Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Alan  O'Connor

Byrne & King Meats Ltd T/A Dempsey & Byrne Craft Butchers

Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

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Representatives

Jim Winters, Dublin South Citizens Information Service

 N/A

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071181-002

30/04/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00071181-003

30/04/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071181-005

30/04/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00071181-006

30/04/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00072565-001

18/06/2025

The Complainant, a butcher with mild haemophilia, stated that he repeatedly sought to return to work after both of his scheduled surgeries in 2024 were cancelled, but the Respondent continued to tell him there was no work available and delayed in seeking medical clearance. He stated that he was willing and available to work from 21 October 2024 to 14 February 2025, during which time he was not paid his wages or holiday pay, and that at a meeting on 14 February 2025 he was told the Respondent’s insurer would not cover him. He also alleged that he was effectively dismissed at this meeting on 14 February 2025.

The Complainant, a butcher, began working for the Respondent in May 2022. He stated that at his interview, he disclosed that he had mild haemophilia and was awaiting hernia surgery, and the Respondent accepted this disclosure, even promising to provide a protective mesh glove which the Complainant required for safe work. Throughout his employment, the Complainant stated that he had an excellent record with no performance issues, and matters remained uneventful until he began receiving hospital dates for surgery in 2024.

In March 2024, the Complainant received his first surgery date and agreed with the Respondent that he would take six weeks off beginning 21 May 2024. This period consisted of annual leave, time in lieu, and some unpaid weeks. However, the day before he was due to begin leave, the hospital cancelled the surgery. When he contacted the Respondent to say he could work after all, he was told that cover had already been arranged and no work was available for the agreed six‑week period. Although he later covered an urgent shift at the Respondent’s request, he did not return to work fully until mid‑June.

A second surgery date was issued for 9 September 2024. Again the Respondent agreed to six weeks’ unpaid leave, but the surgery was cancelled after the Complainant had already reported to the hospital. As before, when the Complainant notified the Respondent, he was told there would be no work for him for the entire six‑week period because cover had been arranged. He remained out of work from early September into late October.

On 19 October 2024, shortly before the six‑week period ended, the Complainant contacted the Respondent seeking his work hours. The Respondent subsequently phoned him and instructed him to provide a letter from his doctor. The Complainant obtained a letter from St James’s Hospital on 21 October 2024 but received no response to his attempts to send it by email. A few days later, the parties met in a church car park, where he handed over the letter and was told the Respondent would be in touch. When the Complainant attended the shop seeking work on 29 October 2024, he was told again that there was no work and that he needed to be assessed by the company doctor. He shared his email address for the purpose of arranging this, but received no further contact.

It was not until 3 December 2024—over a month later—that the Respondent contacted him, requesting a fitness‑to‑work certificate, which the Complainant provided immediately. Hearing nothing further, he wrote formally on 10 February 2025, requesting the wages he believed were owed since October and informing the Respondent that he would attend work again on 17 February. Instead, the Respondent arranged a meeting on 14 February 2025 at a Costa Coffee shop. At this meeting, according to the Complainant, the Respondent’s Managing Director referred to him as a “ticking time bomb” and stated that the company’s insurer could no longer cover his employment because of his medical conditions. The Complainant stated that this made clear that he was not being allowed to return to his job and no communication from the Respondent followed after this meeting.

The Complainant’s employment proceeded without incident until early 2024, when he informed the Respondent that he required time off to undergo surgery for an extended abdominal hernia. This was the first time the Respondent became aware of the condition. In light of the Complainant’s welfare and the seriousness of the issue, the Respondent agreed to the request for medical leave. The Complainant began his leave on 21 May 2024 and was paid for that week.

Shortly thereafter, the Complainant notified the Respondent that his operation had been postponed due to the unavailability of a hospital bed. He returned to work during the week of 24 June 2024, and payroll records confirm he received payment for the week commencing 17 June. Later in the summer, the Complainant informed the Respondent that the surgery had been rescheduled for the week beginning 9 September 2024. Again, the Respondent facilitated this request. A medical certificate was provided, covering the period from 9 September 2024 until 1 December 2024. However, the surgery did not in fact proceed during this period.

