ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00057691

Parties:

Complaint:

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  14/11/2025 & 03/02/2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Michael McEntee

Procedure:

In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act & Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.

In deference to the Supreme Court ruling, Zalewski v Ireland and the WRC [2021] IESC 24 on the 6th of April 2021 the Parties were informed in advance that the Hearing would normally be in Public, Testimony under Oath or Affirmation would be required and full cross examination of all witnesses would be provided for.

The required Oath / Affirmation was administered to all witnesses present. The legal peril of committing Perjury was explained to all parties.

No issue regarding confidentiality arose.

Background:

Opening Legal Issue – Time Limits

Respondent arguments

The Respondent via Mr Wilkinson BL argued that the complaint had been submitted to the WRC on the 11th of March 2025. The date of the ending of employment / dismissal as confirmed in numerous pieces of Inter party correspondence was the 11th of March 2024.

Referring to Section 41 (6) (6 months) and (8) (Extension to 12 months) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 the Complaint was completely out of time under Sub-Section 6 and out of time by a day under Sub-Section 8. Accordingly, the WRC had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

Extensive case law precedents were cited in support. These were very usefully summarised in Adj-00046177 Egan v Tallaght University Hospital

Complainant arguments

The Complainant argued that the 6-month deadline had not been observed as he had been in active communication with the Respondent and had felt, at the time, that any outside reference ,such as the WRC, would not be required.

As regards the 12-month deadline he submitted copy correspondence that indicated that a date of the 15th March was the appropriate end date as it was the date on which his contractual notice of four weeks expired. This date would bring his complaint within the 12-month rule.

Adjudicator viewpoint and conclusion.

There are two relevant dates in this argument, Section 41 (6) – the six-month time limit for an initial referring of a complaint and Section 41(8) the additional 6 months to seek an extension for “reasonable cause”

Sub Section 8 is quoted below.

(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause

The landmark Legal precedent in these types of case is the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska V Carroll (DWT0338) where the Court held that

It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

In O’Donnell v. Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] 1 ILRM 301 at 315 Costello J in the High Court construed the term “good reasons” as follows:

 “The phrase ‘good reasons’ is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under O. 84 r. 21 is on the plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay. There may be cases, for example where third parties had acquired rights under an administrative decision which is later challenged in a delayed action. Although the aggrieved plaintiff may be able to establish a reasonable explanation for the delay the court might well conclude that this explanation did not afford a good reason for extending the time because to do so would interfere unfairly with the acquired rights (State (Cussen) v Brennan [1981] IR 181).”

The test is an objective one and the onus is on the Complainant to identify the reasons for the delay and to establish that the reasons relied upon can both explain and excuse the delay which satisfies the test of “reasonable cause”.

In this case, having listened to both the Oral Testimony and carefully read the Written submissions the Adjudicator could not find sufficient evidential grounds to grant the “Reasonable Cause” extension-Section 41(8) as quoted above.

The Labour Court has consistently observed that a delay of a few days or even a week or two might be acceptable for a variety of bona fide reasons, but a delay of a full six months requires exceptional cause. The Adjudicator could not find such cause in the evidence.

In addition, the very contested evidence of the date of the 11th or the 15th March 2024 was not helpful to the Complainant’s cause. It appeared that the 11th was the date agreed upon in correspondence.  Such date, the 11th, would completely rule the Complaint “out of time”

In summary and referring to both Section 41(6) and Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act,2015 the decision has to be that the WRC does not have proper jurisdiction to hear the Complaint.

Findings and Conclusions:

Decision:

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 and Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions of the cited Acts.

CA: 00069896-001

The WRC Adjudication Office does not have proper jurisdiction to hear this complaint. It has to be deemed, accordingly, as Legally Not Properly Founded.

It has to be deemed Unsuccessful.

Dated:   22nd May 2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Michael McEntee

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