Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Shulammite  Awotundun

Brendan Vacations Ireland, Ltd

Representatives

N/A

Andrea Montanelli Peninsula Business Services Ireland

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071752-001

21/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071752-002

21/05/2025

The Complainant commenced employment as a Celtic Travel Specialist with the Respondent on 27 March 2023. She stated that her dismissal on 24 December 2024 was not the result of a genuine redundancy, as the work did not cease but continued to be performed by others, and she herself was already part of the US team to which the work was said to transfer. She asserted that she was the sole individual selected, that consultation was not meaningful, and that reasonable alternatives were not properly explored. In particular, she stated that a suitable role at the same level and requiring a largely similar skillset existed and that she was unfairly passed over in favour of an external candidate following an interview process.

The Complainant highlighted that the Respondent stated in the redundancy notice that her role was being made redundant due to a “significant decrease in web enquiries” and that the associated work would be absorbed by the US‑based team. She disputed this explanation and stated that her role was not genuinely redundant due to any alleged decrease in web enquiries. She asserted that fluctuations in enquiry volumes were a normal and long‑established feature of the role and that during quieter periods she was routinely assigned project‑based work. She stated that the work did not cease to exist and that what occurred in reality was that the work was taken away from her rather than eliminated, particularly as she herself was already working as part of the US team.

From a procedural perspective, the Complainant stated that she was the sole individual selected for redundancy. No redundancy pool was applied, no objective selection criteria were identified, and no comparative assessment was carried out. Other employees performing the same or similar work were not considered. She asserted that she was effectively selected because of her location in Ireland, even though the work continued to be performed by others in the same team, which she stated was neither fair nor objective.

The Complainant further stated that consultation was not meaningful. Although meetings took place, she asserted that there was no genuine engagement with alternatives to redundancy. In particular, she stated that the Respondent failed to meaningfully consider her continuing to work remotely, despite the fact that she had already been doing so prior to the redundancy process and without issue.

A central aspect of her case concerned redeployment. During the consultation period, a vacancy arose for an Operations Co‑ordinator role. The Complainant was interviewed for this position but was subsequently informed that the role had been offered to an external candidate. The Complainant asserted that this role was suitable, operated at the same level as her own position, and required a largely similar skillset to that which she already possessed and had demonstrated in her employment.

She further stated that the Respondent relied unfairly on interview performance to justify appointing an external candidate while making her redundant. In her view, this amounted to a competitive selection exercise rather than a genuine redundancy process, particularly given the overlap between the roles.

The Complainant stated that the appeal was to be made to the same senior manager who was responsible for the redundancy decision itself, and that there was no indication that an appeal would be heard by an independent or impartial person. In those circumstances, she asserted that the absence of an appeal should not be held against her.

The Respondent stated that the Complainant was not unfairly dismissed, but rather that her employment ended as a result of a genuine redundancy, arising from organisational and operational restructuring within the business.

The Respondent stated that a business case for reorganisation was prepared and approved on 27 September 2024, well in advance of the Complainant’s dismissal, and that the redundancy decision was based on operational requirements rather than any personal characteristic, conduct, or performance of the Complainant. They emphasised that the redundancy process was not triggered by, nor connected to, the Complainant’s disclosure of personal or health‑related matters in October 2024. Indeed, the Respondent asserted that the formal commencement of the redundancy process was actually deferred to allow sensitivity around those disclosures.

The Respondent stated that fair procedures were followed, including consultation with the Complainant, explanation of the business rationale for the redundancy, and consideration of alternatives. It was asserted that the Complainant was fully informed of the reasons her role was being made redundant and was given the opportunity to engage with the process.

In relation to redeployment, the Respondent stated that the Complainant was appropriately considered for alternative roles, particularly the Operations Coordinator position. However, they asserted that this role was not interchangeable with the Complainant’s existing role and that another candidate was selected based on objectively assessed criteria, including experience in conflict resolution.

The Respondent further stated that no other suitable alternative roles were available within the organisation that could reasonably have been offered to the Complainant, having regard to operational requirements and role specifications.

It was also highlighted that the Complainant did not appeal the redundancy decision, notwithstanding that an internal appeal mechanism was available.

