ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00064133
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Tommi Wong | Deel Ireland EOR Limited |
Representatives |
| MP Guinness BL on Day 1 and Rosemary Mallon BL on Day 2 instructed by Emma Quinn Lewis Silkin Ireland LLP |
Complaint(s):
Act | Complaint/Dispute Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-001 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00077898-002 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00077898-003 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-004 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-005 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-006 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-007 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-008 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-009 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00077898-010 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994. | CA-00077898-011 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 | CA-00077898-014 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 | CA-00077898-015 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00077898-016 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 | CA-00077898-017 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-018 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 | CA-00077898-019 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Schedule 2 of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014 | CA-00077898-020 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 | CA-00077898-021 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 | CA-00077898-022 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 | CA-00077898-023 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 | CA-00077898-024 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 23 of the Parent’s Leave and Benefit Act 2019 | CA-00077898-025 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 23 of the Parent’s Leave and Benefit Act 2019 | CA-00077898-026 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00077898-028 | 20/11/2025 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991 | CA-00077898-029 | 23/01/2026 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 | CA-00077898-030 | 23/01/2026 |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 | CA-00077898-031 | 23/01/2026 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 27/04/2026 and25/06/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Breiffni O'Neill
Procedure:
In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015, Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 - 2015, and Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 - 2015, following the referral of the complaints to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaints and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaints.
This hearing was held in conjunction with the complaints set out in ADJ 68409, ADJ 64362, ADJ 64271, and ADJ 67072.
At the outset of the hearing, Counsel for the Respondent on Day 1, Ms Guinness BL, advised that, following his dismissal on 4 December 2025, the Complainant had been granted injunctive relief by Tullamore Circuit Court pursuant to a Court Order dated 12 December 2025, on the basis of his allegation that he had been penalised and dismissed for having made a protected disclosure. She outlined that, by operation of that Order, the Complainant's contract of employment would continue, for the purposes of salary and benefits, until a decision in respect of two of his complaints herein, namely CA-00077898-020 and CA-00077898-028, that he had been penalised and dismissed because he made a protected disclosure, was issued.
Counsel for the Respondent made an application that I should determine, as a preliminary issue, whether the matters relied upon by the Complainant amounted to a protected disclosure within the meaning of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. Having considered both the written and oral submissions, I was satisfied that it was appropriate to deal with this point first, as it goes to the core of the Complainant's complaints at CA-00077898-020 and CA-00077898-028.
Under Section 5 of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014, a protected disclosure requires the disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker, tends to show a “relevant wrongdoing”, and which came to the attention of the worker in a work-related context. A “relevant wrongdoing” is defined in the Act and includes matters such as breaches of legal obligations or risks to health and safety. Section 5(5) of the Act further makes clear that a matter is not a “relevant wrongdoing” if it is a grievance concerning the worker's own employment that affects only that worker.
The Complainant gave evidence that he returned to work from parent's leave on 20 October 2025 and that, from that point onwards, he was subjected to a pattern of adverse treatment. He stated that, on his return, there was a lack of clarity regarding his role, responsibilities and reporting structure, and that his reporting line had changed to an individual who, prior to his taking parent's leave, had been at the same level as him. He said that the duties he had carried out before going on leave had been reassigned to another employee and were not restored to him on his return, and that his role was consequently no longer clearly defined, which he regarded as a diminution of his position.
He further stated that the first communication he received from the Respondent following his return did not occur until 14 November 2025, and that this only followed his own correspondence of 10 November 2025 seeking clarity regarding his role and responsibilities, having previously written on 3 November 2025 without response. He gave evidence that, following his return, he was excluded from normal work-related communications and was not properly included in the day-to-day functioning of the business, and that he was subjected to a series of escalating measures, including the extension of his probationary period (communicated to him on 14 November 2025), the imposition of additional requirements, the issuing of a final written warning, and the initiation of a Performance Improvement Plan, which he described as punitive and not reflective of his actual performance. He also gave evidence of difficulties in having annual leave approved during this period, and of an overall lack of engagement and support from management following his return. He asserted that, taken together, these matters amounted to penalisation arising from his exercise of his statutory entitlement to parent's leave.
Having considered this evidence carefully, I am satisfied that none of the matters highlighted by the Complainant identifies a disclosure of information tending to show a “relevant wrongdoing”. His correspondence of 3 and 10 November 2025 sought clarification as to his own role, responsibilities and reporting structure; it was not a disclosure of information concerning any wrongdoing by the Respondent. The remaining matters relied upon — the change in reporting line, reassignment of duties, delay in engagement, exclusion from communications, extension of probation, final written warning, Performance Improvement Plan, and difficulties with annual leave approval — are not disclosures made by the Complainant at all, but rather the treatment of which he complains. No evidence was presented by the Complainant regarding whether he had, at any point before or during his parent's leave, or at any point prior to 20 October 2025, raised any complaint regarding the way his leave was being administered or any other matter that might constitute a disclosure of wrongdoing. There was, accordingly, no communication, written or otherwise, presented by way of evidence that was suggestive of a disclosure of information tending to show a “relevant wrongdoing” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act.