It was at this point that the Respondent became aware that the Complainant was a haemophiliac. This revelation caused considerable concern given the nature of butchering work, which involves heavy lifting, physical exertion, and the constant use of sharp tools such as knives and saws. The Respondent was conscious that even minor cuts could pose significant or life‑threatening risks to the Complainant. Seeking advice, the Respondent contacted its insurance broker, who confirmed that the Complainant’s condition constituted a material fact for insurance purposes and that allowing him to return to work without an independent medical assessment could jeopardise the Respondent’s insurance cover. The insurer stated that they would require medical confirmation that the Complainant was fit to safely perform the duties associated with butchering.

With this in mind, the Respondent arranged a meeting with the Complainant on 14 February 2025 at a local Costa Coffee shop. This meeting was intended to begin a structured return‑to‑work process rather than any form of disciplinary action. At the meeting, the Respondent explained that it valued the Complainant and wished to see him return to work, but needed assurance that his return would be medically safe and insurable. Relying on the advice of their insurance broker, the Respondent asked the Complainant to obtain a letter or report from his surgeon or medical team confirming that he was medically fit to carry out the required duties.

According to the Respondent, the Complainant appeared to understand the request and agreed to obtain the necessary medical documentation. The discussion was constructive and concluded amicably. However, later that same day, the Complainant collected his tax records from the Respondent. This action was unexpected and interpreted by the Respondent as a clear indication that the Complainant had chosen not to proceed with the proposed return‑to‑work plan. Following this, the Complainant made no further contact. A short time later, the Respondent became aware that the Complainant had commenced employment elsewhere.

CA-00072565-001:

Preliminary Matter - Time Limits:

Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 provides as follows in respect of time limits: 

“Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.

Section 41(8) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 provides that if a complaint is not submitted within six months of the alleged contravention, an extension may be granted by an Adjudication Officer up to a maximum time limit of twelve months where, in the opinion of the Adjudication Officer, a Complainant has demonstrated reasonable cause for the delay in accordance with the provisions:

“An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than six months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.” 

The complaint under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 was referred to the Commission on 30 April 2025. In the absence of any application for an extension of time on grounds of reasonable cause, my jurisdiction is limited to alleged contraventions occurring on or after 1 November 2024. I therefore make no findings in relation to any alleged underpayments before that date.

The Substantive Matter:

The Complainant stated that he was seeking compensation in respect of her outstanding wages from the Respondent.  The approach to be taken when adjudicating on a claim under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 is set out in Marek Balans -v- Tesco Ireland Limited [2020] IEHC 55 approving Dunnes Stores (Cornels court) Limited -v- Lacey [2007] 1 1R 478. Specifically, a decision-maker must firstly determine what wages are properly payable under the employment contract before determining whether there has been a deduction under Section 5(1) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991.  

Section 5(1) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 provides: “An employer shall not make a deduction from the wages of an employee (or receive any payment from an employee) unless- (a) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of any statute or any instrument made under statute, (b) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a term of the employee's contract of employment included in the contract before, and in force at the time of, the deduction or payment, or (c) in the case of a deduction, the employee has given his prior consent in writing to it.” 

In examining the substance of the complaint, it is not in dispute that the Complainant was not actively working in the Respondent’s shop for the period following the cancellation of his surgery in September 2024. The issue for determination is whether wages calculated at €15 per hour for a 40‑hour week were nevertheless “properly payable” during the period 1 November 2024 to 14 February 2025, and, if so, whether their non‑payment constituted an unlawful deduction under the Act.

The Complainant’s evidence is that he remained an employee throughout this period and was ready and willing to work, repeatedly attempting to resume his duties. When his September surgery was cancelled, he says he immediately informed the Respondent, only to be told that no work would be available for six weeks because cover had been arranged. He states that he later sought his hours for the week commencing 21 October 2024, obtained and provided a St James’s Hospital letter dated 21 October 2024, met the Respondent on 24 October 2024 to hand over the letter, and even attended the workplace on 29 October 2024 seeking to start work. At that point, he was told he would first need to see the company doctor, though no such doctor ever contacted him.

