Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Rebecca  O'Neill

Patrick Finlay t/a Sli Beatha Floathouse

Representatives

None

None

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00076968-002

30/10/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00076968-003

30/10/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00076968-004

30/10/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

CA-00076968-005

30/10/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Sick Leave Act 2022

CA-00076968-006

30/10/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00076968-007

30/10/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00076968-009

30/10/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967

CA-00076968-010

01/12/2026

Complaints under the Organisation of Working Time Act

The Complainant outlined that she commenced working on a part-time basis for the Respondent in September 2019.  Her normal hours of work were Thursday 3pm to 10pm; Friday 8am to 3.30pm; and on Saturday she worked 6.5 hours with varying start and finish times.  The Complainant outlined that this pattern prevented her from receiving 11 hours consecutive rest between Thursday night and Friday morning.  On occasion, if there were no customers booked in for the last session on Thursday night or the first session on a Friday morning, she did receive at least 11 hours consecutive rest.  The Complainant was unable to tell the hearing the dates on which she did not receive 11 hours consecutive rest.  The Complainant outlined that she worked alone on Thursdays and Fridays and worked alongside a colleague on Saturdays.  The Complainant outlined the nature of her duties to the hearing.  The Complainant disputed that she could choose her start and finish times but agreed she could choose her shifts.

The Complainant outlined that she did not receive a fixed or uninterrupted meal break on Thursdays and Fridays.  Instead, she was required to eat lunch at reception whilst engaged in her work tasks.  She outlined that there was no designated area to take lunch away from the workspace.  The Complainant confirmed that she always got her rest break: the issue was that the time was not always uninterrupted.

Complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act

The Complainant contends she was not provided with a statement of terms of employment on commencement of employment.  She received a statement of terms of employment on 15 December 2025.  She did not request a statement at any time prior to the referral of the complaint to the WRC.  

Complaint under the Sick Leave Act

The Complainant broke her foot in September 2024.  She was due to return to work on 11 December 2024.  However, despite being medically cleared to return to work, Mr Finlay told her she could not do so as he was not comfortable with the doctor’s recommendation and requested a formal letter of fitness for work.  This resulted in the Complainant having to remain without work or pay for a further 4 weeks.  The Complainant was permitted to return to work on 10 January 2025.

The Adjudication Officer asked the Complainant to identify the provision of the Sick Leave Act, 2022 that she believed the Respondent had contravened.  The Complainant responded that she could not identify a particular provision and that her issue was that her return to work should have been handled differently.  She confirmed that she did not raise this issue with the Respondent at the time or before referring her complaint to the WRC.  

Complaints under the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act

On 3 October 2025 the Complainant was notified she would be placed on lay-off from 10 October 2025.  The Complainant was also told at the same time that she was required to work her normal shift on 23 and 24 October 2025.  The Complainant outlined she was not comfortable doing this as it would put her at risk of social welfare penalties and would put her in a place of financial uncertainty.  A mere one-week notice of lay-off put her in significant financial difficulties and gave her insufficient time to make a financial plan especially given her personal and financial situation (outlined to the hearing). 

On 21 October 2025 the Respondent told the Complainant she was no longer on lay-off, and that instead, he was placing her on short-time.  The Complainant responded that this would require her to cancel job seekers allowance and reapply for social welfare on the basis of short-time working.  She asked for confirmation that this is what was required, which was not forthcoming.  The Respondent arranged a meeting to discuss the matter.  The Respondent then changed her status to short-time working without any consultation, leaving her in a precarious financial position.  The Respondent arranged a meeting to discuss the matter, but the Complainant refused to attend as there would be no HR person present and no private meeting room.  The Respondent replied to tell the Complainant that he had engaged the services of a HR consultant and would rearrange the meeting.  The Complainant refused to attend as she believed another work colleague would be present for the same meeting and so there would be no privacy in relation to her situation.  Further, she felt she did not have sufficient notice of the meeting, and she wanted time to arrange for her representative to be present at this meeting. 

In response to a question from the Adjudication Officer, the Complainant outlined that she should have got four weeks’ notice of lay-off rather than one weeks’ notice.  When asked by the Adjudication Officer to identify the provision of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 allegedly contravened by the Respondent, the Complainant said that she could not identify a particular provision.

Appeal under the Redundancy Payments Act

The Complainant completed an RP9 form on 7 November 2025 and sent same to the Respondent by post.  The Complainant outlined that as the Respondent could not guarantee a resumption of normal working after 4 continuous weeks of no work, she was entitled to a redundancy payment.  The Respondent issued counter-notice.  The Complainant contends that the hours offered did not meet the statutory requirement for a valid counter-notice.  Her normal hours were 20.5 hours per week over three days, whereas she was offered less than her normal hours.  The Respondent stated that he intended to return her to full time work, but the Complainant felt that there was no guarantee of this and no working schedule beyond December.  The Complainant contends that the counter-notice issued by the Respondent is invalid.  The Respondent did not agree with the Complainant’s interpretation of s. 13 of the 1967 Act so the Complainant refused to return to work.  She wants the WRC to decide if she is entitled to a redundancy payment. 

