Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Freddy  Muamba

Lifford Dry Cleaning Lifford / Dry Cleaners & Laundry Ennis Ltd

Representatives

Self-represented 

Patrick Moylan, O’Kelly Moylan Solicitors

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Regulation 18 of the European Communities (Road Transport)(Organisation of Working Time of Persons Performing Mobile Road Transport Activities) Regulations 2012 - S.I. No. 36/2012

CA-00071336-002

06/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071336-003

06/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071336-004

06/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071336-005

06/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071336-006

06/05/2025

The Complainant commenced his employment with the Respondent on 10 February 2003. On 6 May 2025, the Complainant referred a number of claims against the Respondent as listed above.

The Respondent rejects the claims.

Application for an adjournment

At the outset of the hearing the Complainant applied for an adjournment on the basis that he would like to seek legal representation. The Complainant submitted that he contacted a solicitor in September 2025 inquiring if they would represent him and he understood that they would. The Complainant said that he rang the solicitor on 2 November 2025 to inform them that an adjudication hearing had been scheduled for 5 November 2025. He met with his solicitor on 3 November 2025 and at that stage he was informed that the solicitor would not represent him.

The Complainant suggested that no local solicitor would agree to represent him due to the fact that the Respondent was based in Ennis. The Complainant said that he contacted the Ennis branch of the Citizens Information Bureau (CIB’) and was directed to solicitors in Shannon and in Limerick. The Complainant confirmed that he was in contact with the CIB on 24 August 2025 and has been assisted with a variety of queries since. He said that every time he has a query, he visits their office and he was advised by the CIB to refer his claims to the WRC.

The Complainant submitted that the Citizens Information Bureau applied for a postponement on his behalf by email to the WRC dated 31 October 2025. I had no record of any such application. The Complainant was given time to locate on his phone the email correspondence he referred to but was unable to furnish anything to support his assertion that a postponement application had been made.

The Respondent objected to the application. The Respondent asserted that the Complainant had six months since the referral of his claim to secure legal representation. The Complainant received the hearing letter on 3 September 2025, which was sufficient to allow him to secure legal representation in any event.

Having carefully considered the matter, I decided that sufficient cause had not been shown to justify adjourning the case. In deciding to decline the Complainant’s request, I had regard to the following.

The Complainant referred his claims to the WRC on 6 May 2025. Correspondence informing the parties of the arrangements for the hearing to be held on 5 November 2025 issued on 3 September 2025. The Complainant did not seek a postponement prior to the hearing. There was no evidence put forward to show that the Complainant sought legal representation or that he had engaged a solicitor that subsequently and at the very last minute declined to represent him. There was also no evidence put forward to show that the Complainant engaged with the Citizens Information Bureau. There was no communication received by the WRC on the Complainant’s behalf from the Citizens Information Bureau, as asserted by the Complainant.

Even if it was accepted that the Complainant made some efforts to communicate with his solicitor on 2 November or 3 November 2025, having received the hearing notification on 3 September 2025, it is clear that the Complainant left the matter unattended until a very late stage.

The Respondent was present at the hearing with representation and witnesses and was ready to defend the claims. The Respondent was opposed to the application for an adjournment of the case.

The requirement for fairness and equity must apply to both parties. In that regard, I considered the following obiter comments from Barrett J in David Mc Cormack and Ashford Castle Hotel Ltd. [2022] IEHC 188 at paragraph 17.

“Mr Lawless touches on an important point in this regard. Courts too have a tendency to be more lenient with self-represented litigants than other litigants. However, a question does arise as to whether such systemic indulgence is always entirely fair to the parties who are not shown such indulgence. Justice has to be done in an even-handed manner; certainly, the extension of any indulgence in any one case has to be carefully weighed by a court, or other decision-making body minded to extend such indulgence, against any time and /or financial and /or costs that it raises for the other side in proceedings, not least in ensuring that proceedings are brought to a conclusion in as timely a manner as justice allows.”

