Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Una  Cullen

Teagasc

Representatives

Peter Glynn SIPTU

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 14 of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 2003

CA-00073015-001

01/07/2025

The complainant has been employed by Teagasc as a Data Technologist since 5th September 2016, and is based in the research centre in Johnstown Castle, Wexford.

She is employed on a specified purpose fixed-term contract dated 15th July 22016; for the purpose of carrying out specific research activities associated with the Agricultural Catchments Programme.

She says that she is entitled to a Contract of Indefinite Duration.

Ms Una Cullen the complainant commenced employment on a Fixed Term Contract on September 15th, 2016, as a Technologist Grade 1 carrying out the duties and responsibilities of data technologists which is pivotal to both the Nitrates and Water Framework Directive within the Teagasc Agricultural Catchments Programme (ACP).

The complainant submits that the respondent breached Section 9 of the Protection of Employees Fixed Term Work Act 2003.

The ACP which commenced in 2008 funded by the parent Department of Agriculture run by Teagasc. The programme is currently in phase 55, 20242027.

 In July 2023, following a promotional process she secured the position of Technologist Grade 2 and was assigned the additional higher-level duties and responsibilities within the Agriculture Catchment Programme.

The duties carried outby thecomplainant were set outwithin theJob specification although the complainant and has been assigned additionaldutiesoutsidetheJobSpecificationbutalignedtotheGrade.

At no point during her employment has the programme been discontinued or paused. It  began in 2008 and over the period has grown and forms part of the greater government policy on climate actions as identified within the Department correspondence in 2019 and 2023. Appendix 4

The programme is now in its fifth phase and in a recent article in Agriland published in November 2023 the author highlighted the approval provided by Government and the objectives that ACP would be assisting farmers improving water quality. Appendix 5

The ACP is also linked to the overall Climate Action Plan 2050, issued by Government which clearly demonstrates the objectives required by Government and the ongoing work that is needed.

At a recent Teagasc Trade Union and Management forum the Director of Research Dr Pat Dillon advised the audience that Teagasc were the lead appointed body by the Department to head this programme and while some small progress has been achieved lot more work to be done.

The additional duties and responsibilities associated with the phase 4 and 5 of the programmes are a deviation from the original specific purpose and are such contract albeit in name.

The securing of the Technologist 2 position added further duties and responsibilities communicated to the complainant in 2023 was without question a second contract albeit in name. that the duties identified fall outside the original Specific Purpose of the catchment programme contract of 2013 and further demonstrates that work in question is ongoing and continuous.

In the decision, FTC/12/7 the Court refers to the CJEU and the distinction between work undertaken for the purpose of meeting some temporary needsoftheemployerandworkforthepurposeofmeetingsometemporary needs or transient need. In FTC/12/7 the Court found that carrying out research is a core activity of the respondent were some 40% of the respondent budget isresearch.

The Court found that carrying out of funded research is a continuing function of the respondent rather than a once off activity. Appendix 7

The employer has previously argued that the restrictions place on them from the parent Department and workforce plan precludes them from issuing a Contract of Indefinite Duration. The employer cites the pay-roll ceiling as a determining factor in not issuing CID. The parent department DAFM states that the employer has delegated sanction mechanism to address these albeit the organisation has specific grades and core numbers which they cannot exceed without DAFM and DENPR approval.

It is our assertion that the employer does not have the liberty to avoid their legislate responsibilities and a moratorium on recruitment, or a payroll ceiling within the organisation does not negate an individual's legal right or entitlement. Adherence to DAFM rules is not a legislative objective as defined within case law.

In National Gallery of Ireland V Michael Coyne (FTD) 1232 the Court held that an employer cannot pre-emptively have resort to fixed-term contracts to safeguard against possible future of having ‘surplus permanent employees’. Within the Court ruling it was noted that the respondent’s desire to avoid the situation in which it might find itself with more permanent staff could not of itself be a legitimate objective.

