ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00066382

Parties:

Complaints:

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  30/03/2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Catherine Byrne

Procedure:

1. In accordance with section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 – 2015, section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts 1998 – 2015 and section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, these complaints were assigned to me by the Director General. The hearing commenced on March 30th 2026, having been adjourned twice, on October 24th 2025 and February 3rd 2026.  A hearing scheduled for December 9th 2025 was postponed because the respondent’s solicitor was assigned to another appointment at the WRC. 
2. The complainant, Mr James Keegan, was the only witness for his case and he attended the hearing with his father, Mr John Keegan. He was represented by Mr James McEvoy of Work Matters Ireland.  Old Conna Golf Club was represented by Mr Owen Keany BL, instructed by Mr Peter Murphy of McInnes Dunne Murphy LLP.  Ms Jessica Grendon accompanied Mr Murphy.  The general manager of the golf club, Mr Eric Murrihy, gave evidence in response to Mr Keegan’s complaints.  Mr Murrihy was accompanied by the club secretary, Ms Noelle Ryan and the president, Mr Paul Meany.
3. In advance of the hearing, the parties agreed that the complaints listed above could be heard at the same time as seven complaints submitted to the WRC by the complainant on April 1st 2025. A decision on those complaints has been issued under the reference number ADJ-00058045. 
4. While the parties are named in this decision, from here on, I will refer to Mr Keegan as “the complainant” and to Old Conna Golf Club as “the respondent.”

Background:

5. The complainant lives close to the respondent’s golf club in Bray, County Wicklow. At the hearing, I learned that the club has around 1,200 members and employs 21 staff.  The business is seasonal, with the winters being quieter than the summers.  As well as the golf course, this seasonality transfers to the business in the bar. 
6. The club bar has five staff; two full-time bar tenders, one part-time bar tender and two part-time cleaners. The part-time bar tender also does some cleaning.  On January 24th 2018, the complainant commenced in the role of part-time bar tender and cleaner.  On the form he submitted to the WRC, he stated that he worked for 20 hours per week.  In his submission dated October 24th 2025, Mr McEvoy, on behalf of the complainant, said that, between September 2023 and September 2024, he worked an average of 29.5 hours per week.  I understand from the respondent’s submission that, during the summer of 2024, he worked an average of 35.3 hours per week and that, in the winter of 2024-2025, he worked an average of 22.54 hours per week.  His hourly rate of pay was €14.05.

Chronology of Events Leading to these Complaints

7. Although he commenced in his job as a part-time bar tender in January 2018, the complainant was issued with a statement of his terms and conditions of employment in May 2023. This coincided with a change of management in the club.  Under the heading, “Hours of Work,” this document states,

“The club operates a 7 day business between Monday and Sunday.  You will work such hours per day and such hours per week as will be determined by the business from time to time.”

