in the nature of remuneration but is intended to provide recompense for the effects of the discriminatory treatment, including distress, humiliation, and the impact on the Complainant’s dignity.

In assessing the appropriate level of compensation, I have had regard to the following factors:

Firstly, the nature of the conduct. The Complainant was subjected to inappropriate communications of a sexual nature in the workplace of very graphic texts and acknowledged by the Respondent as very serious. While the conduct did not involve physical contact, it nevertheless falls well within the scope of sexual harassment as defined by the Acts. As has been recognised in Labour Court jurisprudence, even non-physical conduct can have a serious and damaging effect on an employee’s dignity and working environment.

Secondly, the impact on the Complainant. I accept the Complainant’s evidence that she experienced distress and anxiety as a result of the conduct. Her evidence that she felt fearful of reporting the behaviour and concerned about the consequences for her employment is consistent with the type of impact recognised in the authorities. She gave evidence that she was the only woman working in a male-dominated area of the Respondent’s operations. The explicit and graphic nature of the messages she received reflects a deeply toxic working environment, one that was degrading and harmful to her as a woman.

Thirdly, and significantly, the Respondent’s handling of the complaint. I have found that there was a substantial delay in responding to a serious complaint, that the matter was not treated with appropriate urgency, and that no effective interim measures were put in place. This prolonged the period during which the Complainant was exposed to an uncertain and distressing situation. The Respondent’s failure to properly implement its procedures and to respond in a timely and effective manner is an aggravating factor in the assessment of redress.

Fourthly, I have had regard to the disparity in the Respondent’s treatment of the Complainant’s complaint as compared to the speed with which it progressed allegations against her. While I have not found victimisation, this disparity is relevant to the overall assessment of the Respondent’s response and its impact on the Complainant.

In determining the appropriate quantum, I have also considered recent Labour Court decisions, which emphasise that awards in cases of sexual harassment must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and must reflect the seriousness of the infringement. In particular, I note that the Labour Court has increased awards where the employer’s response was inadequate or where the harassment had a significant impact on the employee.

Having regard to all of the circumstances of this case, including the nature of the conduct, the impact on the Complainant, and the deficiencies in the Respondent’s response, I consider that this case falls within the mid to upper range of seriousness for non-physical sexual harassment. The Complainant’s decision to report the conduct, in circumstances where she was the only woman in a male-dominated environment, required considerable personal courage. Her evidence demonstrates a resilience in the face of a workplace culture that she reasonably perceived as hostile.

Having found that the Complainant was subjected to sexual harassment contrary to section 14A of the Employment Equality Acts and that the Respondent has failed to establish a defence under section 14A (2), I am required to consider appropriate redress.

In accordance with section 82 of the Acts, I award the Complainant compensation for the effects of the discrimination. I consider an award of €20,000 to be just and equitable in all the circumstances.

In addition to financial redress, I consider it appropriate to direct the Respondent to take specific measures to ensure future compliance with its obligations under the Acts and in line with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 (Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work) Order 2022 (S.I. no 106 of 2022).

Accordingly, I direct that the Respondent shall, within a period of six months from the date of this decision:

1.      Conduct a comprehensive review of its Dignity at Work, grievance, and anti-harassment policies to ensure that they are fully compliant with the Code of Practice and clearly set out procedures for addressing complaints of sexual harassment.

2.      Ensure that such policies are clearly communicated to all employees and are readily accessible. 3

3.      Provide appropriate and effective training to all employees, including non-managerial staff, on the content of these policies, the standards of behaviour expected in the workplace, and specifically) the procedures for making and handling complaints of harassment and sexual harassment.

These measures are necessary to ensure that the Respondent takes such steps as are reasonably practicable to prevent harassment and to respond appropriately to complaints in the future.

Victimisation

Victimisation is defined in broad under section 74(2) of the Acts where it provides:

 (2) For the purposes of this Part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to—

(a) a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer,

(b) any proceedings by a complainant,

(c)  an employee having represented or otherwise supported a complainant,

(d) the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act,

(e) an employee having been a witness in any proceedings under this Act or the Equal Status Act 2000 or any such repealed enactment,

(f) an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the said Act of 2000 or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment, or

(g) an employee having given notice of an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.”

Section 74(2) provides that victimisation occurs where an employee is subjected to adverse treatment as a reaction to having taken a protected act.

I am satisfied that the Complainant engaged in a protected act by making a complaint of harassment. However, I am not satisfied that she has established that she was subjected to adverse treatment as a reaction to that complaint. While the Complainant contends that she experienced reduced hours, changes in duties, and unfavourable treatment following her complaint, the evidence in this regard was not sufficiently cogent to establish a causal link. The evidence of the Respondent witness was that rostering decisions were made centrally, and there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that any alleged detriment was connected to the protected act rather than to operational factors. Furthermore, these issues pre-dated her sexual harassment claim. Furthermore, a disciplinary process involving the Complainant, which was found to be without merit, was initiated on 4 March 2025 which was a number of weeks before her harassment complaint. Applying the statutory test, I find that the Complainant has not established the necessary causal nexus between her protected act and any adverse treatment.

Taking the above into account, I find the Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of victimisation.

(1)   For the reasons outlined above I find that the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of gender regarding sexual harassment contrary to section 14A of the Acts and that the Respondent has failed to establish a defence under section 14A (2).

(2)    I find she did not establish a prima facie case of victimisation.

In accordance with section 82 of the Acts, I award the Complainant compensation for the effects of the discrimination. Having regard to the nature, seriousness and duration of the treatment, and the impact on the Complainant, I consider an award of €20,000 to be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. This award is made in respect of the infringement of the Complainant’s statutory rights and is not subject to tax.