We believe that the grounds stated by the employer in the complainant  contract of employment are not objective grounds, and therefore we consider that they were vague and general do not meet the requirement of Clause 8 of the Act. The statements incorporated within the Contract are based on considerations only on the status of the employee; and was not for the purpose of achieving a legitimate objective of the Employer.

Conclusion:

The work carried out by the respondent is ongoing and continuous when you consider the contracts of employment and the subsequent extensions since 2008 and beyond. The complainant  was employed as a Technologist Grade 1, promoted to Technologist 2 carrying out the duties and responsibilities of that post. In 2019 the specific purpose programme increased the role and responsibilities diverting form the original specific purpose contract.

We believe that the grounds stated by the employer in the complainant contracts of employment are not objective grounds, and therefore we consider that they were vague and general do not meet the requirement of Clause 8 of the Act. The statements incorporated within the Contract are based on considerations only on the status of the employee; and was not for the purpose of achieving a legitimate objective of the Employer.

We further believe that the employer breached Section 9 of the Act, and that the aggregated duration of the Contract and the Extensions to-date is exceeding the four thresholds and therefore Section 9 (3) shall apply in this instance.

The employer quantifies funding as an objective ground. On the issue of Funding, as referred to in the Fixed-Term Contract dated 2013, the general statement is evasive and refers to just funding dependent.

The complainant gave evidence on oath. She spoke to the additional duties that arose on renewal of the projects, such as data interpretation, writing code for websites for other projects etc.

The Agricultural Catchments Programme is a Teagasc research and advisory “living lab” that evaluates how farming practices affect water quality and, more recently, greenhouse gas and ammonia emissions and soil carbon sequestration. The Programme commenced in 2008 and is funded by the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine (DAFM).

Ms Cullen’s specified purpose contract provides that the event which will cause the fixed-term contract to an end is “whichever of the following occurs first:

•      Completion of the overall project referred to above and/or the purpose for which you are employed.

•      Completion of the section of the project for which you are employed; or

•      Cessation of the project for whatever reason including but not limited to withdrawal or expiry of sanction for this post, withdrawal or termination of funding by the funding agency or otherwise at any stage during the life of the project.”

None of the above events has occurred to date and Ms Cullen remains employed under the contract of 15th July 2016.

CA-00073015-001 – Section 14 of the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 2003

Section 9 of the Act outlines that in order for an employee to be eligible for a Contract of Indefinite Duration, there must be two or more continuous fixed-term contracts, and the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years.

9.(1) Subject to subsection (4), where on or after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee completes or has completed his or her third year of continuous employment with his or her employer or associated employer, his or her fixed-term contract may be renewed by that employer on only one occasion, and any such renewal shall be for a fixed term of no longer than one year.

(2)  Subject to subsection (4), where after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee is employed by his or her employer or associated employer on two or more continuous fixed-term contracts and the date of the first such contract is subsequent to the date on which this Act is passed, the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years.

(3)  Where any term of a fixed-term contract purports to contravene subsection (1) or

(2) that term shall have no effect and the contract concerned shall be deemed to be a contract of indefinite duration.

(4)  Subsections (1) to (3) shall not apply to the renewal of a contract of employment for a fixed term where there are objective grounds justifying such a renewal.

(5)  The First Schedule to the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts 1973 to 2005 shall apply for the purpose of ascertaining the period of service of an employee and whether that service has been continuous.

This point was considered by the Labour Court in Department of Employment Affairs and Social Protection v Concarr (FTD184). In that case the employee had been employed on a single specified purpose contract related to the rollout of the Public Service Card. The employee sought a Contract of Indefinite Duration based on the fact that her specified purpose contract had continued for longer than 4 years.

After considering section 9 of the 2003 Act and the Framework Agreement on Fixed-Term Work annexed to EU Directive 99/70/EC which the 2003 Act implements, the Labour Court stated that:

“The language of Section 9 must also be examined carefully. It seems clear from the wording of Section 9 as a whole that it is directed as regulating the circumstances in which fixed-term contracts can be renewed. This appears to comport fully with the requirements of Clause 5 of the Framework Agreement, just quoted, which is also focused on the successive renewal of fixed-term contracts.