8. In October 2023, Mr Eric Murrihy was appointed as the new general manager of the club. At a meeting with Mr Murrihy shortly after he joined the business, the complainant told him that he wanted a more regular roster and longer notice of when he was required to work.  In February 2024, the club president, Mr Paul Meany and the secretary, Ms Noelle Ryan, had one to one meetings with all the staff.  The complainant raised no issues about his terms and conditions of employment.  He told Mr Meany and Ms Ryan that the roster was organised more fairly under Mr Murrihy and that he was rostered for more hours. 
9. It is the complainant’s case that, in March 2024, he was informed by Mr Murrihy that he would be offered full-time work from April onwards. Mr Murrihy’s evidence is that he didn’t have such a conversation with the complainant because it was sufficient to have two full-time bar tenders and one part-time employee. Mr Murrihy’s position is that he told the complainant that he would get more hours during the summer months.
10. In May 2024, as part of annual staff reviews, Mr Murrihy had a meeting with the complainant. The complainant was satisfied with his roster.  The complainant claims that Mr Murrihy informed him that he was planning a re-structure and that he would be promoted to supervisor and that his contract would be re-negotiated and that he would get an increase in pay. 
11. One of the part-time cleaners had resigned in early 2024 and a replacement was hired. When the second cleaner resigned in July 2024, Mr Murrihy asked the complainant if he wanted to do more cleaning shifts.  The complainant’s evidence is that he declined the offer of more hours because he thought that he had an offer of a full-time job.
12. From the complainant’s submission, it appears that he had a difficulty in July 2024 when he wanted a Saturday and Sunday off to attend his grandmother’s birthday party. The bar manager eventually arranged for him to have the time off, although with some inconvenience regarding him having to reimburse the person who covered his shift. 
13. On July 31st 2024, the complainant wrote to the club and addressed his letter “To Whom it May Concern.” The letter was to request pay for public holidays on which he wasn’t rostered and for a Sunday premium.  The letter was passed to Mr Murrihy by the payroll office.  Mr Murrihy replied on August 13th and explained that the complainant had worked on all the public holidays expect the first Monday in May, for which one day had been accrued.  Regarding the Sunday premium, Mr Murrihy referred to the provision in the complainant’s terms and conditions which states that his hourly rate includes a premium for working on Sundays.
14. In August 2024, the complainant was rostered for four closing shifts in one week, including on Friday, Saturday and Sunday. When he spoke about this to the assistant manager, one of his shifts was offered to another employee.  When the complainant objected to losing a shift, he was rostered back on.
15. The complainant had booked himself off for the weekend commencing on Friday, September 6th, but he was rostered on for the Friday. He wasn’t permitted to take the day off because the bar manager was on holidays and a group was booked into the bar.  He had to work from 9.00am until 2.00pm.
16. The evidence of Mr Murrihy is that, in September 2024, there were “rumblings” that the complainant wasn’t available to work certain days and that he didn’t want to work at weekends. On September 4th, Mr Murrihy met the complainant in the bar area of the club and told him that he needed to be more flexible and that he was required to cover for the holidays and time off of the two full-time bar tenders.
17. In his submission, the complainant said that in early September 2024, he began experiencing panic attacks and anxiety at work. He was absent for four weeks due to work-related stress.
18. The complainant’s submission contains an email sent to him on September 9th 2024, from Turas Nua, the employment activation service of the Department of Social Protection. The case worker in Turas Nua confirmed that she had received confirmation from the respondent that, since April 12th 2024, the complainant “has worked / will work 30 hours per week or more over 4 days.”
19. While he was absent, on September 27th 2024, the complainant had a meeting with the club president, Mr Meany, to discuss his concerns about his work situation. Mr Meany denied that the complainant had been offered a full-time position, despite the information provided on the email from Turas Nua.
20. On October 2nd 2024, the complainant had another meeting with Mr Meany. The club secretary, Ms Noelle Ryan also attended.  The complainant’s submission notes that he pointed out to Mr Meany and Ms Ryan that he was rostered for too many closing shifts, that his pay was unfair and his rights had not been acknowledged.  The complainant claims that the meeting ended with Mr Meany and Ms Ryan saying that they would arrange for him to have a meeting with someone from HR.  I understand that such a meeting did not occur.
21. In early 2025, changes were made to the catering service in the club and a franchise arrangement was agreed. In February, a vacancy was advertised for a food and beverage supervisor and the job was filled in March 2025.  Although he didn’t apply for the position, the complainant claims that he was promised this job.
22. On April 1st 2025, the complainant submitted seven complaints to the WRC under ADJ-00058045. On April 4th, he went absent when he was certified as suffering from work-related stress.  On April 10th, the club president, Mr Meany, wrote to the complainant to acknowledge that he had received the complaints that had been submitted to the WRC and to tell the complainant that he hoped that it would be possible to resolve his complaints without the need for adjudication.  The complainant replied on April 17th and told Mr Meany that he had appointed Mr McEvoy to act on his behalf.  He said, “I will not be engaging in any direct communication on the matter.”
23. On July 8th 2025, the complainant attended an examination with a doctor from Medmark, the respondent’s occupational health consultant. I understand that the doctor concluded that he was suffering from moderate anxiety but that he was fit to engage with his employer with a view to resolving his complaints.  In an email dated July 17th 2025, Ms Ryan, the club secretary, suggested three dates for a meeting with the general manager and an admin person.
24. On July 18th, Mr McEvoy replied to Ms Ryan’s email. Among other issues, he asked for an agenda for the meeting and for the complainant to be notified that he could accompany him.  McInnes Dunne Murphy Solicitors replied to Mr McEvoy and stated that the respondent would not engage with a third party “in respect of routine employment matters.”  Mr McEvoy wrote back and said that he agreed that “productive amicable direct engagement is the way forward,” but he insisted that the complainant was entitled to be accompanied by his chosen representative.  Alternatively, Mr McEvoy suggested seeking the assistance of the mediation services of the WRC.  On August 13th, Ms Ryan wrote to the complainant and said that the respondent’s solicitors would contact the WRC about the possibility of mediation.  The complainant replied the next day and indicated that his preferred option was to engage directly with his employer with Mr McEvoy representing him.  Ms Ryan replied and reiterated the respondent’s position that it expected to be able to engage directly with the complainant without legal representation.  It appears that, around the same time, the complaints submitted to the WRC on April 1st 2025 were scheduled for adjudication on October 24th. 
25. When the hearing opened on October 24th 2025, it was adjourned when the respondent’s side complained that the complainant’s submission was received by them only three days earlier and also, due to the unavailability of Mr Murrihy. Mr McEvoy agreed to the adjournment because the respondent had provided no submission and he was seeking information regarding comparator pay, in support of the complainant’s claim under the Employment Equality Act.  On October 29th, the respondent’s solicitors wrote to Mr McEvoy and said that its preferred approach was to resolve the complainant’s concerns through mediation outside the WRC. 
26. To determine his fitness to engage with his employer and the possibility of his return to work, on November 26th 2025, the complainant attended an examination with a doctor from Medmark. The doctor recommended that the complainant engage in discussions with his employer with a support person accompanying him.  On January 16th, the club president, Mr Meany, wrote to the complainant and asked him if he and Mr McEvoy would be willing to meet him and the secretary, Ms Ryan.  The complainant replied on January 19th, seeking a written submission setting out the respondent’s proposal for a resolution.  Mr Meany replied on January 22nd, repeating the respondent’s offer “to meet in the coming days.”
27. A hearing of the first set of complaints was scheduled for February 3rd 2026 and the respondent sent a submission to the WRC on January 30th. The hearing was adjourned when Mr McEvoy complained that he hadn’t had sufficient time to consider the respondent’s submission.  On February 10th, the complainant wrote to the club manager, Mr Murrihy, and informed him that he was resigning.  In his letter, he was critical of the respondent’s request to adjourn the hearings scheduled for October 24th and December 9th 2025, and their late submission for the hearing on February 3rd 2026.  He alleged that the respondent’s actions were designed to penalise him for raising complaints about his terms and conditions and “to prevent my return to work and force my resignation.”  He submitted this second set of complaints to the WRC on February 12th 2026.

