ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00061068
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Adrienne Carroll | Cargotec Engineering Ltd Hiab Moffetts |
Representatives | Self-represented | Peter Gilfedder IBEC |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00073850-001 | 28/07/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 18/02/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Dónal Moore, BL
Procedure:
- In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 and Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 - 2015, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
- The matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2020 and S.I. 359/2020, which designated the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.
- I have taken the time to carefully review all the evidence both written and oral. I have noted the respective position of the parties. I am not required to provide a line- for-line rebuttal of the evidence and submissions that I have rejected or deemed superfluous to the main findings. I am guided by the reasoning in Faulkner v. The Minister for Industry and Commerce [1997] E.L.R. 107 where it was held that minute analysis or reasons are not required to be given by administrative tribunals and only broad reasons need be given. I am required to set out such evidential material which is fundamentally relevant to the decision per Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63.
- The parties were put under notice of the decision in the Zalewski case, that their evidence would be heard under oath or affirmation and of the penalty for perjury. Accordingly, the witnesses were advised of the penalty for perjury
- Additionally, parties were informed that they would be afforded an opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and the hearing was to be held in public; the parties offered me neither objection nor reason to have the hearing held in private and cross-examination was facilitated and availed of.
- For the Complainant the hearing was attended by the Complainant as a Litigant-in-Person and who took an oath to be truthful with the Commission in their evidence and were made available for cross examination, as required.
- For the Respondent the hearing was attended by, Mr Gilfedder (IBEC) and witnesses Mr Giorgio Spoto and Ms Bronagh Kirk both of whom gave evidence under affirmation and were made available for cross-examination.
Background:
8. The Complainant sets out that they were unfairly dismissed by way of a redundancy and were unfairly selected on the basis of their age. The Respondent disputes this and argues that the process was sound and that despite all offers and notice the Complainant failed to appeal the final decision of the redundancy. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
9. It is the Complainant contention that there was a team of staff, some of whom started later than they, with fewer qualifications and less experience and that it was unfair that they be selected in those circumstances. 10. The Complainant outlined that in April 2025, an international merger took place within the Respondent organisation, which was positively received globally and at the Dundalk site. Later that month, the company announced a voluntary redundancy programme affecting approximately 10% of the workforce. During that consultation period, senior management informed them that there would be no further risk to positions until at least December 2025, provided sufficient volunteers came forward. The company subsequently announced a substantial investment of €30–50 million in a new facility, indicating to the Complainant that the employer was not experiencing financial difficulty. 11. The Complainant believes their selection was influenced by age. They state that the employer was aware that they would reach two years of service on 18 September 2025, at which point enhanced redundancy terms of 3.5 weeks’ pay per year of service plus statutory entitlements would normally apply. 12. The Complainant further indicates that the consultation meetings on 20, 21, and 26 May 2025 did not clarify the termination date. Correspondence identified 30 May as the termination date regardless of whether they appealed internally. 13. In June the Complainant received a laptop accompanied by an explanation from a line manager that their original device could not be returned as it had not reached the end of its warranty period. Following delays in obtaining documentation relating to the dismissal, they received a summary confirming their employment end date was 31 August, falling just under two weeks short of reaching two years’ service. 14. The Complainant further claims that statements made during consultation meetings were inaccurate, particularly regarding the removal of training coordination duties. They state these duties were assigned by their manager rather than requested by them and that they continued performing these functions until the end of May. 15. Throughout June and July, the Complainant sought clarification on entitlements such as pay, bonuses, health insurance, pensions, and outplacement support, but found HR’s responses unhelpful. The lack of clarity and support prompted the Complainant to escalate concerns to senior HR personnel before receiving the requested information. 16. The Complainant lodged a complaint with the WRC under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, claiming that the redundancy was involuntary, unfair, and inadequately explained. 17. Redress is sought for loss of livelihood and earnings The Complainant expresses that the redundancy process felt frustrated, lacked adequate consultation, and offered no clear reason for why they were selected. 18. The Complainant submits this claim on the grounds that they were unfairly dismissed and that were subjected to discrimination on the basis of age |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