Section 6 of the Unfair Dismissal Act states inter alia

 (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.…

(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, if an employee was dismissed due to redundancy but the circumstances constituting the redundancy applied equally to one or more other employees in similar employment with the same employer who have not been dismissed, and either—

(a) the selection of that employee for dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (2) of this section or another matter that would not be a ground justifying dismissal, or

(b) he was selected for dismissal in contravention of a procedure (being a procedure that has been agreed upon by or on behalf of the employer and by the employee or a trade union, or an excepted body under the Trade Union Acts 1941 and 1971 as amended by the Industrial Relations Act 1990, representing him or has been established by the custom and practice of the employment concerned) relating to redundancy and there were no special reasons justifying a departure from that procedure, then the dismissal shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal.

(4) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

…

(c) the redundancy of the employee,  

(6) In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from one or more of the matters specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.

(7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had, if the adjudication officer or the Labour Court, as the case may be, considers it appropriate to do so—

(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal, and

(b) to the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in section 14(1) of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice referred to in paragraph (d) (inserted by the Unfair Dismissals (Amendment) Act 1993) of section 7(2) of this Act.”

Section 7 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967, as amended, states:

“(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to—

(a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or

(b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or

(c) the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or

(d) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or

(e) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained.”

Findings:

It is well established that, in a redundancy context, the function of the Adjudication Officer is not to second‑guess an employer's commercial decisions, but rather to examine whether the redundancy relied upon was genuine and whether the process adopted was fair and reasonable in the circumstances. The burden rests with the employer to demonstrate that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from redundancy and that it was implemented in accordance with fair procedures.

Before examining the selection process, I must firstly consider whether the redundancy itself was genuine. In seeking to establish that it was, the Respondent relied on a business case prepared in September 2024 by a Senior Business Systems Manager, who inexplicably did not give evidence at the hearing. The business case highlighted that web enquiry numbers stood at 235 in March 2023 and had fallen to 90 by August 2024. The comparison drawn from those figures is, in my view, simply bizarre. Any person with even a basic knowledge of the travel industry would be aware that enquiry volumes in March — at the height of the holiday booking season — would be significantly higher than those recorded in August, when the peak booking period has passed. To present that seasonal differential as evidence of a sustained decline in business demand, without any seasonal adjustment, does not constitute a credible basis upon which to ground a redundancy decision.

I also note that the business case highlighted that one option available to the Respondent was to require the Complainant to amend her working hours to align with the west coast of the United States, which operates eight hours behind Ireland. The document stated that this would mean a change from hours of 10am–6pm to 2am–10am, and acknowledged that this "would be a big change and disruption to daily routine and could negatively impact the health and wellbeing of the employee." The Respondent therefore appears to have concluded that they knew better than the Complainant what was in her best interests and proceeded to make that determination on her behalf — without ever raising the matter with her at any stage during the process. It is not difficult to imagine that an employee facing the permanent loss of her livelihood might well have preferred the disruption of amended working hours to the prospect of no employment at all.

Considering all of the foregoing, I am not satisfied that the redundancy was genuine.

In next examining the selection process and consultation procedure, I note that the Complainant was the sole individual selected for redundancy. No objective selection criteria, matrix, or comparative assessment was applied. Employees within the US‑based team who were performing the same or similar functions were excluded entirely from any selection pool and were not considered for redundancy. The Respondent's evidence was that the determining factor in selecting the Complainant, as opposed to anyone else, was her location in Ireland. I find however that location alone, in circumstances where the work continued to be performed by others within the same team, does not constitute a fair or objective basis for selection.

The Respondent further asserted that the Complainant could not continue to perform her role remotely because she would have difficulty accessing the Respondent's phone systems outside the United States. However, no technical or expert evidence was produced to explain the alleged phone systems restriction. The Operations Director's evidence was that she had been informed of this position by others. I find that this evidence is hearsay and of limited probative value.

Consultation is a fundamental component of a fair redundancy process. While meetings did take place, consultation must be meaningful and must involve the genuine consideration of alternatives to redundancy. In the instant case, there were only two meetings with the Complainant and there was no evidence that the Respondent explored with her the possibility of relocation to the United States.