In addition to financial redress, I consider it appropriate to direct the Respondent to take specific measures to ensure future compliance with its obligations under the Acts and in line with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 (Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work) Order 2022 (S.I. no 106 of 2022)

Accordingly, I direct that the Respondent shall, within a period of six months from the date of this decision:

1.      Conduct a comprehensive review of its Dignity at Work, grievance, and anti-harassment policies to ensure that they are fully compliant with the Code of Practice and clearly set out procedures for addressing complaints of sexual harassment.

2.      Ensure that such policies are clearly communicated to all employees and are readily accessible.

3.       Provide appropriate and effective training to all employees, including non-managerial staff, on the content of these policies, the standards of behaviour expected in the workplace, and specifically) the procedures for making and handling complaints of harassment and sexual harassment.

These measures are necessary to ensure that the Respondent takes such steps as are reasonably practicable to prevent harassment and to respond appropriately to complaints in the future.

Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. Sexual Harassment. Victimisation.

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

A Security Worker

Security Services Provider

Representatives

A Workplace Colleague

Lisa Moloney IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00072455-002

15/06/2025

The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as a security officer on a part-time contract. Her employment commenced in or around late 2023. The Respondent is a provider of security services operating across multiple sites and the Complainant was assigned to duties involving both onboard and station-based security work for a public transport provider. There was a subsequent transfer of undertakings to a new employer. The Complainant earned €16.00 per hour and was working an approximate 40-hour week at the material time.

The complaint arises from a series of events occurring in early 2025, including disputes concerning rostering and the handling of a complaint of sexual harassment. The Complainant also contends that she was subjected to victimisation following the raising of complaints.

The Respondent denies all allegations of wrongdoing. It submits that the Complainant was at all times treated in accordance with her contract of employment and that her hours were not reduced but varied only in accordance with operational requirements and her own stated availability. The Respondent contends that any limitations on the Complainant’s hours arose from her refusal to work certain shifts, including night work and certain locations.

Regarding the complaint of sexual harassment, the Respondent accepts there was a delay in referring the complaint to HR, attributing this to how it was initially communicated and the lack of clarity about its nature. It states that once identified as a sexual harassment complaint, it was promptly escalated and investigated in line with procedures. The complaint was upheld, but no disciplinary action was taken as the employee had already left. The Respondent further submits that it had appropriate policies and procedures in place, including grievance and dignity at work policies, that these were made available to employees, and that multiple avenues existed for raising complaints.

The Complainant gave sworn evidence with the assistance of an interpreter.

In relation to the alleged inappropriate conduct, the Complainant stated that she had received messages of a suggestive sexual nature from a colleague, Mr B, over a period of time (exhibited).  She described these as distressing and very graphic and explained that the conduct had been ongoing before she made any formal complaint.  When asked why she did not report the matter earlier, she stated that she was afraid of the consequences and indicated that, following earlier concerns, her working arrangements had changed. In that context, she stated that she was scared.

The Complainant said that she raised the matter formally with a supervisor, Mr A. She stated that he advised her to put her complaint in writing, which she did to the operations manager Mr C on 21 March 2025. She further indicated that there was a delay of several months before any formal investigation took place, which she understood to have occurred in or around June or July 2025.

The Complainant stated that she participated in an investigation process at a later stage but maintained that she did not receive clear information regarding the outcome. She said that she understood that her complaint had eventually been taken seriously. However, she was not informed whether any disciplinary action had been taken against the colleague concerned, nor was she given clarity as to how the matter had been resolved.

Turning to the issue of working hours, the Complainant stated that although she was engaged on what she understood to be a part-time basis, she frequently worked additional hours and had sought to obtain more consistent, full-time work. She said that she repeatedly made herself available for additional shifts but that these were not always offered to her. In her words, “everybody was given their hours… but I got those hours only if somebody had refused.” She further stated that work which she was available to perform was, at times, given to new employees or subcontractors instead.

The Complainant also gave evidence that, following her complaints, she was moved from duties she preferred, from one location, to what she regarded as less favourable duties. She linked this change to the raising of her concerns.

In describing the workplace environment, the Complainant stated that she was, for most of her employment, the only woman in her role. She indicated that she had limited contact with management and found it difficult to access support. She described instances where she felt she was treated dismissively and said that she was sometimes spoken to in a rude manner.

The Complainant also addressed a disciplinary process which had been initiated against her on 4 March. She stated that she received notification of the process and that there were delays in the provision of documentation. She indicated that the process ultimately concluded that there was no merit in accusations from work colleagues, and no sanction was imposed. She contrasted the speed with which that process was initiated with what she described as the slower response to her own complaints.

In relation to the question of victimisation, the Complainant asserted that, following her complaints, she experienced adverse treatment. She stated that her hours were restricted, and she was reassigned to less favourable duties.  She felt isolated within the workplace. She attributed this treatment to the fact that she had raised concerns.

The Complainant was also asked about reporting mechanisms within the organisation. She stated that she was not adequately informed about HR procedures and did not feel comfortable using formal channels. She explained that she was fearful of losing her job and stated, “I was really afraid of losing the job… I am a single mother.”

In cross-examination, the Respondent’s representative put it to the Complainant that she was employed on a part-time contract and that she had no contractual entitlement to full-time hours. The Complainant accepted that she was on a part-time contract but maintained that she regularly worked significant hours and had made herself available for additional work. She reiterated her position that she was overlooked for additional hours and that others, including less experienced staff and subcontractors, were allocated work instead.

It was further put to her that the allocation of hours could depend on operational requirements and business needs. The Complainant stated that she did not have knowledge of the contractual arrangements of other employees but did not accept that this fully explained the differences in allocation.