19. The Complainant claims she was unfairly selected for redundancy from her role as ISO Coordinator with the Respondent .The Respondent argues the redundancy was genuine, driven by reduced business need, and that proper consultation occurred. 20. The Complainant started work on 18 September 2023 as an ISO Coordinator, reporting to the Quality Manager GS. The Complainant was told on 20 May 2025 that her role was at risk. The role redundancy was confirmed 26 May 2025, final working day 30 May 2025 (with 3 months’ pay in lieu of notice). The Complainant was not eligible for statutory redundancy having less than 2 years’ service. 21. Although hired as ISO Coordinator, the Complainant had also taken on training coordination tasks since 2023. In Jan/Feb 2025 the Complainant informed their manager this work took up 80% of their time; she requested removal of training duties. These training duties were removed and reassigned to HR. A voluntary redundancy programme was available in April 2025, and the Complainant did not apply. 22. In May 2025 the Respondent told the Complainant their role was at risk due to significant drop in order intake, cost‑saving programme, and the restructure affecting the ISO Coordinator role. At the first consultation meeting the Complainant was offered representation which they declined. The Respondent informed them that the business no longer required a full‑time ISO Coordinator. However, other roles were available; the Complainant said that they lacked relevant experience and suggested part‑time work as alternative. At the Second consultation meeting the Complainant confirmed she had no alternative proposals and the Respondent confirmed that there was no feasible part‑time option available. At this point the Complainant requested pay in lieu of notice and the Respondent agreed with the last working day as 30 May 2025. The Respondent explained the right of appeal, and the Complainant confirmed they would not appeal. 23. July 2025 the Complainant emailed HR disputing: a. why her role was selected, b. lack of advance communication to the quality team, c. town hall statements suggesting no compulsory redundancies expected until Dec 2025, d. her ongoing involvement in training activities (up to q3 2025), e. whether the redundancies (including April voluntary scheme) amounted to a collective redundancy. 24. The Respondent in turn responded, confirming it was not a collective redundancy and re-issued documentation that supported this view. 25. Respondent’s Position The Respondent required fewer employees doing ISO work following the decline in order intake and the restructuring. This meant the ISO Coordinator role was no longer needed by the business and only one ISO Coordinator existed meaning no selection pool was required. To that end the role was identified under Redundancy Payments Act 1967, regarding the carrying on business with fewer employees. 26. Case Law Cited by Employer a. genuine redundancy as per Kohinoor Ltd v Hussain Ali (UDD1629) b. no unfair selection when only one role exists as per Paul Barton v Newsfast Freight Ltd (UD1269/2005) c. consultation not need not be perfect if genuine reason exists as per White v Yenom Limited (UD/993/2009 d. abruptness does not invalidate redundancy as per Torley v Omni Park Shopping Centre Consortium (UD1745/2010) 27. The Respondent sets out that a. the redundancy was genuine. b. the process was fair and objective. c. the complainant fail to appeal internally. d. the WRC should find dismissal not unfair and dismiss the claim. 28. The Respondent set out that two meetings held where it was open, and invited, for the Complainant to propose alternatives. Alternatives were suggested and explored and rejected as being unviable. 29. The Respondent argues that the Complainant was told twice about her right of appeal and in not appealing there is a “fundamental flaw” in the argument of the Complainant. The Respondent cites, Keith Murphy and Chartbusters Limited (UD321/2009, ) Aryzta Bakeries and Vilnis Cacs (UDD1812) and Musgrave Wholesale Partners and Jonathan Fox (UDD1972) in support of this position. 30. The Respondent further sets out that the Complainant chose compensation as the remedy but has not demonstrated efforts to mitigate her loss and cites cases requiring employees to make significant efforts to find new work as per Philip Smith v Mark Leddy (UDD1974), Sheehan v Continental Administration Co Ltd (UD858/1999), Nuala Burke v Superior Express Limited (UD1227/2014). |
Findings and Conclusions:
31. The burden of proof in an unfair dismissal complaint falls on the Respondent, for the most part, and definitively in this case. This is a task placed on them by the legislation. 32. In cases of all complaints there is an onus placed on the Complainant to have exhausted, or attempted to have exhausted the full procedures available in terms of appeal etc. 33. In the current case it is not controversial that the Respondent had introduced voluntary redundancies across the organisation previously and these were properly set out and consulted upon. These however, where a separate process from the individual redundancy of the Complainant. 34. It would seem from the submissions and witness evidence that the timeframe for the dismissal by redundancy is quite short. In the case of individual redundancy, the legislation does not set out a timeframe, only that there be consultation that it allows for alternatives to be explored. In real terms this is at least one meeting but possibly one or two more depending on the complexity of the case. I cannot find fault, legally, with the timeframe and the Respondent is not breach of any law where they seek under s7(2)(c) to carry on the work with fewer employees, which was the evidence under affirmation of the Respondent witness. It appears obvious to me, and it was not denied in cross-examination that the Complainant was informed on the 20th of May that their role was in danger of redundancy and were again consulted on the 21st where they were offered representation and the matter of other potential roles were raised by the Respondent. The Complainant refused these for their own reasons and sought part-time work with the Respondent instead. On the 26th the Respondent confirmed that this was not a possibility. 35. Also, on the 26th the Respondent set out they explained the right of appeal, and this was explored in cross-exam. Also, on this date the Complainant asked for, and it was agreed by the Respondent, to be paid-in-lieu of notice. This arose in cross-exam where the Complainant queried if this was not part of her contract. It was set out that it was in the contract that an employee could be paid in lieu of notice, but at the Respondent discretion. That is, it was within the gift of the Respondent, but not an obligation on them and, in this case, they were acceding to the Complainant request for the same. I am of the view that nothing turns on this request and offer, such clauses and arrangements being common in employment contracts. 36. Sometime later in July the Complainant appears to have begun contesting the fact of the redundancy and it is clear to me that, as set out, the issue of her redundancy was after the collective redundancies and was not encompassed by those. I have seen no evidence to suggest that the individual compulsory redundancy of the Complainant was associated with the previous voluntary redundancy programme in a strict sense within the meaning of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967. 37. The Respondent has cited the case of Kohinoor from the Labour Court ,which means I must consider if there was a genuine redundancy and this was the main reason for dismissal. Having heard from all the parties including under cross-exam I am of the mind that what has been put in front of me constitutes a genuine redundancy. I do not approve of the haste, nor the abruptness as set out by the Complainant , but this is not illegal and cannot, in itself, lead to a conclusion of unfair dismissal. 38. In terms of the dignity of process, the Respondent points to the finding in White where even though the process was appalling in that instance; where the redundancy is genuine and the selection not unfair the dismissal by way of redundancy was fair. Similarly, the finding Torley is an authority that abruptness does not mean unfair, where it is based on the business need. 39. The Complainant has set out that they believe that their age was a factor in the redundancy selection, however, they have offered no evidence other than the fact of their chronological age, and the Respondent offers evidence under affirmation that the age profile of the organisation would not support this, and this was not challenged. 40. Key to any unfair dismissal complaint is the full use, or attempted use, of the available appeal process. Chartbusters and many cases since have set out that a Complainant has a responsibility to exhaust all such processes, otherwise their complaint has a “fundamental flaw”. 41. It is clear from the submissions and the evidence in cross-exam that the Complainant was on notice of these and did not avail of them and this “fundamental flaw” proves fatal to her case. I have not heard evidence that the Respondent kept the appeal a secret or otherwise failed in their duty to inform the Complainant to such a degree that would undermine their argument, or at all and on the evidence their process was fundamentally sound. 42. The Respondent sets out that the Complainant has not demonstrated mitigation, which was true at the time of the submission. I would note the Complainant submitted some documentation in advance of the hearing to that end. However, such mitigation will only be necessary in light of a decision where their complaint is considered well-founded. 43. It is quite clear from both submissions that the organisation had identified a need to reduce costs and streamline the ways that they worked, and it is clear that the Respondent had a need to restructure and reallocate duties. The Employer had attempted to find a new role, and this was rejected by the Complainant from the off and although it is not clear that the request for part- time work was fully considered; this is not the core of this dispute. 44. On my examination I have to find that the process in its totality was fair, transparent, and objectively justified. I do not care for the haste but as I refer to earlier this is not a matter of illegality. I can only find in all the circumstances that the complaint is not well-founded. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act and Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the provisions of that Act
For the reasons set out above I find that the complaint is not well-founded. |
Dated: 13th of March 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Dónal Moore, BL
Key Words:
Failure to Exhaust Appeal, Redundancy Consultation Process, Alternative Roles, Selection Fairness |
