Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Tommy Chee King  Eng

Ecoco Asian Kitchen Limited T/A Ecoco Asian Kitchen

Representatives

Carmen Eng

William Dunne BL instructed by Robert Emmet Bourke & Co Solicitors

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Regulation 10 of the European Communities (Protection of Employees on Transfer of Undertakings) Regulations 2003 (S.I. No. 131 of 2003)

CA-00073635-001

21/07/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00073635-002

21/07/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00073635-003

21/07/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00073635-004

21/07/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00073635-005

21/07/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00073635-009

21/07/2025

The Complainant commenced employment as a Chef with the Respondent on 1 September 2015 and was paid a weekly wage of €600. He was dismissed on 25 June 2025 following allegations of food safety and hygiene breaches having been made against him. He asserts that the dismissal was unfair.

Following an investigation meeting on 14 June 2025 that subsequently resulted in his suspension, the Complainant received an invitation to attend a disciplinary hearing scheduled for 17 June 2025. The letter set out two allegations: (i) that he had picked up food from the floor that was subsequently cooked and served to a customer, and (ii) that he had used an incorrect method to prepare roast duck. The letter stated that he was entitled to be accompanied by an employee or a trade union representative.

On 16 June 2025, the Complainant sought confirmation of the time and location of the hearing. Instead of proceeding on 17 June 2025, the Respondent postponed the hearing to 19 June 2025 at 6 p.m. The Complainant attended the hearing on his own and provided a prepared written response to the two allegations. Management declined to read it before proceeding and attempted to introduce a third, previously undisclosed allegation based on further CCTV review. Given that the process was procedurally unsound—because an additional allegation was raised without prior notice and without consideration of his written response—the Complainant left the meeting. The meeting was conducted in the customer area of the restaurant, in Mandarin Chinese, offering no privacy.

The following morning, 20 June 2025, the Respondent wrote to say that he had refused to co‑operate with the process and proposed a resumed disciplinary hearing for 21 June 2025 at 1 p.m.—less than 27 hours’ notice and on a weekend, when legal advice could not realistically be obtained. The letter also expanded the allegations to include a third allegation (lack of headwear and touching his head while cooking, and use of a phone while preparing food) that had been raised for the first time at the hearing the previous day. The Complainant began to feel targeted, particularly given that other staff had engaged in similar practices without any disciplinary action having been taken against them.

Late that night, on 20 June 2025, the Complainant responded, disputing the Respondent’s account of the 19 June 2025 hearing and explaining his concerns about fairness.

On the morning of 21 June 2025, the Respondent again insisted the hearing take place either on 21 or 22 June 2025 and stated that he had the right to be accompanied by a colleague or union representative. The Complainant again explained that the short notice was inadequate and proposed 27 June 2025 at 2 p.m. as a fair alternative. He also advised that a colleague, Dylan, had agreed to accompany him and assist with language difficulties. He asked that all allegations be set out in advance.

Later that same day, the Respondent expressed “disappointment” that he had not attended the 21 June 2025 hearing—despite it never having been mutually agreed—and simultaneously instructed him not to contact any employees, despite him having already informed them that Dylan would accompany him. They said the resumed hearing would address all three allegations.

That evening, the Complainant reiterated that he could not attend a unilaterally imposed hearing date and that he required reasonable time to prepare and seek advice.

Despite acknowledging his concerns about insufficient notice, the Respondent insisted that the resumed hearing would proceed on 23 June 2025 at 6:30 p.m. The Complainant was given less than four hours’ notice. At 4:27 p.m.—two hours before the meeting— the Respondent added new, vague and wide‑ranging allegations relating to “ongoing service and performance issues” and “workplace conduct,” without giving specific examples.