On 3 December 2024, when the Respondent asked for a fitness‑to‑work certificate, he supplied it the same day. On 10 February 2025, he wrote to the Respondent seeking payment of outstanding wages and confirming that he intended to present for work on 17 February 2025. At a meeting on 14 February 2025, he says he was told he was a “ticking time bomb” and informed that the company’s insurer would not cover him. He maintains that he was never placed on lay‑off, suspended, or dismissed prior to that meeting, and that there was no contractual or statutory justification for withholding his wages.

I accept this account on the balance of probabilities. It is supported by the documentary evidence presented at the hearing, including the hospital letter, the fitness‑to‑work certificate, and contemporaneous correspondence evidencing repeated attempts to return to the workplace.

The Respondent, for its part, stated that, after learning of the Complainant’s haemophilia and postponed hernia surgery, it faced serious health and safety concerns in a role involving heavy lifting and the use of knives and saws. They further stated that their insurance broker warned that allowing the Complainant to return without independent medical clearance could jeopardise insurance cover, exposing both employer and employee to unacceptable risk. The Respondent also asserted that the meeting held on 14 February 2025 was part of a structured, supportive return‑to‑work process, during which the Complainant agreed to obtain medical confirmation of fitness to work. The Respondent further stated that on that same date the Complainant collected his tax records and soon began working elsewhere, and therefore denied that any dismissal occurred. They also asserted that they acted in good faith at all times, in compliance with their insurance and health‑and‑safety obligations. The Respondent also presented an email from their insurance broker to confirm the insurer’s expectations regarding medical clearance before any return to work.

I have fully considered these submissions and the broker’s email. They demonstrate that the Respondent held genuine concerns about safety and insurance and that it sought to obtain medical confirmation before permitting a return to this physically demanding, knife‑based work.

However, the Payment of Wages Act 1991 contains a strict prohibition on unlawful deductions or non‑payment. Wages that are “properly payable” must be paid unless their withholding is authorised by statute, by the contract, or by the employee’s express consent. Legitimate concerns about safety or insurability—while relevant to other areas of employment law—do not constitute a lawful basis under the Act to cease paying wages to an existing employee.

The evidence shows that the Complainant remained an employee during the cognisable period, continued to present himself as willing to work, and produced all medical documentation requested of him, including a fitness‑to‑work certificate on 3 December 2024. He received no written notice placing him on lay‑off, on suspension (whether paid or unpaid), or terminating his employment during this period. There was no contractual variation removing his entitlement to wages. Indeed, the Respondent confirmed the Complainant had no written contract of employment, and therefore cannot rely on any contractual provision permitting non‑payment pending medical clearance.

On the evidence before me, it was the Respondent who prevented the Complainant from working while also withholding his wages, without identifying any statutory or contractual authority for doing so. I therefore conclude that the wages for the period 1 November 2024 to 14 February 2025 were “properly payable”, and that their non‑payment amounted to an unlawful deduction within the meaning of section 5 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991.

CA-00071181-002:

Having carefully considered all of the evidence, I am not satisfied that the Complainant was dismissed, and certainly not that any dismissal occurred because of disability. In reaching this conclusion, I place particular weight on the Respondent’s account of the meeting of 14 February 2025 and the events that followed.

Prior to outlining this analysis, I should firstly highlight that there is no doubt the Respondent delayed in seeking the Complainant’s medical clearance. The Complainant had been attempting to return to work since late October 2024. Yet it was only on 3 December 2024 that the Respondent sought a fitness‑to‑work certificate, and even then no clear plan for his return was put in place. That delay lies squarely with the Respondent. However, this delay, while relevant context, does not resolve the question of whether a dismissal occurred.

Turning to that question, I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the meeting on 14 February 2025 was intended as the first step in establishing a structured and safe return‑to‑work process. Acting on the advice of its insurance broker, the Respondent asked the Complainant to obtain medical confirmation of fitness to perform the heavy physical and knife‑based duties of a butcher. The meeting, according to the Respondent, concluded amicably, with the Complainant indicating that he would revert once he had obtained the necessary medical clearance. The Respondent also stated that the Complainant then collected his tax records later that same day and that this was the last contact before it became known he had taken up employment elsewhere. I find that sequence convincing and coherent and I prefer it on the balance of probabilities.

