EDA2623

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No.: ADJ-00044296 (CA-00055030-001)

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the decision of the WRC Adjudication Officer under Section 83 (1), Employment Equality Acts, 1998 to 2021 on 26 June 2024. A Labour Court hearing took place on 19 May 2026.          

The following is the Determination of the Court.

DETERMINATION:

1. This is an appeal by Ms Tessa King against a Decision of an Adjudication Officer (ADJ-00044296/CA-00055030-001), dated 31 May 2024, made under the Employment Equality Acts, 1998-2021 in an equal pay complaint against Blockstar Limited. In that decision the Adjudication Officer decided that the Complainant had not established facts from which an inference of discrimination could be inferred and therefore she was not discriminated against on grounds of her gender in relation to her complaint of equal pay.
2. This appeal is linked with appeal no. ADE/24/104 which is a complaint of sexual harassment.
3. In this determination, the parties are referred to in the same way as at first instance. Hence, Ms King is referred to as “the Complainant” and Blockstar Limited as “the Respondent”.
4. The Complainant lodged a Notice of Appeal to the Labour Court on 26 June 2024, which was lacking the relevant complaint reference numbers being appealed. The completed appeal was received by the Court on 12 July 2024. The Court was satisfied that there was sufficient detail included in the appeal documentation submitted on 26 June 2024 for that date to be noted as the date of appeal. In that circumstance the appeal was submitted within the 42-day period for bringing an appeal provided for in section 44(3) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The Respondent raised no objection to the Court’s conclusion in that regard and was not raising a time limit point as part of its defence to the Complainant’s appeal.
5. Unlike in the linked appeal, there was no time limit point regarding the date of submission of the equal pay case to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC). By application of section 77(5)(c) of the Employment Equality Acts 1998-2021 (the Acts) the six-month time limit for referring cases under the Acts does not apply to equal pay cases.
6. A hearing of the Court was held on 19 May 2026 in Limerick. The Complainant was accompanied by her husband at the hearing. The Respondent was represented by Mr Stephen Keogh of MHP Sellors LLP. The Court heard submissions from both parties, and the Complainant gave evidence under affirmation. Ms Daveen Heyworth, Director of the Respondent gave evidence under oath on behalf of the Respondent.

Submission and Evidence of the Complainant

7. The Complainant made written submissions and gave evidence outlining that she had been employed by the Respondent as an administrator in Riverdale Nursing Home in Co Clare (the Clare nursing home) from 14 December 2021 until she resigned on 13 January 2023. At the commencement of her employment the Complainant was paid €13.50 per hour for 33 hours per week. The Complainant’s evidence was that she received no handover or training on commencement of employment and that she had substantial work to do in clearing backlogs and setting up operational procedures. In August 2022 the Respondent employed a male administrator (the Comparator) in another of the Respondent’s nursing homes, St Michael’s in Limerick (the Limerick nursing home).
8. The Complainant gave evidence that she provided full training to this new administrator who she said had no prior nursing home experience and that this training comprised multiple days over three or four weeks. The Complainant said that the training covered processing accounts for the residents, Fair Deal processes, accounts payable including use of the accounting software, use of the payroll system including introducing him to the Irish taxation system, PAYE and USC, petty cash including reconciliation of petty cash and residents’ accounts, and HIQA processes. The Complainant said that access to the Respondent’s banking system, including authorisation of payroll, was the responsibility of the company’s accountant but that this was the same in both the Limerick and Clare nursing homes. The Complainant’s position was that the administrator role in Limerick was identical to that in the nursing home in which she was employed.
9. The Complainant’s evidence was that she discovered that the Comparator was paid €15.00 per hour for what she considered was a job identical to hers. When she raised the issue with the Respondent she was told that the Comparator had a degree which the Complainant did not. The Complainant did not accept this as a justification as she considered that his degree was not relevant to Ireland and she had a more relevant Level 6 accounting technician qualification. The Complainant said that the Respondent later maintained that the pay differential was because the Limerick nursing home was larger and the job performed by the Comparator was bigger including that he had full responsibility for payroll which role was performed by the accountant in the Clare nursing home. The Complainant disputed both of these points and maintained that the Limerick and Clare nursing homes had exactly the same number of residents at the time the Comparator was employed. The Complainant was not able to say how many employees were in each of the nursing homes and did not give evidence of the bed capacity other than to say that the Limerick nursing home was operating at significantly reduced capacity at the time the Comparator commenced employment.
10. The Complainant’s evidence was that she was given an increase in pay to €14.50 per hour within days of raising the issue of unequal pay with the Respondent.
11. The Complainant’s position is that her role and that of the Comparator were identical. The Complainant maintained that there was no justification for a pay differential between the Comparator’s rate of pay and her rate of pay and that the reason for the pay differential is because she is a different gender to the Comparator.