For these reasons, I find that the Complainant did not make a protected disclosure within the meaning of the Protected Disclosures Act 2014. It follows that the claim of penalisation based on an alleged protected disclosure, as set out in CA-00077898-020, and the complaint of unfair dismissal connected to an alleged protected disclosure, as set out in CA-00077898-028, cannot succeed, and I decline jurisdiction in respect of those complaints accordingly.
Background:
The Complainant was employed by the Respondent as Head of Sales- Nordic from 7 May 2025 until 4 December 2025 and was paid a monthly salary of €10,371.40. The Complainant alleged that he was subjected to penalisation, including dismissal, for having made a protected disclosure, and that he was treated adversely in relation to a range of workplace matters following concerns he raised. He also brought multiple other complaints concerning the handling of various leave requests, his pay and working conditions, and the way he was treated following his return from parent’s leave on 20 October 2025. |
Summary of Complainant’s Case:
The Complainant’s stated that, during his employment from 7 May 2025 to 4 December 2025, he was subjected to a series of adverse and unlawful actions connected in particular to his exercise of statutory leave rights, and that these events formed a pattern of escalating unfair treatment. At the start of his employment, he alleged that his working time was excessive and non‑compliant. In particular, during June 2025, he stated that he was required to work every day, including four Saturdays and four Sundays, albeit for limited hours on those weekend days. He stated that this work was not voluntary and that he received no compensation or time off in lieu for Sunday working, nor was he afforded a proper weekly rest period during that period. He also highlighted a specific incident on 11 June 2025, when he was required to attend a 7:00am meeting without sufficient notice. He asserted that he declined to attend due to the lack of notice and was subjected to adverse treatment as a result, which he says formed part of a broader pattern of unreasonable management practices. The central focus of his case concerns his decision to take parent’s leave. He stated that he applied for leave on 8 July 2025, which was approved on 10 July 2025. However, he alleged that matters escalated at a meeting on 22 July 2025, where he was told that there might be no role available to him on his return, or that he might return to a worse role. He interpreted this as a threat linked directly to his decision to take leave. He further stated that, within approximately 30 minutes of that meeting, his already approved leave was withdrawn, which he regarded as clear adverse treatment. Although his leave was later reinstated, he alleged that this sequence of events caused him significant uncertainty and constituted less favourable treatment on the family status ground as well as penalisation for exercising statutory rights. The Complainant went on to take parent’s leave commencing 18 August 2025 and returned to work on 20 October 2025. He asserted that, from the date of his return, he experienced a marked deterioration in his treatment. He stated that his role had fundamentally changed: his duties had been reassigned, his reporting line altered to someone previously at his level, and his position was no longer clearly defined. He regarded this as a diminution of his role. He further alleged a lack of engagement and communication following his return. He wrote to the Respondent on 3 November 2025 and again on 10 November 2025 seeking clarity about his role, but stated that he received no response until 14 November 2025, and only after initiating contact himself. During this same period, he alleged that he was excluded from normal workplace communications and not properly reintegrated into the business. He described a series of escalating measures taken against him, including the extension of his probationary period (communicated on 14 November 2025), the imposition of additional requirements, the issuing of a final written warning, and placement on a Performance Improvement Plan. He stated that these measures were punitive and unjustified, and not reflective of his performance. He also alleged difficulty in securing approval for annual leave during this time, and an overall lack of support from management. In addition, he raised concerns about his pay, including that deductions were made from his wages for pension contributions (€2,029.60) which, he claims, were not remitted to his pension fund. Finally, he referred to a further issue arising on 17 October 2025, when he notified the Respondent of his intention to take parental leave in 2026, and was told that this request “would be reviewed,” which he interpreted as the Respondent treating a statutory entitlement as discretionary. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent did not give direct evidence at the hearing and did not call any witnesses. Its position was advanced entirely through submissions made by its legal representatives. In those submissions, the Respondent rejected the Complainant’s version of events and maintained that its actions were lawful, reasonable, and consistent with their contractual rights and operational requirements. In relation to working time matters, the Respondent asserted that the Complainant was not instructed or required to work on Sundays and that any such work was not mandated by the company. They similarly did not accept that there had been any breach of rest period obligations. In respect of the 7:00am meeting on 11 June 2025, the Respondent’s position was that there was no breach of statutory obligations concerning notice of working hours, particularly having regard to the Complainant’s contract, which specified normal working hours and allowed for variation in line with business needs. Regarding the extension of the Complainant’s probationary period, the Respondent submitted that this was a proportionate and appropriate step, taken to reflect the period during which the Complainant was absent on parent’s leave, and was consistent with the applicable statutory framework. In relation to the events surrounding the Complainant’s parent’s leave in July 2025, it was suggested in submissions that discussions about his role arose in a broader context, including prior indications that he may have been considering resignation. However, no evidence was adduced to substantiate this position or to provide an alternative account of the meeting of 22 July 2025 or the subsequent cancellation of leave. In respect of the Complainant’s treatment following his return from parent’s leave on 20 October 2025, the Respondent maintained in correspondence that it had attempted to engage with him, including through internal communication platforms. They did not, however, call evidence to support that assertion or to rebut his account of exclusion, role changes, or disciplinary measures. More generally, the Respondent asserted that decisions taken in relation to the Complainant’s role, performance management, and probation following his return from parent’s leave on 17 October 2025 were legitimate management actions and fell within its discretion. On the issue of parental leave requested in October 2025 for 2026, the Respondent submitted that it was entitled to review such requests having regard to business and operational considerations. Finally, in relation to the pension deductions, the Respondent relied on the contractual framework governing pension arrangements and submitted that such deductions were permissible where an employee had opted into a PRSA arrangement. |
