Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Rachel Carolan

Pain and Performance Clinic Ltd

Representatives

Self-represented

Director

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

CA-00074936-001

29/08/2025

The complainant was employed by the respondent as front of house receptionist from March 2025 until the respondent terminated her employment on 11 August 2025.

The complainant claims she was dismissed for making a protected disclosure.

The respondent denied all matters asserted by the complainant and the claim of unfair dismissal.

The complainant was dismissed on 11 August 2025 on her return to the office from 2 weeks’ annual leave.

Before going on annual leave, the complainant raised various matters with Mr Brennan, including the matter of customer queries regarding treating therapist information on customer invoices.  The complainant told Mr Brennan that she found it stressful to manage changes to invoices when the clinic is so busy and that she did not know if this was something she should be doing or was happy dong after a customer told her it was fraud.  The complainant thought this was one of the reasons for her dismissal. 

The complainant also asked why she had not received her contract and job description, despite making repeated requests for a job description, and raised a concern relating to a manager.  In addition, the complainant informed Mr Brennan that she would no longer take the work phone home outside of her contracted hours of work at the clinic.  The complainant felt she was dismissed for bringing up these issues. 

The respondent provided no notice of termination and gave no reason for ending the complainant’s employment. The complainant received no reply to the registered letter and email she sent after her dismissal seeking reasons for the termination of her employment.

Summary of complainant’s oral evidence

The complainant believes she was dismissed because she raised an issue concerning invoices which she thought was wrongdoing. 

The complainant was managing the clinic herself from 7 to 14 July 2025 when Mr Brennan and the office manager were on leave.  The complainant had been trained to change the treating therapist’s name on invoices to Mr Brennan’s name where the treating therapist was not CORU registered.  Two issues arose in the week of 7 July; firstly, the complainant issued an invoice in the name of a non-CORU registered therapist and a customer contacted the office complaining because they were unable to have their insurance benefit claim processed, and another customer contacted the office irate because their invoice detailed Mr Brennan as the treating therapist whereas the customer had been seen by a different therapist.  It was during this week of 7 July that the complainant started to think that the training she had received on invoices was wrong or maybe that she was doing something wrong.

The complainant thought it was on or around the 16 July 2025 that she asked Mr Brennan could they have a chat about something.  The complainant said to Mr Brennan that there had been a couple of queries about invoices.  The complainant told Mr Brennan about the customer complaints during the week he was on leave.  The complainant wanted to make sure that her response to customer queries in this regard was appropriate.  Mr Brennan’s response was that he would have to speak with the office manager and get back to the complainant on it. 

The invoice issue was the main issue the complainant wanted to discuss with Mr Brennan however Mr Brennan closed this issue down and led the conversation to four other issues, namely the complainant’s job description, a therapist scheduling error, cleaning and the work phone.  The complainant subsequently stated that she asked about the job description and that when Mr Brennan asked about who was responsible for doing the work schedules, the complainant told him that the office manager was always on her back to get things done. 

There was no follow-on from the complainant’s discussion with Mr Brennan, and the complainant did not see Mr Brennan on the 18, 19 and 20 July 2025.  The complainant felt uncomfortable the issue had not been addressed by Mr Brennan but thought that it would be addressed in due course.

The complainant attended work as normal on 21 July 2025, did not work on 22 July, and was on annual leave from 23 July 2025.  Things were normal, the complainant’s performance and standards were constantly praised by the respondent and there was no indication that the complainant would be dismissed.   

It was after the complainant’s dismissal that she realised the seriousness of the compliance issue.

On 11 August 2025, the complainant attended work and messaged both Mr Brennan and office manager as the laptop and mobile phone were not at the office.    When Mr Brennan arrived at the office, there was a conversation that lasted approximately 20 seconds in which Mr Brennan told the complainant it wasn’t good news but that he was going to have to let her go that day.  The complainant was shocked.  Messages the complainant subsequently sent to Mr Brennan and the manager were out of character and because of the high stress experienced by reason of the dismissal.  The complainant had no further direct contact with Mr Brennan after 11 August.  She received no response to a letter and email of 12 August 2025.