Dylan could not accompany the Complainant because he was rostered to work at the time. Given this, and the absence of union representation, his daughter attended with the Complainant. She informed the Respondent that she was representing her father because no colleague was available at such short notice. The Respondent raised no objection when she arrived. No private space was available for the hearing: first the customer seating area was proposed, then the kitchen, and finally a tiny storeroom/coat closet. During the short exchange that followed, the Complainant and his daughter explained why the hearing could not proceed fairly in those conditions. When his daughter attempted to clarify matters, a manager attempted to video-record her on a mobile phone before being told to stop. The encounter lasted approximately ten minutes before they left the premises.

On the morning of 25 June 2025, the Respondent dismissed the Complainant for gross misconduct. The letter offered a right of appeal until 30 June. The Complainant’s daughter filed the appeal on his behalf, but the Respondent refused to hear it.

The Respondent is a small restaurant operator that assumed control of the undertaking where the Complainant worked at the end of April 2025 and continued to employ the Complainant as a chef. They stated that serious food‑hygiene and food‑safety concerns arose in early June 2025, supported by CCTV and staff observations: on 7 June the Complainant dropped cooked food on the floor and continued preparation; on 10 June he instructed that duck be reheated in a microwave contrary to required methods; and a subsequent review of CCTV identified additional hygiene issues, including head/hand hygiene and handling a phone while cooking.

In light of what the Respondent considered potential gross misconduct, they suspended the Complainant on full pay on 14 June 2025 as a neutral measure, provided written notice of the allegations and potential outcomes (including possible summary dismissal), and moved to a disciplinary process.

They stated that a disciplinary hearing on 19 June 2025 did not proceed substantively because the Complainant refused to answer questions; further written particulars issued on 20 June (including the additional hygiene points from the CCTV review), and after further exchanges, a meeting on 23 June 2025 also failed to progress because the Complainant insisted that his daughter act as his spokesperson rather than attending with a workplace colleague or trade‑union representative as permitted.

They stated that they considered the Complainant’s written submissions and, given the seriousness of the food‑safety concerns, dismissed him for gross misconduct on 25 June 2025, offering a right of appeal. The Respondent stated that they followed fair procedures proportionate to a small employer (suspension on pay; notice of allegations; the right to accompaniment by a colleague/union representative; multiple hearing dates; and a right of appeal), and that dismissal fell within the range of reasonable responses in a food business.  

CA-00073635-005:

Section 6(1) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 provides that “the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be an unfair dismissal unless, having regard to all the circumstances, there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal.”

Section 6(4) of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 provides as follows:

4)     Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section the dismissal of an employee shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, not to be an unfair dismissal, if it results wholly or mainly from one or more of the following:

(a)   the capability, competence or qualification of the employee for performing work of the kind which he was employed by the employer to do,

(b)   the conduct of the employee,

(c)    the redundancy of the employee, and

(d)   the employee being unable to work or continue to work in the position he held without contravention (by him or by his employer) of a duty or restriction imposed by or under any statute or instrument made under statute.

Section 6(6) of the Act states as follows:

“In determining for the purposes of this Act whether the dismissal of an employee was an unfair dismissal or not, it shall be for the employer to show that the dismissal resulted wholly of mainly from one or more grounds specified in subsection (4) of this section or that there were other substantial grounds for justifying the dismissal.

Section 7 of the Act, in relevant part, makes provision as follows:

(7) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining if a dismissal is an unfair dismissal, regard may be had….

(a) to the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal

The combined effect of the above sections of the Act requires me to consider if the Respondent’s decision to dismiss the Complainant was reasonable in the circumstances and if it was substantively and procedurally fair. 

In terms of the substantive aspect, it is well established case law that it is the role of the Adjudication Officer to consider the reasonableness of the Respondent’s decision in the circumstances and not to establish the guilt or innocence of the Complainant in relation to the allegations presented. This is helpfully set out by the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) in the case of Looney and Co Ltd v Looney UD 843/1984:

“It is not for the EAT to seek to establish the guilt or innocence of the claimant nor is it for the EAT to indicate or consider whether we in the employer’s position would have acted as it did in its investigation or concluded as it did in its investigation or concluded as it did or decided as it did, as to do so would be to substitute our own mind and decisions for that of the employer.  Our responsibility is to consider against the facts what a reasonable employer in his position and circumstances at that time would have done and decided and to set this up as a standard against which the employer’s actions and decisions are to be judged.”