Findings and Conclusions:
CA-00077898-001: Section 14(1) of the Organisation of Working Time Act provides as follows: “(1) An employee who is required to work on a Sunday (and the fact of his or her having to work on that day has not otherwise been taken account of in the determination of his or her pay) shall be compensated by his or her employer for being required so to work by the following means, namely— (a) by the payment to the employee of an allowance of such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (b) by otherwise increasing the employee's rate of pay by such an amount as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (c) by granting the employee such paid time off from work as is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances, or (d) by a combination of two or more of the means referred to in the preceding paragraphs.” The Complainant stated in evidence that he was required by the Respondent to file sales income reports “every day” over the month of June 2025. He stated that he understood “every day” to mean seven days per week and as a result worked on four Sundays in June 2025, although he never worked any more than three hours on any of these Sundays. He stated that this work was not voluntary and that he was not provided with any additional payment, time off in lieu, or other compensation in respect of that Sunday work. The Respondent, in their legal submissions, asserted that the Complainant was not instructed or required to work on Sundays. However, no evidence was presented at the hearing to support that assertion or to challenge the Complainant’s account that he was required to perform such work “every day”. In circumstances where the Complainant gave clear evidence and the Respondent did not provide evidence to the contrary, I accept the Complainant’s evidence that he was required to work on four Sundays in June 2025 for which he was not paid and find that the complaint is well founded. CA-00077898-004: Weekly rest period 13.—(1) In this section “daily rest period” means a rest period referred to in section 11. (2) Subject to subsection (3), an employee shall, in each period of 7 days, be granted a rest period of at least 24 consecutive hours; subject to subsections (4) and (6), the time at which that rest period commences shall be such that that period is immediately preceded by a daily rest period. (3) An employer may, in lieu of granting to an employee in any period of 7 days the first-mentioned rest period in subsection (2), grant to him or her, in the next following period of 7 days, 2 rest periods each of which shall be a period of at least 24 consecutive hours and, subject to subsections (4) and (6)— (a) if the rest periods so granted are consecutive, the time at which the first of those periods commences shall be such that that period is immediately preceded by a daily rest period, and (b) if the rest periods so granted are not consecutive, the time at which each of those periods commences shall be such that each of them is immediately preceded by a daily rest period. (4) If considerations of a technical nature or related to the conditions under which the work concerned is organised or otherwise of an objective nature would justify the making of such a decision, an employer may decide that the time at which a rest period granted by him or her under subsection (2) or (3) shall commence shall be such that the rest period is not immediately preceded by a daily rest period. (5) Save as may be otherwise provided in the employee’s contract of employment— (a) the rest period granted to an employee under subsection (2), or (b) one of the rest periods granted to an employee under subsection (3), shall be a Sunday or, if the rest period is of more than 24 hours duration, shall include a Sunday. (6) The requirement in subsection (2) or paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (3) as to the time at which a rest period under this section shall commence shall not apply in any case where, by reason of a provision of this Act or an instrument or agreement under, or referred to in, this Act, the employee concerned is not entitled to a daily rest period in the circumstances concerned. The Complainant stated in evidence that he worked every weekday, together with four Saturdays and four Sundays during June 2025. On that evidence, I am satisfied that, during each of the four weeks in June, the Complainant worked on all seven days of the week and was not afforded a continuous weekly rest period of at least 24 consecutive hours, as required by section 13 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, as set out above. I further note that the Respondent produced no evidence to rebut the Complainant's account of his working pattern or to demonstrate that he received the statutory weekly rest entitlement. In addition, section 25(1) of the Act requires employers to maintain records demonstrating compliance with the provisions of the Act. The Respondent failed to produce any working time records capable of showing that the Complainant received the statutory weekly rest periods. In circumstances where the Complainant's evidence was credible and unchallenged, and the Respondent failed to produce the records it was statutorily obliged to maintain, I prefer the Complainant's evidence and find that the Respondent has failed to demonstrate compliance with section 13 of the Act. Accordingly, I find that the complaint is well founded. CA-00077898-005: The Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 states: 15.