The Complainant has been employed since 2019.  At no point prior to referring a complaint to the WRC did the Complainant raise a grievance, complaint, or concern regarding breaks, rest periods, sick pay, written terms, or notice. The issues complained of arose following temporary lay-off and short-time working arrangements, and in the context of a disputed redundancy claim.

The business operated a highly flexible working environment.  All staff worked on a part-time basis which allowed for much flexibility.  Staff regularly swapped shifts, adjusted start times, and blocked off availability using the booking system.  This was always facilitated by management.  Breaks were taken freely, including leaving the premises, taking extended breaks, or using on-site facilities. This flexible system operated transparently and consistently for all staff.  The Respondent accepts that there was no recording of breaks at the time of the Complainant referring her complaint to the WRC but this has since been rectified.  

In September 2025, the business experienced a significant and unexpected downturn. Staff were informed of the situation and temporary lay-off was introduced to protect the viability of the business and preserve employment.  The Respondent offered some shifts to the Complainant during this time, but she refused these shifts and a decision to introduce short-time working arrangements was implemented.  The Complainant declined available work and subsequently submitted an RP9 redundancy claim.

The Respondent accepts that on occasion the interval between the Complainant’s Thursday night shift and Friday morning shift may have been 10.5 hours rather than 11 hours.  However, the Complainant had control over her working hours and had the freedom to adjust shift patterns in terms of varying start and finish times, and or swop shifts.  The booking and rostering system allowed staff to start later or finish earlier.  All requests for changes were routinely approved.  Where a shorter daily rest period occurred, it arose at the employee’s request and could be avoided at any time through the established and approved shift-swap system.  At no point during five years of employment did the Complainant raise any concern regarding daily rest periods.

The Complainant had the freedom to avail of her rest break during her shift, and she routinely took her break.  There is a separate room suitable for uninterrupted breaks.  As there is double staffing during busy periods such as Saturdays, there was no reason why the Complainant could not avail of her breaks.  She had the freedom to temporarily close the premises or to request cover as is evidenced by the WhatsApp messages.   She frequently left the premises for food or personal errands and regularly took extended breaks.  She was permitted to and did avail of float and sauna sessions free of charge during paid working time.  Breaks were uninterrupted and unrestricted.  No issue was raised at any time in relation to breaks.

The Respondent accepts that written terms were not formally issued at the outset of employment. This was an oversight and is acknowledged.  The Complainant was provided with a written statement of employment terms in December 2025.

The Complainant’s injury leading to sick leave occurred outside of work.  No medical certificate was provided.  The Respondent made payments beyond statutory requirements to support the Complainant.  The Respondent correctly sought confirmation that she was medically fit to resume duties, noting that no medical certificate or clearance had yet been provided.  Once this was received the Complainant returned to work in January 2025 without raising any concern.

Temporary lay-off does not require statutory notice under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act.  The employee was consulted and written notice of lay-off and short-time was issued.  The Respondent submits that the Minimum Notice Acts do not apply in these circumstances.

The Complainant submitted an RP9 redundancy claim which was received by the Respondent on 13 November 2025.  In accordance with s. 13 of the Redundancy Payments Acts, the Respondent issued counter-notice within the statutory timeframe.  The business continued to trade, and the Complainant’s role was never redundant.  A return-to-work date of 9 December 2025 was offered which was within four weeks of the counter-notice.  More than half her normal weekly hours were available each week.  The Complainant confirmed in writing that she would not return to work pending a WRC decision, while stating this was not a resignation.  The refusal to attend rostered shifts was the Complainant’s decision.  A redundancy entitlement cannot arise where suitable work is available and refused.  

An external HR consultant was engaged once issues arose. The Respondent acted consistently, transparently, and in good faith throughout. Temporary lay-off, short-time and subsequent return-to-work arrangements were implemented in response to genuine financial difficulty, with the clear intention of preserving employment and resuming normal working hours as business levels recovered.  Work was offered to the Complainant within the statutory timeframe, including hours in excess of the minimum threshold required under the Redundancy Payments Acts.  Despite this, the Complainant declined to return to work. The Complainant’s refusal to return to work during this period had a tangible operational impact on the business. During what is ordinarily one of the busiest trading periods, the Respondent was forced to close the premises for certain periods each week and incur a loss of earnings while attempting to secure temporary cover pending resolution of this matter. Notwithstanding these difficulties, the Respondent has continued to engage constructively with the process and has complied fully with statutory obligations.