Having regard to all the above, I was satisfied that, in all the circumstances, a further delay would be contrary to the parties’ right to have a fair and expeditious hearing of the matter within a reasonable timeframe. I decided that justice would not be served by postponing the hearing further. I notified the Complainant that his application for an adjournment was denied. However, I informed the parties that, if at any stage during the hearing the Complainant indicated that he was unable to present his case, I would revisit the matter. Having regard to the fact that the Complainant was unrepresented, I took care to ensure the Complainant understood the process to be followed during the hearing. The hearing proceeded and at no stage did the Complainant suggest that he was unable to follow the process or was incapable of presenting his case.

Termination of employment

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant stated that his employment terminated on 24 August 2024. At the hearing, the parties confirmed that the Complainant’s employment had not ceased. The Complainant remains unfit for work “due to medical illness”. The Complainant exhibited copies of medical certificates, the most recent dated 26 June 2025 covering the period from 26 June 2025 to 27 September 2025. The Respondent confirmed that it had received the Complainant’s medical certificates that covered his absence from 26 August 2024 to date.

In the WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant claimed that the Respondent is not keeping statutory employment records.

The Complainant asserted that he did not feel as though he was given a correct contract and was only given a copy of it after 2 years already working (2005). The Complainant did not feel as though the tax taken from his wages was being correctly paid.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant confirmed that he received his contract of employment, which he signed, in 2005. In cross-examination, the Complainant confirmed that his claim related to a matter that was addressed some 20 years ago.

The Complainant did not dispute that he did not fall within the scope of the European Communities (Road Transport)(Organisation of Working Time of Persons Performing Mobile Road Transport Activities) Regulations 2012.

By way background, the Respondent submits that it received complaints in relation to the Complainant’s allegedly inappropriate behaviour towards the female members of staff that he was working with. In order to address same, the Respondent decided to move the Complainant from the job of rolling linens to the blankets team. The Complainant did not attend for work since 25 August 2024 which was the day before the Complainant was due to start on the blankets team.

The Respondent has been in business for 42 years and has had a great relationship with its employees and has never had a complaint made about it to the WRC.

The Respondent submits that Regulation 18 of S.I. 36 of 2012 does not apply in this case as the Complainant is not a mobile worker.

Without prejudice to that submission, the Respondent submits that the Complainant was issued a contract of employment dated the 15 May 2019 which was exhibited at the hearing. On that same date, the Complainant acknowledged that he had received a copy of the document and understood and accepted the terms and conditions of employment contained therein.

As regards the complaint regarding tax being taken, the Respondent exhibited examples of the Complainant’s payslips showing the tax deducted. These payslips, and the tax deducted, are determined by Thesaurus Payroll Software which has live interface with the Revenue Commissioners regarding the appropriate rates of tax, USC and PRSI to be deducted. All of these taxes are then returned to the Revenue Commissioners in the usual way by the Respondent.

The European Communities (Road Transport) (Organisation of Working Time of Persons Performing Mobile Road Transport Activities) Regulations 2012 - S.I. No. 36/2012 apply to mobile workers and those engaged in international road transport activities.  

The Complainant conceded that his employment did not come within the scope of the Regulations.

No evidence has been presented to support a claim under the Regulations and, therefore, I must find that this complaint is not well founded.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

The Complainant asserted that he worked 9 hours per day and did not get any breaks. The Complainant submitted that he was constantly under pressure to work faster and that he was told that he was too slow. The Complainant submitted that his GP was ready to give evidence of the physical toll this has taken on him, albeit there were no witnesses attending the hearing on behalf of the Complainant.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant alleged that he worked from 9am to 6pm with no breaks. The Complainant denied that there was a place to sit down and eat during a break. He disputed that he insisted on taking breaks at his machine or that he used to leave earlier in lieu of his breaks. The Complainant stated that everybody else took breaks and went for a cigarette and there was no problem with that. However, he said that he was told to keep going. The Complainant asserted that “black men are not taking breaks”.

The Complainant agreed that there are employees of different nationalities working for the Respondent and all are taking breaks.

Regarding the time limits, the Complainant stated that he needed more time as his case was not a minor one.

The Respondent submits that it encouraged, and continues to encourage, its employees, including the Complainant, to take breaks. The Respondent provides free tea and coffee making facilities as well as a microwave and has created a space for such breaks.

It is the Respondent’s submission that the Complainant refused to take breaks either individually, or with the other employees, and would instead remain at his work position and eat there and would effectively take his break there but would then leave early at the end of the day on the basis that he was taking his break in that way. The Respondent allowed this in order to keep the Complainant happy at work.