—(1) An employer shall not permit an employee to work, in each period of 7 days, more than an average of 48 hours, that is to say an average of 48 hours calculated over a period (hereafter in this section referred to as a “reference period ”) that does not exceed— (a) 4 months, or (b) 6 months— (i) in the case of an employee employed in an activity referred to in paragraph 2, point 2.1. of Article 17 of the Council Directive, or (ii) where due to any matter referred to in section 5, it would not be practicable (if a reference period not exceeding 4 months were to apply in relation to the employee) for the employer to comply with this subsection, or (c) such length of time as, in the case of an employee employed in an activity mentioned in subsection (5), is specified in a collective agreement referred to in that subsection. The Complainant stated that he worked in excess of 48 hours each week during June 2025. However, when questioned further, he was unable to provide clear or specific evidence in relation to the number of hours worked outside of that period. In particular, he was unable to state whether he exceeded 48 hours in the other weeks falling within the relevant four‑month reference period. No detailed records of hours worked were produced by either party. While I accept that the Complainant may have worked long hours during June 2025, the Act requires me to assess whether the average over the applicable reference period exceeded 48 hours per week. The evidence presented in relation to that broader period was limited and lacked sufficient detail to allow me to make that assessment. Even if I were to accept the Complainant’s evidence that he worked in excess of 48 hours in each week of June 2025, that alone would not establish a breach of section 15 unless it could be shown that, when averaged over the full reference period, the 48‑hour threshold was exceeded. Accordingly, this complaint is not well founded. CA-00077898-009: 17.—(1) If neither the contract of employment of the employee concerned nor any employment regulation order, registered employment agreement or collective agreement that has effect in relation to the employee specifies the normal or regular starting and finishing times of work of an employee, the employee's employer shall notify the employee, subject to subsection (3), at least 24 hours before the first day or, as the case may be, the day, in each week that he or she proposes torequire the employee to work, of the times at which the employee will normally be required to start and finish work on each day, or, as the case may be, the day or days concerned, of that week. (2) If the hours for which an employee is required to work for his or her employer in a week include such hours as the employer may from time to time decide (in this subsection referred to as “additional hours”), the employer shall notify the employee, subject to subsection (3), at least 24 hours before the first day or, as the case may be, the day, in that week on which he or she proposes to require the employee to work all or, as the case may be, any of the additional hours, of the times at which the employee will be required to start and finish working the additional hours on each day, or, as the case may be, the day or days concerned, of that week. (3) If during the period of 24 hours before the first-mentioned or, as the case may be, the second-mentioned day in subsection (1) or (2), the employee has not been required to do work for the employer, the time at which the employee shall be notified of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall be not later than before the last period of 24 hours, preceding the said first or second-mentioned day, in which he or she has been required to do work for the employer. (4) A notification to an employee, in accordance with this section, of the matters referred to in subsection (1) or (2), as the case may be, shall not prejudice the right of the employer concerned, subject to the provisions of this Act, to require the employee to start or finish work or, as the case may be, to work the additional hours referred to in subsection (2) at times other than those specified in the notification if circumstances, which could not reasonably have been foreseen, arise that justify the employer in requiring the employee to start or finish work or, as the case may be, to work the said additional hours at those times. Findings: The Complainant alleged that he was not given 24 hours’ notice of a requirement to attend a meeting at 7.00am on 11 June 2025 and that he was subjected to adverse treatment for failing to attend that meeting, having declined to do so on the basis that insufficient notice had been provided. In determining this complaint, I have had regard to section 17 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, as set out above, which requires an employer, in certain circumstances, to notify an employee of their start and finish times at least 24 hours in advance. That obligation arises where the employee’s contract of employment or a relevant agreement does not specify the employee’s normal or regular working hours. In the instant case, the Complainant’s contract of employment specified that his normal working hours commenced at 9.00am from Monday to Friday. The contract further provided that the Respondent reserved the right to vary those hours in accordance with the needs of the business from time to time. I am therefore satisfied that the Complainant had identifiable normal working hours within the meaning of the Act. In those circumstances, I do not accept that section 17 imposed an obligation on the Respondent to provide 24 hours’ notice of the meeting in the manner contended for by the Complainant. The statutory requirement is concerned with the provision of information where working hours are not otherwise specified, and I am not satisfied that it applies to the situation described. The Complainant also alleged that he was subjected to adverse treatment arising from his failure to attend the meeting on 11 June 2025 at 7.00am because he had not received 24 hours advance notice of same. In order for this aspect of the complaint to succeed under the Act, however it is first necessary to establish that there was a breach of the relevant statutory obligation. As I have found that no breach of the Act has been established, I find that the complaint is not well founded. CA-00077898-011: The Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 Act states as follows: 6D.