A review of the written communications between the parties, which were opened to the hearing, demonstrates that a positive working relationship existed between the Complainant and the Respondent prior to October 2025.  Issues emerged after the Complainant was placed on lay-off.  The Complainant’s oral evidence made clear that the lay-off and subsequent short-time arrangements caused her financial and other difficulties.  She outlined her personal circumstances in evidence.  I understand that those personal circumstances were made more difficult by the lay-off and short-time working arrangements.  It was equally apparent to the hearing that Mr Finlay was endeavouring to do what he considered right in the circumstances: to protect the business and preserve jobs.  He too was operating in a very difficult situation.  The Complainant’s job remains open, although the Complainant states she feels the employment relationship has broken down which is unfortunate given the nature of the relationship prior to October 2025.  Both the Complainant and Respondent are anxious to have all issues between the parties adjudicated upon.

Findings

Complaints under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 (as amended)

The complaints under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 (“the 1997 Act”) were presented to the WRC on 30 October 2025.  The WRC’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing contraventions that may have occurred in the six-month period prior to that date.  The period for consideration is therefore limited to 1 May 2025 to 30 October 2025.  

CA-00076968-002 (daily rest period)

Section 11 of the 1997 Act provides:

“An employee shall be entitled to a rest period of not less than 11 consecutive hours in each period of 24 hours during which he or she works for his or her employer.”

Section 27(3) of the 1997 Act provides:

“A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of a relevant provision shall do one or more of the following, namely:

(a) declare that the complaint was or, as the case may be, was not well founded,

(b) require the employer to comply with the relevant provision,

(c) require the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 2 years’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment.”

The Respondent acknowledged that on occasion the Complainant may have received 10.5 hours rest as opposed to 11 hours following her Thursday night shift.  The Complainant was unable to identify the dates on which she did not get 11 hours rest; however, it was her sworn evidence that this was most Thursdays.  The Complainant gave evidence that she was responsible for keeping the service going on Thursdays and Fridays as she was the only one who covered those shifts.  The Complainant outlined the nature of her duties to the hearing.   WhatsApp chat exchange between the parties and work schedules (opened to the hearing by the Respondent) show requests for flexibility with regards to working hours and a readiness of the Respondent to facilitate same.  These communications support the Respondent’s assertion that the Complainant was free to swop shifts, block and unblock appointment times and alter starting and finish times.  However, the Respondent acknowledged that at the time of the referral of the complaint to the WRC, there was no formal recording of working hours.  The burden of proving compliance with the 1997 Act rests with the employer. 

Considering all the foregoing, I find this complaint under the 1997 Act is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €350 which I consider is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances.

CA-00076968-003 (rest and intervals at work)

Section 12 of the 1997 Act provides:

“(1) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 4 hours and 30 minutes without allowing him or her a break of at least 15 minutes.

(2) An employer shall not require an employee to work for a period of more than 6 hours without allowing him or her a break of at least 30 minutes; such a break may include the break referred to in subsection (1) . . . . ”

The Complainant accepted she got a break every day.  Her issue was that breaks on a Thursday and a Friday may have been interrupted as she worked alone on these shifts.  The Complainant was unable to identify the dates on which she did not get an uninterrupted rest break, but her sworn testimony is that on occasion the rest interval was interrupted.  WhatsApp chat messages support the Respondent’s contention that the Complainant did take uninterrupted breaks on occasion, including for example: “Hey Pat, Im just going to put the calls through to you while I have food . . . I’m going to get food and then take the calls back if that’s ok?” – all of which was answered “OK” by Mr Finley.   The Complainant was also free to and did use the float and sauna services herself if there were no customers booked in.  This resulted in additional breaks during working time varying in duration of 45 to 90 minutes.  This was excepted by the Complainant at the hearing.   She was paid during this time and was not charged for the use of these services.  An email provided by the Complainant within her written submission dated 29 September 2025 reads: “Work has been very quiet for ages and I fully expect that the shop will close soon”.  Therefore, it is likely, and in line with the Respondent’s contention for same, that Complainant had time to avail of this extra break time regularly during the cognisable period.  However, the Respondent acknowledged that at the time of the referral of the complaint to the WRC, there was no formal recording of rest breaks during the working day.  Therefore, it is possible that there may have been occasions within the cognisable period when the Complainant did not get an uninterrupted break.  The burden of proving compliance with the 1997 Act rests with the employer. 

Considering all the foregoing, I find this complaint under the 1997 Act is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €150 which I consider is just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances.