Where a fixed-term contract is not renewed there can be no contravention of Section 9(1), (2) or (3) of the Act. The Court is entirely satisfied that this is a correct interpretation of the Act.”

As Ms Cullen has been employed on one specified purpose contract of employment and there has been no renewal of this contract, there is no eligibility for a Contract of Indefinite Duration under the 2003 Act in this case.

In relation to the claim under the 2003 Act, as Ms Cullen has only been employed by Teagasc on one specified purpose fixed-term contract, which has never been renewed, section 9 of the 2003 Act does not apply.

The facts are set out above in both submissions.

The complainant was recruited in 2016 on a fixed term, specific purpose contract with an initial (indicative) duration of forty two months.

She remains on that contract almost ten years later.

The respondent defended its position on the basis that the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 2003(hereafter ‘The Act’) becomes relevant only where there has been a renewal of a contract within a four year period and that no such triggering event has occurred.

The complainant has argued that there have been a number of episodes which challenge this assertion.

Firstly, the complainant says that the project on which she works has had its funding renewed on two occasions, on November 11th, 2019, and December 1st, 2023, and that this is relevant to a determination as to whether she has had her contract extended.

In support of this, in her sworn evidence she outlined how each extension of the project involved a revision and expansion of the project objectives and included new elements that had not been in the previous programmes.

A further consideration is that the complainant was successful in an internal promotional competition and was upgraded on August 18th, 2023. She says that any one, or all of these three episodes, is sufficient to be considered a de facto renewal of her contract.

In summary, the position of the respondent in respect of an alleged breach of section 9 is essentially that the project on which the complainant works has been an uninterrupted sequence of activity. It says that this did not require any renewal or extension of the complainant’s contract, and that, in any case, as a matter of fact it did not formally issue any contract since the original one in 2016 that would bring it within the provisions in Section 9 of the Act.

As a matter of fact, this latter assertion, that no formal written contract was issued is true, but whether the preceding statements are also true must be examined further. It will be necessary to consider whether, what the respondent describes as ‘phases’ of the programme, with the implication that there is a continuous project, is valid.

And if they were not, did this result in a fresh contract arising, whether or not the respondent gave expression to this in writing.

In reviewing the Framework Agreement (Council Directive 999/70, June 28th, 1999) on which the Protections of Employees (Fixed term Work) Act 2003 is based, it has been noted that.

‘An important point to make about the Framework Agreement is that it proceeds on the premise that employment contracts of indefinite duration are the general form of employment relationship while recognising that fixed term employment contracts are a feature of employment in certain sectors or in respect of certain occupations and activities.

In essence the framework agreement and the directive and consequently the transposing Irish legislation embody two specific purposes set out in clause one of the framework agreement.

These are.

·       To  improve the quality of fixed term work by ensuring the application of the principle of non-discrimination

·       To  establish a framework to prevent abuse arising from the use of successive fixed term employment contracts or relationships.

‘Employment Law’  Second Edition, eds, Murphy Regan. Para 13.04

This continues as follows at para 13.05 to describe the principle of non-discrimination as follows

In  respect of employment conditions fixed term workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable permanent workers solely because they have a fixed term contract or relation unless different treatment is justified on objective grounds.

This finds expression in the Act in Section 6 as follows.

Conditions of employment for fixed-term employees.

6.—(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (5), a fixed-term employee shall not, in respect of his or her conditions of employment, be treated in a less favourable manner than a comparable permanent employee.

The conditionality provided for in sub section 2 relates to ‘objective justification’, (sub section 5 is not relevant for the purposes of this complaint). Section 2 is as follows.

(2) If treating a fixed-term employee, in respect of a particular condition of employment, in a less favourable manner than a comparable permanent employee can be justified on objective grounds then that employee may, notwithstanding subsection (1), be so treated.

Section 9 is as follows.

Successive fixed-term contracts.

9.—(1) Subject to subsection (4), where on or after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee completes or has completed his or her third year of continuous employment with his or her employer or associated employer, his or her fixed-term contract may be renewed by that employer on only one occasion and any such renewal shall be for a fixed term of no longer than one year.