I have also considered the Respondent's approach to redeployment and noted that the Complainant was interviewed for this position of Operations Co‑ordinator during the consultation period. In fairness to the Respondent, I accept that the role was in a different team from the role ultimately made redundant. This was not a case where the Respondent abolished a role and immediately recreated it under the same title or reporting line. However, the issue is whether, in substance, the roles were sufficiently distinct so as to justify the redundancy of the Complainant while an external appointment was made. While the Respondent contended that the roles were different, I am of the view that the skillset required, the level at which the role operated, and the competencies assessed were largely the same as those already used by the Complainant. Both roles operated at a comparable grade, involved similar levels of responsibility, and required skills in customer service and operational delivery. Even if it were accepted that the Complainant did not possess every competency for the new role—which, the Respondent asserted, related largely to an alleged lack of conflict‑resolution skills—this deficiency was not treated in a proportionate or reasonable manner. While conflict‑resolution skills were described as seemingly vital to the Operations Co-ordinator position during the hearing, they were notably absent from the job description for the role. Moreover, no consideration was given to providing training or development to address any skills the Respondent claimed the Complainant lacked.

I also noted that the Respondent placed significant reliance on the outcome of an interview process to justify the decision not to appoint the Complainant. While interviews are a legitimate recruitment tool, their probative value is limited when relied upon to justify redundancy, particularly where an existing employee is being displaced from employment. Where a role at a similar level, requiring a largely transferable skillset, continues to exist within the organisation, the Respondent must demonstrate with clarity why that role did not represent a reasonable alternative to redundancy. An interview is, by its nature, a snapshot in time, reflecting performance in a relatively artificial setting rather than sustained competence in the workplace. Where an employee has already demonstrated the capacity to operate at the required level and possesses virtually all of the competencies for the role, reliance on interview performance alone is a relatively weak basis for asserting that redundancy was unavoidable.

The Respondent also relied on the fact that the Complainant did not appeal the redundancy decision. While I accept that no appeal was lodged, I note that the Operations Director, who had been centrally involved in the redundancy decision itself, accepted in evidence that a reasonable person would understand from the redundancy notification that any appeal would be heard by her, and there was no indication that any appeal would be heard by an independent or impartial person. In those circumstances, I attach limited weight to the absence of an appeal.

Having considered all of the foregoing, I am not satisfied either that the Respondent has established that the redundancy was genuine, that the selection process was fair, or that reasonable alternatives to dismissal were properly explored. Accordingly, I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed.

CA-00071752-001:

I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed for the reasons set out above.

Section 7 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, in relevant part, states that:

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14,

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

3) In this section—

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

The Remedy

In deciding on a suitable remedy, I must firstly consider reinstating or re-engaging the Complainant.

In making this decision, I have regard to the findings of the Supreme Court in An Bord Banistiochta, Gaelscoil Moshiolog v The Labour Court, where it was stated that “the remedy of reinstatement is exceptional in nature,involving as it does the imposition of a contractual relationship which is not only personal, but involves a high level of mutual trust and confidence, on an unwilling party…. It is wrong to view reinstatement simply as punishment for wrongdoing on the part of the employer”

Considering the foregoing, I am satisfied, based on the evidence presented to me, that the trust and confidence required for the resumption of an employment relationship no longer exists.  Accordingly, I have decided to make an award of compensation and note that the maximum award permissible under the Act is €72,100, namely 104 weeks’ pay.

The “Financial Loss” Attributable to The Dismissal

In calculating the “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal, I note that Charleton J in Panisi, in assessing loss, stated as follows: 

My task is to assess the financial damage which the dismissal has brought about and then to place the measure of that damage against the maximum amount of compensation that is available. In the event that the compensation that is available, amounting to 104 weeks remuneration, is less than that sum, then that is the measure of damages. Where the quantum of damage is more, then the jurisdiction is limited to that maximum and the amount of damages must thus be reduced to that maximum sum. Where the measure of damages on dismissal is more than the maximum but contributory fault is found in respect of the dismissal against the employee, the reduction is on the totality of those damages, and not on the maximum award. If the result is to reduce compensation within the maximum award, that sum is appropriate. Where the reduction in total damages for contributory fault puts the damages above the maximum award, then the maximum award is the correct measure of compensation for unfair dismissal.

In assessing the Complainant’s overall financial loss in this case, I note that she was dismissed on 24 December 2024 and secured alternative employment commencing on 7 April 2025. This results in an actual loss of earnings of €10,173 for the period between the date of dismissal and the commencement of her new employment.

I further note that the Complainant earned approximately €2,000 in that new role during the period from 7 April 2025 to 1 May 2025.

Following the termination of that employment, the Complainant sustained an ongoing loss of €32,395 for the period from 2 May 2025 to 27 March 2026, the second day of the WRC hearing of the matter.