—(1) Subject to this section, where an employee has entered into a contract of employment with an employer which provides for a probationary period, such period shall not exceed 6 months. (3) The probationary period referred to in subsection (1) may, on an exceptional basis, be longer where such longer period— (a) does not exceed 12 months, and (b) would be in the interest of the employee.” The Complainant stated that his probationary period was extended by 63 days. It is not in dispute that the Complainant was absent from work for a period of 63 days on parent’s leave during his probationary period. The Respondent, through its legal representatives, submitted that the extension of probation corresponded to that period of absence. However, no direct evidence was presented by the Respondent to substantiate the basis upon which the extension decision was made. In examining this complaint, I must consider whether the extension of the probationary period was consistent with section 6D of the Act. I note that the extension did not exceed 12 months in total and that the duration of the extension corresponds exactly to the period of the Complainant’s absence on statutory leave. In circumstances where an employee is absent from work during probation on statutory leave, an extension which mirrors the duration of that absence may be objectively explicable, as it allows for the completion of an equivalent period of actual service. On the facts before me, the extension was limited to that period and did not extend beyond it. While there was no direct evidence from the Respondent explaining the decision‑making process, I am satisfied, having regard to the objective facts, that the extension of 63 days was proportionate and directly linked to the Complainant’s period of absence on parent’s leave. I am also satisfied that the overall duration of the probationary period remained within the statutory maximum. Considering all of the foregoing, I find that this complaint is not well founded. CA-00077898-014: Section 6 of the Act states as follows: (1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where— (a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified insubsection (2)(in this Act referred to as the ‘discriminatory grounds’) which— (i) exists, (ii) existed but no longer exists, (iii) may exist in the future, or (iv) is imputed to the person concerned, (b) a person who is associated with another person— (i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and (ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue ofparagraph (a), constitute discrimination. Regarding the burden of proof in relation to an allegation of discrimination, Section 85A provides that, “(1) Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary. In the matter of Southern Health Board -v- Mitchell [2001] E.L.R. 201 the Labour Court set out the now well-established test in determining whether the probative burden shifts by application of this subsection. In particular, the Court held that, “The first requirement is that the claimant must establish facts from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them. This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment”. In the matter of Melbury Developments Ltd v Valpeters EDA 09/17, the Labour Court commented that, “Section 85A of the Act provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit. This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred. What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts which can be relied upon. All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination. However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence. Mere speculation or assertions, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn. Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.” The Complainant in this case stated that he was treated less favourably on the family status ground following his request for parent's leave. He gave evidence that he applied for parent's leave on 8 July 2025 and that this request was approved on 10 July 2025. He further stated that, during a meeting on 22 July 2025, he was informed that there might be no role available to him, or that he might return to a less favourable role, following his period of leave and that he should consider resigning. He understood these comments as a threat connected to his decision to take parent's leave and as pressure to reconsider that decision. He also gave evidence that, within approximately 30 minutes of the conclusion of that meeting, he was informed that the previously approved parent's leave had been cancelled. The Complainant maintained that this treatment arose directly from his request for parent's leave and would not have occurred had he not sought to exercise that entitlement. As the request for parent's leave arose directly from his status as the parent of a qualifying child, I am satisfied that the treatment complained was connected to the protected ground of family status. While the Complainant did not identify an actual comparator, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to consider a hypothetical comparator in the circumstances of this case. I find that an employee in comparable circumstances who had not applied for parent's leave would not reasonably be expected to be informed that their role might not exist, or that they might return to a less favourable role, because of an absence from work, nor would an approved period of leave have been withdrawn in the circumstances described. I am therefore satisfied that the Complainant was treated less favourably than such a comparator and has thus established a prima facie case of discrimination. The evidential burden therefore shifts to the Respondent to prove that the treatment complained of was in no sense whatsoever related to the Complainant's family status. In the absence of any direct evidence having been presented to discharge that burden, I find that the Respondent has failed to rebut the inference of discrimination. I therefore conclude that the Complainant was subjected to less favourable treatment on the family status ground, contrary to the Acts and find that he was discriminated against. CA-00077898-015: Section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 prohibits an employer from penalising an employee for having exercised, or proposed to exercise, his entitlement to parental leave under that Act. Penalisation under that section accordingly requires a causal connection between a detriment suffered by the employee and his having exercised, or proposed to exercise, that specific entitlement. I have found at CA-00077898-026 below that the Complainant was penalised within the meaning of the Parent's Leave and Benefit Act 2019, arising from his treatment following his return to work from parent's leave taken under that Act in August and October 2025. However, the entitlement protected by section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998 is a distinct statutory entitlement — unpaid parental leave of up to 26 weeks — and is not the same leave as the parent's leave taken by the Complainant under the 2019 Act. On the evidence before me, the Complainant's only engagement with his entitlement under the 1998 Act was his notification on 17 October 2025 of an intention to take parental leave in 2026, a request which remained under review at the date his employment ended and which he had not, by that date, exercised. I am not satisfied on the evidence that the treatment found at