(2) Subject to subsection (4), where after the passing of this Act a fixed-term employee is employed by his or her employer or associated employer on two or more continuous fixed-term contracts and the date of the first such contract is subsequent to the date on which this Act is passed, the aggregate duration of such contracts shall not exceed 4 years.

(3) Where any term of a fixed-term contract purports to contravene subsection (1) or (2) that term shall have no effect and the contract concerned shall be deemed to be a contract of indefinite duration.

(4) Subsections (1) to (3) shall not apply to the renewal of a contract of employment for a fixed term where there are objective grounds justifying such a renewal.

While there is much litigation on this point it is not the only aspect of the protections provided by the legislation that has to be considered.  The respondent has exclusively addressed the provisions of Section 9 of the Act which deal with the renewal of successive fixed term contracts. It has not provided any ‘objective grounds’ beyond the original contract for the complainant‘s continuing status.

It will be necessary to address whether the complainant’s position is any different to co-workers with the respondent engaged on generally similar work but who are on contracts of indefinite duration (CID), and especially having regard to the total, and considerable length of the complainant’s employment and the nature and duration of the project on which she is working.

A co-worker on a CID has obvious benefits denied to the complainant. They have security of tenure, membership of a superannuation scheme etc.

I return to this below.

The complainant’s original contract.

The complainant has been employed on a fixed term, specific purpose contract for just under ten years. For context, this would represent about a quarter of an entire working life for most workers.

Under the heading ‘Duration/Purpose’ in her contract of employment the following appears.

1.1 ‘Subject to the provisions for termination hereafter appearing, for the purpose of carrying out specific research activities associated with the following research project: Agricultural Catchments Programme (ACP), Dept. Reference: T/B 22 (176), Dept. Sanction: DAFM 18/2015/PR.EFP. Externally Funded non grant-in-aid.

The programme itself has been running since 2008 and is currently extended to 2027 so that by that time it will have been running for almost twenty years, and the complainant, if she remains with the respondent, will have served eleven of those.

The ‘provisions for termination’ in the complainant’s contract were set out by the respondent as follows.

‘Ms Cullen’s specified purpose contract provides that the event which will cause the fixed-term contract to an end is “whichever of the following occurs first’:

•      Completion of the overall project referred to above and/or the purpose for which you are employed.

•      Completion of the section of the project for which you are employed; or

•      Cessation of the project for whatever reason including but not limited to withdrawal or expiry of sanction for this post, withdrawal or termination of funding by the funding agency or otherwise at any stage during the life of the project.”

This raises an interesting question about the related concepts of a ‘fixed term’ and a ‘specific purpose’.

For example, on a close reading of the section ‘Duration/Purpose’ it will be seen that neither duration nor purpose are adequately defined; the first not at all, and the second extremely vaguely as to ‘carry out specific research activities with the named research project’.

For the purposes of the complaint this invites examination of the point at which those terms exhaust the normal meaning attached to them in everyday usage, specifically having regard to the requirements of Section 2 of the Act.

 Also, add to this the objective set out above from the Framework Agreement that contracts of indefinite duration should be the normal basis for the employee relationship.

The Agricultural Catchment Project.

This is the project on which the complainant has been engaged since 2016 on a specific purpose contract.

It is not at all inconceivable that the ‘specific purpose’ for which this project exists could last, if not indefinitely (especially having regard to its role in addressing climate change which is unlikely to be concluded anytime soon), then for quite some time.

Thus, the first two points referred to above related to ‘completion’ of the complainant’s contract might never materialise.

If that were to be the case, the complainant’s original contract would be little more than a device to avoid giving her a CID and to bypass the requirements of the Act. This may not have been the original intention in 2016, but after almost ten years it is long past time to look at it in a different light.

This is expressed in the contract as follows in the section headed ‘Duration/Purpose’.

1.3    You should note that it is not possible to offer you a contract for a fixed period since the exact duration and the amount of funding of the said Teagasc/Agricultural Catchments Programme (ACP), Dept. Reference: T/B 22 (176), Dept. Sanction: DAFM 18/2015/PR.EFP is incapable of precise ascertainment.