The email from the Respondent’s insurer supports this account. It confirms that medical clearance was sought out of concern for safety and insurability in a role involving sharp tools and heavy lifting, and that an insurer might withdraw cover if material medical facts were not properly managed. This contemporaneous evidence strengthens the Respondent’s position that it was seeking a safe and insurable pathway back to work rather than looking to terminate the relationship.

I have also considered the Complainant’s claim that he was effectively refused a return to work and referred to as a “ticking time bomb”. His correspondence shows he indicated that he intended to present for work on 17 February 2025, but, on the Respondent’s evidence (which I prefer), he collected his tax documents and soon after commenced work with another employer. Even if some of the language used at the meeting was insensitive, these events do not establish that the Respondent made a decision to dismiss him. Rather, they suggest that the Complainant himself brought the employment relationship to an end following the Respondent’s request for medical clearance.

Considering all of the foregoing, I find that the Complainant was not discriminatorily dismissed.

CA-00071181-003:

Section 4 of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973, states:

4.—(1) An employer shall, in order to terminate the contract of employment of an employee who has been in his continuous service for a period of thirteen weeks or more, give to that employee a minimum period of notice calculated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

(2) The minimum notice to be given by an employer to terminate the contract of employment of his employee shall be—

(a) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for less than two years, one week,

(b) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for two years or more, but less than five years, two weeks,

(c) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for five years or more, but less than ten years, four weeks,

(d) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for ten years or more, but less than fifteen years, six weeks,

(e) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for fifteen years or more, eight weeks.

As I have found that the Complainant was not dismissed, he was not entitled to be paid any notice. I therefore find that this complaint is not well founded.

CA-00071181-005:

The Complainant stated that he did not receive either his annual leave or his public holiday entitlements in respect of the period from 21 October 2024 to 14 February 2025.

In relation to annual leave entitlements, the Organisation of Working Time Act states:

19.—(1) Subject to the First Schedule (which contains transitional provisions in respect of the leave years 1996 to 1998), an employee shall be entitled to paid annual leave (in this Act referred to as “annual leave”) equal to—

(a) 4 working weeks in a leave year in which he or she works at least 1,365 hours (unless it is a leave year in which he or she changes employment),

(b) one-third of a working week for each month in the leave year in which he or she works at least 117 hours, or

(c) 8 per cent. of the hours he or she works in a leave year (but subject to a maximum of 4 working weeks):

Provided that if more than one of the preceding paragraphs is applicable in the case concerned and the period of annual leave of the employee, determined in accordance with each of those paragraphs, is not identical, the annual leave to which the employee shall be entitled shall be equal to whichever of those periods is the greater

The complaint concerning holiday pay was referred on 30 April 2025. For annual leave complaints under the Organisation of Working Time Act, the cognisable period is determined by reference to the statutory leave year (1 April to 31 March) falling within the six‑month period prior to referral. Six months prior to 30 April 2025 is 1 November 2024, and the start of the applicable statutory leave year is 1 April 2024.

Accordingly, the Complainant’s holiday‑pay entitlements arising within the leave year commencing 1 April 2024 may be assessed, which the Complainant stated included the period from 21 October 2024 to 14 February 2025. As set out above in relation to the Payment of Wages Act complaint above, namely CA-00072565-001, I have found that wages were properly payable for the period 1 November 2024 to 14 February 2025 and were unlawfully withheld. Accordingly, this aspect of the complaint is well founded, and the Complainant is entitled to statutory holiday pay for the period from 21 October 2024 to 14 February 2025, calculated on the statutory accrual method

The Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 states the following in relation to public holidays:

Section 2 – Interpretation

This is where the term “public holiday” is defined:

"public holiday" means any of the following days:

(a) 1st January, (b) first Monday in February, except where it falls on the 1st day of February (in which case that day), (c) 17th March, (d) Easter Monday, (e) first Monday in May, (f) first Monday in June, (g) first Monday in August, (h) last Monday in October, (i) 25th December, (j) 26th December,

and any day or days prescribed for the purposes of this definition.