The Respondent also suggested that appropriate HR channels were available to her for raising complaints. The Complainant stated that she had not been provided with sufficient information about these channels and that she was reluctant to use them due to fear of repercussions.

In relation to the investigation of her sexual harassment complaint, it was put to the Complainant that the matter had been investigated and that an outcome had issued. The Complainant accepted that a process had taken place but maintained that she did not receive sufficient information about the outcome and did not know what action, if any, had been taken.

Questions were also put to her regarding her contract and employment documentation. The Complainant stated that she had not seen or signed certain documentation until later in her employment and that there had been confusion regarding whether she was part-time or full-time.

Evidence of Mr B, Supervisor.

The witness gave sworn evidence on behalf of the Complainant. He confirmed that he was employed by the Respondent and that he had been appointed to a supervisory role in or around January 2025. He stated that this was the first time he had managerial responsibility in respect of the Complainant and that, prior to his appointment, he understood that she had limited interaction with management.

The witness described his role as supervisory in nature and clarified that he did not have responsibility for rostering decisions, which were managed centrally by a separate function within the organisation.

He stated that the Complainant approached him shortly after he assumed his role and raised concerns regarding her working hours. He said that she expressed dissatisfaction that she was not receiving sufficient hours and that she wished to obtain additional shifts. He indicated that he explained to her that the allocation of hours was an operational matter and that he did not have direct control over rostering. He stated that, based on his understanding, hours were allocated by a rostering office having regard to availability and operational requirements.

The witness further gave evidence that the Complainant raised issues with him regarding alleged inappropriate conduct by a colleague, Mr B.  He stated that she informed him of messages she had received and that she was upset by the situation. He recalled asking her whether she had raised the matter previously and advised her to put her concerns in writing so that they could be formally addressed.

He stated that the Complainant subsequently provided him with a written account of her complaint. He confirmed that he forwarded this document to her line manager in late March 2025 and to other members of management. He further stated that he followed up to ensure that the complaint had been received and was informed that it had been escalated to HR for further handling. He indicated that this occurred shortly after he received the written complaint, which he believed was over a weekend, and that he received confirmation of receipt on the following working day.

In relation to what occurred thereafter, the witness stated that his understanding was that an investigation process would be initiated by HR. However, he did not have direct involvement in that process and was not in a position to give detailed evidence as to how or when it progressed. He stated that, from his perspective, there appeared to be a delay in the handling of the complaint.

The witness also gave evidence regarding complaints made about the Complainant by other employees. He stated that he became aware, through communication from his line manager, that complaints had been made by colleagues concerning the Complainant’s conduct. He indicated that these matters were escalated to management and that a disciplinary process was subsequently initiated. He stated that this information came to him by way of a telephone call from his line manager.

He further stated that the Complainant had asked him to attend a disciplinary meeting as her representative. He indicated that he sought permission to do so but was informed by management that, due to his supervisory position, it would not be appropriate for him to act in that capacity. He accepted that this was consistent with general procedure rather than being specific to the Complainant.

In his evidence, the witness was asked about the allocation of hours and whether he had any insight into why the Complainant did not receive additional shifts. He stated that he did not have direct knowledge of the decision-making process and could not provide a definitive explanation. He indicated that, from his perspective, the allocation of hours appeared to be based on operational considerations and that he had no evidence to suggest that gender played a role.

When asked directly whether he believed that the Complainant had been treated less favourably on the ground of her gender, the witness stated that he did not consider gender to be a factor. However, he expressed the view that the handling of her complaints appeared to be slow. He stated that his impression was that, once a complaint was made, the response from management was delayed rather than prompt, and that this contributed to the Complainant’s dissatisfaction.

In relation to the Respondent’s response to the Complainant’s complaints more generally, the witness stated that he had been informed that an investigation would take place but that he was not aware of the detail of that investigation or its outcome at the time. He indicated that he did not observe any immediate or visible measures being taken following the initial complaint.

In cross-examination, the witness was questioned regarding the timing of events and the extent of his involvement.

He confirmed that he had been appointed to his supervisory role in January 2025 and that his interaction with the Complainant began shortly thereafter. He reiterated that he did not have responsibility for rostering decisions and that he had no role in determining the allocation of hours.

He was asked to clarify when he became aware of complaints made by colleagues about the Complainant. He stated that he understood these complaints to have arisen in or around mid-2025 and that he became aware of them through communication from his line manager. He acknowledged that he did not have exact dates but believed that the information was conveyed to him around that time.

He was further asked about his role in forwarding the Complainant’s complaint. He confirmed that he had transmitted the written complaint to management promptly and that he had followed up to ensure that it had been received. He reiterated that he was informed that the matter had been escalated to HR.

In relation to his inability to act as the Complainant’s representative at the disciplinary hearing, he confirmed that this was due to his supervisory position and that it reflected standard practice rather than any specific decision relating to the Complainant.

The witness accepted that his knowledge of subsequent events, including the conduct and outcome of any investigation, was limited. He stated that he did not have direct involvement in those processes and could not provide detailed evidence in that regard.

Complainant Argument:

The Complainant submits that she was subjected to unfair treatment in the course of her employment, including in relation to the allocation of working hours, the handling of complaints, and her treatment following the raising of protected complaints.

The Complainant states that while she was initially engaged on a part-time basis, her circumstances changed, and she sought additional hours and full-time employment. While some additional hours were provided, she contends that she was required to repeatedly request these and was not afforded the same consistency of hours as other employees. She maintains that other colleagues were given set rosters and greater access to hours, while she was overlooked and, at times, replaced by external subcontractors despite her availability to work.

The Complainant further submits that, following complaints about her treatment and the conduct of colleagues, she experienced adverse treatment. She contends that she was removed from preferred duties and assigned to less desirable locations. She asserts that this amounted to penalisation for raising concerns.