Summary of the Complainant’s Case:

28. In his submission in preparation for the hearing of these complaints, Mr McEvoy said that the complainant had no option but to resign because of the respondent’s “complete failure to engage with the process and the Workplace Relations Commission.” Mr McEvoy referred to efforts made by the respondent to communicate with the complainant and to discuss his complaints.  Mr McEvoy said that, because of the absence of any outline of proposals, and the respondent’s initial decision not to allow the complainant to be accompanied at a meeting, the matters remained unresolved. 

CA-00080644-001:  Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

29. Under this heading, on the e-complaint form he submitted to the WRC, the complainant said that the concerns he asked his employer to address were not addressed, and that he was subjected to less favourable treatment for having raised the concerns. He complained that, when the hearing of the complaints he submitted on April 1st 2025 was scheduled for the first time on October 24th 2025, the hearing was adjourned because the general manager, Mr Murrihy was on holidays.  When the hearing was re-scheduled for December 9th 2025, it was re-scheduled at the request of the respondent’s legal representative, because he was engaged in a separate hearing at the WRC on the same day.  The hearing was scheduled for a third time on Tuesday, February 3rd 2026 and was adjourned at the request of the complainant’s representative, Mr McEvoy.  Mr McEvoy requested the adjournment because the respondent’s documents for the hearing were submitted to the WRC and to him on Friday, January 30th, which was the Friday before the public holiday on February 2nd.  The complainant claims that, when the hearing was scheduled for the fourth time on March 30th 2026, he had another long time to wait and that he suffered from stress and anxiety and that he had “no guarantee or belief” that his employer would properly engage with the process and facilitate his return to work.  The complainant believes that his employer has penalised him for raising concerns about his employment relationship. 

CA-00080644-002:  Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

30. Under this heading, the complainant repeated the narrative he used to set out his complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act. He also claims however, that his employer penalised him for raising concerns about his contract of employment. 

CA-00080644-003:  Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

31. Under this heading, the complainant repeated the narrative he used to set out his complaints under the Unfair Dismissals Act and the Terms of Employment (Information) Act. He also claims that his employer penalised him for raising concerns about breaks and working hours. 

CA-00080644-004:  Complaint under the Employment Equality Act 1998

32. Under this heading, the complainant repeated the narrative he used to set out his complaints under the Unfair Dismissals Act, the Terms of Employment (Information) Act and the Organisation of Working Time Act. He also claims that his employer penalised him for raising concerns about equal pay and discrimination on the gender ground.