Having regard to prevailing labour‑market conditions, and recognising that the Irish jobs market remains relatively buoyant, I also allow a prospective loss equivalent to a further 12 weeks’ earnings, calculated at the same weekly rate, amounting to €8,319.

The combined wage loss—actual and prospective—therefore amounts to €48,887.

Calculation of award

As set out above, I have found that the Complainant’s overall “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal is €48,887. I must now examine if there is any basis for a “reduction .. on the totality of those damages” as set out by Charleton J in Panisi.

Before turning to mitigation, it is necessary to address certain conduct by the Respondent following the dismissal, which bears directly on the assessment of financial loss under section 7(2)(a) of the Act. That provision requires that, in calculating compensation, regard be had to the extent to which the Complainant's financial loss is attributable to an act, omission or conduct on the part of the employer. As I have set out below, the Respondent's handling of a post-dismissal reference request was a causative factor in the termination of the Complainant's subsequent employment and therefore falls squarely within the scope of that provision.

Mitigation

Following her dismissal on 24 December 2024, the Complainant received an offer of alternative employment in late February 2025. Prior to commencing that role on 7 April 2025, she provided the names of two referees from her former employer, the Respondent. Notably, the reference‑checking process had not been completed by the new employer before the Complainant began her new position.

On 24 March 2025, the Complainant’s new employer contacted the two nominated referees from the Respondent and requested that they complete a brief questionnaire concerning the Complainant’s employment with the Respondent. Neither referee provided any response to that request. Instead, on 27 March 2025, the Respondent’s Director of Operations replied by email on behalf of the Respondent. That response was confined to issuing a statement of service as well as confirming the reason for the Complainant’s departure and the requested questionnaire was not completed nor was any explanation provided for its non-completion.

At the outset, I wish to make it clear that I take no issue whatsoever with the Respondent choosing to limit its reference to a statement of service and a reason for departure. Many employers adopt such an approach for the sake of consistency, and it is entirely legitimate to do so. Indeed, the Director of Operations confirmed at the hearing that this had long been the Respondent’s established policy.

Before proceeding further, however, I wish to explain why I am consciously placing emphasis on the Respondent’s failure to communicate that policy clearly to the Complainant’s new employer in circumstances where the new employer had looked for a questionnaire to be completed and the Respondent failed to explain why they did not do so. This is because, in determining the appropriate level of compensation, I am required to consider whether and to what extent the Complainant’s ongoing financial loss is attributable to an act, omission, or conduct on the part of the employer, as outlined above.

I should highlight at this juncture that I am also mindful that decisions of this nature are often widely read and, on occasion, selectively reported. For the avoidance of any doubt, my concern in this case does not arise from the Respondent’s limited reference policy itself, which, as I have already stated, was entirely legitimate. I cannot emphasise that point enough.

Rather, my difficulty lies in the Respondent’s failure to communicate that position clearly and in a timely manner to the Complainant’s new employer on three separate occasions:

·       at the outset, when the questionnaire was first received on 24 March 2025 by the Complainant’s two nominated referees;

·       in the email from the Operations Director of 27 March 2025, which enclosed the statement of service; and

·       subsequently, when the new employer expressly requested on 3 April 2025 that the questionnaire be completed.

The omission of any such explanation—when coupled with the refusal to complete the questionnaire or respond to the 3 April 2025 query—would reasonably, and foreseeably in my view, have caused uncertainty and concern for the Complainant’s prospective employer. In those circumstances, the new employer was reasonably entitled to draw adverse inferences from the Respondent’s silence and lack of engagement.

I also note that no explanation whatsoever was provided in the email of 27 March 2025 as to why the Director of Operations was responding in place of the two nominated referees. That unexplained substitution, in addition to the incomplete and non‑responsive reference process, would reasonably and understandably have compounded the concerns of the Complainant’s new employer.

For the avoidance of doubt, I make no findings and express no opinion on the conduct or decision‑making of the Complainant’s new employer, as that does not fall for determination in this complaint. My analysis is confined solely to the acts and omissions of the Respondent.