Complaints under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 (as amended)

The complaints under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 (“the 1994 Act”) were presented to the WRC on 30 October 2025.  The WRC’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing contraventions that may have occurred in the six-month period prior to that date.  The period for consideration is therefore limited to 1 May 2025 to 30 October 2025.  However, it is well established that where an employee does not receive the statements provided for at s. 3 of the 1994 Act, they suffer a subsisting breach of their statutory rights until the statements are provided (or their employment ends).

CA-00076968-004

Section 3 of the 1994 Act provides:

“(1) An employer shall, not later than one month after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment . . . 

(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1), an employer shall, not later than 5 days after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment . . .

Section 7 (2) of the Act provides:

“(2) A decision of an adjudication officer under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 in relation to a complaint of a contravention of section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6C, 6D, 6E, 6F or 6G, shall do one or more of the following, namely—

(a) declare that the complaint was or, as the case may be, was not well founded,

(b) either—

(i) confirm all or any of the particulars contained or referred to in any statement furnished by the employer under  section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6C, 6D, 6E, 6F or 6G, or

(ii) alter or add to any such statement for the purpose of correcting any inaccuracy or omission in the statement and the statement as so altered or added to shall be deemed to have been given to the employee by the employer,

(c) require the employer to give or cause to be given to the employee concerned a written statement containing such particulars as may be specified by the adjudication officer,

(d) in relation to a complaint of a contravention under change section 3, 4, 5, 6, 6D, 6E, 6F, or 6G, and without prejudice to any order made under paragraph (e) order the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 4 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.

(e) in relation to a complaint of a contravention under section 6C, and without prejudice to any order made under paragraph (d), order the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount (if any) as the adjudication officer considers just and equitable having regard to all of the circumstances, but not exceeding 4 weeks’ remuneration in respect of the employee’s employment calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977.”

It is not in dispute that the Complainant was not in possession of the statements provided for under s. 3 of the 1994 Act at the time she referred her complaint to the WRC.  Therefore, I am satisfied the Respondent contravened s. 3 of the 1994 Act.  Accordingly, I find this complaint is well founded.  The Complainant received a statement of terms in December 2025.

In accordance with s 7(2) of the 1994 Act, I award the maximum compensation of 4 weeks remuneration, which I consider just and equitable in the circumstances, as the Complainant was without a statement of terms of employment for over 5 years.  I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €1,107 (which represents 4 weeks gross remuneration).

CA-00076968-005

The Complainant withdrew this complaint at the hearing as it was a duplicate of complaint CA-00076968-004.

Complaint under the Sick Leave Act, 2022 (as amended)

The Sick Leave Act, 2022 (“the 2022 Act”) inter alia provides for payment for statutory sick leave.

CA-00076968-006

The complaint under the 2022 Act was presented to the WRC on 30 October 2025.  The WRC’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing contraventions that may have occurred in the six-month period prior to that date.  The period for consideration is therefore limited to 1 May 2025 to 30 October 2025. 

This complaint dated back to 2024 and is therefore outside the cognisable period for the complaint.  Accordingly, I find I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint.  

Complaints under the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 (as amended)

The purpose of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 (“the 1973 Act”) is to require an employer to give a minimum period of notice to terminate an employee’s employment.

CA-00076968-007

The complaints under the 1973 Act were presented to the WRC on 30 October 2025.  The WRC’s jurisdiction is confined to assessing contraventions that may have occurred in the six-month period prior to that date.  The period for consideration is therefore limited to 1 May 2025 to 30 October 2025. 

The Complainant was given written notice of lay-off on 3 October 2025.  The lay-off arrangement commenced on 10 October 2025.  The Complainant contends the 1973 Act confers on her the right to 4 weeks’ notice in the event of lay-off.  The Complainant submits the Respondent is in breach of the 1973 Act as she received one-weeks’ notice only.  The Respondent submits that the 1973 Act does not provide for notice in the event of lay-off.

I note that the purpose of the 1973 Act is to require a minimum period of notice to terminate employment.  The Complainant is still in the Respondent’s employment.  At the hearing, the Complainant was unable to identify a breach of the 1973 Act.  

The Redundancy Payments Acts, 1967 (as amended) provides that an employer is required to give notice of short-time and lay off to employees, however, that legislation does not provide for a minimum period of notice. 

I am satisfied the Respondent did not contravene the 1973 Act.  Accordingly, I find this complaint is not well founded.

CA-00076968-009

The Complainant submitted that the Respondent was wrong to require her to work while on lay-off and then switch to a short-term working arrangement without consulting her.  The Complainant was unable to identify a breach of the 1973 Act with respect to this complaint.  I am satisfied the Respondent did not contravene the 1973 Act.  Accordingly, I find this complaint is not well founded.