Summary Position of the Respondent

12. The Respondent submitted that the difference in pay between the Complainant’s rate of €13.50 per hour and the Comparator’s rate of pay of €15.00 per hour was because the Comparator’s workload was considerably heavier than the Complainant’s and he had additional responsibilities for which he deserved to be remunerated accordingly. The Respondent set out that the Limerick nursing home had 80 beds compared to 43 beds in the Clare nursing home so the Comparator had more staff and patients to oversee than the Complainant, and also that the Comparator administered the payroll for the Limerick nursing home where that role was undertaken by the accountant in the Complainant’s nursing home. The Respondent noted that the Comparator was educated to degree level where the Complainant had an accounting technician qualification. The Respondent’s position was that the two roles were different with one having a much greater degree of responsibility in terms of the size of the operation and with the Comparator carrying out a payroll function not undertaken by the Complainant.

Evidence of the Respondent

13. Ms Heyworth, as Director of the Respondent, gave evidence under oath that the Respondent had four nursing homes, employing over 400 staff. She said all the Respondent’s nursing homes were regulated by HIQA and that there were no non-compliances. She said there was one nursing home in Limerick (with 80 beds and approximately 100 employees) where the Comparator was the administrator, one in Clare (with 43 beds and approximately 53 employees) where the Complainant was the administrator, one in Urlingford (with 90 beds and approximately 105 staff) and one in Dooradoyle (with 57 beds and approximately 83 employees). Her evidence was that the Comparator had a much greater role than the Complainant with almost double the number of residents and employees.
14. Ms Heyworth’s evidence was that salary levels varied depending on the size of the nursing home with the Director of Nursing in Limerick also earning more than the Director of Nursing in Clare. She said that the administrators in Urlingford and Dooradoyle, who were both female, earned €15.00 per hour and €14.00 per hour respectively at the time the Complainant was earning €13.50 and the Comparator earning €15.00 per hour. The Complainant’s predecessor was female and earned €13.50 per hour. Ms Heyworth’s evidence was that the size of the nursing home determined the pay levels but that there were no pay scales or pay determination mechanisms in place for administrative staff. Ms Heyworth said that gender was not a factor in determining pay.
15. Ms Heyworth said that the reduced bed count in Limerick, contended for by the Complainant, was only for a brief period after a Covid outbreak and that it returned to full occupancy thereafter.
16. Ms Heyworth understood that the main focus of the training of the Comparator by the Complainant was on the Epicare system of invoicing because it was being introduced into Limerick and the Complainant had experience of it. She said that other people in addition to the Complainant, including the Director of Nursing, worked with the Comparator for his induction. Ms Heyworth said that the Comparator was extremely sharp, very diligent but that he was not familiar with the computerised system. She said he did not need support for payroll/wages. Ms Heyworth said that the accountant processed the payroll for the Clare nursing home from hours totalled on the system by the Complainant but that the Comparator processed the entire payroll for Limerick with the accountant only providing the banking authorisation in Limerick. She said that there was double the workload for the administrator in the Limerick nursing home and that it had operated at full capacity after the Covid outbreak.
17. Ms Heyworth said that when she was approached by the regional manager about the Complainant’s request for an increase in or around August 2022 she agreed to an increase to €14.50 per hour. She said that the Complainant’s manager said she was good in the role and should be rewarded with extra pay. Ms Heyworth did not pay the full €15.00 per hour because she felt a differential had to be maintained because of the additional work in Limerick and said that some two to three months later the Comparator’s pay was also increased.