Central to her case is a complaint of sexual harassment made against a colleague. The Complainant submits that this complaint was of a serious nature and was communicated to management on 23 March 2025. She contends that there was an unjustified delay of approximately two months before the matter was escalated to HR, despite the seriousness of the allegations. She further argues that the complaint was only investigated after it was sent to the WRC. She argues that this delay demonstrates a failure on the part of management to take appropriate action and to provide her with a safe working environment.

The Complainant further submits that, during this period, she received little or no communication regarding the status of her complaint, despite making repeated requests for updates. She contends that she was left without clarity as to whether her complaint was being addressed, which caused her distress.

While she accepts that an investigation was ultimately carried out and that her complaint was upheld, she submits that this only occurred after she escalated matters further to the WRC. She contends that no meaningful action was taken following the outcome of the investigation and that the process was inadequate.

Evidence of Mr C – Operations Manager:

The witness gave evidence that he was employed as an Operations Manager with responsibility for approximately 400 employees. He stated that his role involved overseeing the day-to-day operations of the contract, including rostering, handling complaints, liaising with clients and general operational matters. He confirmed that he had recruited the Complainant.

In relation to rostering, the witness outlined that the Complainant was initially engaged to work one shift per week (Sunday), later increased to two set days (Sunday and Monday). He described the rostering system as partly fixed and partly dependent on operational requirements such as annual leave, sick leave and client requests. He stated that he endeavoured to allocate additional hours when available but had to ensure fairness to other employees. He further stated that the Complainant had declined certain shifts, including night work and work at a specific location, which limited the hours available to her.

The witness maintained that the Complainant’s hours were not reduced and that she received additional hours where possible, stating emphatically that her hours were “never affected” and that she could have full-time hours when available. He explained that rostering was primarily prepared by a rostering department, though he occasionally completed rosters himself. He described the Complainant’s two set days as fixed and unaffected, with any additional hours subject to operational variables.

Regarding complaints, the witness stated that his general approach was to resolve issues locally where possible and escalate to HR where necessary. He indicated that he would involve HR in more serious matters or where local resolution was not feasible. In respect of the March complaint concerning rosters, he stated that he would typically copy senior management on communications. However, he was unable to recall specific dates or responses, noting that he no longer had access to his emails and could not confirm the timeline.

Turning to the sexual harassment complaint, the witness accepted that he became aware of its nature at some point and stated that he forwarded it to HR “as soon as [he] noticed the nature of the complaint”. He was unable to clearly recall when he first read the email, stating that he received “around 300–400 emails per day” and could not confirm when the complaint came to his attention. He denied recalling any prior confirmation to another manager that he had seen the complaint earlier and stated that he could not place conversations within a clear timeline. The witness also gave evidence that he had received training, including training relating to sexual harassment, though he was unable to specify when such training occurred. He described sexual harassment in general terms as improper behaviour or communication of a sexual nature.

In relation to workplace practices, he outlined the expected duties of security staff, including following patrol plans and recording activities, though he accepted limited recollection of specific operational details. He further stated that he was not aware of complaints concerning alleged inappropriate conduct by a colleague and that, had such complaints been made, they would ordinarily have been reported. He emphasised that he did not recall any such complaint being raised with him. He denied that any interpersonal conflict influenced the Complainant’s roster and stated that “personal conflicts didn’t affect her roster.”

On the handling of the sexual harassment complaint, the witness confirmed that once he became aware of its nature, he escalated it to HR, after which HR assumed responsibility for the investigation. He stated that he was not the investigating manager and had no further involvement beyond forwarding the complaint.

Under cross-examination, the witness repeatedly stated that he could not remember specific dates, timelines or details, attributing this to the passage of time and the volume of matters he dealt with. He accepted that he could not recall when he first read the March email containing the complaint, nor why there was a delay until late May before it was forwarded to HR. While maintaining that he acted promptly once aware of its contents, he could not explain the intervening period.

It was put to him that he had received the complaint in March but only acted in May. He responded that he could not confirm when he saw the email and suggested it may not have been immediately apparent due to the volume of emails and the absence of a clear subject line indicating its seriousness.

When questioned on his assertion that the Complainant had refused night work, the witness accepted that he could not recall the reason for this refusal, though he maintained that such refusal affected her available hours. He was also questioned regarding alleged earlier complaints about a colleague’s conduct. The witness stated that he had no recollection of such complaints and reiterated that, had they been made, they would ordinarily have come to his attention.

In relation to the Complainant’s removal from certain duties, he denied that any such change was linked to conflict, maintaining that rostering decisions were based solely on operational needs and availability.

Regarding his recollection of training the witness said that while he had asserted in his evidence that he received training on dignity at work, he was unable to identify when such training took place. He was further questioned regarding complaints made against the Complainant. While he accepted that such complaints existed, he was unable to state whether they arose before or after the Complainant’s own complaint, again citing lack of recall. In relation to the handling of the March complaint email, it was put to him that it was unusual that both he and another manager failed to act on it for a period of approximately two months. The witness reiterated that he could not recall when he became aware of the email and that, once he did, he forwarded it immediately.

Evidence of Ms D, HR Manager.

The witness gave evidence that she was Head of HR for the Respondent’s Ireland division since 2021. She outlined that the Respondent had a range of training and policies in place, including online training modules available through the company’s internal academy for managers, covering topics such as equality, diversity, and prevention of sexual harassment. She stated that additional workshops were periodically delivered to managers. In terms of policies, the witness explained that employees had access to policies via an internal portal, received an induction on commencement, and were provided with a handbook. She stated that these included grievance procedures and policies relating to dignity at work.