CA-00077898-026 — namely the change to the Complainant's reporting line, his exclusion from communications, the extension of his probationary period, and the related disciplinary and performance measures — was connected to his having exercised, or proposed to exercise, his entitlement to parental leave under the 1998 Act, as distinct from his having taken parent's leave under the 2019 Act. Accordingly, I find that the Complainant was not penalised within the meaning of section 18 of the Parental Leave Act 1998, and I find this complaint is not well founded. CA-00077898-016 and CA-00077898-017:The Complainant's complaints are that he was penalised within the meaning of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994. Section 6C of the Act prohibits an employer from penalising or threatening to penalise an employee for invoking a right conferred by the Act, having in good faith opposed an act unlawful under the Act, giving evidence in proceedings under the Act, or giving notice of an intention to do any of those things. Penalisation under that section accordingly requires a causal connection between a detriment suffered by the employee and his having done one of those specific things. I have found at CA-00077898-026 below that the Complainant was penalised within the meaning of the Parent's Leave and Benefit Act 2019. However, I am not satisfied that this treatment was connected to the Complainant having invoked a right under this Act, having opposed unlawful conduct under it, having given evidence in proceedings under it, or having given notice of an intention to do so. The treatment in question arose, on the evidence, in the context of his return from parent's leave — an entitlement protected under a different statute, and one I have already addressed at CA-00077898-026 below. Accordingly, I find these complaints are not well founded. CA-00077898-018 and CA-00077898-019: The Complainant's complaints under these references are that he was penalised within the meaning of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Section 26 of the Act prohibits an employer from penalising an employee for having, in good faith and by lawful means, opposed an act which is unlawful under the Act. Penalisation under that section accordingly requires a causal connection between a detriment suffered by the employee and his having opposed, in good faith and by lawful means, conduct he reasonably believed to be unlawful under the Act. I have found at CA-00077898-026 below that the Complainant was penalised within the meaning of the Parent's Leave and Benefit Act 2019. However, I am not satisfied that this treatment was connected to the Complainant having opposed, in good faith and by lawful means, conduct he believed to be unlawful under the Organisation of Working Time Act. The treatment in question arose, on the evidence, in the context of his return from parent's leave — an entitlement protected under a different statute, and one I have already addressed at CA-00077898-026 above. I therefore find these complaints to be not well founded. CA-00077898-022: The Parental Leave Act states as follows at section 6 and 7: 6.— (1) Subject to this Act, an employee who is a relevant parent in respect of a child shall be entitled to leave from his or her employment, to be known and referred to in this Act as "parental leave", for a period of 26 weeks to enable him or her to take care of the child. 7—(1) Subject to this Act, parental leave may consist of— (a) a continuous period 26 weeks (aa) subject to subsection (1A), 2 separate periods— (i) each consisting of not less than 6 weeks, and (ii) not exceeding 26 weeks (b) with the agreement of the employer or representatives of the employer and other employers and the employee or representatives of the employee and other employees, a number of periods each of which comprises— (i) one or more days on which, but for the leave, the employee would be working in the employment concerned, (ii) one or more hours during which, but for the leave, the employee would be working in the employment concerned, or (iii) any combination of periods referred to in subparagraphs (i) and (ii), or (ba) where an employee has taken leave pursuant to paragraph (a), (aa) or (b), periods each consisting of not less than 1 week. The Complainant alleged that, when he notified the Respondent on 17 October 2025 of his intention to take parental leave in 2026, the Respondent’s initial response treated his entitlement as discretionary, stating that it “would be reviewed.” The Respondent, through its legal representatives, submitted that an employer is entitled to review a request for parental leave having regard to business needs and operational requirements. I accept that an employer may review such a request in the context of business and organisational considerations. In addition, I note that there was no evidence before me that the Complainant’s request was refused at any stage. Furthermore, the Complainant’s employment was terminated prior to the dates on which the requested parental leave was to be taken. Considering all of the foregoing, I find that this complaint is not well founded. CA-00077898-023: The Complainant stated that the Respondent was unwilling to sign a Parental Leave Confirmation document. A parental leave confirmation document is essentially the formal written evidence of the employee’s statutory leave being approved and agreed. As highlighted in CA-00077898-022 above, the Complainant’s parental leave request was under review following his request on 17 October 2025 to take parental leave in 2026 and his employment was terminated on 4 December 2025. In such circumstances, I find that it was not unreasonable that any confirmation document was not signed and accordingly I find that the complaint is not well founded. CA-00077898-025: The Parent’s Leave and Benefit Act states: 5. Subject to this Part, an employee who is a relevant parent in relation to a child shall be entitled to leave from his or her employment for a period of 9 weeks, to be known (and referred to in this Act) as “parent’s leave”, to enable him or her to provide, or assist in the provision of, care to the child. (2) Other than where section 14 applies, the period of leave referred to in subsection (1) may comprise— (a) a continuous period, or (b) periods each consisting of not less than one week. Although the Complainant stated that his Parent’s Leave was cancelled on 22 July 2025, it was subsequently re-instated and his leave commenced on 18 August 2025. In circumstances where he was granted his parent’s leave, I find that this complaint is not well founded. CA-00077898-026: The Complainant states that he returned to work from parent’s leave on 20 October 2025 and that, from that point onwards, he was subjected to a pattern of adverse