Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Uze  Abdulrakim Adekoya

John O' Connor

Representatives

None

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 21 Equal Status Act, 2000

CA-00069494-001

23/02/2025

The Complainant alleges discrimination and harassment in relation to housing assistance when the Respondent allegedly refused the Complainant’s request to complete the Housing Assistance Payment (“HAP”) application form.  The Complainant also alleges he was victimised by the Respondent.

There was no appearance by or on behalf of the Respondent at the hearing. 

Relevant Law

Section 2(1) of the Equal Status Act, 2000 (“the Act”) provides:

““prohibited conduct” means discrimination against, or . . .  harassment of, or permitting the  . . . harassment of, a person in contravention of this Act”

Section 3 of the Act provides:

“(1) For the purposes of this Act discrimination shall be taken to occur— (a) where a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) or, if appropriate, subsection (3B), (in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) . . .

(2) As between any two persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are . . . (j) that one— (i) has in good faith applied for any determination or redress provided for in Part II or III, (ii) has attended as a witness before the Authority, the adjudication officer or a court in connection with any inquiry or proceedings under this Act, (iii) has given evidence in any criminal proceedings under this Act, (iv) has opposed by lawful means an act which is unlawful under this Act, or (v) has given notice of an intention to take any of the actions specified in subparagraphs (i) to (iv), and the other has not (the “victimisation ground”) . . .

(3B) For the purposes of section 6(1)(c), the discriminatory grounds shall (in addition to the grounds specified in subsection (2)) include the ground that as between any two persons, that one is in receipt of rent supplement (within the meaning of section 6(8)), housing assistance (construed in accordance with Part 4 of the Housing (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014) or any payment under the Social Welfare Acts and the other is not (the “housing assistance ground”).

Section 5(1) of the Act provides:

“A person shall not discriminate in disposing of goods to the public generally or a section of the public or in providing a service, whether the disposal or provision is for consideration or otherwise and whether the service provided can be availed of only by a section of the public”.

Section 6(1) of the Act provides:

“A person shall not discriminate in— (a) disposing of any estate or interest in premises, (b) terminating any tenancy or other interest in premises, or (c) subject to subsection (1A), providing accommodation or any services or amenities related to accommodation or ceasing to provide accommodation or any such services or amenities . . . . ”

Section 11 of the Act provides:

“(1) A person shall not . . .  harass (within the meaning of subsection (4) or (5)) another person (“the victim”) where the victim . . . (b) is the proposed or actual recipient from the person of any premises or of any accommodation or services or amenities related to accommodation . . .

(5) (a) In this section—

(i) references to harassment are to any form of unwanted conduct related to any of the discriminatory grounds . . . being conduct which in either case has the purpose or effect of violating a person’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the person.

(b) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (a), such unwanted conduct may consist of acts, requests, spoken words, gestures or the production, display or circulation of written words, pictures or other material.”

Section 21 of the Act provides:

“(2)Before seeking redress under this section the complainant shall, within 2 months after the prohibited conducted is alleged to have occurred, or, where more than one incident of prohibited conduct is alleged to have occurred, within 2 months after the last such occurrence, notify the respondent in writing of— (i) the nature of the allegation, (ii) the complainant’s intention, if not satisfied with the respondent’s response to the allegation, to seek redress under this Act, and (b) may in that notification, with a view to assisting the complainant in deciding whether to refer the case to the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court, question the respondent in writing so as to obtain material information and the respondent may, if the respondent so wishes, reply to any such questions . . . .”

Section 21(3) of the Act provides:

“(a) On application by a complainant the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission . . .  may — (i) for reasonable cause, direct that in relation to the complainant subsection (2) shall have effect as if for the reference to 2 months there were substituted a reference to such period not exceeding 4 months as is specified in the direction, or (ii) exceptionally, where satisfied that it is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstance of the case to do so direct that subsection (2) shall not apply in relation to the complainant to the extent specified in the direction, and, where such a direction is given, this Part shall have effect accordingly.

 (b) In deciding whether to give a direction under paragraph (a)(ii) the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission . . .  shall have regard to all the relevant circumstances, including—

(i) the extent to which the respondent is, or is likely to be, aware of the circumstances in which the prohibited conduct occurred, and

(ii) the extent of any risk of prejudice to the respondent’s ability to deal adequately with the complaint”

Section 21(4) of the Act provides:

“The Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or, as the case may be, the Circuit Court shall not investigate a case unless the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission or the Circuit Court, as the case may be, is satisfied either that the respondent has replied to the notification or that at least one month has elapsed after it was sent to the respondent.”