Ms Nagy, Floor Manager gave evidence that there is an international mixture of employees who know each other well. The Respondent does not micromanage them. Ms Nagy said that she would stand at the door in the morning and greet staff and chat. She said that she would ask the Complainant if he would like tea/coffee and if he did, she would make it for him and bring it to his table.

Ms Nagy said that staff bring cakes etc. to work. She said that she personally asked the Complainant to join the celebrations such as birthdays, but he refused to seat and eat together. She said that she would often sit down and chat with him. She said that she told him that he needed to take his breaks. Ms Nagy said that the Complainant sometimes asked to leave earlier. She said that the family highly respected him. She said that the Complainant has been with the Respondent for 20 years, he would have had long chats with the now deceased member of the family owning the business. He also would have chats with the new manager about football etc. He seemed happy. Ms Nagy could not understand what had happened.

In cross-examination, the Complainant asked Ms Nagy how many employees celebrated his birthday. Ms Nagy said that the Complainant never joined any celebrations and had told her specifically not to buy a cake or to mention his birthday.

The Complainant has claimed that he was not afforded his statutory entitlement to rests breaks at work as required by section 12 of the Act.

The law

Section 12 provides as follows:

12.— (1) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 4 hours and 30 minutes without allowing him or her a break of at least 15 minutes.

(2) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 6 hours without allowing him or her a break of at least 30 minutes; such a break may include the break referred to in subsection (1).

(3) The Minister may by regulations provide, as respects a specified class or classes of employee, that the minimum duration of the break to be allowed to such an employee under subsection (2) shall be more than 30 minutes (but not more than 1 hour).

(4) A break allowed to an employee at the end of the working day shall not be regarded as satisfying the requirement contained in subsection (1) or (2).

Time limits

The Complainant referred his complaint to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission pursuant to the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 on 6 May 2025.

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 states:

Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 provides that if a complaint is not submitted within six months of the alleged contravention, an extension may be granted by an Adjudication Officer up to a maximum time limit of 12 months where, in the opinion of the Adjudication Officer, the Complainant has demonstrated reasonable cause for the delay in accordance with the provisions:

An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.

The implications of the above provisions were explained to the parties. The Complainant sought an extension of the time limit for the referral of this complainant. He submitted that he needed time as his case was not a minor one.

It is for the Complainant to establish that there is reasonable cause for the delay in presenting a claim under the Act to the Director General of the WRC. The general principles which apply are that something must be advanced which will both explain and excuse the delay. 

The established test for deciding if an extension of time should be granted for ‘reasonable cause’ is set out in the Labour Court determination in the case of Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) Limited v Carroll DWT0338 and is summarised in Salesforce.com v Alli Leech EDA1615 wherein the Labour Court stated:

‘The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll. Here the test was set out in the following terms: -

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

In that case, and in subsequent cases in which this question arose, the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the Superior Courts in considering whether time should enlarged for ‘good reason’ in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84, Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986. That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU & Ors [2007] 18 ELR 36.

The test formulated in Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] ILRM 30. Here Costello J. (as he then was) stated as follows:

“The phrase ‘good reasons’ is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under O. 84 r. 21 is on the plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.”

In Cementation Skanska, the Court further held that: ‘The length of the delay should be taken into account. A short delay may require only a slight explanation whereas a long delay may require more cogent reasons.’

The Complainant submitted that he needed time as his case was not a minor one. According to his own evidence, from August 2024 he was in regular contact with the Citizens Information Bureau, receiving guidance and advice. He stated that it was the Bureau that advised him to refer his claim to the WRC following his contact with them on 24 August 2024. He further indicated that he had also been in communication with a solicitor, although the solicitor did not represent him at the hearing.

I find that the Complainant has not shown reasonable cause to empower me to extend the timeframe for the submission of a complaint under the Act. 

By application of the time limit provided for at section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 the cognisable period for the purpose of this claim is confined to the six-month period ending on the date on which the complaint was presented to the WRC. Therefore, the cognisable period covered by the complaint is the six-month period from 7 November 2024 to 6 May 2025.