The function of the Adjudication Officer is therefore to assess what a reasonable employer in the Respondent’s position and circumstances might have done and this is the standard by which the Respondent’s actions must be judged against. 

In examining the substantive fairness of the dismissal in the instant case, I note firstly that the allegations were confined to hygiene and food‑safety issues:

·        that food which had fallen to the floor was not discarded by the Complainant but was in fact served to a customer;

·        that duck was reheated using a microwave rather than by the method preferred by the Respondent;

·        and that further hygiene concerns (head or hand hygiene and the handling of a phone while cooking) were later identified. These additional matters did not arise from routine supervision after the takeover but only after the first incidents were noted, when the Respondent began retrospectively reviewing CCTV in search of further issues.

Having carefully considered the evidence provided, I am of the view that the Respondent’s reactive, backward‑looking approach to the allegations is at odds with what would ordinarily be expected of a new owner inheriting a long‑serving employee accustomed to existing practices. In my view, a reasonable employer would have clearly communicated any revised standards, issued updated hygiene protocols, and offered refresher training with a reasonable period for adjustment. Instead, all of the allegations relied on the Respondent’s own CCTV review and internal observations. In addition, the Complainant’s explanations (including that the dropped food was re‑fried) were not probed in any structured way, and the Respondent did not evidence any written communication of revised expectations. A reasonable employer, faced with such explanations, would have sought corroboration or clarification before concluding that they were inadequate.

I am also of the view that, even taking the allegations at their height, they fall far short of the type of serious and deliberate misconduct capable of justifying dismissal, let alone summary dismissal. They concerned isolated lapses in food handling practice; none resulted in any customer complaint, harm, or regulatory concern. Even in cases where food safety and hygiene issues arise, which I recognise are serious, warnings, retraining, and closer supervision are typically used unless there is gross negligence, intentional wrongdoing, or actual harm. Any reasonable employer would have considered proportionate corrective steps rather than proceeding directly to termination. My view in this regard is supported by the decision in the case of Desmond Brennan v Institute of Technology Carlow (UD281/2000), where the Employment Appeals Tribunal made the often-cited statement that:

“gross misconduct must be something very serious indeed, perhaps criminal or quasi-criminal in nature.”

In examining the procedures used by the Respondent in relation to the dismissal, I noted that the process moved along at a remarkable speed. The Respondent suspended the Complainant on 14 June 2025 following an investigation meeting held that day and sought to hold a disciplinary meeting only five days later, on 19 June 2025. When that meeting stalled, further correspondence issued the very next day, 20 June 2025, setting out new allegations arising from additional CCTV review. Between 21 and 23 June 2025, the Respondent pressed for a further meeting. Although the parties dispute whether the disciplinary hearing on 23 June 2025 actually proceeded because of the presence of the Complainant’s daughter, what is clear is that no suitable or private meeting space was available: first, the customer seating area was proposed; then the kitchen; and finally a tiny storeroom/coat closet which once again is indicative of the speed at which the Respondent wished to proceed with the process.

In considering the location of the disciplinary hearing which took place on 19 June 2025 in the customer seating area of a restaurant and the disciplinary hearing which took place in a tiny storeroom on 23 June 2025, I am of the view that, while S.I. No. 146/2000 does not expressly use the word “privacy,” the Code requires that a disciplinary process affords an employee a fair and impartial hearing, with representation and a real opportunity to respond. Those guarantees cannot be meaningfully provided unless the meeting is conducted in a private and confidential setting. Holding (or attempting to hold) the meeting in a customer area, then proposing the kitchen, and finally a tiny storeroom/coat‑closet fell well short of the standard needed to give effect to the Code’s requirements of fair procedures and natural justice.