Section 25 of the Act provides:

“. . . (1A) (a) Claims to have been discriminated against on more than one of the discriminatory grounds (other than the victimisation ground) shall be investigated as a single case, and (b) claims to have been discriminated against on discriminatory grounds which include the victimisation ground may, in an appropriate case, be so investigated, but a decision shall be made on each of the claims”.

Section 38A of the Act provides:

“(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a person from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct has occurred in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary . . . .”

In Gaelscoil Thulach Na Nogv. Fitzsimons-Markey (EET034) the Labour Court stated:

“The term exceptional is an ordinary familiar English adjective and not a term of art.  It describes circumstances such as to form an exception, which is out of the ordinary course or unusual or special or uncommon, to be exceptional a circumstance need not be unique or unprecedented or very rare; but it cannot be one which is regular or routinely or normally encountered.”

Findings

Notification Requirements & Jurisdiction to Investigate the Complaint

The Act provides that a complainant must notify a respondent in writing of the nature of the complaint and the complainant’s intention, if not satisfied with the respondent’s response to the complaint, to seek redress under the Act before the WRC.  This must be done before seeking redress before the WRC. 

The Complainant in this case did send an ES.1 Form to the Respondent within two months of the alleged prohibited conduct.  The Respondent did not reply to that ES.1 Form.  The Complainant accepts that the ES.1 Form may have been sent to the incorrect address for the Respondent.  It transpired on or about the first hearing date that the ES.1 Form was sent to the incorrect address for the Respondent.  Therefore, it is clear that the Complainant has not satisfied the notification requirement provided for at s. 21(2) of the Act as the notification was sent to the wrong address for the Respondent.  Further, s. 21(4) of the Act provides that the WRC cannot “investigate” a case unless satisfied either that the respondent has replied to the notification OR that at least one month has elapsed after it was sent to the respondent.  The Complainant in this case did not wait one month before referring the complaint to the WRC.   

A complainant can make an application to the WRC to dispense with the notification requirement at s. 21(2) of the Act.  Section 21(3)(a)(ii) of the Act provides that in considering such an application the WRC may exceptionally, where satisfied that it is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstance of the case to do so, direct that the notification requirement need not apply in relation to a complainant.  In so directing the WRC must have regard to the extent to which the respondent is, or is likely to be, aware of the circumstances in which the prohibited conduct occurred, and the extent of any risk of prejudice to the respondent’s ability to deal adequately with the complaint. 

In considering the discretion at s. 21(3)(a)(ii) of the Act to disapply the notification requirement in the particular circumstances of this case, I am mindful of the purpose of the Act and decisions of the superior courts on the manner in which the Act is to be applied.  The Act is intended to promote equality, prohibit various forms of discrimination and provide for remedying such discrimination.  The Act is regarded as remedial social legislation to be interpreted as widely and liberally as possible (see Cahill v. The Minister for Education and Science [2017] IESC 29 and XTX Markets Technologies Limited v. Aviva Investors Liquidity Funds PLC [2025] IEHC 651).  I am also mindful of the purpose of s. 21(2) of the Act.  In Tracey O’Brien and Francis McCarthy v. Ruairí’s Bar, Tralee (DEC-S2007-039) the Equality Tribunal explained the purpose of the notification requirement at s. 21(2) of the Act as follows:

“The purpose of this notification is twofold.  Firstly, it is designed to alert the respondent at an early stage to the nature of the allegation and the fact that a complaint is being considered against them and, secondly, it affords the respondent the opportunity of communicating directly with the complainant with a view to resolving the issue between themselves without recourse to the Equality Tribunal.” 

At the hearing on 10th February 2026, the uncontested evidence of the Complainant was that the Respondent refused to sign the HAP application form and evicted the Complainant.  He outlined the difficulty he had trying to secure alternative accommodation.  He further outlined the distress caused to him and his family arising from conduct by the Respondent and/or a group of other men who, according to the Complainant, threatened and intimidated him and his children.  The Complainant also gave uncontested evidence that the electricity supply to the apartment was repeatedly disconnected, which he found extremely distressing.  He was required to report these matters to the gardaí.  He stated that the Respondent consistently refused to provide him with a postal address despite numerous requests.  The Complainant contacted the RTB to ascertain whether it held an address for the Respondent; however, the RTB was unable to assist.  The Complainant ultimately relied upon an address provided to him by a former tenant for the purpose of serving the ES.1 Form.  Unknown to the Complainant at the time, this address had the wrong house number (“No. 1” instead of “No. 2”). 