treatment. He asserted that, on his return, there was a lack of clarity regarding his role, responsibilities and reporting structure. In particular, he stated that his reporting line had changed to an individual who, prior to his taking parent’s leave, had been at the same level as him. He also said that the duties he had carried out before going on leave had been reassigned to another employee and were not restored to him on his return. As a result, he said that his role was no longer clearly defined, which he regarded as a diminution of his position. He further stated that the first communication he received from the Respondent following his return on 20 October 2025 did not occur until 14 November 2025, and that this response was only issued after he had contacted the Respondent himself on 10 November 2025 seeking clarity in relation to his role and responsibilities. He said that he had previously written on 3 November 2025 but had received no response to that correspondence. The Complainant also gave evidence that, following his return, he was excluded from normal work-related communications and was not properly included in the day-to-day functioning of the business. He stated that he was then subjected to a series of escalating measures, including the extension of his probationary period, communicated to him on 14 November 2025, the imposition of additional requirements, the issuing of a final written warning, and the initiation of a Performance Improvement Plan. He described these measures as punitive in nature and not reflective of his actual performance. In addition, the Complainant gave evidence that he experienced difficulties in having annual leave approved during this period and that there was an overall lack of engagement and support from management following his return to work. He asserted that, taken together, these matters amounted to penalisation arising from his exercise of his statutory entitlement to parent’s leave. The Respondent did not present any evidence to contradict or challenge the Complainant’s account of his treatment following his return from leave. While an email dated 1 December 2025 was opened at the hearing, in which the Respondent asserted that it had attempted to contact the Complainant on numerous occasions via the FEISHU messaging platform following his return to work on 20 October 2025, the Complainant, in his evidence, denied that this was the case and maintained that he had not been engaged with in the manner suggested. In the absence of any direct evidence from the Respondent to rebut the Complainant’s evidence, I prefer the evidence of the Complainant. I find, on balance, that following his return from parent’s leave, the Complainant was subjected to a range of unfavourable changes to his working conditions, including uncertainty regarding his role, changes to his reporting structure, exclusion from communications, and the application of disciplinary and performance management measures. I am satisfied that these actions go beyond ordinary workplace management and, taken together, amount to penalisation within the meaning of the Act. I am further satisfied that there is a direct link between the Complainant’s exercise of his right to parent’s leave and the treatment he experienced on his return. Accordingly, I find that the complaint of penalisation under the Parent’s Leave and Benefit Act 2019 is well founded. CA-00077898-029: 5.—(1) An employer shall not make a deduction from the wages of an employee (or receive any payment from an employee) unless— (a) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of any statute or any instrument made under statute, (b) the deduction (or payment) is required or authorised to be made by virtue of a term of the employee's contract of employment included in the contract before, and in force at the time of, the deduction or payment, or (c) in the case of a deduction, the employee has given his prior consent in writing to it. Section (6) provides that Where— (a) the total amount of any wages that are paid on any occasion by an employer to an employee is less than the total amount of wages that is properly payable by him to the employee on that occasion (after making any deductions therefrom that fall to be made and are in accordance with this Act), or (b) none of the wages that are properly payable to an employee by an employer on any occasion (after making any such deductions as aforesaid) are paid to the employee, then, except in so far as the deficiency or non-payment is attributable to an error of computation, the amount of the deficiency or non-payment shall be treated as a deduction made by the employer from the wages of the employee on the occasion. The Complainant alleged that pension contributions in the amount of €2,029.60, which had been deducted from his salary, were not transferred to his pension fund. I noted the Respondent’s position that, under the terms of the contract of employment, the Complainant had the option to join a PRSA and that, where an employee elected to do so, deductions would be reflected on the employee’s payslip. However, no evidence was presented to demonstrate that the Complainant had authorised such deductions or given prior written consent to them. In that regard, I have had regard to section 5(1) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991, which provides that an employer may not make a deduction from an employee’s wages unless the deduction is authorised by statute, is authorised by a term of the contract in force at the time, or the employee has given prior written consent. In the absence of evidence of such consent, or of a clear contractual basis demonstrating that the deductions were properly authorised in the specific circumstances of this case, I find that the Respondent has not established that the deductions were lawfully made in accordance with the Act. I also note section 5(6) of the Act, which provides that where wages properly payable are not paid in full, the resulting deficiency is to be treated as a deduction. While I noted that there had been delays on previous occasions in the transfer of pension contributions, no evidence was presented to demonstrate that the sum of €2,029.60 was ultimately remitted to the Complainant’s pension fund. In all of the circumstances, I am satisfied that the deductions were not shown to be lawful and that the amount in question was not properly paid over. I therefore find that the complaint is well founded. |
Decision:
Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.
Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Acts, 1977 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the unfair dismissal claim consisting of a grant of redress in accordance with section 7 of the 1977 Act.
Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act.