I also noted that in the invitation to the disciplinary hearing scheduled for 23 June 2025 the Complainant was expressly instructed not to discuss the matter with any other colleague without prior written authorisation from the Respondent. I find that this instruction is at odds with the Respondent’s assertion that the Complainant was free to have a colleague accompany him at the disciplinary hearing. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the Complainant could realistically secure such accompaniment when he was simultaneously prohibited from even speaking to colleagues about the matter unless the Respondent first granted written approval. This contradiction is, frankly, bizarre, and it calls into question the Respondent’s bona fides in presenting itself as willing to facilitate colleague representation.

This bizarre instruction is underscored by what occurred when the Complainant did identify a colleague, Dylan, willing to attend the hearing with him. That colleague was rostered to work for the Respondent at the scheduled time, yet the Respondent refused to adjust either the hearing time or the colleague’s roster to allow him to accompany the Complainant. In circumstances where the Respondent had already restricted accompaniment to a workplace colleague or union representative—and where the available meeting window was exceptionally tight—the refusal to make even a minor adjustment meant that the Complainant was effectively deprived of the only form of representation the Respondent itself insisted upon.

I also noted the introduction of new allegations mid‑process without any supplementary investigation. Although these matters which were identified for the first time in CCTV review were added to the disciplinary case against him on 20 June 2025, the Complainant was never interviewed in relation to these allegations before they were relied upon at the disciplinary stage. Fair procedure requires that where new information emerges, the investigation must expand to address it and the employee must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond before those matters are treated as established.

This requirement was set out very clearly by Mr Des Ryan BL at para 13.72 of Redmond on Dismissal Law (3rdEd., Bloomsbury Professional, 2017) where he stated:

“Heavy emphasis has been laid in recent case law on the duty on an employer to set out clearly allegations made against an employee from the outset, with the employer not being permitted to augment the allegations as the investigation progresses. This is because an employee is entitled to be informed at the outset of the complaint(s) being made against him or her in order to ensure he or she has a meaningful opportunity to prepare and present his or her defence.”

This suggestion was echoed by the Labour Court in the case of Ibrahim Salah v RCI Call Centre (Ireland) Ltd (UDD 202) where it was stated that:

“It appears to the Court that the Complainant was not informed at the outset of the investigation of all of the allegations ultimately raised against him. This raises a question in the Court’s mind as to whether or not he was afforded a proper and meaningful opportunity to present his defence to them.” 

The involvement of the same two management personnel throughout the process was also a cause for grave concern. The Respondent’s own documentation indicates that the same two individuals, Jessica and Ming, were jointly involved at each stage of the process: namely in making the decision to suspend the Complainant, gathering information, framing the allegations, conducting meetings, and ultimately determining the outcome. While smaller employers may face practical constraints, there is nonetheless an expectation that some distinction be maintained between investigatory and decision‑making roles, or that steps be taken to mitigate the risk of pre‑determination. No such step was taken in this case.

The dismissal letter of 25 June 2025 offered the Complainant a right of appeal and an email was subsequently received from the Complainant’s daughter purporting to appeal the decision to dismiss. I noted that the Respondent replied seeking written authorisation from the Complainant before they would accept or consider the appeal, and no appeal hearing was ever convened thereafter. In the circumstances of this case, and given that English is not the Complainant’s first language, the Respondent’s refusal to accept the daughter’s appeal on behalf of her father was unreasonable. The Respondent knew an appeal had been lodged within days of the dismissal and that the Complainant wished to challenge the decision. They could easily have regularised the authorisation (for example, via a brief call with the Complainant to confirm that he did wish to appeal) but did not do so. Given the pace of the earlier stages and the seriousness of the outcome, the absence of any functioning appeal process is a significant procedural failing.