There was no dispute that the Complainant did not work during the cognisable period.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

The Complainant submits that he was never paid for any holidays. He asserted that when he had to take time off, he was never paid or time off was refused because it too busy.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant said that he took holidays three or four times. He stated that in the winter he would have taken one month. The Complainant could not recall when did he take time off. When prompted by the Adjudication Officer to recall any details he could, the Complainant stated that he could not remember anything. He said that he once took three weeks leave for a funeral but was not paid for it. He did not know when it was.

The Complainant did agree that the Respondent’s records as presented at the hearing were

accurate.

The Respondent rejects the claim.

The Respondent noted that the Complainant’s allegations in the WRC complaint referral form were very vague and, therefore, difficult to address.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant received his annual leave entitlements.  In support of its position, and by way of one example, the Respondent exhibited copies of rosters for the first two weeks of 2024 which showed that the Complainant was off. The corresponding payslips for those two weeks showed that the Complainant was paid for 40 hours for each of those two weeks off. The Respondent submits that the Complainant was never refused holidays.

The Respondent also exhibited a copy of the Complainant’s Contract of employment, which outlined the Complainant’s leave entitlements.

The Complainant alleges that he did not receive his annual leave entitlements. The Respondent rejects the claim.

The law

Entitlement to annual leave.

19.—(1) Subject to the First Schedule (which contains transitional provisions in respect of the leave years 1996 to 1998), an employee shall be entitled to paid annual leave (in this Act referred to as “annual leave”) equal to—

(a) 4 working weeks in a leave year in which he or she works at least 1,365 hours (unless it is a leave year in which he or she changes employment),

(b) one-third of a working week for each month in the leave year in which he or she works at least 117 hours, or

(c) 8 per cent. of the hours he or she works in a leave year (but subject to a maximum of 4 working weeks):

Provided that if more than one of the preceding paragraphs is applicable in the case concerned and the period of annual leave of the employee, determined in accordance with each of those paragraphs, is not identical, the annual leave to which the employee shall be entitled shall be equal to whichever of those periods is the greater.

(1A) For the purposes of this section, a day that an employee was absent from work due to illness shall, if the employee provided to his or her employer a certificate of a registered medical practitioner in respect of that illness, be deemed to be a day on which the employee was—

(a) at his or her place of work or at his or her employer’s disposal, and

(b) carrying on or performing the activities or duties of his or her work.

(2) A day which would be regarded as a day of annual leave shall, if the employee concerned is ill on that day and furnishes to his or her employer a certificate of a registered medical practitioner in respect of his or her illness, not be regarded, for the purposes of this Act, as a day of annual leave.

(3) The annual leave of an employee who works 8 or more months in a leave year shall, subject to the provisions of any employment regulation order, registered employment agreement, collective agreement or any agreement between the employee and his or her employer, include an unbroken period of 2 weeks.

(4) Notwithstanding subsection (2) or any other provision of this Act but without prejudice to the employee’s entitlements under subsection (1), the reference in subsection (3) to an unbroken period of 2 weeks includes a reference to such a period that includes one or more public holidays or days on which the employee concerned is ill.

(5) An employee shall, for the purposes of subsection (1), be regarded as having worked on a day of annual leave the hours he or she would have worked on that day had it not been a day of annual leave.

(6) References in this section to a working week shall be construed as references to the number of days that the employee concerned usually works in a week.

In relation to taking annual leave, section 20 of the 1997 Act provides as follows:-

Times and pay for annual leave.

20.—(1) The times at which annual leave is granted to an employee shall be determined by his or her employer having regard to work requirements and subject—

(a) to the employer taking into account—

(i) the need for the employee to reconcile work and any family responsibilities,

(ii) the opportunities for rest and recreation available to the employee,

(b) to the employer having consulted the employee or the trade union (if any) of which he or she is a member, not later than 1 month before the day on which the annual leave or, as the case may be, the portion thereof concerned is due to commence, and

(c) to the leave being granted—

(i) within the leave year to which it relates,

(ii) with the consent of the employee, within the period of 6 months after the end of that leave year, or

(iii) where the employee—

(I) is, due to illness, unable to take all or any part of his or her annual leave during that leave year or the period specified in subparagraph (ii), and

(II) has provided a certificate of a registered medical practitioner in respect of that illness to his or her employer,

within the period of 15 months after the end of that leave year.