Complaint under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 (as amended)

CA-00076968-010

The Complainant is still in the Respondent’s employment; however, she claims that her role became redundant on 30 October 2025.  It is the Respondent’s position that the Complainant’s role was not redundant on this date, nor has the role become redundant since that date.

Relevant Law

Section 11 of the 1967 Act provides:

“(1) Where an employee’s employment ceases by reason of his employer’s being unable to provide the work for which the employee was employed to do, and— (a) it is reasonable in the circumstances for that employer to believe that the cessation of employment will not be permanent, and (b) the employer gives notice to that effect to the employee prior to the cessation, that cessation of employment shall be regarded for the purposes of this Act as lay off.

(2) Where—

(a) for any week an employee’s remuneration is less than one-half of his normal weekly remuneration or his hours of work are reduced to less than one-half of his normal weekly hours,

(b) the reduction in remuneration or hours of work is caused by a diminution either in the work provided for the employee by his employer or in other work of a kind which under his contract the employee is employed to do.

(c) it is reasonable in the circumstances for the employer to believe that the diminution in work will not be permanent and he gives notice to that effect to the employee prior to the reduction in remuneration or hours of work,

the employee shall, for the purposes of this Part, be taken to be kept on short-time for that week.”

(Emphasis added)

Section 12 of the 1967 Act provides:

“(1) An employee shall not be entitled to redundancy payment by reason of having been laid off or kept on short-time unless—

(a) he has been laid off or kept on short-time for four or more consecutive weeks or, within a period of thirteen weeks, for a series of six or more weeks of which not more than three were consecutive, and

(b) after the expiry of the relevant period of lay-off or short-time mentioned in paragraph (a) and not later than four weeks after the cessation of the lay off or short-time, he gives to his employer notice (in this Part referred to as a notice of intention to claim) in writing of his intention to claim redundancy payment in respect of lay-off or short-time . . . ”

Section 13 of the 1967 Act provides:

“(1) Subject to subsection (2), an employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment in pursuance of a notice of intention to claim if, on the date of service of that notice, it was reasonably to be expected that the employee (if he continued to be employed by the same employer) would, not later than four weeks after that date, enter upon a period of employment of not less than thirteen weeks during which he would not be laid off or kept on short-time for any week.

(2) Subsection (1) shall not apply unless, within seven days after the service of the notice of intention to claim, the employer gives to the employee notice (in this Part referred to as a counter-notice) in writing that he will contest any liability to pay to him a redundancy payment in pursuance of the notice of intention to claim.

(3) If, in a case where an employee gives notice of intention to claim and the employer gives a counter-notice, the employee continues or has continued, during the next four weeks after the date of service of the notice of intention to claim, to be employed by the same employer, and he is or has been laid off or kept on short-time for each of those weeks, it shall be conclusively presumed that the condition specified in subsection (1) was not fulfilled.

(4) For the purposes of section 12 and for the purposes of subsection (3)—

(a) it is immaterial whether a series of weeks (whether it is four weeks, or four or more weeks, or six or more weeks) consists wholly of weeks for which the employee is laid off or wholly of weeks for which he is kept on short-time or partly of the one and partly of the other;

(b) no account shall be taken of any week for which an employee is laid off or kept on short-time where the lay-off or short-time is wholly or mainly attributable to a strike or a lock-out, whether the strike or lock-out is in the trade or industry in which the employee is employed or not and whether it is in the State or elsewhere.”

Findings

It was common case the Complainant’s normal hours of work were 20.5 hours per week, and her normal days of work were Thursday, Friday and Saturday.  The following sequence of events is also not in dispute:

(i)                  3 October 2025 - the Complainant was given written notice that she would be placed on temporary lay-off with effect from 10 October 2025. The Complainant was advised that this was a temporary measure. 

(ii)                 10 October 2025 – the Complainant is placed on lay-off.

(iii)               21 October 2025 – the arrangement is changed to one of short-time working.  In a letter to the Complainant to confirm the latter, the Respondent outlined that he expected to be able to offer between 0 and 3 days work per week, depending on business needs, and that the short-term arrangement was temporary.

(iv)               13 November 2025 - the Respondent was served with notice (RP9) of the Complainant’s intention to claim a redundancy payment.  

(v)                 13 November 2025 - the Respondent issued counter notice.

(vi)               26 November 2025 - the Respondent wrote to the Complainant to advise that he was in a position to resume the gradual return to normal operations in December, with the intention of restoring normal weekly hours from January onwards.  The Complainant was offered the following shifts: Tuesday 9th December: 11:00am – 6:00pm; Thursday 11th December: 3:00pm – 9:30pm; Saturday 13th December: 11:00am – 6:00pm; Thursday 18th December: 3:00pm – 9:30pm; and Saturday 27th December: 8:00am – 3:30pm.