The question arises therefore as to the precise legal status of a contract purporting to be for a ‘specific purpose’ which runs for ten or twenty years and whose exact duration ‘is incapable of precise ascertainment’, and whether it is simply a device to evade the proscription on discrimination against fixed term workers in Section 6 of the Act.

The phrase ‘specific purpose’ must be considered in its ordinary meaning; put simply, there must be a definable purpose, and it must be capable of being specified within reason. It may be easier to say what it is not than what it is. Certainly, it will be very difficult to shoehorn a period equivalent to the duration of a significant portion of a person’s working life into the concept of a ‘specific purpose’.

It would be an interesting exercise in semantics to attempt to distinguish between a contract whose duration is described as being ‘incapable of precise ascertainment’ and a contract of indefinite duration; in their ordinary meaning the phrases are practically synonymous.

Put bluntly, one reason that may be ‘incapable of precise ascertainment’ is because there is no prospect of it coming to an end for the foreseeable future.

This then is the case as to whether there has been a breach under Section 6 of the Act and whether the complainant is being discriminated against in respect of key terms of her conditions of employment by reference to comparators in Teagasc who are on contracts of indefinite duration.

Has the contract been renewed?

Turning then to look at the other grounds advanced by the complainant, viz that the extensions of the programme in 2018 and 2023 represented a de facto renewal of her contract, she says that on each occasion the newly mandated project involved additional, or revised functions.

I note the following from the Department of Agriculture website on the occasion of the 2019 extension.

Following three successful phases of the ACP, Phase 4 of the programme will now also collect data on greenhouse gases emissions, ammonia emissions and soil carbon sequestration, as well as extending the current baseline monitoring of water quality. These new developments will significantly enhance the monitoring of impacts of agriculture on our environment and aid the Department achieve our targets under the Climate Action Plan

The complainant relies on a similar argument about her 2023 promotion and that this was, de facto, a contract extension. There were ‘new’ developments’ a significant enhancement of monitoring etc.

The respondent’s position is simply that this was a continuum and specifically that no formal contract was issued on any of these occasions. Both the respondent and the funding Department refer to the individual episodes of the programme as ‘phases’.

Thus, the current programme is described as phase five, suggesting the idea of a continuum, and not individual, free standing projects.

In reality, and in applying it to this complaint, this is somewhat imprecise and self-serving.

It may be fine to refer to ‘phases’ in a general description of the project for public relations purposes, but seeking to construe the status of the complainant’s contract by relying on this language is another matter.

In reality. each of these so-called ‘phases’ is independently approved for funding by the Department of Agriculture. There is no guarantee as one comes to an end that another will be funded either at all or to what extent. One cannot look forward at the project and how many phases it has, of which a set number are yet to follow.

Indeed, looking at this from the complainant‘s perspective, as each ‘phase’ of the project nears its end, she will have every reason to be concerned that she will lose her job until she hears to the contrary. Rather than being one of a number of phases, for her, each phase has a distinct air of finality until it is formally re-funded, which as has been noted, may or may not happen.

It is accepted that the word ‘phase’ may not be amenable to a precise definition. That said, to the extent that there is an attempt by the respondent to use it to suggest each ‘phase’ is but one component of a longer incarnation it is not an accurate description of the reality of each individual project for the purposes of considering the complainant’s contractual position.

This is especially the case if its purpose is to diminish the significance of each renewal for the complainant’s employment status.

I was not provided with any documentation in relation to this, for example whether the complainant is put on provisional notice of the termination of her employment etc in the event of non-renewal. But her contract of employment clearly foresees that outcome. The complainant faces the very real prospect as a ‘phase’ approaches its conclusion that she will be out of work.

In reality, the so called ‘phases’ are essentially only capable of being viewed retrospectively and looking back it may be possible to see a seamless transition from one phase to the next, but this is only the position as long as funding has been made available, which is not guaranteed for the future.

The reality that it may not be renewed must be factored into any consideration as to what happens at the end of each ‘phase.’