Addressing the Complainant’s evidence that she did not know how to contact HR, the witness stated that there were multiple avenues available, including an HR email address and a confidential hotline. She confirmed that the Complainant had, in fact, contacted HR on a number of occasions. The witness gave evidence that HR had received “numerous communications” from the Complainant, but stated that prior to the relevant complaint, these did not contain any allegation of sexual harassment and instead related to general workplace issues and alleged behaviours.

She explained that the Respondent’s normal approach was for line managers to attempt to resolve issues locally, but once a sexual harassment allegation arose, it was considered appropriate to appoint an independent manager to investigate. She stated that, upon the sexual harassment allegation becoming known, a formal process was initiated. The witness outlined the Respondent’s procedure in such cases. She stated that HR would gather all relevant evidence, notify the employee against whom allegations were made, and seek a response. She described this as involving two parallel processes: a grievance process for the complainant and a disciplinary investigation in respect of the respondent employee.

She acknowledged that delays could occur in investigations due to operational constraints, including the need to appoint an independent manager from another location. In relation to the specific complaint, the witness confirmed that once the matter was brought to her attention, she recognised it as serious and took steps to progress it. She stated that an investigation was initiated promptly thereafter and that the Complainant was invited to participate. She further stated that the investigation into the sexual harassment complaint was upheld. However, she explained that no disciplinary sanction issued because the employee concerned had resigned during the process.

On the issue of working hours, the witness stated that employees could request additional hours and that such requests would be accommodated where possible, but availability was dependent on operational needs.

Cross-Examination of the Witness

In cross-examination, the witness was questioned regarding the timing and handling of the sexual harassment complaint. It was put to her that there had been a delay in progressing the complaint. She accepted that delays could arise but maintained that, once the allegation was identified as one of sexual harassment, it was acted upon and an investigation commenced. She was asked whether the investigation process was initiated promptly in this instance and agreed that a meeting was arranged within a short period once HR became aware of the nature of the complaint. It was suggested that the Complainant had repeatedly sought updates and received little communication. The witness acknowledged that the Complainant had made requests for information but maintained that communication had issued, including an email in July outlining the investigation outcome.

She was challenged on the classification of the complaint as a grievance. The witness explained that, from the Respondent’s perspective, a complaint of sexual harassment was treated as a grievance for the complainant and as a disciplinary matter for the respondent employee. She accepted that this approach was not expressly set out in the written policy, stating that this was “how we managed it in the process.”

The witness was further questioned as to whether the employee accused of harassment had been suspended. She stated that she could not definitively confirm whether the individual had been suspended or had resigned but asserted that it would not have been appropriate for that individual to continue working alongside the Complainant once the allegation became known. She was also questioned regarding training. While she confirmed that managers received specific training, she accepted that she could not confirm whether non-managerial staff received dedicated training specifically on sexual harassment, beyond elements contained within induction materials.

It was put to her that the Respondent’s procedures were unclear and that there was no explicit policy provision stating that sexual harassment complaints were to be processed as grievances. She accepted that this was not explicitly stated in the policy documentation. In relation to earlier complaints made by the Complainant, the witness stated that she could not confirm precise timelines without reviewing records but maintained that HR had received multiple communications from the Complainant.

The Respondent’s Argument.

The Respondent’s case, as advanced in both its written submission and closing statement, is that the complaint is fundamentally misconceived in fact and in law. It is asserted that the Complainant was at all times employed on a part-time contract, received her contracted hours, and in practice worked additional hours—often amounting to full-time hours—where operationally available. Any fluctuation in hours is said to have arisen from legitimate rostering considerations, including the Complainant’s own restrictions on night work and certain locations, rather than any retaliatory or discriminatory motive.

The Respondent rejects the allegation that the Complainant was subjected to adverse treatment following her complaints. In particular, it argues that the disciplinary process invoked in respect of the Complainant cannot constitute victimisation, as it was triggered by a separate complaint dated 4 March, predating the sexual harassment complaint of 23 March. On this basis, the Respondent submits that the essential causal link required for victimisation under the Employment Equality Acts is absent. It is further emphasised that the disciplinary process concluded without sanction, and therefore no detriment arose.

In relation to the sexual harassment complaint, the Respondent accepts that the allegations were serious but maintains that once the nature of the complaint came to its attention, it acted promptly and in accordance with its procedures. The delay between March and May is attributed to operational factor, including the volume of emails received by management and the absence of any clear indication of the complaint’s nature in the subject line. Once identified, the complaint was immediately referred to HR, investigated, and upheld. The Respondent stresses that no further disciplinary action could be taken against the alleged perpetrator due to his resignation at the commencement of the investigation.

A central plank of the Respondent’s legal defence is reliance on the statutory defence under section 14A (2) of the Employment Equality Acts, namely that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent harassment and to address complaints. In support of this, the Respondent points to the existence of a dignity at work policy, a grievance procedure contained in the employee handbook, accessibility of policies through an employee portal, induction training covering equality and harassment, and additional training for managers. It also emphasises that multiple reporting avenues were available to employees, including direct contact with HR and a confidential hotline.

The Respondent further submits that, although the Complainant contended, she did not know how to escalate her complaint, the evidence demonstrates that she had previously engaged with HR on other matters and therefore had knowledge of the appropriate channels. It is argued that any failure to utilise those channels in respect of the sexual harassment complaint cannot be attributed to the Respondent.

The Respondent submitted that victimisation requires a causal nexus between a protected act and adverse treatment, and that an employer may avail of a defence where it has taken reasonable steps to prevent and address harassment. In conclusion, the Respondent contends that there was no discriminatory treatment, no victimisation within the meaning of the Acts, and that it responded appropriately once the complaint was identified. It maintains that it has satisfied the statutory defence and that the complaint should therefore be dismissed in its entirety.