(2) The pay in respect of an employee’s annual leave shall—

(a) be paid to the employee in advance of his or her taking the leave,

(b) be at the normal weekly rate or, as the case may be, at a rate which is proportionate to the normal weekly rate, and

(c) in a case in which board or lodging or, as the case may be, both board and lodging constitute part of the employee’s remuneration, include compensation, calculated at the prescribed rate, for any such board or lodging as will not be received by the employee whilst on annual leave.

(3) Nothing in this section shall prevent an employer and employee from entering into arrangements that are more favourable to the employee with regard to the times of, and the pay in respect of, his or her annual leave.

(4) In this section “normal weekly rate” means the normal weekly rate of the employee concerned’s pay determined in accordance with regulations made by the Minister for the purposes of this section.

Burden of proof

Records.

25.—(1) An employer shall keep, at the premises or place where his or her employee works or, if the employee works at two or more premises or places, the premises or place from which the activities that the employee is employed to carry on are principally directed or controlled, such records, in such form, if any, as may be prescribed, as will show whether the provisions of this Act and, where applicable, the Activities of Doctors in Training Regulations are being complied with in relation to the employee and those records shall be retained by the employer for at least 3 years from the date of their making.

(2) The Minister may by regulations exempt from the application of subsection (1) any specified class or classes of employer and regulations under this subsection may provide that any such exemption shall not have effect save to the extent that specified conditions are complied with.

(3) An employer who, without reasonable cause, fails to comply with subsection (1) shall be guilty of an offence.

(4) Without prejudice to subsection (3), where an employer fails to keep records under subsection (1) in respect of his or her compliance with a particular provision of this Act or the Activities of Doctors in Training Regulations in relation to an employee, the onus of proving, in proceedings before a rights commissioner or the Labour Court, that the said provision was complied with in relation to the employee shall lie on the employer.

Statutory Instrument S.I. number 473/2001 - Organisation of Working Time (Records) (Prescribed Form and Exemptions) Regulations, 2001 makes provision in relevant part as follows:

Form of records under section 25(1).

3.The records required to be kept under section 25(1) shall contain the following particulars and documents —

(a)  the name and address of each employee concerned, the number known as the Revenue and Social Insurance number that has been assigned to him or her and a brief statement (which may be by reference to any form of job description or classification used by the employer concerned) of his or her duties as an employee,

(b) a copy, as appropriate, of the statement provided to each employee concerned in accordance with the provisions of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 (No. 5 of 1994), or any order or regulation made under that Act, that relates to him or her,

(c) (i) the days and total hours worked in each week by each employee concerned,

(ii) any days and hours of leave in each week granted by way of annual leave or in respect of a public holiday to each employee concerned and the payment made to each employee in respect of that leave,

(iii) any additional day's pay referred to in section 21(1)(d) provided in each week to each employee concerned, and

(d) a copy of a written record of a notification issued to an employee concerned in relation to any of the matters provided for in section 17 (including a copy of a notice posted in the manner referred to in subsection 5 of that section),

and shall generally be in such form as will enable an inspector to understand the particulars contained in them without difficulty.

4(1) Where no clocking in facilities are in place in a work place a form to record the days and hours worked in each week by each employee shall be kept by the employer in the form set out in the Schedule entitled Form OWT 1 or in a form substantially to like effect.

Although each case will turn on its own facts and the level of autonomy afforded to an employee, ultimately the employer is responsible for ensuring compliance with the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997.

In Jakonis Antanas v Nolan Transport (2011) 22 ELR 311 the Labour Court has set out a well-established test for interpreting the applicable burden of proof as provided for under section 25(4) of the Act in relation to complaints brought under the Act as follows:

(1) The effect of section 25(4) of the Acts is to shift the burden of proof to the respondent in cases where records in the statutory form were not maintained.

(2) The evidential burden on a claimant requires the claimant to adduce such evidence as is available to support a stateable case of non-compliance with the relevant provision of the Act with sufficient particularity to allow the respondent to know, in broad terms, the nature of the complaint.

(3) That when the claimant has met his or her evidential burden, the respondent is required to put the records required by section 25(1) of the Act to demonstrate compliance with the relevant provision. Where such records are produced, the claimant bears the evidential and legal burden of proving that his or rights under the Acts were contravened in the manner alleged.