Such an appeal would have been the first realistic opportunity to test whether the additional allegations had been fairly investigated and put to the Complainant before being relied upon. Given also the compressed timetable and the lack of separation of roles at first instance, as outlined above, an independent appeal would have provided the fresh scrutiny that the initial process lacked, including a review of proportionality and alternatives to dismissal for a long‑serving employee with a clean record. None of that occurred.

Considering all of the foregoing, I find that the overall process cannot be characterised as fair or reasonable. Moreover for an employee with long service and no prior disciplinary history, an employer would ordinarily be expected to consider alternatives to dismissal such as retraining, closer supervision, or a warning. There is no evidence that the Respondent considered any such alternatives. Accordingly, I find both that the Respondent has not shown that the dismissal was within the range of responses open to a reasonable employer, and the significant procedural shortcomings identified above fall short of the standards required by natural justice. I therefore find that the dismissal was unfair.

CA-00073635-009:

Section 4 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973, states:

4.—(1) An employer shall, in order to terminate the contract of employment of an employee who has been in his continuous service for a period of thirteen weeks or more, give to that employee a minimum period of notice calculated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

(2) The minimum notice to be given by an employer to terminate the contract of employment of his employee shall be—

(a) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for less than two years, one week,

(b) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for two years or more, but less than five years, two weeks,

(c) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for five years or more, but less than ten years, four weeks,

(d) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for ten years or more, but less than fifteen years, six weeks,

(e) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for fifteen years or more, eight weeks.

Findings:

It was not disputed by the Respondent that the Complainant did not receive his minimum notice entitlements when he was dismissed. Consequently, I find this complaint to be well-founded because the dismissal was unfair. Specifically, considering his length of service, which exceeded five years, he is entitled to four weeks’ notice.

CA-00073635-001:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00073635-002:

This complaint was withdrawn.

CA-00073635-003:

This is a duplicate complaint and has been addressed in CA-00073635-005 below.

CA-00073635-004:

This is a duplicate complaint and has been addressed in CA-00073635-005 below.

CA-00073635-005:

I find that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed for the reasons set out above.

Section 7 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, in relevant part, states that:

(1) Where an employee is dismissed and the dismissal is an unfair dismissal, the employee shall be entitled to redress consisting of whichever of the following the adjudication officer, considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances:

(a) re-instatement by the employer of the employee in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal on the terms and conditions on which he was employed immediately before his dismissal together with a term that the re-instatement shall be deemed to have commenced on the day of the dismissal, or

(b) re-engagement by the employer of the employee either in the position which he held immediately before his dismissal or in a different position which would be reasonably suitable for him on such terms and conditions as are reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances,

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) of this section, in determining the amount of compensation payable under that subsection regard shall be had to—

(a) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employer,

(b) the extent (if any) to which the financial loss referred to in that subsection was attributable to an act, omission or conduct by or on behalf of the employee,

(c) the measures (if any) adopted by the employee or, as the case may be, his failure to adopt measures, to mitigate the loss aforesaid,

(d) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the procedure referred to in subsection (1) of section 14 of this Act or with the provisions of any code of practice relating to procedures regarding dismissal approved of by the Minister,

(e) the extent (if any) of the compliance or failure to comply by the employer, in relation to the employee, with the said section 14,

(f) the extent (if any) to which the conduct of the employee (whether by act or omission) contributed to the dismissal.

3) In this section—

“financial loss”, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the rights of the employee under the Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation;

“remuneration” includes allowances in the nature of pay and benefits in lieu of or in addition to pay.

The Remedy

In deciding on a suitable remedy, I must firstly consider reinstating or re-engaging the Complainant.