CA-00080644-005:  Complaint under the Protection of Employees (Part-time Work) Act 2001

33. Under this heading, the complainant repeated the narrative he used to set out his complaints under the Unfair Dismissals Act, the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, the Organisation of Working Time Act and the Employment Equality Act. He claims that he was penalised for raising concerns about his part-time status and access to a full-time position.
34. In his complaints under ADJ-00058045, the complainant claims that he was penalised for raising issues about his contract of employment, his working hours, breaks, discrimination on the gender ground, equal pay and concerns about his part-time status. His evidence on these matters is recorded in that decision.  This more recent sent of complaints is concerned with the complainant’s decision to resign on February 10th 2026, having been absent for the previous 10 months.  In his evidence he said that he believes that the respondent was stalling in their response to the WRC.  The penalisation he alleges occurred is his case that his employer acted to prevent him from returning to work and that resignation was his only option.  In his evidence at the hearing, the complainant said that after a discussion with his doctor and therapist, he decided to leave.  He said that he didn’t think the club had responded to his complaints and he didn’t think that they engaged in good faith.

Summary of Respondent’s Case:

35. In his submission for the respondent, Mr Keany said that they rely on their submission delivered in response to the complainant’s claims under ADJ-00058045. Mr Keany observed that the five new complaints contain virtually identical narrative text, with the only difference being the concluding sentence of each complaint, which attributes the alleged penalisation to a different statutory right.

CA-00080664-001:  Complaint of Constructive Dismissal

36. Mr Keany referred to s.1(b) of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977, which envisages two circumstances in which a resignation may be considered to be a constructive dismissal. In Cedarglade Limited (formerly Pineglade Limited) v Hilban[1], the Labour Court stated:

“Section 1 of the Act envisages two circumstances in which a resignation may be considered a constructive dismissal.  This arises where the employer’s conduct amounts to a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment and in such circumstances the employee would be “entitled” to resign his position, often referred to as the “contract test”.

This requires that an employer be ‘guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract, then the employee is entitled to treat himself as discharged from any further performance’ as held in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp [1978] IRL 332. 

Secondly, there is an additional reasonableness test which may be relied upon as either an alternative to the contract test or in combination with that test. This test asks whether the employer conducted his or her affairs in relation to the employee so unreasonably that the employee cannot fairly be expected to put up with it any longer and, if so, she is justified in leaving.”

Referring to Conway v Ulster Bank Limited[2], the Court continued:

“In constructive dismissal cases, the Court must examine the conduct of the parties. In normal circumstances a complainant who seeks to invoke the reasonableness test in furtherance of such a claim must also act reasonably by providing the employer with an opportunity to address whatever grievance they may have. They must alert the employer to their situation in order to allow the employer an opportunity to rectify the problem before resigning. They must demonstrate that they have pursued their grievance through the procedures laid down in the contract of employment before taking the step to resign.”

37. In its decision in McCormack v Dunnes Stores[3], the EAT addressed the burden of proof that rests on a complainant in cases of constructive dismissal:

“[T]he notion places a high burden of proof on the employee to demonstrate that he or she acted reasonably and had exhausted all internal procedures or otherwise in an attempt to resolve her grievance with his/her employer. The employee would need to demonstrate the employer’s conduct was so unreasonable as to make the continuation of employment with the particular employer intolerable.”

38. The complainant’s case rests on the proposition that the respondent deliberately stalled the WRC process to the extent that he was left with no option but to resign. Mr Keany submitted that the complainant’s claim is entirely misconceived and must be dismissed.

Failure to Exhaust the Grievance Procedures

39. Mr Keany submitted that it is well established that a complainant who resigns without first having substantially utilised their employer’s grievance procedure will have great difficulty succeeding. In Conway v Ulster Bank Limited, the Employment Appeals Tribunal (EAT) held that the complainant “did not act reasonably by resigning without first having substantially utilised her employer’s grievance procedure to attempt to remedy her complaints.”  In Jabczuga v Ryanair Limited[4], the Tribunal held that,

“The Complainant in this case failed to fully engage with and exhaust the grievance procedure available to her.  In resigning in circumstances that Complainant asserts amount to constructive dismissal, such Complainant must act reasonably. This includes affording her employer an adequate and reasonable opportunity to address and remedy any grievance.  By resigning before the grievance procedure had run its course the Complainant did not afford this opportunity to the respondent and the Tribunal is satisfied that she did not act reasonably in so doing.  Accordingly this claim pursuant to the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 to 2007 fails.”

