Complainant

Respondent

Anonymised Parties

An Employee

An Employer

Representatives

Self-Represented

Kiwana Ennis B.L. instructed by respondent solicitor 

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977

CA-00070897-001

16/04/2025

The complaint relates to a claim for constructive dismissal. The Complainant’s resignation took effect on 10 June 2024 and her complaint was referred to the WRC on 16 April 2025. The Respondent submits that the complaint is statute-barred, having been presented outside the six-month time limit prescribed by section 8(2) of the 1977 Act.

The Complainant submits that she did not present her complaint within the statutory six-month period due to significant personal, medical and family circumstances.

She states that following a probation review she became distressed and was certified unfit for work. She commenced maternity leave in April 2023. She describes a traumatic childbirth in May 2023, during which her child required resuscitation and she experienced a medical complication affecting her vision for a period thereafter. The Complainant stated that she had previously suffered a miscarriage and found the birth particularly traumatic. She gave evidence that she was breastfeeding for approximately nine months following the birth and that her child was unsettled during that period.

The Complainant further outlines ongoing caring responsibilities, including caring for her newborn child and another young child, as well as supporting extended family members, including her mother-in-law who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. She stated that she also assisted in supporting her two nieces, whom she described as being “like daughters” to her. She describes significant practical and administrative responsibilities in this regard.

She also refers to experiencing stress-related health issues and submits that she was not mentally or physically able to pursue a complaint within the initial six-month period. In her complaint form, she stated that she delayed submitting her claim because she was “caught up in taking care of [her] baby”, was “still traumatised,” and that she brought the complaint after giving the matter “a lot of thought and consideration.”

Under cross-examination, the Complainant accepted that the difficulties relating to her vision arose in May 2023, more than a year prior to her resignation. She stated that during the relevant period following her resignation she was caring for her child and assisting with family matters. She accepted that she had breastfed her child for approximately eight to nine months following the birth and that this period had concluded prior to the expiry of the statutory six-month time limit. When asked what prevented her from referring her complaint within the statutory time limit, she stated that she “couldn’t deal with it at the time.” The Complainant further stated that she believed she had twelve months within which to present a complaint to the WRC and accepted that, had she known the time limit was six months, she would have submitted the complaint within that period. She stated that she ultimately submitted the complaint following encouragement from her mother.

The Complainant submits that these cumulative circumstances constitute reasonable cause and seeks an extension of time.

The Respondent submits that the complaint is statute-barred, having been presented outside the six-month time limit prescribed by section 8(2) of the 1977 Act in circumstances where the Complainant’s resignation took effect on 10 June 2024 and her complaint was lodged on 16 April 2025.

The Respondent relies on established authority, including Cementation Skanska v Carroll (DWT0338), Minister for Finance v CPSU [2007] ELR 36, and PJ Personnel Ltd v Maguire (AWD201), to submit that the Complainant must demonstrate a reason for the delay, that such reason provides a justifiable excuse, and that there is a causal link between the reason relied upon and the failure to present the complaint in time.

It is submitted that the Complainant has failed to meet this test. In particular, the Respondent contends that the Complainant has relied on a range of personal and family circumstances without identifying a specific cause of the delay or establishing how these circumstances prevented her from lodging the complaint within the statutory period.

The Respondent further submits that many of the matters relied upon pre-date the termination of employment and therefore cannot explain the delay in the six months following the resignation. It is also submitted that the medical evidence does not establish that the Complainant was medically unfit to submit a complaint during the relevant period.

The Respondent further submits that the Complainant’s evidence amounted to an acknowledgement that she delayed pursuing the complaint because she was dealing with other personal matters and did not feel ready to pursue the matter at that time, rather than because she was prevented from doing so. The Respondent submits that a mistaken belief regarding the applicable statutory time limit does not constitute reasonable cause for the purposes of section 8(2)(b) of the 1977 Act.

The Respondent submits that no causal link has been established and that, having regard to the length of the delay, cogent reasons have not been provided. Accordingly, it is submitted that the complaint should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the parties, the oral evidence adduced at the hearing summarised above and the oral and written submissions made by and on behalf of the parties at the hearing.

Preliminary Decision:

In Brothers of Charity (Roscommon) Ltd. v. Marian Keigher (EDA1014), the Labour Court considered the determination of an issue by way of preliminary decision. The Labour Court referred to the judgments of Kenny J. in Tara Explorations and Development Co. Ltd v. Minister for Industry and Commerce [1975] IR 242 and Hardiman J. in B.T.F. v. Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] 2 I.L.R.M. 367. In the latter case Hardiman J. found:

"It is often a difficult and delicate decision as to whether to try a particular issue as a preliminary matter. In a case where a point is raised which in and of itself and without regard to anything else may terminate the whole proceedings, clearly a strong case can be made for its trial as a preliminary issue. The classic example is where the Statute of Limitations is pleaded.”

In Donegal Meat Processors v. Donal Gillespie t/a Foyle Donegal (UDD2114) the Labour Court noted that, seeking to have the substantive issue and the jurisdictional issue dealt with together was:

“akin to asking the court to exercise its jurisdiction before it determines whether or not it has jurisdiction in the first instance. […] Only if the court determines that it has jurisdiction to do so can it go on to consider the fairness or otherwise of the dismissal itself”.

Following the case law outlined above I find that there is a “strong case” for determining this matter by way of preliminary decision.