The complainant and manager got along; the conversation between Mr Brennan and the complainant on or around 16 July was never meant to be about the manager, and the complainant had never raised an issue with Mr Brennan about the manager, other than on that date.

The complainant is not currently working as she has been unable to secure suitable, alternative employment.   The complainant has applied for approximately 60 jobs all over Dublin and Wicklow following her dismissal.  The interviews were fine, but hours of work were an issue due to the complainant’s personal commitments.  The complainant confirmed compensation as her preferred form of redress.  

The complainant did not recall a meeting or discussion with Mr Brennan on 18 July 2025, and could not see how a meeting, as described by Mr Brennan, could possibly have taken place at the front of office desk.  The complainant challenged the veracity of the diary schedule for the day and queried why it was not submitted to the WRC before the hearing.   There were no issues between the complainant and the office manager; they got on well, as far as the complainant was concerned.  The only time the office manager came up between Mr Brennan and the complainant was during the complainant’s conversation with Mr Brennan on 16 July 2025. 

The respondent submits that assertions made by the complainant in relation to issuing of invoices are inaccurate. The respondent outlined the services offered by the clinic, the integrated nature of same and how clients could be seen by multiple therapists over a course of treatment with Mr Brennan overseeing all clinical cases and treatment plans.   All clients at the clinic receive clinically appropriate care overseen by a CORU-registered physiotherapist.

The complainant’s account of discussions with Mr Brennan is not accurate.  The issues raised by the complainant were not primarily concerned with receipts or invoicing practices.  The primary issue raised by the complainant related to the practice/office manager, and was the principal concern addressed by the complainant with Mr Brennan on 18 July 2025.  Mr Brennan investigated the complainant’s assertions regarding the manager and concluded they were unfounded. It became apparent to Mr Brennan that the complainant’s conduct was an issue for the professional and respectful operation of the clinic.  Mr Brennan was ultimately faced with deciding between retaining either the office manager or the complainant.   He concluded that the complainant was not a right fit for the clinic and that there was no alternative but to terminate her employment.

Summary of Mr Brennan’s oral evidence

Mr Brennan outlined the services offered by the clinic, treatment/training packages on offer and the emphasis on staff training.  He explained his oversight role of all cases, including digital review of cases with treating therapists.

Mr Brennan refuted the complainant’s submission that she raised concerns directly with him during 5 informal conversations between 14 and 18 July 2025.  The complainant asked to speak with him on a date in that week when the witness had a few minutes free in between clients.  The complainant raised an issue regarding invoices, along with approximately five other matters.  The witness had no notice in advance of the matters raised by the complainant, it was not a scheduled conversation and his response to the complainant was that he would speak with the office manager. 

Regarding the invoice issue, the witness recalled the complainant saying a client had telephoned about their invoice and the complainant querying with him what the procedure/system is for issuing invoices.  The witness considered the complainant to have a genuine query about the respondent’s invoice procedure, notwithstanding the complainant’s tendency to dramatize a situation through reaction or the language used by the complainant, such as describing a client as irate. 

The complainant raised other issues during this conversation, including her job description, cleaning duties at the clinic, the work mobile phone and a therapist scheduling error.

A further unscheduled discussion occurred between the witness and the complainant on 18 July 2025.  The witness asked the complainant how it was going as he could tell she was not happy, and the complainant raised several issues relating primarily to the office manager and the complainant’s stress or overwhelm from her job.  This discussion was approximately an hour in duration and took place at the complainant’s desk.  The complainant complained about the office manager not pulling her weight and fooling Mr Brennan.  The complainant told Mr Brennan that she could not continue to work with the office manager, she requested different work shifts and told him that if things did not improve, she would leave.  The witness was wondering how he could manage this situation and what he could do to alleviate it.   It was clear to him from this discussion that the office manager and complainant working together was a problem.  This was significant in a small clinic where collaboration was key.   The complainant did not mention invoices at all during this conversation.   When Mr Brennan told the office manager about his conversation with the complainant, the office manager was very upset.  Mr Brennan looked into this a bit more and the combined feedback from other staff members and clients led him to the view that the complainant was not the right fit for the small team in the clinic. 