Relevant Law

18. Section 8(1)(b) of the Acts prohibits discrimination by employers in relation to conditions of employment.
19. Section 6(1) of the Acts provides:

“For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions regarding discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where-

• (a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the “discriminatory grounds”)…

20. Subsection (2)(a) provides that: “As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory ground (and the description of those grounds for the purposes of the Act) are – that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this Act referred to as “the gender ground”.
21. Section 19(1) of the Acts provides an entitlement to equal remuneration as between men and women (where A is a woman and B is a man or vice versa) as follows:

“It shall be a term of the contract under which A is employed that, subject to this Act, A shall at any time be entitled to the same rate of remuneration for the work which A is employed to do as B who, at that or any other relevant time, is employed to do like work by the same or an associated employer.”

22. Section 19(5) provides that: “Subject to subsection (4) [which deals with indirect discrimination and is not relevant to the facts of this case], nothing in this Part shall prevent an employer from paying, on grounds other than the gender ground, different rates of remuneration to different employees.”
23. Section 7 of the Acts provides that:

“7(1) Subject to subsection (2), for the purposes of this Act, in relation to the work which one person is employed to do, another person shall be regarded as employed to do like work if –

• (a) both perform the same work under the same or similar conditions, or each is interchangeable with the other in relation to the work,
• (b) the work performed by one is of a similar nature to that performed by the other and any differences between the work performed or the conditions under which it is performed by each either are of small importance in relation to the work as a whole or occur with such irregularity as not to be significant to the work as a whole, or
• (c) the work performed by one is equal in value to the work performed by the other, having regard to such matters as skill, physical or mental requirements, responsibility and working conditions.”

Burden of Proof

24. The burden of proof in respect of an equal pay claim has its basis in EU law, now reflected in the Recast Directive (Directive 2006/54/EC). Article 19 of this Directive provides, in respect of the burden of proof that:

“Member States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment.”

25. This burden of proof is reflected in section 85A of the Acts which provides that: -

‘Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove to the contrary.’

26. In Southern Health Board v Mitchell [2001] ELR 201, the Labour Court considered the extent of the evidential burden which a claimant must discharge which is that : -

“The first requirement is that the claimant must establish facts from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them.  This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise the presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if those primary facts are regarded…as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there was no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

27. In Melbury Developments v Arturs Valpeters [2010] ELR 64, the Labour Court, whilst examining the circumstances in which the probative burden of proof operates, stated that a complainant:

"must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the  burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule."

28. In HSE North Eastern Area v SheridanEDA0820, the Labour Court said that whether a complainant has shifted the burden of proof necessitates the following three-step evaluation:

"First, the complainant must prove the primary facts upon which he or she relies in alleging discrimination.

Second, the Court must evaluate those facts and satisfy itself that they are of sufficient significance in the context of the case as a whole to raise a presumption of discrimination.

Third, if the complainant fails at stage 1 or 2, he or she cannot succeed. However, if the complainant succeeds at stages 1 and 2, the presumption of discrimination comes into play and the onus shifts to the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there is no discrimination."

