Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Jacki  Detlof-Wismer

LS Professional Placements  Ltd

Representatives

Self-Represented

Richard Schumann

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071422-001

08/05/2025

The Complainant gave evidence on Affirmation.

Richard Schumann, Director, gave evidence on behalf of the Respondent on Affirmation.  

Submissions and documentary evidence were opened at hearing.

The parties availed of the opportunity cross examine.

The Complainant submitted that she was employed by the Respondent as an Accounts Manager from 1 April 2024 until her date of dismissal on 29 April 2025 . She was paid €1,500 per month gross.

 It was her evidence that, on 29 April 2025, she received a telephone call from Mr. Richard Schuman informing her that her employment was terminated with immediate effect.

The Complainant submitted that no clear or substantive reason for the dismissal was provided to her, other than a general statement that the Respondent was experiencing financial difficulties.

 It was her evidence that she had received no prior warning, had not been subject to any disciplinary or redundancy process, and was afforded no opportunity to respond or engage in any consultation prior to the termination of her employment.

The Complainant further submitted that, despite multiple requests by email and telephone, she had not received any written confirmation or documentation relating to her dismissal.

It was her evidence that the manner of her dismissal caused her significant financial and emotional distress, leaving her without income and without the documentation necessary to access supports or entitlements.

The Complainant submitted that her dismissal was affected without fair procedures

Upon inquiry, the Complainant submitted that, although she was informed by telephone on 28/29 April 2025 that her employment was being terminated, she did not receive written confirmation of her dismissal until 28 May 2025.

It was her evidence that, during the period between the telephone call and receipt of the termination letter, she continued to carry out work duties, in particular maintaining contact with candidates and progressing ongoing matters. She stated that much of this work was conducted via her personal mobile phone as part of her candidate care role.

The Complainant further submitted that her termination letter recorded a final working date of 28 May 2025, which she contended did not reflect the reality of the situation and added to the uncertainty surrounding her employment status during this period. She did accept that she continued working beyond the 8 May 2025.

The Respondent submitted that the business was experiencing severe financial difficulties in the period leading up to April 2025, including significant debt, cashflow issues, and an inability to meet payroll obligations. It was the Respondent’s evidence that a restructuring process had been undertaken from March 2025, during which all roles were reviewed and a number of positions were identified as redundant.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant’s role was among those deemed redundant as part of this process. It was his evidence that the decision arose from the financial position of the company and the need to reduce costs in order to sustain the business.

The Respondent further submitted that the Complainant was aware that redundancies were being considered within the organisation. He maintained that the company’s financial position necessitated urgent action, and that the termination of the Complainant’s employment was a consequence of those financial constraints.

The first issue to be determined is whether jurisdiction arises in respect of this complaint of unfair dismissal. The complaint was submitted by the Complainant via the online form and received by the Workplace Relations Commission on 8 May 2025, which predates the effective date of dismissal of 28 May 2025, as set out in the termination letter furnished in evidence.

Section 8(2) of the Unfair Dismissals Acts provides as follows:

“A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015) to the Director General—

(a)   within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal,…”

The High Court in Brady v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2015] 26 ELR 1 considered the issue of whether a claim had been submitted prematurely to the Employment Appeals Tribunal. In that case, the employee was dismissed on grounds of redundancy on 16 December 2011, and he lodged his claim on 23 December 2011. The Respondent argued that this was premature, as the statutory notice period meant that the effective date of dismissal was 30 December 2011. In concluding that the claim was not lodged prematurely, given that it was submitted during a notice period when the termination of employment was imminent, Barrett J. placed emphasis on a number of key factors:

“8. A number of issues come into play at this point. The first is that prescribed time periods are typically intended to thwart the tardy, not punish the prompt. The second, is the longstanding principle of equity, good since at least the time of Smith v. Clay (1761) 3 Bro CC 639n, that “Equity aids the vigilant, not the indolent”. The third is the practical issue of whether a person, here the Employment Appeals Tribunal, can be said not to have received notice within a prescribed period, if it had notice immediately prior to, at the commencement of, and throughout that period. It seems to the court that in the particular circumstances of this case it would be absurd to hold that where the Employment Appeals Tribunal had notice of the claim at the commencement of, and throughout, the six-month period, that Mr. Brady should be denied to opportunity to bring his claim because the Tribunal, through no fault of Mr. Brady, may also have had notice of the claim immediately prior to the applicable six-month period.”

“ Moreover, the court considers that in reaching this conclusion no violence is done to the language of the Act. Section 8(2) requires that notice be given within the period of six months from the date of dismissal. It appears to the court that in the circumstances of this case, giving notice to the Tribunal on one date such that it has notice on another date, is within the scope of the legislation.”

He continued at paragraph 9:

“Of course there will be some boundary in time and some circumstances in which an ostensibly premature notice will be found in fact to have been premature and thus not duly lodged within the appropriate time period for the purposes of s.8(2).”

In Neeson v O’Rourke and O’Rourke Chartered Accountants UD2049/2011, the EAT held that the intention of Section 8(2) of the Act “demonstrate[d] a manifest intention by the legislature to preclude claims being lodged before the dismissal date”. 

The Tribunal found that the wording of Section 8(2) “demonstrates a manifest intention by the legislature to preclude claims being lodged before the dismissal date.”  The Tribunal also went on to state, “if the Tribunal were to look with leniency on premature claims the system could well become clogged up with claims based on the expectation that a dismissal might occur sometime in the future which could later be withdrawn.”

Applying the caselaw to the circumstances of this complaint, it is noted that the Complainant submitted her complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission on 8 May 2025 but in her evidence she continued in her employment the Respondent until 28 May 2025 .

For this reason, I decline jurisdiction in this complaint.

For the reasons outlined above, I find the complaint was not unfairly dismissed.