Findings and Conclusions

The complaints before me fall to be considered under two distinct headings, namely: (i) sexual harassment, and (ii) victimisation.

I have carefully considered the totality of the oral and documentary evidence, including the evidence of the Complainant, the witness, and the Respondent’s witnesses over both days of hearing, together with the submissions of the parties and the relevant statutory provisions of the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015.

(1)   Sexual Harassment.

Section 14A of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015 (“the Acts”) state:-

Harassment and Sexual Harassment

(1) For the purposes of this Act, where—

(a) an employee (in this section referred to as “the victim”) is harassed or sexually harassed either at a place where the employee is employed (in this section referred to as “the workplace”) or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by a person who is—

(i) employed at that place or by the same employer,

(ii) the victim's employer, or

(iii) a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's employer and the circumstances of the harassment are such that the employer ought reasonably to have taken steps to prevent it, or

(b) without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a)—

(i) such harassment has occurred, and

(ii) either—

the victim is treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment by reason of rejecting or accepting the harassment, or

(II) it could reasonably be anticipated that he or she would be so treated,

the harassment or sexual harassment constitutes discrimination by the victim's employer in relation to the victim's conditions of employment.

If harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable—

(a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and

(b) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies, to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the victim's employment and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred, to reverse its effects.

(2) If harassment or sexual harassment of the victim by a person other than his or her employer would, but for this subsection, be regarded as discrimination by the employer under subsection (1), it is a defence for the employer to prove that the employer took such steps as are reasonably practicable—

(a) in a case where subsection (1)(a) applies (whether or not subsection (1)(b) also applies), to prevent the person from harassing or sexually harassing the victim or any class of persons which includes the victim, and

(b) in a case where subsection (1)(b) applies, to prevent the victim from being treated differently in the workplace or otherwise in the course of the victim's employment and, if and so far as any such treatment has occurred, to reverse its effects.

(3) A person's rejection of, or submission to, harassment or sexual harassment may not be used by an employer as a basis for a decision affecting that person.

(4) The reference in subsection (1)(a)(iii) to a client, customer or other business contact of the victim's employer includes a reference to any other person with whom the employer might reasonably expect the victim to come into contact in the workplace or otherwise in the course of his or her employment.

(5) In this section “employee” includes an individual who is—

(a) seeking or using any service provided by an employment agency, and

(b) participating in any course or facility referred to in paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 12(1),

and accordingly any reference to the individual's employer includes a reference to the employment agency providing the service or, as the case may be, the person offering or providing the course or facility.

(6) Where subsection (5) applies in relation to a victim, subsection (1) shall have effect as if for “in relation to the victim's conditions of employment” there were substituted “contrary to section 11”, or, as the case may be, section 12.

(7) (a) In this section—

(i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds, and

(ii) references to sexual harassment are to any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature,

(b) being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person's dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.

(c) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.

The applicable law is set above, which provides that sexual harassment consists of any form of unwanted conduct of a sexual nature which has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating, or offensive environment.

I accept the Complainant’s evidence that she was subjected to explicit, graphic, and highly inappropriate messages of a sexual nature by a colleague. This evidence was not materially contradicted and was, in substance, borne out by the Respondent’s own processes, which upheld her complaint. I am satisfied that the conduct complained of meets the statutory definition of sexual harassment.

The issue for determination is whether the Respondent can avail of the defence under section 14A (2) of the Acts, namely that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable to prevent the harassment and to address it appropriately. In assessing the Respondent’s defence, I have considered section 14A (2) together with the standards set out in the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 (Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work) Order 2022. The statutory defence requires the Respondent to demonstrate that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable both to prevent the occurrence of harassment and to respond appropriately where it arose.

I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that the Complainant’s complaint came to the attention of the Respondent’s operations manager on 24 March 2025. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the allegations, I am equally satisfied that there was no prompt or effective response. The evidence of the operations manager was marked by a lack of recall of key dates and actions, which I found to be unreliable. I prefer the evidence of the Complainant and her witness, the supervisor Mr B, that the operations manager was aware of the seriousness of the complaint at that time. On the balance of probabilities, no meaningful action was taken for a period of approximately two months and that a formal investigation did not commence until June or July 2025, and as the evidence showed only after the Complainant had submitted her complaint to the WRC.

Such delay is inconsistent with the requirement for immediate and appropriate intervention in cases of alleged sexual harassment. The complaint was not treated with the requisite seriousness at the outset. The evidence indicates that it was initially processed as a general grievance rather than as an allegation of sexual harassment. This mischaracterisation materially contributed to the delay in escalation and investigation.

There was also a failure to implement appropriate interim measures. There was no evidence that the alleged perpetrator was suspended, nor that any effective steps were taken to separate the parties or otherwise protect the Complainant pending investigation. This represents a significant departure from the standards envisaged by the Code of Practice.

In addition, I am not satisfied that the Respondent had in place effective preventative measures. While policies were referenced in evidence, there was insufficient evidence that such policies were clearly communicated or properly understood by staff. The evidence further indicated gaps in training, particularly at non-managerial level, and an absence of clarity as to how complaints of sexual harassment were to be processed. As is well established, the mere existence of a policy is insufficient; it must be effective in practice.

A further and significant factor in my assessment is the contrast between the Respondent’s handling of the Complainant’s complaint and its treatment of allegations made against her. The evidence establishes that a disciplinary process was initiated against the Complainant in or around April 2025 and progressed with relative promptness, albeit resulting in no sanction. In stark contrast, the Complainant’s complaint of sexual harassment, known to management from 24 March 2025, was not addressed with comparable urgency. This disparity demonstrates that the Respondent was capable of acting expeditiously where it chose to do so and underscores its failure to properly recognise and respond to the seriousness of the Complainant’s complaint.