(4) That where forms in the prescribed form as required by section 25(1) of the Act are not produced by the respondent and the claimant has satisfied the evidential burden, the respondent carries the legal burden of proving on credible evidence and on the balance of probabilities that the Act was not contravened in the manner alleged by the claimant. If the respondent fails to discharge this burden, the claimant will succeed in their complaint/s under the Act.

The Court stated that ‘The burden on a Respondent of proving compliance with the Act arises in proceedings in which a complaint of non-compliance is made. It is clear from s.27(2) of the Act that the jurisdiction of the Rights Commissioner is invoked by an aggrieved worker, or his or her trade union, by presenting a complaint to a Rights Commissioner that his or her employer has contravened a relevant provision of the Act in relation to him or her. The subsection goes on to provide that where a complaint is made the Rights Commissioner shall give the parties an opportunity to be heard and to present to the commissioner any evidence relevant to the complaint.

This suggests that the evidential burden is on the Claimant to adduce such evidence as is available to support a stateable case of non-compliance with a relevant provision of the Act. It seems to the Court that, as a matter of basic fairness, the Claimant should be required to do so with sufficient particularity as to allow the Respondent to know, in broad terms, the nature of the complaint and the case which they are expected to meet. As was pointed out by Lord Devlin in Bratty v Attorney General for Northern Ireland [1963] A.C. 386 an evidential burden is satisfied where the evidence adduced is sufficient to “suggest a reasonable possibility.”

The Complainant alleged that he did not receive his annual leave entitlements. The Respondent exhibited copies of records of working days for the employees. These records were not kept in the manner prescribed by S.I 473 of 2001. Accordingly, because Respondent failed to keep records under section 25(1) in respect of its compliance with section 19 of the Act, in relation to the Complainant, the onus of proving in these proceedings that the said provision was complied with in relation to the Complainant lies on the Respondent.

Time limits

The Complainant referred his claims to the Director General on 6 May 2025. In line with my findings above and the decision declining the Complainant’s application to extend the time limits, I have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 for a period of six months from the date of the referral of complaint. This complaint was presented to the WRC on 6 May 2025 and therefore the cognisable period that may be investigated is from 7 November 2024 to 6 May 2025. I note that section 2(1) of the Act stipulates that “leave year” means a year beginning on any 1st day of April”. Therefore, I may consider annual leave entitlements for the period from the 1 April 2024 to 6 May 2025.

There was no dispute that the Complainant was absent on sick leave from 26 August 2024.

I note that the Complainant’s contract of employment at section 7 outlines his annual leave entitlements as 1.66 days per month (20 days / 12 months). The annual leave in the Respondent’s organisation runs from 1 January to 31 December.

The Complainant could not remember whether or not, or when he took any leave. He then remembered that he did, in fact, take some leave but was unsure when. On the other hand, he did not dispute that the records exhibited by the Respondent were accurate. The Respondent’s records showed that the Complainant did avail of two weeks of annual leave in January 2024 (outside the cognisable period) and he was paid for it. There was no evidence of any further leave taken by the Complainant in 2024.

​​In Vladimir Vecerin Pepito Trade​ v Lucian Liviu Ionut​ DWT245 the Labour Court held that

“It is well settled that where an employee does not receive his or her full entitlement of annual leave a cause of action accrues at the end of the relevant leave year. The High Court so decided in Royal Liver Assurance Limited v Macken & ors,Unreported, Lavan J, 15th November 2002.”

The Complainant commenced his long terms absence on 26 August 2024. Therefore, even if there was any outstanding annual leave, he was not in a position to avail of same by the end of the relevant leave year due to his absence. For the avoidance of any doubt, it was confirmed at the hearing that the Complainant’s employment did not terminate and, therefore, therefore, payment on cessation of employment did not arise.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

The Complainant alleged that he was not given compensation for working on a Sunday.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant said that he could not remember how many Sundays he worked, when or how frequently he worked on a Sunday.

In a response to the Respondent exhibiting copies of the rosters for 2024, the Complainant agreed that the rosters are accurate and that he did not work on any Sundays in 2024. However, he asserted that he worked on Sundays prior to 2024, in 2023 and 2022. He asserted that a person in the Respondent’s organisation who is deceased now paid him €50 cash for work performed on a Sunday in the past.