So, while we are currently in ‘Phase Five’, and we know there was a phase four, no one can say for certain at this stage that there will be a ‘Phase Six’. Going on past form it is likely that there will and that here could be many more ‘phases’. There appear to have been variations and extended tasks in the mandate of each project.

But the essential characteristic of each ‘phase’ is that it has to be approved and funded and if this did not happen the complainant’s contract would terminate, and it is only revived by the provision of a fresh tranche of funding. The word ‘phase’ is probably being used here to create a false impression of the status of each project to undermine the complainant’s assertion that each renewal gives rise to a fresh contract for her.

In my view, her exposure to the risk of a termination at the end of each phase transforms it into a free-standing episode in her career.

The respondent had a choice. It could have offered the complainant a contract for the duration of each project, but it understood well that this would eventually bring her within range of a CID, and it chose not to do so. Instead, it chose to operate this long term strategy which placed its own convenience and interests above that of the complainant and, as we shall see, outside the law.

What is required to establish whether the contact was extended?

In general, while a  written document provides clarity and certainty about the terms of any contract,  a contract of employment may be discerned by reference to other criteria, and it is certainly not the case that the absence of a written document means that no contract exists, or, by extension that the terms of an initial contract have not changed to the point where it represents a new contract.

Thus, the failure of the respondent in this case to formally issue a fresh contract is not fully determinative of whether, in fact, a new contract (or more precisely a renewed contract) came into being. In my view it should have issued a fresh contract on the commencement of a newly funded project.

And that question acquires a particular significance in the context of the protection of fixed term workers. Indeed, mindful of the contra proferentum principle the respondent had a vested interest in not regularising the complainant’s position by formally issuing a new contract.

Were the employer’s argument to succeed it would entirely undermine the purpose of the legislation if a person could be given a specific purpose contract, say at the age of twenty-five with some vague, ‘unascertainable’ purpose or duration and left there without the benefits and security of a CID until they retired.

Other than in the event of a non-renewal of funding there is no realistic means of ascertaining how the complainant’s contract could ever be completed.

The respondent is trying to have the best of both worlds. On the one hand it relies on the ‘unascertainable’ argument to justify the complainant’s uncertain contractual status but is happy to overlook the reality that the project has been renewed for a twenty-year period and is likely to continue to be renewed for some time.

However, the complainant’s 2023 promotion gives rise to a quite different set of issues. It is a somewhat peculiar oddity in all of this.

While it is provided for in the ‘Teagasc Procedures and Guidelines for Filling Technologist Grade 2 ‘General Round’ Promotions, May 2022’, the idea that a fixed term worker would be permitted to compete and succeed in an internal promotion within the established public sector grading structure of Teagasc is surprising to say the least.

It suggests very strongly that the complainant was more integrated into the respondent’s structures than might be expected in general for a person who was a ‘contract (for services) worker’.

In any event, its particular significance is for the current complaint under the Act and looking at the outcome of the competition, this is further reinforced.

The complainant submits above that following her promotion to Technologist Grade 2 she was ‘assigned the additional higher-level duties and responsibilities within the Agriculture Catchment Programme’.

The letter of offer from the respondent’s HR department contained the following. (All underlining added).

You will commence on the 1st point of the Technologist Grade 2 pay scale on a salary of €68,491 per annum. You will move to the 2nd point of this scale on 1st July 2024 subject to satisfactory service, this date will become your new increment date going forward.

On receipt of this letter and on confirmation that you are accepting the promotion, you are requested to meet with your line manager, HOD and/or HOP (as appropriate) at the earliest date to discuss and agree the additional duties/higher responsibilities relevant to your role at Technologist Grade 2 as outlined in the Technologist Grade 2 Promotions Procedures Guidelines. These additional duties/higher responsibilities should be reflected in your PMDS objectives/role profile going forward.

Your annual leave will be capped at a maximum of 30 days per annum in keeping with the public sector annual leave arrangements.

Please indicate your acceptance or otherwise of this promotion to Technologist Grade 2by signing this letter and returning it to me via email no later than Thursday 24th August 2023.