(vii)             1 December 2025 - the Complainant wrote to the Respondent to outline that the counter notice was only valid if the Respondent could offer the Complainant her normal weekly working hours of 20.5 hours per week, continuously for 13 weeks, starting from 4 weeks of issuing the counter-notice, which she submitted would be 11 December 2025.  As the hours offered - 5 shifts in total for the month of December - did not meet this requirement, the Complainant submitted she was entitled to a redundancy payment.  She accordingly requested her statutory redundancy payment to be paid.

(viii)            1 December 2025 – the Complainant emailed the WRC stating she was claiming a redundancy payment.

(ix)               3 December 2025 - the Respondent replied stating he was offering a return to work starting on 9 December 2025, which was within the statutory four-week window. He added that his intention remained to return the Complainant to her normal weekly hours from January 2026.  He outlined that while the business was still operating under financial pressure and reduced hours, he was now in a position to offer the Complainant more than half of her normal weekly working hours (20.5 hours) in each week from week commencing 5 December 2025 as follows: WEEK 1 - Fri 5 Dec to Thu 11 Dec - Tue 9 Dec: 11:00am – 6:00pm = 7 hrs; Thurs 11 Dec: 3:00pm – 9:30pm = 6.5 hrs Total Week 1 Hours: 13.5 hrs; WEEK 2 — Fri 12 Dec to Thu 18 Dec  - Sat 13 Dec: 11:00am – 6:00pm = 7 hrs; Thu 18 Dec: 4:30pm – 9:30pm = 5 hrs Total Week 2 Hours: 12 hrs; WEEK 3 — Fri 19 Dec to Thu 25 Dec  - Fri 19 Dec: 11:00am – 4:30pm = 5.5 hrs; Thu 25 Dec (Christmas Day): Entitled to 6.5 hrs paid Total Week 3 Hours : 5.5 + 6.5 = 12 hrs; WEEK 4 — Fri 26 Dec to Thu 1 Jan  - Fri 26 Dec (St Stephen’s Day): Entitled to 1/5 of normal weekly hours = 4.1 hrs; Tue 30 Dec: 10:00am – 2:30pm = 4.5 hrs; Thu 1 Jan: Paid Public Holiday = 7.5 hrs Total Week 4 Hours: 16.1 hrs.

(x)                 3 December 2025 - the Complainant responded that a counter-notice requires that 13 consecutive weeks of normal employment to be available within the statutory timeframe, and as the hours offered only covered a 4 week period, the conditions for a valid counter-notice had not been met and that an intention to restore normal hours at a later point does not meet this requirement.  The Complainant added that public holiday entitlements do not represent available work and therefore cannot be counted towards meeting the required period of normal employment. On this basis, the Complainant stated she was entitled to a redundancy payment.

(xi)               5 December 2025 - the Complainant wrote to the Respondent stating she was ceasing communications and that she believed it was  best to allow a WRC Adjudicator to resolve the matter, and that she would not be returning to work until the WRC inquired into the matter.  She added that her communication was not to be treated as a resignation.

It is not in dispute the Complainant met the requirements of s. 12 of the 1967 Act. 

From the time she was placed on lay-off and then short-time working, the Complainant refused to accept any shifts offered, insisting that valid counter-notice had not been tendered in relation to her notice to claim a redundancy payment.  The Complainant contends that as the hours offered were not her normal working hours and as a roster was provided for a 4-week period only, with just a promise of ‘normal hours thereafter, the conditions for a valid counter-notice had not been met.  She submits that an intention to restore normal hours at a later point does not meet the requirements of s. 13 of the 1967 Act.  The Complainant added that public holiday entitlements do not represent available work and therefore cannot be counted towards meeting the required period of normal employment.  On this basis the Complainant submits she became entitled to a redundancy payment on 30 October 2025.  The Complainant refuses to return to work until this matter is adjudicated on by the WRC.

The Respondent does not accept that the counter-notice issued was invalid.  According to the Respondent, the statutory test under s. 13 of the 1967 Act is whether, at the time the counter-notice is served, it is reasonable for the employer to expect that the employee will be able to resume employment within a short period.  The Respondent submits that s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act does not require a guarantee of full contractual hours for a continuous 13-week period, nor does it require that exact hours be fixed at the point of service of the counter notice.  It is the Respondent’s position that the counter notice was valid in substance and intent and that the statutory purpose of s. 13 of the 1967 Act was fully met.  

The principal question that falls to be determined in this complaint relates to the proper interpretation of s. 13 of the 1967 Act and specifically whether the counter-notice served by the Respondent meets the requirements of s. 13 of the 1967 Act. 