The Respondent submits that on no occasion was the Complainant ever given cash.

As regards working on a Sunday, the Complainant only ever worked on two Sundays which were 18 August 2024 and 25 August 2024, for which he was paid. The Respondent exhibited copies of the rosters from the beginning of 2024 through to 25 August 2024, being the last time the Complainant worked for the Respondent. The rosters show that these were only two Sundays that the Complainant worked on. The Respondent also exhibited copies of the Complainant’s payslips for the weeks of the 12 to 18 August 2024 and 19 to 25 of August 2024.

The law

14. Sunday work: supplemental provisions

(1)

An employee who is required to work on a Sunday (and the fact of his or her having to work on that day has not otherwise been taken account of in the determination of his or her pay) shall be compensated by his or her employer for being required so to work by the following means, namely—

(a) by the payment to the employee of an allowance of such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(b) by otherwise increasing the employee's rate of pay by such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(c) by granting the employee such paid time off from work as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or

(d) by a combination of two or more of the means referred to in the preceding paragraphs.

This section provides that an employee required to work on a Sunday is entitled to a premium payment for the work which may consist of a payment or time off in lieu or a combination of both. 

The Complainant referred his claims to the Director General on 6 May 2025. In line with my findings above and the decision regarding the Complainant’s application to extend the time limits, I have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 for a period of six months from the date of the referral of complaint. This complaint was presented to the WRC on 6 May 2025 and therefore the cognisable period that may be investigated is from 7 November 2024 to 6 May 2025.

There was no dispute that the Complainant did not work during the cognisable period.

I declare this complaint to be not well founded.

The Complainant alleged that he had not received his public holiday entitlements.

At the adjudication hearing, the Complainant initially said that he worked on all public holidays and was paid €50 cash. He then stated that he could not recall exactly when he worked. He could not remember whether he worked on a public holiday and whether he was paid for public holidays if off or if worked.

It was put to the Complainant that the rosters and corresponding payslips show that he was paid his entitlements. In response, the Complainant accepted that this was the case in 2024 but asked “what about 2023, 2022, 2021 and 2020?”.

The Complainant accepted that he worked 8 hours per day.

The Respondent submits that on no occasion has it ever given cash to the Complainant.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant was always paid for public holidays. If the Complainant did not work the public holiday, he was paid for that day. If the Complainant worked the public holiday, then he was paid an additional day in compensation for same.

The Respondent exhibited rosters and payslips for weeks when public holidays fell during 2024.

The Respondent showed that for example, in week 1 of 2024, the Complainant took the entire week off. This was recorded in the Respondent’s records as being 4 days holidays, but the payslip reflects payment for a 5-day week.

At week 14 that the Complainant worked on Monday 1 April 2024 and was paid for 48 hours, a 6-day week, despite only working 5 and this was to reflect the additional payment for the public holiday worked.

The Complainant alleges that he did not receive his public holiday entitlements.

The law

Section 21. Entitlement in respect of public holidays of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 provides as follows.

(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an employee shall, in respect of a public holiday, be entitled to whichever one of the following his or her employer determines, namely—

(a) a paid day off on that day,

(b) a paid day off within a month of that day,

(c) an additional day of annual leave,

(d) an additional day's pay:

Provided that if the day on which the public holiday falls is a day on which the employee would, apart from this subsection, be entitled to a paid day off this subsection shall have effect as if paragraph (a) were omitted therefrom.

An employee may, not later than 21 days before the public holiday concerned, request his or her employer to make, as respects the employee, a determination under subsection (I) in relation to a particular public holiday and notify the employee of that determination at least 14 days before that holiday.

(3) If an employer fails to comply with a request under subsection (2), he or she shall be deemed to have determined that the entitlement of the employee concerned under subsection (1) shall be to a paid day off on the public holiday concerned or, in a case to which the proviso to subsection (1) applies, to an additional day's pay.

(4) Subsection (1) shall not apply, as respects a particular public holiday, to an employee (not being an employee who is a whole-time employee) unless he or she has worked for the employer concerned at least 40 hours during the period of 5 weeks ending on the day before that public holiday.