40. In Cedarglade, the Labour Court endorsed the principles expounded by the EAT in Conway v Ulster Bank, stating as follows:

“In constructive dismissal cases, the Court must examine the conduct of the parties. In normal circumstances a complainant who seeks to invoke the reasonableness test in furtherance of such a claim must also act reasonably by providing the employer with an opportunity to address whatever grievance they may have. They must alert the employer to their situation in order to allow the employer an opportunity to rectify the problem before resigning. They must demonstrate that they have pursued their grievance through the procedures laid down in the contract of employment before taking the step to resign.”

41. The complainant was aware that the respondent has a grievance procedure, but he didn’t raise a grievance through the procedure at any stage. Despite repeated invitations by the respondent to meet to discuss his concerns, he refused to meet them.  Mr Keany said that the respondent relies particularly on the following:

41.1    On July 17th 2025, the club secretary, Ms Ryan, wrote to the complainant and referred to the Medmark occupational health report dated July 8th which confirmed that the complainant was fit to engage with his employer and that he should do so as soon as possible.  The complainant was offered three dates for a meeting in July and August and was also offered the option of a meeting off-site.

41.2    On behalf of the complainant, Mr McEvoy replied on July 18th and declined the meeting, insisting that the complainant had a right to be represented.

41.3    Each of the assessments that the complainant attended with Medmark resulted in a recommendation that he attend talks with his employer to resolve his grievances.  The third report recommended that he attend with a support person.

41.4    On August 13th, the club secretary wrote again to the complainant and confirmed that the respondent was willing to engage in mediation at the WRC.  On August 19th, Ms Ryan wrote again and offered a face to face meeting at which the complainant could be represented by Mr McEvoy.

41.5    On October 29th 2025, the respondent’s solicitor wrote to Mr McEvoy and proposed mediation that would be paid for by the respondent.

41.6    On January 16th 2026, Mr Meany wrote to the complainant personally and conceded to the complainant’s request to have Mr McEvoy present at any meeting.  Mr Meany wrote again on January 16th and confirmed that the offer to meet remained open.

41.7    The complainant declined each invitation to meet.  He attended no meetings with his employer from the date he went absent in April 2025 until his resignation in February 2026, although the consistent medical advice was that he was fit to engage.

42. Mr Keany submitted that the complainant’s position seems to be that his WRC complaint was a substitute for the grievance procedure, a position he argued is not sustainable. A hearing at the WRC is an external statutory process.  It does not relieve the complainant of the obligation to engage with his employer, particularly where the employer is seeking such engagement.  Mr Keany said this is the type of failure that the authorities have found is fatal to a claim of constructive dismissal.

The Alleged Stalling of the WRC Process

43. Mr Keany set out the respondent’s position in relation to the progress of the WRC hearing.

43.1    In advance of the date of the first scheduled hearing on October 24th 2025, the respondent was actively pursuing the option of resolving the complainant’s grievances through mediation.  The complainant’s submission was received on October 20th, only four days before the hearing and the respondent looked for time to prepare a proper response.  I, in my role as the adjudicator, encouraged the parties to engage in discussions to reach an agreed resolution of the complaints.

43.2    A postponement was granted when the respondent’s solicitor was unavailable on December 9th.

43.3    The respondent’s submissions were sent to the WRC and the complainant’s representative on January 29th; however, when the hearing opened on February 3rd, the complainant’s representative sought an adjournment.  Before lodging the submission, the respondent had made efforts to engage with the complainant.  At the brief hearing, the complainant did not indicate that he intended to resign, which he did on February 10th.

44. Mr Keany noted that adjournments are a common feature of WRC proceedings and do not constitute employer misconduct. The complainant resigned one week after the third listed hearing, when the respondent had furnished its detailed submissions and a new hearing date was imminent.  Mr Keany asserted that this is difficult to reconcile with the complainant’s suggestion that the respondent was preventing the matter from being heard.  He said that, viewed objectively, the complainant’s resignation was a voluntary decision which cannot be attributed to the respondent’s conduct in the WRC proceedings.