Deliberations

29. The burden of proof in an equal pay case requires a complainant to prove that they perform like work to a relevant comparator(s) and that their remuneration for performing that work is less than their comparator(s). The burden of proof then shifts to the respondent to prove that the principle of equal treatment has not been infringed.
30. In this case the Complainant asserts that she engaged in “like work”, work that was the same as that of her Comparator, claiming that the work undertaken was “identical” and “the exact same”. She maintains that her Comparator was paid a higher rate of pay than her because he was a man and she was a woman. No evidence was given by the Complainant to support an assertion that she was engaged in work of equal value as provided for in section 7(1)(c) of the Acts.
31. The Complainant’s evidence that she earned less than her Comparator was not disputed and neither was the quantum of the differential disputed. The Comparator joined the Respondent company in August 2022 and at that time the Comparator was paid €15.00 per hour and the Complainant was paid €13.50 per hour. Shortly thereafter, from September 2022, the Complainant’s pay increased to €14.50 per hour while the Comparator’s pay remained at €15.00 per hour. Some months after the Complainant’s rate of pay increased the Comparator also benefited from an increase in pay but the details of this increase were not provided to the Court and the Complainant appeared unaware of this development. The Complainant’s employment ceased in January 2023.
32. The Complainant’s evidence was that she trained the Comparator in all aspects of his work and that their roles were identical in all material respects. She identified the role as involving processing accounts for the nursing home residents, Fair Deal applications, managing residents’ accounts, processing and reconciling creditors’ invoices, maintaining staff files, payroll, petty cash reconciliation, allocation of pension to residents’ accounts and compliance with HIQA standards. The Complainant maintained that at the material time there were the same number of residents in the nursing home in which she worked and where the Comparator worked. The Complainant also gave evidence that the Comparator had a degree but that her Level 6 accounting technician qualification was more relevant to the role being performed by the parties. The fact of the differing qualifications was not in dispute between the parties.
33. The Court is of the view that the Complainant was in a position to identify the similarities between her role and that of the Comparator in circumstances where she provided lengthy induction training in what she identified as the areas in which she herself performed her role. The pay differential was not in dispute and neither was the fact that when the Complainant identified and objected to the differential an increase was given which went some way to closing the gap. The Respondent did not dispute that the Comparator performed the same tasks as the Complainant.
34. The Respondent confirmed that there were no pay scales in place and no pay determination mechanisms in place by which administrative pay rates were established. In Case 109/88 Handels-og Kontorfunktion Rernes Forbund I Fanmark v Dansk Arbejdsiverforening Danfos [1991] 1 CMLR 8 the Court of Justice of the EU interpreted the Equal Pay Directive as meaning that where an undertaking applies a system of pay which is totally lacking in transparency, it is for the employer to prove that his practice in the matter of wages is not discriminatory. This essentially means that opaqueness in a pay determination system, in combination with other factors, can operate to shift the burden of proving the absence of discrimination to the employer, as set out by the Labour Court in Calor Teoranta v Sharon Brierton EDA1510.
35. Having regard to the submissions and evidence and the response to questioning, the Court is satisfied that the Complainant has established primary facts on which she relies to demonstrate that she and the Comparator engage in like work and that there is a differential in pay between the two which, on the basis of evidence available to her, is not explained in any way other than that it is due to gender.
36. The Court in evaluating those facts has satisfied itself that they are of sufficient significance in the context of the case as a whole to raise a presumption of discrimination, particularly having regard to the lack of any objective measures or mechanisms used by the Respondent to determine pay for administrative staff.
37. In those circumstances the Court determines that the Complainant has met her burden of proof and the onus therefore shifts to the Respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that there is no breach of the principle of equal treatment.
38. In Brandon House Hotel v Joanna Barska EDA 148 the Labour Court identified that while section 19(5) of the Acts provides that an employer may pay different rates of remuneration on grounds other than gender, to different employees, this “does not mean that an employer is free to circumvent the right to equal pay by finding ostensibly gender neutral reasons to explain what is in reality the placing of a greater value on that work when it is performed by an employee of the opposite gender.” That determination went on to identify, by reference to the dicta of Barron J in Flynn v Primark [1997] ELR 218, that “[I]t is settled law that where men and women are engaged in like work and there is a difference in pay, there is prima facie discrimination”. The Labour Court set out that: “[I]t is then for the employer to show that an apparently gender neutral reason relied upon for the disparity in pay is genuine and compelling and worth the difference to the employer on an objective standard.”