The Complainant commenced employment with the new employer on 7 April 2025 in the belief—entirely reasonably in my view—that all necessary pre‑employment checks, including references, had concluded. It was not until 28 April 2025 that she was informed that the reference checks had not, in fact, been completed satisfactorily. Upon being made aware of this, she acted promptly and responsibly and wrote to the Director of Operations on 29 April 2025 requesting that the reference be finalised. While I note that she did not explicitly spell out the urgency of the request or state that her employment was at risk, that omission does not absolve the Respondent of the expectation to reply within a reasonable timeframe, particularly where the foreseeable consequences of continued silence should have been obvious. Inexplicably, no response issued to the Complainant’s email of 29 April 2025, and her employment was subsequently terminated on 1 May 2025 on the grounds of unsatisfactory reference checks.

Given the absence of any response, the Complainant again contacted the Director of Operations on 7 May 2025, seeking an explanation and asking whether any issue arose in respect of her conduct or performance during her employment with the Respondent because she was at this stage very concerned about what the Respondent’s view of her was. The completed questionnaire was ultimately provided on 9 May 2025, more than six weeks after the initial request and, crucially, only after the Complainant had already lost her job.

While insignificant in terms of my overall findings, it is also striking—and particularly disappointing in my view—that when the Complainant informed the Respondent on 12 May 2025 of the adverse impact that the Respondent’s delayed and deficient handling of the reference process had had on her employment, the Director of Operations neither acknowledged any responsibility, nor offered an apology, nor made any effort to explore whether anything might be done to mitigate the consequences of that delay, even at that very late stage. Instead, in a reply sent some 8 hours and 14 minutes later, the Director of Operations stated simply: “It’s disappointing to hear that. I really wish they had followed up with me again.” That response demonstrates an incredible lack of insight into the Respondent’s own role in the sequence of events that had unfolded.

Having considered all of the foregoing, I am satisfied that the Complainant acted reasonably and in good faith throughout the reference process. By contrast, the Respondent—while, as I have repeatedly emphasised, was entirely entitled to maintain a limited reference policy—failed to reasonably anticipate the foreseeable consequences of its inaction and their refusal to explain their reference policy to the Complainant’s new employer.

In assessing whether the financial loss which followed remains attributable to the dismissal, I note that the dismissal itself placed the Complainant in a position where she was dependent on references in order to secure and retain alternative employment. As I have found that the Respondent's conduct in relation to that reference process effectively prevented the Complainant from exiting the loss position in which she had been placed by the dismissal, I am satisfied, having regard to section 7(2)(a) of the Act, that those acts and omissions were not merely incidental but constituted a causative factor in her ongoing financial loss following the termination of her new employment on 1 May 2025. It would not therefore be appropriate to treat the assessment of financial loss as concluding on 7 April 2025, the date on which the Complainant commenced that employment, as would otherwise be the case.

I must also recognise, however, that while the loss of her new role was attributable to the conduct of the Respondent the Complainant was under a continuing obligation to mitigate her losses following the termination of her subsequent employment on 1 May 2025. In assessing whether she did so, I note that she furnished extensive documentation at the WRC hearing in support of her contention that she was actively seeking alternative employment since 1 May 2025.

While I accept that significant documentation was produced in respect of job applications made, there was limited corroborative evidence of engagement by prospective employers, such as rejection correspondence, requests for further information, or progression beyond the initial application stage. This, in turn, led me to question whether the breadth and nature of the roles applied for were appropriate, having regard to the Complainant’s experience and seniority.

Accordingly, while I am satisfied that the Complainant did make efforts to mitigate her loss, I apply a mitigation deduction of 25% to the financial loss in the period between 1 May 2025 and 27 March 2026. I make no deduction for lack of mitigation to the financial loss in the period between 24 December 2024 and 7 April 2025 given that I find it reasonable to allow the Complainant approximately three months to find and start in a new role.

Considering all of the foregoing, I make an award of compensation of €40,789 and direct that the Respondent make a payment to the Complainant in this amount in respect of the unfair dismissal. This figure reflects: (i) the dismissal being substantively and procedurally unfair; (ii) the absence of any contribution by the Complainant to the dismissal; (iii) her loss of earnings in the period from 24 December 2024 to 7 April 2025 (iv) her earnings with her new employer in the period from 7 April 2025 – 1 May 2025 (v) the conduct by the Respondent in relation to the provision of a reference to her new employer in March – April 2025 (vi) the Complainant’s loss of earnings in the period from 1 May 2025 to 27 March 2026 and a reduction for insufficient mitigation in respect of same. (vi) An amount in respect of her prospective loss.

CA-00071752-002:

This complaint was withdrawn.