Preliminary Issue: Time Limits

The first matter I must decide is whether the complaint was referred to the WRC within the statutory time limit set out in the 1977 Act.  

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 12 December 2022 and was employed as an Executive Officer. It is not in dispute that the Complainant resigned from her employment with the Respondent and that her employment ended on 10 June 2024.

I am satisfied that the date of resignation, 10 June 2024, constitutes the date of dismissal for the purposes of section 1 of the 1977 Act in circumstances where a claim of constructive dismissal is asserted.

The relevant time limits for the referral of a complaint to the WRC are set out in section 8(2) of the 1977 Act:

“(2) A claim for redress under this Act shall be initiated by giving a notice in writing containing such particulars (if any) as may be specified in regulations under subsection (17) of section 41 of the Act of 2015 the Director General —

(a) within the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the relevant dismissal, or            

(b) within such period not exceeding 12 months from the date of the relevant dismissal as the adjudication officer considers appropriate, in circumstances where the adjudication officer is satisfied that the giving of the notice within the period referred to in paragraph (a) was prevented due to reasonable cause, and a copy of the notice shall be given by the Director General to the Respondent concerned as soon as may be after the receipt of the notice by the Director General.”

The Complainant referred her complaint to the WRC on 16 April 2025, outside the six-month time limit provided for in section 8(2)(a) of the 1977 Act. The time limit may be extended up to twelve months where I am satisfied that the failure to present the complaint within the six-month period was prevented due to reasonable cause.

The well-established test for granting an extension of time for reasonable cause is set out in the Labour Court decision of Cementation Skanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v. Carroll (DWT0338) wherein the Court held:

 “It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

In O’Donnell v. Dun Laoghaire Corporation [1991] 1 ILRM 301 at 315 Costello J in the High Court construed the term “good reasons” as follows:

“The phrase ‘good reasons’ is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely. However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved plaintiff believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings. What the plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under O. 84 r. 21 is on the plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay. There may be cases, for example where third parties had acquired rights under an administrative decision which is later challenged in a delayed action. Although the aggrieved plaintiff may be able to establish a reasonable explanation for the delay the court might well conclude that this explanation did not afford a good reason for extending the time because to do so would interfere unfairly with the acquired rights (State (Cussen) v Brennan [1981] IR 181).”

The test is an objective one. The onus rests on the Complainant to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon both explains the delay and affords a justifiable excuse. Crucially, there must be a causal link between the circumstances relied upon and the failure to present the complaint within time, such that it can be said that the delay was prevented by those circumstances.

It is not in dispute that the Complainant’s resignation took effect on 10 June 2024 and that the complaint was presented on 16 April 2025. The complaint was therefore lodged outside the statutory six-month period.

I have carefully considered the submissions and evidence of both parties. I accept that the Complainant experienced difficult and distressing personal, medical and family circumstances. However, I note that a substantial portion of the matters relied upon arose prior to, or contemporaneously with, the termination of her employment. I further note that many of the family and caring responsibilities relied upon by the Complainant were ongoing circumstances which existed prior to her resignation and continued thereafter. As such, they do not explain the failure to present the complaint within the six months following her resignation.

I have also had regard to the Complainant’s explanation in her complaint form that she delayed submitting her claim because she was “caught up in taking care of [her] baby”, was “still traumatised” and submitted the complaint after giving the matter “a lot of thought and consideration”. I have also taken into account the Complainant’s oral evidence wherein she stated that she “couldn’t deal with it at the time” and that she was occupied with caring responsibilities and family matters during the relevant period. I further note her evidence that she believed she had twelve months within which to submit her complaint and that she would have lodged the complaint earlier had she known the applicable statutory time limit was six months. However, a mistaken understanding of the applicable statutory time limit does not, of itself, constitute reasonable cause for the purposes of section 8(2)(b) of the 1977 Act.

While I accept that the foregoing reflects the Complainant’s personal circumstances, it does not establish that she was prevented from initiating her complaint within the statutory period. In this regard, I accept that the Complainant appears to have had an exceptionally difficult and stressful period in her personal life and that she undertook significant caring and support responsibilities for both her immediate and extended family. However, difficult personal circumstances, of themselves, do not satisfy the statutory test. The issue I must determine is whether the circumstances relied upon operated so as to prevent the referral of the complaint within the statutory time limit.

The statutory test requires that the delay be attributable to circumstances which operated so as to prevent the referral of the complaint. The evidence before me does not demonstrate that the Complainant was precluded from submitting a complaint during the relevant six-month period. Rather, the explanation advanced points to competing personal priorities and the timing of a considered decision to pursue a complaint.

There is no evidence before me of any specific barrier, incapacity, or external factor arising during the relevant period which would have prevented the Complainant from referring her complaint to the WRC. Nor am I satisfied that, but for the circumstances relied upon, the complaint would have been presented within time.

In those circumstances, I find that the Complainant has not established that the delay in presenting her complaint was prevented due to reasonable cause within the meaning of section 8(2)(b) of the 1977 Act.

Accordingly, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint under the 1977 Act.

For the reasons set out above, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into this complaint under the 1977 Act. The complaint was not presented within the time limit prescribed by section 8(2)(a) of the 1977 Act, and the Complainant has not established that the delay was prevented due to reasonable cause within the meaning of section 8(2)(b) of the 1977 Act.