(5) Subsection (1) shall not apply, as respects a particular public holiday, to an employee who is, other than on the commencement of this section, absent from work immediately before that public holiday in any of the cases specified in the Third Schedule.

(6) For the avoidance of doubt, the reference in the proviso to subsection (1) to a day on which the employee is entitled to a paid day off includes a reference to any day on which he or she is not required to work, the pay to which he or she is entitled in respect of a week or other period being regarded, for this purpose, as receivable by him or her in respect of the day or days in that period on which he or she is not required to work as well as the day or days in that period on which he or she is required to work.

Third Schedule Entitlement under section 21 in respect of public holidays: exceptions

Section 21(5)

Each of the following are the cases mentioned in section 21(5) of absence by the employee concerned from work immediately before the relevant public holiday:

1. such an absence, in excess of 52 consecutive weeks, by reason of an injury sustained by the employee in an occupational accident (within the meaning of Chapter [13] of Part [2] of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act [2005]),

2. such an absence, in excess of 26 consecutive weeks, by reason of an injury sustained by the employee in any accident (not being an accident referred to in paragraph 1) or by reason of any disease from which the employee suffers or suffered,

3. such an absence, in excess of 13 consecutive weeks, caused by any reason not referred to in paragraph 1 or 2 but being an absence authorised by the employer, including a lay-off,

4. such an absence by reason of a strike in the business or industry in which the employee is employed.

The Complainant referred his claims to the Director General on 6 May 2025. In line with my findings above and the decision regarding the Complainant’s application to extend the time limits, I have jurisdiction to investigate any complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 for a period of six months from the date of the referral of complaint. This complaint was presented to the WRC on 6 May 2025 and therefore the cognisable period that may be investigated is from 7 November 2024 to 6 May 2025.

There was no dispute that the Complainant did not work during the cognisable period and was certified unfit for work due to a medical illness.

The following public holidays fell during the cognisable period: Christmas Day (25 December 2024), St. Stephen’s Day (26 December 2024), New Year’s Day (1 January 2025), St. Brigid’s Day (3 February 2025), St. Patrick’s Day (17 March 2025), Easter Monday (21 April 2025) and (5 May 2025).

As of 24 February 2025, the Complainant reached 26 consecutive weeks of an absence due to illness. Therefore, subsection (1) does not apply in respectofSt. Patrick’s Day (17 March 2025), Easter Monday (21 April 2025) and 5 May 2025.

The position of employees who are on sick leave on a public holiday was considered by the Rights Commissioner’s decision WT19572/04/JC upheld by the Labour Court in Thermo King v Kenny DWT0611. I find that owing to the fact that the Complainant was and remains on certified sick leave an in receipt of illness benefit from the Department of Social Protection, the options of a paid day off on the day a public holiday fell on or a paid day off within a month of that day, were not available to the Respondent. Accordingly, there were two options left to the employer, either an additional day of annual leave or an additional day's pay. 

In Thermo King the Rights Commissioner held that ‘While the claimant did not receive an additional day's pay either during his sick leave or on his return to work I am satisfied that under the Act it is the employer who determines which option will apply in respect of each public holiday and that the employee may not insist on one option over another, unless a collective agreement or the terms and conditions of employment of the employee concerned determines which option and in what circumstances such an option is applicable. In this case there was no such provision in either a collective agreement or in the terms and conditions of employment of the claimant.’

It is, therefore, open to the Respondent to implement one of the remaining options i.e. an additional day of annual leave or an additional day's pay. 

I find that the Respondent should comply with the provisions of section 21 in respect of the following public holidays: Christmas Day (25 December 2024), St. Stephen’s Day (26 December 2024), New Year’s Day (1 January 2025), St. Brigid’s Day (3 February 2025), by providing the Complainant with (i) an additional day of annual leave or (ii) an additional day's pay.

I declare this complaint to be well founded.  I direct the Respondent to comply with the provisions of section 21 in respect of the following public holidays: Christmas Day (25 December 2024), St. Stephen’s Day (26 December 2024), New Year’s Day (1 January 2025), St. Brigid’s Day (3 February 2025), by providing the Complainant with either an additional day of annual leave or an additional day's pay.

Annual leave- public holiday – Sunday premium - breaks- mobile workers