In making this decision, I have regard to the findings of the Supreme Court in An Bord Banistiochta, Gaelscoil Moshiolog v The Labour Court, where it was stated that “the remedy of reinstatement is exceptional in nature,involving as it does the imposition of a contractual relationship which is not only personal, but involves a high level of mutual trust and confidence, on an unwilling party…. It is wrong to view reinstatement simply as punishment for wrongdoing on the part of the employer”

Considering the foregoing, I am satisfied, based on the evidence presented to me, that the trust and confidence required for the resumption of an employment relationship no longer exists.  Accordingly, I have decided to make an award of compensation and note that the maximum award permissible under the Act is €62,400, namely 104 weeks’ pay.

The “Financial Loss” Attributable to The Dismissal

In calculating the “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal from 25 June 2025, I note that Charleton J in Panisi, in assessing loss, stated as follows: 

My task is to assess the financial damage which the dismissal has brought about and then to place the measure of that damage against the maximum amount of compensation that is available. In the event that the compensation that is available, amounting to 104 weeks remuneration, is less than that sum, then that is the measure of damages. Where the quantum of damage is more, then the jurisdiction is limited to that maximum and the amount of damages must thus be reduced to that maximum sum. Where the measure of damages on dismissal is more than the maximum but contributory fault is found in respect of the dismissal against the employee, the reduction is on the totality of those damages, and not on the maximum award. If the result is to reduce compensation within the maximum award, that sum is appropriate. Where the reduction in total damages for contributory fault puts the damages above the maximum award, then the maximum award is the correct measure of compensation for unfair dismissal.

As set out above, I must therefore next assess the overall loss attributable to the dismissal

In examining this, I noted firstly that the Complainant was dismissed on 25 June 2025 and the WRC hearing took place on 2 March 2026, 36 weeks later. This yields an actual loss of €21,600 to the hearing date. While I recognise that his age may hinder swift re‑entry to comparable employment, I allow a modest prospective element of 12 weeks at the same weekly rate, amounting to €7,200, given the current shortage of chefs in the jobs market. The combined wages loss (actual plus prospective) therefore stands at €28,800.

In addition, I note that the dismissal has resulted in the Complainant losing his entitlement to a statutory redundancy payment. As reflected in the definition of “financial loss” in the Act—which, in relation to the dismissal of an employee, includes any actual loss and any estimated prospective loss of income attributable to the dismissal, and the value of any loss or diminution, attributable to the dismissal, of the employee’s rights under the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 1973, or in relation to superannuation—the value of the lost redundancy entitlement forms part of the  financial loss arising from the dismissal.

The statutory redundancy lump sum is a distinct statutory entitlement that accrues over the course of the Complainant’s service and vests only upon termination. It is therefore properly regarded as a statutory right forfeited as a direct consequence of the dismissal, rather than as compensation for post‑dismissal loss.

On the evidence before me, I quantify the value of the redundancy rights lost as a result of the dismissal at €11,400.

Calculation of award

As set out above, I have found that the Complainant’s overall “financial loss” attributable to the dismissal is €40,200. I must now examine if there is any basis for a “reduction .. on the totality of those damages” as set out by Charleton J in Panisi.

Mitigation is firstly considered. While the Complainant is required not to act unreasonably, I noted that since his dismissal he confined his job search to a very, very narrow geographic area close to his home. That falls short of the duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate his financial loss, and a deduction is warranted. I therefore apply a mitigation deduction of 25% to the financial loss. The Complainant’s contribution to the dismissal is assessed as negligible and no reduction is made on that ground.

Considering the foregoing, I make an award of compensation of €30,150 and direct that the Respondent make a payment to the Complainant in this amount in respect of the unfair dismissal. This figure reflects: (i) the dismissal being both substantively and procedurally unfair; (ii) the Complainant’s negligible contribution to the dismissal; and (iv) a 25% reduction for insufficient mitigation based on his very narrow job‑search geography.

 CA-00073635-009:

I find this complaint to be well-founded for the reasons set out above and direct that the Respondent make a payment to the Complainant of €2,400.