Finally, while the Respondent did ultimately conduct an investigation and uphold the complaint, such post hoc action does not satisfy the statutory defence, which is preventative in nature.

Taking all of these matters together, I find that the Respondent has failed to establish that it took such steps as were reasonably practicable either to prevent the harassment or to respond to it appropriately once it occurred. Accordingly, the Respondent cannot avail of the statutory defence under section 14A (2) of the Acts.

I find  the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of gender regarding sexual harassment contrary to section 14A of the Acts and that the Respondent has failed to establish a defence under section 14A(2).

Redress.

Section 82 of the Acts dels with redress:

82.Redress which may be ordered

(1) Subject to this section, the types of redress for which a decision of the [Director General] under section 79 may provide are such one or more of the following as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case:

(a) an order for compensation in the form of arrears of remuneration (attributable to a failure to provide equal remuneration) in respect of so much of the period of employment as begins not more than 3 years before the date of the referral under section 77(1) which led to the decision;

(b) an order for equal remuneration from the date referred to in paragraph (a);

(c) an order for compensation for the effects of acts of discrimination or victimisation which occurred not earlier than 6 years before the date of the referral of the case under section 77;

(d) an order for equal treatment in whatever respect is relevant to the case;

(e) an order that a person or persons specified in the order take a course of action which is so specified;

(f) an order for re-instatement or re-engagement, with or without an order for compensation…

…(3) The types of redress for which the Circuit Court may provide on a reference under section 77(3) are such one or more of the following as may be appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case:

(a) an order for compensation in the form of arrears of remuneration (attributable to a failure to provide equal remuneration) in respect of so much of the period of employment as begins not more than 6 years before the date of the referral;

(b) an order for equal remuneration from the date of the referral;

(c) the orders referred to in [paragraphs (c) to (f)] of subsection (1);

(d) and no enactment relating to the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court shall be taken to limit the amount of compensation or remuneration which may be ordered by the Circuit Court by virtue of this subsection.

(4) The maximum amount which may be ordered by the [Director General] by way of compensation under subsection (1)(c) or (1)(f) shall be—

(a) in any case where the complainant was in receipt of remuneration at the date of the reference of the case, or if it was earlier, the date of dismissal, an amount equal to the greatest of—

(i) 104 times the amount of that remuneration, determined on a weekly basis,

(ii) 104 times the amount, determined on a weekly basis, which the complainant would have received at that date but for the act of discrimination or victimisation concerned, or

(iii) €40,000.

or

(b) in any other case, €13,000.

(5) Where the case for which the redress is to be provided is referred to the Director General  and arises—

(a) under Part III, or

(b) in any other circumstances (including circumstances amounting to victimisation) to which the Equal Pay Directive or the Equal Treatment Directive is relevant, the Director General may, in addition to making an order for compensation, also order the payment of interest, at the rate which is applicable under section 22(1) of the Courts Act 1981—

(i) in respect of the whole or any part of the amount of the compensation, and

(ii) in respect of the period beginning on the relevant date and ending on the date of the payment,

and, for the purposes of subparagraph (ii), “the relevant date” means the first day of the period (if any) to which the compensation is expressed to be referable or, if there is no such period, the date of the reference under section 77(1).

(6) (a) The maximum amount of compensation specified in subsection (4) applies notwithstanding that conduct the subject of the investigation by the [Director General] constituted—

(i) discrimination on more than one of the discriminatory grounds, or

(ii) both discrimination on one or more than one of such grounds and harassment or sexual harassment.

(b) In paragraph (a) “discrimination” does not include non-compliance with an equal remuneration term.

(7) An order for compensation under this section may not be made in favour of the [Commission] in a case referred by it to the [Director General] under section 85(1).

(8) Where an act constitutes victimisation under both this Act and the Equal Status Act 2000, redress may be provided under only one of them.

(9) Where a delay in referring a case under this Act to the [Director General] or Circuit Court is attributable to the respondent's having misrepresented to the complainant the fact of the case, references in this section to the date of referral shall be construed as references to the date of the misrepresentation.

Having found that the complaint of sexual harassment was well-founded under the Employment Equality Acts 1998–2015, I must now consider the appropriate form of redress.

In accordance with section 82 of the Acts, redress may include compensation for the effects of discrimination. Such compensation is not in the nature of remuneration but is intended to provide recompense for the effects of the discriminatory treatment, including distress, humiliation, and the impact on the Complainant’s dignity.

In assessing the appropriate level of compensation, I have had regard to the following factors:

Firstly, the nature of the conduct. The Complainant was subjected to inappropriate communications of a sexual nature in the workplace of very graphic texts and acknowledged by the Respondent as very serious. While the conduct did not involve physical contact, it nevertheless falls well within the scope of sexual harassment as defined by the Acts. As has been recognised in Labour Court jurisprudence, even non-physical conduct can have a serious and damaging effect on an employee’s dignity and working environment.

Secondly, the impact on the Complainant. I accept the Complainant’s evidence that she experienced distress and anxiety as a result of the conduct. Her evidence that she felt fearful of reporting the behaviour and concerned about the consequences for her employment is consistent with the type of impact recognised in the authorities. She gave evidence that she was the only woman working in a male-dominated area of the Respondent’s operations. The explicit and graphic nature of the messages she received reflects a deeply toxic working environment, one that was degrading and harmful to her as a woman.

Thirdly, and significantly, the Respondent’s handling of the complaint. I have found that there was a substantial delay in responding to a serious complaint, that the matter was not treated with appropriate urgency, and that no effective interim measures were put in place. This prolonged the period during which the Complainant was exposed to an uncertain and distressing situation. The Respondent’s failure to properly implement its procedures and to respond in a timely and effective manner is an aggravating factor in the assessment of redress.