CA-00077898-001: I find that the complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above. Section 27(c) affords me the jurisdiction to require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment. In considering an award of compensation in this case, I noted that the breach relates to four Sundays worked over a relatively short period, that the Complainant worked no more than three hours on each of those Sundays and that no compensation whatsoever was provided for that work. I consider it appropriate to award compensation which reflects the failure to provide a Sunday premium and the impact on the Complainant of being required to work on those days without additional remuneration. Considering all of the foregoing, I find that an award in the sum of €1,500 is just and equitable. CA-00077898-002: This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-003: This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-004: I find that the complaint is well founded for the reasons set out above. Section 27(3) of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997 provides that I may award such compensation as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, subject to a maximum of two years' remuneration. In assessing the appropriate level of compensation, I note that the Complainant was deprived of his statutory entitlement to a weekly rest period on four occasions during June 2025. I also take into account that, while he worked on each Saturday and Sunday during that period, he stated that he worked for approximately three hours on each of those days. Accordingly, although the breaches were confined to a four-week period and involved relatively limited weekend working, the Respondent nonetheless failed to afford the Complainant the statutory protection of a continuous weekly rest period. I further note that the right to a weekly rest period derives from the Working Time Directive and that the principles established in Von Colson require that the remedy be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. Having regard to all of the circumstances, and pursuant to section 27(3) of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, I torder the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €2,000 for the breach of section 13 of the Act. CA-00077898-005: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-006 This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-007: This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-008: This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-009: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-010 This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-011: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-014: Section 82 (4) of the Act states as follows: (4) The maximum amount which may be ordered by the Director General of the Workplace Relations Commission by way of compensation under subsection (1)(c) or (1)(f) shall be— (a) in any case where the complainant was in receipt of remuneration at the date of the reference of the case, or if it was earlier, the date of dismissal, an amount equal to the greatest of— (i) 104 times the amount of that remuneration, determined on a weekly basis, (ii) 104 times the amount, determined on a weekly basis, which the complainant would have received at that date but for the act of discrimination or victimisation concerned, or (iii) €40,000, or (b) in any other case, €13,000. In determining the appropriate level of compensation in respect of the discrimination found under the Employment Equality Acts, I have had regard to all of the circumstances of the case, including the nature and seriousness of the treatment to which the Complainant was subjected, the timing of that treatment, and its impact on him. I have also had regard to the requirement that any award be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. I have found that the Complainant was subjected to less favourable treatment on the family status ground following his request for parent’s leave, in particular at the meeting of 22 July 2025, where he was informed that there may be no role available to him if he took the requested leave, or that he may return to a worse role, the suggestion that he should resign and where, shortly thereafter, his previously approved parent’s leave was withdrawn. I regard this as serious treatment, directly connected to his exercise of a statutory entitlement. However, I also take into account that the Complainant’s parent’s leave was subsequently reinstated on 30 July 2025 and that he subsequently availed of this leave. While this does not negate the discrimination identified, it is a relevant factor in assessing the overall impact on the Complainant and in ensuring that the award is proportionate to the effects of the discrimination. Taking all of these factors into account, I consider that an award equivalent to three months’ remuneration is appropriate. I therefore order the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €31,114.20, namely three months’ pay. This award is made for the effects of the discrimination and is not in respect of remuneration. CA-00077898-015: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above CA-00077898-016: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-017: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-018: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-019: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-020: Given that I have found that the Complainant did not make a protected disclosure, as set out in the preamble above, I find that I do not have jurisdiction in respect of this complaint. CA-00077898-021: This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-022: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-023: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-024: This complaint was withdrawn. CA-00077898-025: I find that this complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above. CA-00077898-026: The Parents’ Leave and Benefit Act 2019 states as follows in relation to redress: 24. (1) A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Act of 2015 in relation to a dispute between an employee and the relevant employer relating to any entitlement of the employee under Part 2 or 3 (or any matter arising out of or related to such entitlement) may include such directions to the parties to the dispute as the adjudication officer considers necessary or expedient for the resolution of the dispute or matter and such other redress as the adjudication officer considers appropriate having regard to all of the circumstances and the provisions of this Act, and accordingly may specify— (a) the grant to the employee of parent’s leave of such length to be taken at such time or times and in such manner as may be so specified, (b) an award of compensation (in favour of the employee to be paid by the relevant employer) of such amount, not exceeding such number of weeks of remuneration equivalent to the number of weeks referred to in section 5(1) in respect of the employee’s employment as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, or (c) both such grant and such award. Given that Section 5(1) (as amended by S.I. No. 300 of 2024, effective 1 August 2024) states that an employee who is a relevant parent is entitled to leave for a period of 9 weeks, the maximum award I can make under this heading in accordance with section 24 (1) (b) above is an award of 9 weeks. In determining the appropriate level of compensation to award, I have considered the nature, extent and duration of the adverse treatment to which the Complainant was subjected following his return from parent’s leave on 20 October 2025, together with its impact on him. I have found that, upon his return to work, the Complainant was subjected to a range of unfavourable treatment, including a lack of clarity regarding his role and responsibilities, a change in reporting structure which he reasonably perceived as a diminution of his position, exclusion from normal work-related communications, and the imposition of escalating measures such as the extension of his probationary period, the issuing of a final written warning, and the initiation of a Performance Improvement Plan. I am satisfied that these actions, taken together, amount to penalisation and that there is a clear and direct link between this treatment and the Complainant’s exercise of his statutory entitlement to parent’s leave. In assessing compensation, I have also taken into account that the Complainant continues to receive remuneration from the Respondent following the granting of interim relief. This is a relevant factor in assessing the financial impact of the penalisation, as the Complainant has not suffered a loss of income in the same way as might arise in other cases. I must also recognise that this penalisation of him only occurred over a relatively brief period, namely a few weeks. Taking all of these factors into account, I consider that an award equivalent to six weeks’ pay is appropriate. I therefore order the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation in the amount of €14,360.40. This award is made in respect of the effects of the penalisation and is not in respect of remuneration. CA-00077898-028: Given that I have found that the Complainant did not make a protected disclosure, as set out in the preamble above, I find that I do not have jurisdiction in respect of this complaint. CA-00077898-029: I find that this complaint is well founded and direct that the Respondent makes a payment of €2,029.60 to the Complainant. CA-00077898-030: As the Complainant did not have 12 months’ service, find that I do not have jurisdiction in respect of this complaint. CA-00077898-031: This complaint was withdrawn. |
Dated: 30th of June 2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Breiffni O'Neill
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