Mr Brennan took the decision to terminate the complainant’s employment having regard primarily to the feedback from the office manager, who had played an instrumental part in the clinic’s growth, and the fact that the complainant had said she would not continue working there if the situation with the office manager did not improve.  Mr Brennan arranged an hour free in his schedule to speak with the complainant on 11 August 2025.  The complainant stormed out of the meeting within 30 seconds of Mr Brennan saying he was letting her go.  Mr Brennan did not reply to the complainant’s subsequent messages, email or letter.   Mr Brennan believed that the complainant did not know why she had been let go because her reaction and leaving the office on 11 August meant that there was no explanation given to her.   

The claim under section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, as amended, (the “1977 Act”) was referred to the Commission on 29 August 2025.  It concerns the complainant’s dismissal from employment on 11 August 2025, which she asserts occurred because she made a protected disclosure.

At the outset of the hearing, the complainant advised she was not pursuing a complaint relating to pay in lieu of notice.

The complainant commenced employment with the respondent on or around 10 March 2025, initially on a part-time basis, moving to full-time hours on or around 28 March 2025.

The complainant contends that she made a protected disclosure on or around the 16 July 2025 and that her dismissal on 11 August 2025 was a consequence of that disclosure. The respondent denies the complainant made a protected disclosure, denies any wrongdoing, and denies that the complainant was dismissed for making a protected disclosure. 

As explained to the parties at the hearing, my role is not to investigate or determine whether relevant wrongdoing within the meaning of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, as amended, (the “2014 Act”), occurred.  The question of whether a protected disclosure was made is relevant by reason of the nature of the claim and material facts in dispute between the parties.

The Legal Framework

Generally, an employee must have at least one year’s continuous service at the date of dismissal to bring an unfair dismissal claim under the 1977 Act. Section 6(2D) creates an exception to this requirement where section 6(2)(ba) applies. This means that if an employee establishes that their dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from making a protected disclosure, the one‑year service requirement does not apply, and the 1977 Act applies to their claim.

Section 6(2) of the 1977 Act provides in relevant part:-

“… the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal if it results wholly or mainly from …

(ba) the employee having made a protected disclosure,”

Section 5 of the 2014 Act provides for the meaning of a protected disclosure and related matters:-

“(1)… subject to subsection (6) and sections 17 and 18, a disclosure of relevant information (whether before or after the date of the passing of this Act) made by a worker in the manner specified in section 6, 7, 7B, 8, 9 or 10.

(2) For the purposes of this Act information is “relevant information” if-

(a) in the reasonable belief of the worker, it tends to show one or more relevant wrongdoing, and

(b) it came to the attention of the worker in a work-related context.

(3) The following matters are relevant wrongdoings for the purposes of this Act-

(a) that an offence has been, is being or is likely to be committed,

(b) that a person has failed, is failing or is likely to fail to comply with any legal obligation, other than one arising under the worker’s contract of employment or other contract whereby the worker undertakes to do or perform personally any work or services,

(c) that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

(d) that the health or safety of any individual has been, is being or is likely to be endangered,

(e) that the environment has been, is being or is likely to be damaged,

(f) that an unlawful or otherwise improper use of funds or resources of a public body, or of other public money, has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur,

(g) that an act or omission by or on behalf of a public body is oppressive, discriminatory or grossly negligent or constitutes gross mismanagement,

(h) that a breach has occurred, is occurring or is likely to occur, or

(i) that information tending to show any matter falling within any of the preceding paragraphs has been, is being or is likely to be concealed or destroyed or an attempt has been, is being or is likely to be made to conceal or destroy such information.