39. The Respondent made two submissions in asserting that there are grounds, other than gender, to justify the differential in pay between the Complainant and the Comparator and provided oral evidence in respect of both. First, the Respondent maintains that the size of the operation and the area of responsibility of the Comparator is much greater than that of the Complainant in circumstances where he has administrative responsibility for 80 beds and approximately 100 employees where the Complainant’s responsibility is in respect of 43 beds and approximately 53 employees. Second, that the Comparator has responsibility for payroll in the Limerick nursing home where that function is carried out by an accountant and not the Complainant in the Clare nursing home. Further, the Respondent identified that the Comparator held a degree level qualification where the Complainant was qualified to Level 6.
40. The Complainant disputed the evidence in respect of both of those factors and asserted that the bed capacity in the Limerick nursing home was the same as in the Clare home at the material time. The Court considered the evidence of both parties in that regard and accepts that, while there may have been a temporary reduction in bed capacity in the aftermath of a Covid outbreak, the Limerick nursing home returned to full capacity thereafter. Further, there was no suggestion made or evidence given that the numbers employed in the Limerick nursing home reduced during the time of reduced bed capacity. The Complainant acknowledged that she did not undertake the payroll process in full although she collated information from rosters to provide to the accountant for the purposes of him running the payroll process. The Respondent’s evidence, which the Complainant was not in a position to meaningfully dispute, was that the Comparator conducted the payroll in the Limerick nursing home, only requiring the accountant’s input for authorisation purposes.
41. The Respondent’s position was that the number of beds was the material factor in determining the rate of pay. The Respondent’s witness gave evidence that the female administrator in the Urlingford nursing home, which was significantly larger than the nursing home where the Complainant was based, was paid the same rate of pay as the Comparator. The female administrator in the Dooradoyle nursing home, which was larger than the Clare nursing home but not as big as Limerick or Urlingford, was paid at a rate between the Complainant and the Comparator.
42. The Court accepts that the Complainant and the Comparator undertake many of the same tasks in respect of the nursing home residents’ accounts, petty cash, accounts payable, HIQA compliance and other such roles. The difference in size between the two nursing homes will result in a quantitively different workload which is reflected in the working hours of the parties with the Complainant working 33 hours per week and the Comparator working 39/40 hours per week. However, there is also a difference in terms of responsibility with the Complainant having a lesser level of responsibility than the Comparator having regard to the size of the respective nursing homes, and the numbers of residents and staff for which each administrator has responsibility. Further, the Court accepts the evidence of the Respondent that the Comparator has full responsibility for the payroll function in the Limerick nursing home where that substantive role, with administrative assistance from the Complainant, is carried out by the accountant in the Clare nursing home.
43. The Court does not consider the differing qualification levels of the Complainant and Comparator to be a relevant factor in this case. The Respondent did not argue that the Comparator’s degree was what qualified him to undertake the additional payroll function but rather indicated that the Complainant had not wished to undertake that role, not that she was not qualified to do so.
44. The Court has also had regard to the fact that while the Respondent clearly valued the Complainant’s role and reflected that in her increase in pay it considered that the Comparator’s pay should also increase having regard to the continuing differences in their respective roles.

Determination

45. The Court determines that while the Complainant discharged her burden and established a prima facie case of unequal pay on gender grounds, the Respondent provided sufficient evidence to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the difference in pay was justified on grounds other than gender.
46. The Adjudication Officer, in respect of the equal pay claim (CA-00055030-001) decided that the Complainant had not established facts from which an inference of discrimination can be inferred. That element of the decision is varied by the Court where the Court determines that the Complainant met her burden of proof in respect of her equal pay claim. However, the finding of the Adjudication Officer that the Complainant was not discriminated against on the ground of her gender in relation to her complaint of equal pay is affirmed.
47. The Court so determines.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Niamh McGowan
AR	______________________
15th June, 2026	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Mr Aidan Ralph, Court Secretary.