The Penalisation and Victimisation Claims

45. The complainant has lodged four claims of penalisation (CA_00080664-002 to 005), each alleging that the respondent penalised him for raising concerns regarding his contract of employment, breaks and working hours, equal pay, gender and his part-time status. Each complaint identifies the same conduct as constituting the alleged penalisation, namely, the respondent’s handling of the WRC proceedings and the alleged obstruction of his return to work. 
46. While each complaint is brought under a separate statutory provision, Mr Keany submitted that the legal principles applicable to penalisation claims are well established and consistent across the various enactments. In Paul O’Neill v Toni & Guy Blackrock Limited[5], the Labour Court held that the initial burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish a case on the initial facts by demonstrating that he suffered a detriment and that it was caused by, or resulted from him having made a protected act.  The Court articulated the “but for test” as follows:

“This suggests that where there is more than one causal factor in the chain of events leading to the detriment complained of, the commission of a protected act must be an operative cause in the sense that ‘but for’ the claimant having committed the protected act he/she would not have suffered the detriment. This involves a consideration of the motive or reasons which influenced the decision maker in imposing the impugned detriment.”

47. The Labour Court, in An Garda Síochána v Delahunt[6], held that an “unjustified sense of grievance cannot amount to a detriment within the statutory meaning.”
48. Applying these principles to the present case, Mr Keany argued that the complainant’s penalisation claims fail on each of the required elements. Firstly, it is denied that he committed any protected act within the meaning of the relevant statutes.  Secondly, the conduct replied upon as constituting the alleged detriment, that is, the respondent’s exercise of its procedural rights in WRC hearings (seeking adjournments and lodging submissions) cannot amount to penalisation.  Thirdly, there is no causal connection between any protected act and any alleged detriment.  The adjournments were sought for legitimate, documented reasons that were unconnected to the complainant’s exercise of any statutory right.  The latest adjournment, which the complainant seeks to rely on to support these claims, was granted at the request of the complainant.
49. Mr Keany submitted that the allegation that the respondent deliberately prevented the complainant from returning to work is denied. He said that this allegation is not consistent with the record of communications between the complainant and the respondent.

The Substantive Employment Claims

50. To the extent that the complainant’s new submissions repeat the substantive claims of April 1st 2025, Mr Keany said that the respondent relies on its primary submissions of January 29th 2026. The respondent submits as follows:

50.1    The allocation of hours to the complainant was based on the operational needs of the business and the complainant’s availability, and not gender.  The complainant’s average weekly hours in the winter of 2024 – 2025, at 22.54 hours, compared to 21.48 hours the previous winter.

50.2    The complainant’s hourly rate of pay was €14.05.  One female member of staff was on a higher rate of pay.  This employee, the food and beverage supervisor, was in a supervisory role with materially different responsibilities compared to the complainant.

50.3    The complainant was issued with a written statement of his terms and conditions of employment.

50.4    Staff were permitted to take breaks during their working hours.

50.5    The complainant was not treated less favourably by reason of his part-time status.

Findings and Conclusions:

CA-00080664-001:  Complaint under the unfair Dismissals Act 1977

51. The definition of “dismissal” at s.1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act includes the concept of constructive dismissal:

dismissal, in relation to an employee means -

the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employer, in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee, to terminate the contract without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer…

52. Taking account of the conduct of the respondent in relation to the complainant, and considering that, in the 10 months before he resigned, he was absent from work and he didn’t raise a grievance about the issues that concerned him in his workplace, the issue I must consider is, was it reasonable for him to terminate his employment and to claim that he was constructively dismissed?
53. The premise relied upon by the complainant to ground his claim of constructive dismissal is his contention that the respondent’s request to adjourn the scheduled hearing of his complaint at the WRC on October 24th 2025, the request to postpone the hearing scheduled for December 9th and the late submission lodged on January 29th 2026 is penalisation for his submission of complaints in April 2025 under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, the Organisation of Working Time Act, the Employment Equality Act and the Protection of Employees (Part-time Work) Act. The complainant’s case is that this alleged penalisation “put me in a position where resignation was my only option.”
54. At paragraph 2 of the complainant’s letter of resignation which he sent to Mr Murrihy on February 10th 2026, he stated:

“You will also be aware that I referred the matter of my employment grievance issues to the Workplace Relations Commission.  I did this in the hope that the Company would engage with an impartial and independent review by the Workplace Relations Commission to address my concerns which were unaddressed internally.”