In cases of lay‑off or short-time working, the 1967 Act seeks to strike a balance between an employee’s right to claim a redundancy payment and an employer’s need to retain employees where the interruption to work is reasonably expected to be temporary.  Section 13 of the 1967 Act concerns the right of the employer to give counter-notice following an employee’s notice of intention to claim a redundancy payment following lay-off or short-time or a combination of both.  Section 13(1) of the 1967 Act provides that an employee is not entitled to a redundancy payment if at the time they made the claim, it was reasonable to expect that within 4 weeks, work would resume for a period of at least 13 continuous weeks without the employee being laid off or put on short‑time during that 13-week period. 

Section 13(1) of the 1967 Act does not apply unless the employer has served counter-notice in accordance with s. 13(2) of the 1967 Act.  In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the Respondent issued counter-notice in accordance with the requirements set out at s. 13(2) of the 1967 Act.  It was common case that counter-notice, by way of completion of Part C of the RP9, contesting any liability to pay a redundancy payment, was served by the Respondent within 7 days of the Complainant’s notice of intention to claim a redundancy payment.

For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the counter-notice issued to the Complainant by the Respondent was in compliance with s. 13 of the 1967 Act, and therefore I find the Complainant is not entitled to a redundancy payment.

Firstly, I am satisfied s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act does not require a period of employment of not less than 13 weeks of “normal” employment as contended for by the Complainant.  There is no reference to ‘normal’ or contractual hours in s. 13(1).  On a plain reading of s. 13(1), it requires that there is no lay-off or short-time in any of those 13 weeks.  ‘Short-time’ has a specific definition for the purposes of the 1967 Act.  It is defined at s. 11(2) of the 1967 Act as referring to a temporary situation where in any week an employee’s remuneration is less than one-half of their normal weekly remuneration or their hours of work are reduced to less than one-half of their normal weekly hours.  The hours of work and or remuneration proposed for the 13-week period of employment (and beyond), as communicated to the Complainant on 3 December 2025, although below her usual hours and or remuneration for the first 4 weeks of the 13-week period, were nonetheless more than half of her normal working hours and or remuneration.  The Complainant was assured of her normal hours from week 5 onwards.  Considering all the foregoing, I am satisfied the Complainant would not have been on short-time or lay-off in any week of the period of employment relevant to s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act.

Second, I am satisfied there is nothing to preclude an employer counting a public holiday for the purposes of satisfying the requirements of s. 13(1).  Section 11(2), in defining ‘short-time’ for the purposes of the 1967 Act, refers to “remuneration” or “hours”.  While the 1967 Act does not define remuneration for the purposes of s. 13 of the 1967 Act, I am satisfied that holiday pay is generally regarded as remuneration for most employment statutes (for example, “wages” for the purposes of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991, and comes within the meaning of remuneration as  being “any consideration” as defined within the Employment Equality Act, 1998 and the Protection of Employees (Fixed-Term Work) Act, 1994).  Further, the Complainant was rostered to work the public holidays that fell within the 13-week period. As each of those public holidays fell on her normal working days, she would have worked them had the business not been closed on those days.

Third, s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act further requires that “it was reasonably to be expected” that the employee would enter a specified period of employment within a specified time.  The Respondent contends it is the employer, on date counter-notice is issued, who must reasonably have expected to enter the specified period of employment within 4 weeks.  However, s. 13(1) refers to the date of notice of an intention to claim a redundancy payment (“. . . an employee shall not be entitled to a redundancy payment in pursuance of a notice of intention to claim if, on the date of service of that notice . . . .”).  Thus, it would appear that the relevant date for the purposes of s. 13(1) is the date notice of an intention to claim is served (I note also that Part C (counter-notice) of the RP9 Form refers to “your notice” meaning the employee’s notice).  However, s. 13(1) is subject to ss. (2) which provides for counter-notice within 7 days of the service of the notice of intention to claim.  When read together, I am satisfied that the relevant date for the purposes of s. 13(1) may be interpreted as the date the counter-notice is issued in response to the notice of intention to claim (see Leinster Cleaning Services v. Muningus, RPD199 where the Labour Court was satisfied that it is at the time of the service of the counter-notice that “it was reasonably to be expected” that the employee would enter a specified period of employment within a specified time.  In any event, in this case, the notice of an intention to claim and the counter-notice to that claim were both served on the same date i.e., 13 November 2025, and the proposed period of employment of not less than 13-weeks was due to commence within four weeks of 13 November 2025.