The complainant signed and returned the letter of offer.

Consider the components of this as identified by my underlining above; a promotion to a higher grade following a competitive interview process, an incremental salary scale on which progression is subject only to ‘satisfactory service’, additional duties, higher responsibilities, and, critically, the total absence of any reference to her ‘specific purpose’ contract.

The original 2016 contract contains the following.

It is agreed that [with consent of the Minister etc] Teagasc shall appoint you as a contract Technologist Grade 1…etc)

Contrast this with the text above in the letter of offer. The grade in question is Technologist Grade 2, not ‘contract’ Technologist Grade 2, as appears in the original contract.

For the purposes of the instant complaint, it is impossible to see this as anything other than the offer of a new contract as it involved a re-grading to a higher grade and essentially a significant change in her contractual relationship with the respondent.

The suggestion that this represented some continuum of her previous contractual position is ludicrous and not sustainable in the face of this.

There is no doubt that this would have required an amendment to the Terms of Employment (Information Act statement but it is much more than this.

Having regard to these facts and arguments I find and conclude as follows.

The complainant is engaged on work that is part of the core work of the respondent.

Contracts of Indefinite Duration are the norm within Teagasc as a public service body, and its employees are, in general, public servants employed on contracts of indefinite duration.  These are the relevant comparators for the purposes of an assessment of a breach under section 6.

It is excessively and unacceptably vague to rely on the concept of a ‘specific purpose’ to describe a project whose duration is ‘incapable of precise ascertainment’ and it would completely undermine the protections provided by the Act to permit it on these facts.

It might be possible to make a case on this point where the degree of uncertainty was in the nature of provision for a margin of error, for example about whether a project might end in six months, but it could be nine, or end in two years but it could be two and a half.

But a failure to ‘ascertain precisely’ a duration that puts a worker on a ten-year contract without the benefits of a Contract of Indefinite Duration is another matter entirely. As noted earlier, this is a project which is now in its eighteenth year, and which has references on its website to targets for 2030, by which time it will have been in being for twenty two years; about half the normal span of a working life.

If the complainant continued in her current role to that point, (which is admittedly beyond the life of the current ‘phase’) she will have given be eleven years’ service to the project. And all of the facts indicate that the complainant is becoming more embedded in the project with each year; there is not the remotest suggestion that her field of work will somehow evaporate in the near future.

Such a definition of ‘specific purpose’ is little more than a contrivance by the respondent to evade its responsibilities under the Act.

In that regard I refer to section 12 of the Act which states.

Voidance of certain provisions.

12.—Save as expressly provided otherwise in this Act, a provision in an agreement (whether a contract of employment or not and whether made before or after the commencement of the provision concerned of this Act) shall be void insofar as it purports to exclude or limit the application of, or is inconsistent with, any provision of the Act.

I find for the reasons set out above that the terms of the complainant’s contract were constructed in such a way as to exclude or limit the application of the Act and her right to a contract of indefinite duration. I find therefore that it is void and that the respondent has breached Section 6 of the Act in discriminating against her.

I further also find that by the time each of the episodes of renewal of the projects took place in 2019 and 2023 it was clear that the life of the project had moved outside that which might reasonably be comprehended by a specific purpose or fixed term contract, and her position should have been regularised at that stage.

The failure to do so constitutes a breach of Section 9.

The complainant’s promotion in 2023 is a decisive moment; it represented such a material variation in her contractual status as to represent an extension of her original contract for the purposes of the Act, and/or a new contract and for this, and the reasons above she is entitled to a contract of indefinite duration.

The complaint is well founded.

I direct the complainant be given a Contract of Indefinite Duration.

Having particular regard to all of the circumstances set out above I also consider it just and equitable to award her compensation in the amount of €15,000.

Complaint CA-00073015-001 is well founded.

I direct the complainant be given a Contract of Indefinite Duration.

Having particular regard to all of the circumstances set out above I also consider it just and equitable to award her compensation in the amount of €15,000.

Fixed terms contract, Specific purpose contract.