55. The notion that the WRC has a role in carrying out a review of an individual employee’s workplace grievances is a complete misunderstanding of its function. The purpose of the WRC is to investigate complaints of breaches of employment legislation, where an employee believes that their rights have been infringed.  It is not to carry out reviews of individual workplace grievances.
56. In July 2024, the complainant believed that he had not received certain entitlements related to his employment. He wrote to his employer and asked to be paid for public holidays on which he wasn’t working and for a Sunday premium.  Mr Murrihy replied on August 13th and explained to the complainant that he had worked on all the public holidays, except one, for which he had claimed a day in lieu, and that his hourly rate included a Sunday allowance.  Until he lodged seven complaints with the WRC on April 1st 2025, the complainant’s letter of July 31st 2024 is the only time he formalised a concern or a grievance about a work-related matter.
57. It seems to me that the complainant’s misunderstanding of the role of the WRC is part of the reason he resisted engaging with his employer directly. He was unhappy about his pay, he felt he was rostered for too many closing shifts and his claim for double time on Sundays had been rejected.  A full-time food and beverage supervisor was recruited in March 2025 and he claims that he should have got that job, although he didn’t apply for it.  He didn’t submit a grievance about any matter and, instead, on April 1st 2025, he submitted seven complaints to the WRC which have been adjudicated on under ADJ-00058054:
    • (i) He complained that he didn’t get a statement of his terms and conditions of employment;
    • (ii) He said that he had no guaranteed hours of work and that his shifts were cancelled at short notice and that he didn’t get paid;
    • (iii) He complained that he didn’t get breaks during the working day;
    • (iv) He claimed that he was paid less than his female colleagues;
    • (v) He complained that he wasn’t invited to apply for the vacant position of food and beverage supervisor which was filled by a female;
    • (vi) He claimed that his hours were reduced as penalisation for raising concerns about his contract, hours of work and a Sunday premium;
    • (vii) He complained that his hours of work vary each week and are changed at short notice and without consultation.
58. When he submitted these complaints to the WRC, the complainant hadn’t raised them with his employer. He had two meetings with the president and secretary when he was out sick in September and October 2024.  At that time, he complained that he was rostered for too many closing shifts, that his pay was unfair and that his rights had not been acknowledged.  He didn’t mention the alleged failure to issue a statement of terms and conditions of employment, which, in his evidence, he said he was given in May 2023.  He never mentioned that he didn’t get breaks or that he was discriminated against with regard to pay or that he was being penalised for raising concerns about his contract.  In his evidence, he said that Mr Meany and Ms Ryan told him that a meeting would be arranged with “someone from HR.”  I accept that a meeting with someone from HR didn’t take place and that this must have been disappointing.  That said, before he submitted his complaints to the WRC in April 2025, the complainant should have made a more serious attempt to have his concerns addressed by his employer.
59. In advance of the complainant’s attendances at the WRC, and throughout the process, the respondent’s managers were emphatic that they wanted to resolve his grievances and they invited him to engage directly with them. When he was absent due to work-related stress in April 2025, Mr Meany wrote to him to acknowledge that he had submitted complaints to the WRC and to say that they would contact him the following week to arrange a meeting.  The complainant replied and said that he had appointed Mr McEvoy to act on his behalf and that he would “not be engaging in any direct communication on the matter.”  While this is strange behaviour for an employee, it was somewhat pedantic, in my view, not to allow the complainant to attend meetings with the support of Mr McEvoy.  I accept that an employee has no legal entitlement to be accompanied by an employment law advisor at a meeting to discuss issues of concern at work and I note that, on January 16th 2026, Mr Meany wrote to the complainant and offered to meet him with Mr McEvoy.  The complainant replied on January 19th and asked Mr Meany to “put in writing to me what it is you might propose as a means of resolution in advance of the suggested meeting.”
60. Mr Meany replied on January 22nd. It is important to remember that this was just 10 days in advance of the hearing scheduled for February 3rd.  Mr Meany wrote:

“At this stage may I reiterate what I have said to you on many occasions: you are a valued member of staff, popular with colleagues and members alike and an asset to the Club.  You say that you are open to discussion to reach a resolution, so we will very much regret if you feel that you cannot meet Noelle Ryan and myself to explore ways in which we can address your work-related concerns and enable you to return to work as soon as possible. 

Our offer to meet in the coming days remains open and we will make the arrangements in a suitable location if you suggest some dates and times.”

When there was no reply to this letter, the respondent’s solicitors set about preparing a submission which was delivered to the WRC and to the complainant’s representative on January 29th.