As s. 13 is concerned with the right of the employer to give counter-notice, the phrase “it was reasonably to be expected”, on its face calls for an objective assessment of what could reasonably be anticipated in the circumstances, having regard in particular to the employer’s business position.  However, it appears that s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act has been interpreted as meaning that it is the employee who must reasonably have expected to enter the specified period of employment based on the assurances given by the employer in the counter-notice (see Employment Law, 2nd ed., Roundhall, 2023 at [21-49] - the author Francis Meenan opines that it is the employee who must reasonably have expected to enter the specified period of employment, and in Leinster Cleaning Services the Labour Court states that an employer who seeks to defeat an employee’s claim for redundancy following lay-off/short-time “. . . must take steps as will permit the employee to form a reasonable expectation . . . ” (my emphasis) to enter the specified period of employment.  The Labour Court in that case concluded that the Respondent’s counter-notice “ . . . did not clearly and unequivocally communicate to the Complainant any such assurance”).  Thus, it would appear from the foregoing that the question to be addressed is whether the employee reasonably had (or could have formed) an expectation that within 4 weeks, work would resume for a period of at least 13 weeks without being laid off or put on short‑time during that 13-week period, based on the assurances (if any) provided by the employer in the counter-notice.

It was the Complainant’s position that an intention to restore normal hours at a later point does not meet the requirements of valid counter-notice (in effect it was not sufficient assurance).  It was the Respondent’s position that counter-notice does not require exact hours be fixed at the point of service of the counter notice (in effect this level of assurance is not required by s.13(1)).  I accept the position of the Respondent for the following reasons.  The Complainant elected to use the RP9 Form to give notice of an intention to claim a redundancy payment, and the Respondent, in turn, issued its counter-notice using the same RP9 Form.  While the RP9 Form is not a statutory form, it is an official administrative form created by the Department of Enterprise, Tourism and Employment to operate the statutory redundancy scheme in practice.  The Respondent completed and signed Part C of the RP9 Form as follows:  “I contest any liability to pay you a Redundancy Lump Sum on the grounds that it is reasonable to expect that within four weeks of the date of service of your notice, namely, 13 November 2026, you will enter upon a period of employment of not less than thirteen weeks during which you will not be on lay off or short time any week” (my emphasis). I am satisfied that, by completing the RP9 Form, the Respondent provided a clear and unequivocal assurance that work would recommence within 4 weeks for a period of not less than 13 weeks during which the Complainant would not be laid off or placed on short-time (within the meaning of the 1967 Act).  I am further satisfied that, objectively assessed, the wording at Part C of the RP9 Form constitutes sufficient assurance, because if an employer reneged on the assurance implicit in the wording of Part C of the RP9, an employee could rely on s. 13(3) of the 1967 Act.   Section 13(3) (which I am satisfied does not apply in the instant case) provides that where an employer gives counter-notice and the employee continues during the next four weeks after the notice of intention to claim to be kept on layoff or short-time for each of those weeks, “it shall be conclusively presumed that the condition specified in subsection (1) was not fulfilled”. 

Accordingly for the reasons set out above, objectively assessed, I am satisfied the Respondent, when issuing counter-notice in response to notice of an intention to claim, assured the Complainant that within 4 weeks she would resume work for at least 13 weeks during which time she would not be laid off or placed on short-time, and in doing so, the Respondent met the requirements of s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act.   

In conclusion, taking all the foregoing into consideration, I am satisfied that on 13 November 2025, it was reasonably to be expected, that the Complainant would, by the 11 December 2025 (the date the four week period provided for at s. 13(1) would have expired), enter a period of employment of not less than 13 weeks during which she would not be laid off or kept on short-time for any of those weeks.  Accordingly, I am satisfied the Respondent met the requirements of s. 13(1) of the 1967 Act so as to disentitle the Complainant to a redundancy payment within the cognisable period for this appeal. 

Accordingly, in circumstances where I am satisfied that the counter-notice issued to the Complainant by the Respondent was in compliance with s. 13 of the 1967 Act, I find the Complainant is not entitled to a redundancy payment.

CA-00076968-002 (daily rest)

I decide this complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €350.

CA-00076968-003 (rest intervals at work)

I decide this complaint under the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997 is well founded and I require the Respondent to pay the Complainant compensation of €150.

CA-00076968-004

I decide this complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 is well founded and I order the Respondent to pay to the Complainant compensation of €1,107 (which represents 4 weeks gross remuneration).

CA-00076968-005

The Complainant withdrew this complaint at the hearing as it was a duplicate of complaint CA-00076968-004.

CA-00076968-006

I decide I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint as the complaint is statute barred.

CA-00076968-007

I decide this complaint under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 is not well founded.

CA-00076968-009

I decide this complaint under the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 is not well founded.

CA-00076968 -010

I decide to disallow this appeal under the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967.  

Redundancy. Valid counter notice.