21.—(1) Subject to this section, an employee shall, in respect of a public holiday, be entitled to—

(a) a paid day off on that day, (b) a paid day off within a month of that day, (c) an additional day of annual leave, or (d) an additional day’s pay,

as the employer may determine.

(2) If the public holiday falls on a day on which the employee normally works, then the employee is entitled to a paid day off on that day.

(3) If the public holiday falls on a day on which the employee does not normally work, the employee shall receive one of the benefits specified in subsection (1)(b), (c), or (d).

(4) An employee who has not worked at least 40 hours during the 5 weeks ending on the day before the public holiday shall not be entitled to the benefits of this section.

(5) Where an employee ceases to be employed during the week ending on the day before a public holiday, having worked the required 40 hours, they are still entitled to the benefit for that public holiday.

A different jurisdictional rule applies to public holiday complaints. Unlike annual leave, which is assessed by reference to the statutory leave year, claims for unpaid public holiday entitlements fall under the general six‑month limitation period in section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. Accordingly, I may only consider public holidays falling within the period of six months prior to the date the complaint was referred. The complaint was referred on 30 April 2025, and therefore only public holidays occurring on or after 1 November 2025 fall within my jurisdiction.

In that period, the following public holidays occurred:

– Christmas Day: 25 December 2024 – St Stephen’s Day: 26 December 2024 – New Year’s Day: 1 January 2025 – St Brigid’s Day (first Monday in February): 3 February 2025

As the Complainant was not paid for four public holidays in the cognisable period, I find that the complaint is well founded.

CA-00071181-006:

The Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, as amended, (the “TE(I)A”) sets out the basic terms of employment which an employer must provide to an employee in written form. Section 3(1) of the TE(I)A also obligates an employer to provide employees with a statement in writing concerning other aspects of an employee’s terms and conditions of employment within one month of commencing employment.

Findings:

The Complainant stated, and the Respondent accepted, that he did not receive a statement in writing of his general terms of employment within one month of commencing work.

I therefore find that this complaint is well founded.

CA-00072565-001:

The complaint is well‑founded for the reasons set out above.

Using the net weekly wage provided on the complaint form of (€517) and the period already found within jurisdiction (1 November 2024 to 14 February 2025 = 15.142857 weeks, i.e., pro‑rated for partial weeks), I find that the Complainant is owed the following:

• €517 × 15.142857 weeks = €7,828.86 (net),

I therefore direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €7,828.86 (net) in respect of this complaint.

CA-00071181-002:

As I have found that the Complainant was not dismissed, I find that he was not discriminated against.

CA-00071181-003:

The complaint is not well‑founded for the reasons set out above.

CA-00071181-005:

(i) Annual Leave:

Holiday‑pay calculation (gross):

• Period: 21 October 2024 to 14 February 2025 (inclusive) = 117 calendar days, approximately 16.7143 weeks.
• Weekly hours: 40; hourly rate: €15.
• Statutory accrual method applied: 8% of reckonable hours worked.
• Reckonable hours in period (deemed paid): 16.7143 weeks × 40 hours = 668.5714 hours.
• Holiday hours at 8%: 53.4857 hours.
• Using an 8‑hour working day (40 hours/5 days):
  • Holiday days: 6.6857 days (approximately 6.69 days or 1.34 working weeks).
• Gross holiday pay: 53.4857 hours × €15 = €802.29.

(ii) Public Holidays:

Under the Organisation of Working Time Act, a full‑time employee working 40 hours per week is entitled to a paid public holiday, calculated as the equivalent of a normal day’s pay. The Complainant’s weekly pay, at €15 per hour for 40 hours, is €600, which results in a daily rate of €120.

As set out above, there are four public holidays within jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Complainant’s public holiday pay entitlement is calculated as follows:

Daily rate: €600 ÷ 5 = €120 Number of public holidays: 4 Total public holiday pay: 4 × €120 = €480 (gross)

I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant € 1,282.29 (€802.29+€480) (gross) in respect of this complaint.

CA-00071181-006:

I find that this complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above.

In deciding on an award of compensation, I note that the Respondent is a very small enterprise with very few employees. Bearing this in mind, I direct the Respondent to pay the Complainant €600 (gross), namely one weeks’ pay in respect of this complaint.