Fourthly, I have had regard to the disparity in the Respondent’s treatment of the Complainant’s complaint as compared to the speed with which it progressed allegations against her. While I have not found victimisation, this disparity is relevant to the overall assessment of the Respondent’s response and its impact on the Complainant.

In determining the appropriate quantum, I have also considered recent Labour Court decisions, which emphasise that awards in cases of sexual harassment must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive, and must reflect the seriousness of the infringement. In particular, I note that the Labour Court has increased awards where the employer’s response was inadequate or where the harassment had a significant impact on the employee.

Having regard to all of the circumstances of this case, including the nature of the conduct, the impact on the Complainant, and the deficiencies in the Respondent’s response, I consider that this case falls within the mid to upper range of seriousness for non-physical sexual harassment. The Complainant’s decision to report the conduct, in circumstances where she was the only woman in a male-dominated environment, required considerable personal courage. Her evidence demonstrates a resilience in the face of a workplace culture that she reasonably perceived as hostile.

Having found that the Complainant was subjected to sexual harassment contrary to section 14A of the Employment Equality Acts and that the Respondent has failed to establish a defence under section 14A (2), I am required to consider appropriate redress.

In accordance with section 82 of the Acts, I award the Complainant compensation for the effects of the discrimination. I consider an award of €20,000 to be just and equitable in all the circumstances.

In addition to financial redress, I consider it appropriate to direct the Respondent to take specific measures to ensure future compliance with its obligations under the Acts and in line with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 (Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work) Order 2022 (S.I. no 106 of 2022).

Accordingly, I direct that the Respondent shall, within a period of six months from the date of this decision:

1.      Conduct a comprehensive review of its Dignity at Work, grievance, and anti-harassment policies to ensure that they are fully compliant with the Code of Practice and clearly set out procedures for addressing complaints of sexual harassment.

2.      Ensure that such policies are clearly communicated to all employees and are readily accessible. 3

3.      Provide appropriate and effective training to all employees, including non-managerial staff, on the content of these policies, the standards of behaviour expected in the workplace, and specifically) the procedures for making and handling complaints of harassment and sexual harassment.

These measures are necessary to ensure that the Respondent takes such steps as are reasonably practicable to prevent harassment and to respond appropriately to complaints in the future.

Victimisation

Victimisation is defined in broad under section 74(2) of the Acts where it provides:

 (2) For the purposes of this Part victimisation occurs where dismissal or other adverse treatment of an employee by his or her employer occurs as a reaction to—

(a) a complaint of discrimination made by the employee to the employer,

(b) any proceedings by a complainant,

(c)  an employee having represented or otherwise supported a complainant,

(d) the work of an employee having been compared with that of another employee for any of the purposes of this Act or any enactment repealed by this Act,

(e) an employee having been a witness in any proceedings under this Act or the Equal Status Act 2000 or any such repealed enactment,

(f) an employee having opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act or the said Act of 2000 or which was unlawful under any such repealed enactment, or

(g) an employee having given notice of an intention to take any of the actions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs.”

Section 74(2) provides that victimisation occurs where an employee is subjected to adverse treatment as a reaction to having taken a protected act.

I am satisfied that the Complainant engaged in a protected act by making a complaint of harassment. However, I am not satisfied that she has established that she was subjected to adverse treatment as a reaction to that complaint. While the Complainant contends that she experienced reduced hours, changes in duties, and unfavourable treatment following her complaint, the evidence in this regard was not sufficiently cogent to establish a causal link. The evidence of the Respondent witness was that rostering decisions were made centrally, and there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that any alleged detriment was connected to the protected act rather than to operational factors. Furthermore, these issues pre-dated her sexual harassment claim. Furthermore, a disciplinary process involving the Complainant, which was found to be without merit, was initiated on 4 March 2025 which was a number of weeks before her harassment complaint. Applying the statutory test, I find that the Complainant has not established the necessary causal nexus between her protected act and any adverse treatment.

Taking the above into account, I find the Complainant did not establish a prima facie case of victimisation.

(1)   For the reasons outlined above I find that the Complainant was discriminated against on the grounds of gender regarding sexual harassment contrary to section 14A of the Acts and that the Respondent has failed to establish a defence under section 14A (2).

(2)    I find she did not establish a prima facie case of victimisation.

In accordance with section 82 of the Acts, I award the Complainant compensation for the effects of the discrimination. Having regard to the nature, seriousness and duration of the treatment, and the impact on the Complainant, I consider an award of €20,000 to be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. This award is made in respect of the infringement of the Complainant’s statutory rights and is not subject to tax.

In addition to financial redress, I consider it appropriate to direct the Respondent to take specific measures to ensure future compliance with its obligations under the Acts and in line with the Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission Act 2014 (Code of Practice on Sexual Harassment and Harassment at Work) Order 2022 (S.I. no 106 of 2022)

Accordingly, I direct that the Respondent shall, within a period of six months from the date of this decision:

1.      Conduct a comprehensive review of its Dignity at Work, grievance, and anti-harassment policies to ensure that they are fully compliant with the Code of Practice and clearly set out procedures for addressing complaints of sexual harassment.

2.      Ensure that such policies are clearly communicated to all employees and are readily accessible.

3.       Provide appropriate and effective training to all employees, including non-managerial staff, on the content of these policies, the standards of behaviour expected in the workplace, and specifically) the procedures for making and handling complaints of harassment and sexual harassment.

These measures are necessary to ensure that the Respondent takes such steps as are reasonably practicable to prevent harassment and to respond appropriately to complaints in the future.

Employment Equality Acts 1998-2015. Sexual Harassment. Victimisation.