I have had regard to foregoing as relevant factors in my assessment of the application to disapply the notification requirement at s. 21(2) of the Act.  While I am satisfied that it is the responsibility of the Complainant to ensure the notification required at s. 21(2) of the Act is sent to the correct address of the Respondent, the Complainant was unable to verify the address for the Respondent despite expending considerable effort in trying to do so. 

I have also considered the extent to which the Respondent could be prejudiced by this application to disapply the notification requirement at s. 21(2) of the Act.  On 17th and 27th November 2025, the Respondent was notified by the WRC (to the address confirmed by the Respondent’s partner) that the Complainant was seeking adjudication by the WRC under s. 21 of the Act.  The Respondent was notified on 27th November 2025 that a rescheduled hearing would take place on 10th February 2026.  Several months elapsed between the WRC notification of the rescheduled hearing and the second hearing date.  The Respondent did not make contact with the WRC in relation to the complaint before 10th February 2026.  The Respondent did not attend the rescheduled hearing on 10th February 2026.  The uncontested evidence of the Complainant on that date was that the Respondent made no effort to contact him in relation to the complaint between the 17th November 2025 and 10th February 2026.  Having regard to the foregoing matters, and in accordance with the considerations mandated by s. 21(3)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act, I am satisfied that the Respondent is, or is likely to be, aware of the circumstances in which the alleged prohibited conduct occurred.  I am further satisfied that there is now no discernible risk of prejudice to the Respondent’s ability to deal adequately with the complaint arising from the Complainant’s inadvertent use of an incorrect address when attempting to serve the ES.1 Form.

In summary, having regard to all of the circumstances identified above, I am satisfied that the particular circumstances arising in this case, as set out above, meet the statutory threshold of being exceptional for the purposes of s. 21(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.  I am further satisfied, in accordance with s. 21(3)(b)(i) and (ii), that the Respondent is, or is likely to be, aware of the circumstances in which the alleged prohibited conduct occurred and that there is no risk of prejudice to the Respondent’s ability to deal adequately with the complaint.  In light of these findings and being satisfied that it is fair and reasonable in the particular circumstances of this case to do so, I direct that s. 21(2) of the Act shall not apply in relation to the Complainant.

Section 21(4) of the Act provides that the WRC must not investigate a case unless satisfied either that the respondent has replied to the notification or that at least one month has elapsed after it was sent to the respondent.  The purpose of s. 21(4) is to give a respondent a reasonable opportunity to engage with the notification before a WRC investigation commences.  Having exercised my discretion to dispense with the notification requirement at s. 21(2) of the Act, it follows, in my view, as a consequence of exercising that discretion, that the requirement set out at s. 21(4) of the Act does not arise.  The operation of s. 21(4) is contingent upon the sending of a valid notification.  Where the notification requirement has been lawfully waived, the requirement at s. 21(4) is, by necessary implication, displaced.  If that analysis is incorrect, I am in any event satisfied that a period in excess of one month elapsed between the Complainant’s attempted service of the ES.1 Form and the commencement of the WRC’s investigation of the complaint.  In this regard, I have had regard to the findings of the Adjudication Officer in McGinley v. Smyths Toys Superstores (ADJ‑00031660) concerning the point at which a WRC investigation is deemed to commence.

In McGinley the complainant did not wait one month before issuing a complaint to the WRC.  The Adjudication Officer noted:

“As a matter of practicality, of course, no investigation is conducted until the hearing of this matter as all interim steps are designed to be administrative only . . . In considering the issue raised, I am particularly drawn to the wisdom of M. Justice O’Malley in the case of  G  -v-  The Department of Social Welfare [2015] IEHC 419 in which Ms. Justice O’Malley noted that:- “Having regard to the objectives of the Act, it must be acknowledged to be a remedial statute. It follows that it must be liberally construed”.  The Judge confirmed Dodd’s Statutory Interpretation in Ireland (2008) that: “Remedial social statues and legislation of a paternal character favour a purposive interpretation and are said to be construed as widely and liberally as can be fairly done within the constitutional limits of the Courts interpretive role.”  The Equal Status Act 2000 – 2011 she said “…is intended to cover a broad range of human life and activity, and that it’s overall purpose is to reduce the social wrong of discrimination based on improper considerations. Having regard to the principle applicable to remedial statutes, it should be construed widely and liberally.”  In the circumstances I believe I am bound to construe the seemingly mandatory sequencing set out in the Act in as liberal a way as possible in order that any injustice be avoided. I am therefore satisfied that the Complainant is entitled to make her case under the Equal Status Act 2000. These are procedural steps created for the convenience of the parties and time limitations should not be construes [sic] as rigidly as, for example, the time limit for bringing a claim at all” (my emphasis).

In line with the findings of the Adjudication Officer in McGinley, I consider that an investigation only commences when a hearing into the complaint commences, which in this case was 10th February 2026.  On that date more than one month had elapsed since the WRC issued notice to the Respondent of the complaint and the proposed rescheduled hearing date.  Accordingly, I am satisfied that the requirement with respect to the waiting period in s. 21(4) of the Act has been met.

In conclusion, considering all the foregoing, I am satisfied I have jurisdiction to investigate this complaint.

The Complaint

Section 38A of the Act requires a complainant to establish facts from which the alleged prohibited conduct may be inferred.  It is only where such facts are established that the burden of proof shifts to a respondent to rebut the inference of prohibited conduct.  Therefore, the Complainant in this case must show that he has been treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on the housing assistance ground which requires that, as between any two persons, one is in receipt of housing assistance and the other is not.  The Act provides for a hypothetical comparator: in this case a tenant of the Respondent who is not in receipt of HAP.

The cognisable period for this complaint is 24th August 2024 to 23rd February 2025.  The uncontested evidence of the Complainant is that the Respondent refused to complete the HAP application form when requested to do so in October 2024.  The Complainant outlined that he was served with an “illegal notice of eviction” on 1st November 2024 (a “Notice of Eviction” was opened to the hearing).  The Complainant outlined that he was also subjected to acts of unwanted conduct including the repeated switching off of the electricity supply and repeated threats of violence and intimidation by or on behalf of the Respondent.  The Complainant outlined that this conduct severely impacted his and his family’s well-being. 

I am satisfied, based on the uncontested evidence of the Complainant, that the Complainant has established facts from which it may be presumed that prohibited conduct on the housing assistance ground has occurred.  As the Respondent did not attend the hearing, the Respondent has not availed of an opportunity to rebut the inference of prohibited conduct.  I am satisfied that the Respondent’s refusal to sign the HAP application form to enable the Complainant to obtain HAP amounts to less favourable treatment than a tenant not so entitled.  Following the request to sign the HAP application form, the Complainant was served with an eviction notice, and the tenancy was subsequently terminated contrary to s. 6(1) of the Act.  I am further satisfied that the Respondents’ conduct towards the Complainant after he requested the signing of the HAP application form constitutes harassment within the meaning of s. 11(5)(a) of the Act.  I am satisfied the conduct was unwanted and that it had the effect of violating the Complainant’s dignity and creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for the Complainant. 

In conclusion, I find the Complainant’s complaint under the Equal Status Act, 2000 (as amended) to be well founded.

Section 27(1) of the Act provides:

“Subject to this section, the types of redress for which a decision of the Director of the Workplace Relations Commission under section 25 may provide are either or both of the following as may be appropriate in the circumstances:

(a) an order for compensation for the effects of the prohibited conduct concerned; or

(b) an order that a person or persons specified in the order take a course of action which is so specified.”

Given the Complainant no longer resides in the property, I am satisfied the appropriate redress is compensation.  I note the Complainant did not pay rent due for several months prior to him leaving the property in April 2025.  I also note that any compensation I order must be effective, persuasive, and dissuasive. 

Considering the foregoing, I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €5,000 for the effects of the prohibited conduct.

The Complainant gave no evidence in relation to the victimisation ground.  Therefore, I find this complaint is not well founded.

I find the Respondent discriminated and harassed the Complainant on the housing assistance ground.  I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €5,000 for the effects of that prohibited conduct.

I decide the Complainant was not victimised within the meaning of the Equal Status Act, 2000 (as amended).

HAP.  Discrimination. Harassment. Victimisation.