61. We know from the decision of the Labour Court in Cedarglade, which was cited by Mr Keany that, to succeed in a complaint of constructive dismissal, a complainant must show that their employer has acted in a way that breaches a fundamental term of their contract or, that the behaviour of their employer was so unreasonable that they had to resign. It is apparent from the decision in Conway v Ulster Bank, that the notion of reasonableness goes both ways and,and an employee must give their employer an opportunity to address whatever grievance they may have.  No evidence has been presented that indicates that the respondent attempted to repudiate a term of the complainant’s contract.  His case is that they acted unreasonably in the way they handled his complaints at the WRC, by seeking an adjournment, then a postponement and by providing a late submission.  I do not accept this contention.  It is clear to me that, running concurrently with the complaints process from April 2025 until January 2026, the respondent made efforts to meet the complainant to address his concerns.  The fact that the first hearing was adjourned and the second hearing date was postponed is not an indication that the respondent sought to cause distress or disadvantage to the complainant.  When the third hearing was adjourned, it was at the request of the complainant’s representative.  The respondent’s submission was delivered late due to ongoing efforts to resolve the complaints without the need for a hearing.
62. “Penalisation” is generally described in the employment statutes as an act or an omission by an employer that affects an employee to his or her detriment. These acts include suspension, lay-off, dismissal, demotion, transfer, change of location, reduction in wages, change in working hours, disciplinary sanction or coercion and intimidation.  The respondent’s conduct with regard to the scheduling of the hearings is not encompassed by this description.  While the delay in the hearing of his complaints may have caused the complainant some inconvenience, for the duration of the delay, the respondent made reasonable efforts to arrange a meeting to discuss his concerns and to facilitate his return to work.  This is not the behaviour of an unreasonable employer.  It is evident to me that the respondent’s management was open to meeting the complainant to discuss the issues that caused him to submit complaints to the WRC.  The complainant submitted no evidence that they manoeuvred to engineer his resignation or to prevent him from returning to work and, it is my view, that, if he had engaged with his employer, a way could have been found to resolve the issues that were causing him to feel aggrieved.  Based on this conclusion, I find that there is no substance to the complainant’s case that he was constructively dismissed.

CA-00080664-002 to 004:

002:  Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act

003:  Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act

004:  Complaint under the Employment Equality Act

005:  Complaint under the Protection of Employees (Part-time Work) Act

63. These complaints are grounded in the claim that the complainant was penalised, victimised or threatened with penalisation in the manner in which his employer approached the hearing of his complaints at the WRC. He claims that his complaints to the WRC in April 2025 led to his employer deliberately acting to prevent him returning to work and that this resulted in him having to resign.
64. In the seminal determination of the Labour Court in Paul O’Neill v Toni & Guy, cited by Mr Keany, an employee claiming that they have been penalised must show that, “but for” carrying out a protected act, they would not have been penalised. In my findings under the heading of the Unfair Dismissals Act above, I have concluded that no penalisation occurred.   I found that the adjournment of the hearing on October 24th 2025 and the postponement of the hearing scheduled for December 9th were for valid reasons and were not intended to penalise the complainant.  It is my view that the respondent’s late delivery of their submission on January 29th which caused the second postponement was due to the efforts being made to resolve the complaints without the need for a hearing.  Based on these conclusions, I am satisfied that the complainant was not penalised or victimised.

Decision:

CA-00080644-001:  Complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

65. Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act. As I have concluded that the complainant was not constructively dismissed, I must also conclude that his dismissal was not unfair.  I decide therefore, that this complaint is not well founded. 

CA-00080644-002:  Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994

66. Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to this complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act. I have concluded that the complainant was not penalised for raising concerns about his contract of employment.  I decide therefore, that this complaint is not well founded. 

CA-00080644-003:  Complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997

67. Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to this complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act. I have concluded that the complainant was not penalised for raising concerns about his breaks and working hours.  I decide therefore, that this complaint is not well founded. 

CA-00080644-004:  Complaint under the Employment Equality Act 1998

68. Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to this complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act. I have concluded that the complainant was not penalised for raising concerns about equal pay and discrimination on the gender ground.  I decide therefore, that this complaint is not well founded. 

CA-00080644-005:  Complaint under the Protection of Employees (Part-time Work) Act 2001

69. Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to this complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act. I have concluded that the complainant was not penalised for raising concerns about his part-time status and access to a full-time position.  I decide therefore, that this complaint is not well founded. 

Dated:   24th June 2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Catherine Byrne

Key Words:  Constructive dismissal, resignation, penalisation

[1] Cedarglade Limited (formerly Pineglade Limited) v Hilban, [2018] 7 JIEC 1302

[2] Conway v Ulster Bank Limited, UDA 474/1981

[3] McCormack v Dunnes Stores, UD14 21/2008

[4] Jabczuga v Ryanair Limited, UD 66/2013

[5] Paul O’Neill v Toni & Guy Blackrock Limited, [2010] 21 ELR 1

[6] An Garda Síochána v Delahunt, HSD 1311