…

(5A) A matter concerning interpersonal grievances exclusively affecting a reporting person, namely, grievances about interpersonal conflicts between the reporting person and another worker, or a matter concerning a complaint by a reporting person to, or about, his or her employer which concerns the worker exclusively, shall not be a relevant wrongdoing for the purposes of this Act and may be dealt with through any agreed procedures applicable to such grievances or complaint to which the reporting person has access or such other procedures, provided in accordance with any rule of law or enactment (other than this Act), to which the reporting person has access.

…

(7) The motivation for making a disclosure is irrelevant to whether or not it is a protected disclosure.

(8) In proceedings involving an issue as to whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that it is.”

Section 6 of the 2014 Act provides for disclosure by a worker to the worker’s employer.

Application of the Law

As the complainant’s employment was terminated after approximately five months, the onus is on the complainant in this claim under the 1977 Act to establish that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from her having made a protected disclosure.

Whether a Protected Disclosure was made

The complainant’s case is that she made a protected disclosure when she raised an issue regarding invoice procedures at the clinic (the “invoice issue”) that she thought was wrongdoing.

The respondent contested the complainant having made a protected disclosure submitting that the assertions made in relation to the invoice issue were inaccurate, and by reference to the way the complainant raised the invoice issue and her rationale for so doing.  Mr Brennan’s evidence was that the complainant asked to speak with him when he was in between clients, that the complainant mentioned the invoice issue as a genuine concern on her part about the procedure/system in place for giving invoices and how it should be done but that it was not raised as a compliance issue.  Mr Brennan described the conversation as informal, taking place without notice and when Mr Brennan had a few minutes free in between clients. 

Where in proceedings there is an issue as to whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure, section 5(8) of the 2014 Act provides that it is presumed to be protected disclosure until the contrary is proven.  As per section 5(7) of the 2014 Act, the motivation for making a disclosure is not relevant to the question of whether a disclosure is a protected disclosure.

It was common case that the complainant spoke with Mr Brennan on or around 16 July 2025 and that a number of matters were discussed.  Mr Brennan accepted that the complainant asked him during a conversation on that date about the invoice procedure, which he said he would speak with the office manager about.  

On the complainant’s account of the communication on or around 16 July 2025, I find that the complainant told Mr Brennan that there had been customer queries on invoices and specifically that the queries related to the treating therapist invoice detail and were made in the context of a claim for insurance benefit.  The foregoing account was not rebutted by the respondent.  I do not accept the complainant’s submission that she expressed concern in this conversation that the practices were not compliant with professional and insurance standards having regard to the complainant’s evidence at hearing including that it was post-dismissal she realised there was a compliance issue.  I do however acknowledge the context to the complainant raising the invoice issue with Mr Brennan and accept that the complainant conveyed the dissatisfaction of one customer who had referred to fraud and that the complainant queried with Mr Brennan in this conversation the clinic’s invoice procedure and system. 

The fact that the complainant did not expressly refer to a “protected disclosure” and/or the 2014 Act when she raised the invoice issue, or that she did not request an appointment or meeting with Mr Brennan to discuss the issue is not sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption in favour of the complainant that her disclosure was a protected disclosure.

I am satisfied the complainant held a reasonable belief, by reference to the customer queries / complaints and the training she had received on amending invoices, that the information tended to show relevant wrongdoing of an offence and/or failure to comply with a legal obligation on the part of the respondent.  It is worth noting here, having regard to the respondent’s submissions, that the fact that the complainant’s belief may be wrong or that the information disclosed does not in law amount to an offence or breach of a legal obligation does not render the belief unreasonable.  The question is whether there is a reasonable or objective basis for the complainant’s belief.

Based on the foregoing, I find that the complainant disclosed to the respondent relevant information within the meaning of section 5 of the 2014 Act, and that the respondent has not rebutted the presumption that the disclosure constitutes a protected disclosure.

Whether dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from the complainant having made a protected disclosure

For the 1977 Act to apply, it must be established that the protected disclosure was the main reason for the decision to dismiss, in other word it brought about or was the operative reason in the respondent’s decision to dismiss the complainant.

