Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Claire  Morton

Inspire Wellbeing

Representatives

Dominic Wilkinson BL instructed by Paula Walshe Arag Legal Protection Limited

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00069595-001

25/02/2025

The Complainant’s employment with the Respondent as a Support Worker commenced on or about 3 August 2021. She stated that she was left with no alternative but to resign from her employment on or around 4 April 2024 because of bullying that she had been subjected to in the workplace that was not addressed by the Respondent.

In her complaint form submitted to the WRC, the Complainant stated that she was left with no alternative but to resign from her employment on or around 4 April 2024 because of bullying that she had been subjected to in the workplace that was not addressed by the Respondent.

The Complainant’s employment with the Respondent as a Support Worker commenced on or about 3 August 2021. The Complainant went on a period of maternity leave from 23 December 2022 to 12 October 2023. The Complainant also took a period of parents leave until 30 November 2023. The Complainant then went on a period of annual leave until 13th December 2023. Whilst on maternity leave the Complainant raised a complaint about an incident that occurred prior to her going on maternity leave. The matter was investigated with an outcome issued on 13th December 2023 and an appeal to that outcome heard and decided upon on 20th February 2024. The Complainant went on a period of sick leave from 14th December 2023 to 1st March 2024. The sick certificate simply stated “Medical Condition” in the section entitled “is suffering from”.

The Complainant was absent from work from 2 to 29 March 2024. On or around 29 March 2024, the Complainant tendered her resignation with immediate effect.

Preliminary Issue – Time Limit

The Respondent raised a preliminary objection to my jurisdiction to inquire into the within complaint, contending that it was not presented within the time limits prescribed by statute.

Specifically, section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1993 states the following in respect of time limits: A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing (containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015) to the Director General— (a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or (b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause.

It is common case that the Complainant’s employment terminated in the period between 29 March 2024  - 4 April 2024 and that the complaint was not referred to the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission until 25 February 2025. The complaint was therefore plainly outside the primary six-month limitation period, though within the outer limit of twelve months.

The Complainant does not dispute the delay. She applies for an extension of time, asserting that her failure to lodge the complaint within six months arose by reason of ill-health following the termination of her employment.

The Respondent, for its part, maintains that no reasonable cause has been established. It disputes that the Complainant’s medical condition was such as to prevent her from referring her complaint within the statutory period.

In those circumstances, I must determine whether the Complainant has discharged the burden of establishing reasonable cause so as to warrant an extension of time.

The Applicable Legal Test

The principles governing applications of this nature are well settled. The test was authoritatively set out by the Labour Court in Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll (DWT0338). In that case, the Court held:

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

This test has been consistently applied. It is not sufficient that a claimant encountered difficulty or distress; rather, the circumstances relied upon must both explain the delay and excuse it. There must be a clear causal connection between the matters asserted and the failure to comply with the statutory time limit.

The burden rests squarely upon the Complainant.

Analysis

The Complainant contends that she was medically unfit to attend to her affairs during the relevant six-month period. However, while medical difficulties were asserted, no compelling or cogent medical evidence was adduced to establish that she was rendered incapable of taking the relatively straightforward step of lodging a complaint with the WRC within time.

No detailed medical report was furnished addressing her functional capacity during the material period. Her general practitioner did not attend to give evidence, nor was there persuasive documentation demonstrating that she was prevented, as distinct from distressed or unwell, from initiating proceedings.

Ill-health, even of a significant nature, does not of itself constitute reasonable cause. The question is whether it prevented the presentation of the complaint. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that such prevention has been established.

Having considered the totality of the evidence, I am not persuaded, on the balance of probabilities, that the Complainant’s medical condition caused the delay in referring her complaint. Nor am I satisfied that, but for the circumstances relied upon, she would have presented her claim within the six-month statutory period.

Conclusion

In those circumstances, I find that the Complainant has failed to establish reasonable cause within the meaning of the Act. The complaint was not presented within the primary six-month limitation period, and the statutory threshold for extending time has not been met.

Accordingly, I find that the complaint is out of time and I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into it.

I do not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint for the reasons set out above.