The respondent maintained that it terminated the complainant’s employment because it concluded she was not a right fit for the team and place of employment. 

I have very carefully examined the respondent’s position in the following context.   

Mr Brennan’s evidence was of a conversation on 18 July 2025 during which the complainant raised various allegations about the manager, stress and overwhelm in work and stated that she would leave if things did not improve.  

The complainant denied any conversation with Mr Brennan on 18 July 2025 and further denied a conversation as per Mr Brennans’ account having occurred on any other date.

Mr Brennan’s evidence was that he spoke with the office manager, staff members and clients following his conversation with the complainant on 18 July, combined all the information, and took the decision that the complainant could no longer continue working with the respondent. 

What is not in dispute is that Mr Brennan did not inform the complainant of any such conversations with the manager, staff members and clients, and did not convey to her information which he attested came to his attention in such conversations and concerned the complainant’s manner and attitude in the workplace.  Not only was the complainant not aware of Mr Brennan’s investigation in this regard, but this information was also not forthcoming when the complainant requested reasons in writing for the termination of her employment from the respondent.   The first time the complainant was made aware of this information, which Mr Brennan maintains was the reason for his decision to dismiss, was by way of the respondent’s written submissions to the WRC.

The foregoing feature, coupled with the proximity in time between the complainant making a protected disclosure and the termination of her employment, and the fact that there was a complete absence of basic procedural fairness in and around the termination of the complainant’s employment, called for a very careful examination and scrutiny of the information before me in assessing the respondent’s reason for dismissal and causation.

I had some difficulty with the evidence of both parties.

There were inconsistencies on the complainant’s account between the complaint referral form, the complainant’s written submissions, and in the complainant’s evidence. 

On balance, I find that on 16 July 2025, the complainant raised, along with the invoice issue, several other matters relating to her employment.  I find that the complainant also raised the matter of not having received a contract of employment, a request for a job description, an issue with cleaning duties, the complainant not bringing home the work phone and an issue concerning the office manager.  This finding is based on the complainant’s evidence and submissions and is supported by the complaint specific detail provided by the complainant in the complaint referral to the WRC on 29 August 2025.  I also note messages from the complainant to the respondent in the aftermath of the termination of her employment refer to her dismissal having been because she spoke up for herself.

It follows therefore that the invoice issue/protected disclosure was one of a number of issues raised by the complainant that potentially gave rise to the complainant’s dismissal.  This indeed was acknowledged by the complainant in her complaint referral to the Commission. 

I am unable, and do not need to reconcile a conflict between the parties as to what, if any, discussion took place on the 18 July 2025. 

I am satisfied on the evidence, including the messages between the complainant and the office manager, that Mr Brennan spoke with the office manager about the issues raised by the complainant.  I accept that Mr Brennan spoke with the office manager because he took from his conversation with the complainant that she was not happy working alongside the office manager.   Mr Brennan then embarked on a type of investigation, unbeknownst to the complainant, whereby he spoke with other staff members and clients about the complainant. 

On balance, the evidence supports a finding that the decision to dismiss was taken as a means to an end or an avoidant measure so that Mr Brennan would not have to address interpersonal issues, and specifically the effort involved in attempting to resolve interpersonal issues between the complainant and the manager.

There was no persuasive and/or reliable evidence that the protected disclosure was a material factor or consideration in Mr Brennan’s decision to dismiss the complainant, and certainly no reliable evidence that it was the main reason for the decision to dismiss.

In conclusion, I find that the complainant has not established that the dismissal resulted wholly or mainly from the making of a protected disclosure.

It follows from the foregoing that section 6(2D) of the 1977 Act does not apply to the present case and that the complainant has insufficient service to maintain an unfair dismissal claim under the 1977 Act.  

Accordingly, my decision is that the complainant was not unfairly dismissed contrary to the 1977 Act.

For the reasons set out above, my decision is that the complainant was not unfairly dismissed.  Accordingly, I find that this claim is not well founded.

Unfair Dismissal – Less than 1 year’s continuous service - Protected disclosure – Wholly or mainly