Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Martin Carr

DHL Express Ireland Limited

Representatives

Self

Sarah Dowling of IBEC

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00070860-001

16/04/2025

The Complainant submitted this complaint on 16th April 2025 alleging that the Respondent had not provided notice in writing of a change to his terms and conditions.

The Complainant gave evidence on his own behalf by way of religious oath. Witnesses for the Respondent were Mr. David Courtney, HR Business Partner, who gave evidence by way of religious oath as well as Mr. Stephen Rowe, Field Operations Manager and Mr. Michael Farrell, Managing Director, both of whom gave evidence following a civil affirmation.

11 calendar days before the hearing, on 26th October 2025, the Complainant emailed the Commission and sought to include a dispute under the Industrial Relations Act. He received a response from the Adjudication Services Unit to the effect that he could raise this with the Adjudication Officer at the commencement of the hearing. At the hearing, the Respondent stated that it would not voluntarily participate in an industrial relations dispute at that time.

Under the Industrial Relations Act 1969, when a workplace dispute between an employer and a worker is referred to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC), the Director General of the WRC may assign the case to an Adjudication Officer for investigation and consideration. However, this is a voluntary process and under the law, either party to the dispute has the right to object to it being investigated by an Adjudication Officer. That opportunity to object must be offered. Once a party receives notice that a trade dispute has been referred to the Director General, they have three weeks from the date the notice was posted to lodge a written objection. If they miss that deadline, the objection is invalid and the investigation may proceed

Therefore, when a dispute is referred to the WRC, an employer is written to and offered the opportunity to object to a hearing within 21 days. If no objection is received then a hearing is scheduled for the dispute to be investigated. As the Complainant first raised his desire to pursue an industrial relations dispute 11 days before the hearing, the Respondent was not offered the statutory three week period during which it could object. That process must be followed and an employer afforded the opportunity to object if they wish.

As that process was not completed in this case, a dispute was therefore not validly referred to me for investigation by the Director General and the only complaint the subject of this decision is the employment rights complaint which is dealt with further below.

However, for the sake of clarity, this does not prevent the Complainant from submitting a dispute under the Industrial Relations Act using a fresh complaint form if he so wishes.

In the narrative section of the complaint form, the Complainant sets out that he has worked for the Respondent for 33 years. From the outset of his employment he worked a 40-hour week over four ten-hour days, with a rotating day off between Monday and Friday. This arrangement resulted in the Complainant having a long weekend every fifth week, with days off falling on both a Friday and the following Monday. The Complainant states that this pattern of work was a significant factor in his decision to accept the role and that, over time, it became an integral part of his terms and conditions of employment.

The Complainant submits that this arrangement remained in place for decades and became embedded as a fundamental aspect of his work-life balance. It enabled him to meet personal family obligations which were, and are, very important to him.

In or around 2010, during a period of economic downturn, the Respondent undertook a restructuring exercise and requested that drivers move to a five-day working week. The Complainant made representations to retain his four-day arrangement and the Respondent agreed to this, thereby reaffirming the continuation of his established working pattern.

This long-standing practice continued without issue until January 2025 when, after approximately thirty-three years working under the existing arrangement, the Complainant was informed by his manager that he would be moved to a five-day working week. When the Complainant objected, he was informed that the change would proceed.

On 20th January 2025, the Complainant received written confirmation from the Respondent setting out revised working arrangements and offering a sum of €1,000 as compensation. The Complainant initiated a formal grievance on 22nd January 2025. A grievance meeting took place on 5th February 2025 with representatives of the Respondent, at which it was proposed that the Complainant would remain on a four-day week but would be required to work every Monday and Tuesday, with a rotating day off between Wednesday and Friday. The Complainant requested that any such change be deferred until January 2026 to allow for the orderly reorganisation of family commitments. This request was not accepted.

By letter dated 12th February 2025, the Respondent confirmed that the revised working arrangements would take effect from 3rd March 2025. The Complainant escalated his grievance, but by letter dated 3rd March 2025 the Respondent upheld the decision. On 6th March 2025, the Complainant advised that he intended to continue his existing working arrangement pending the outcome of the grievance process. On the same date, he received correspondence indicating that failure to comply with the revised roster could result in disciplinary action up to and including dismissal for gross misconduct.

The Complainant further escalated his grievance on 9th March 2025. During this period, the Respondent issued an updated grievance policy which included a provision requiring employees to comply with management instructions pending the outcome of grievance procedures. The Complainant was informed that this updated provision did not apply retrospectively to his case. Notwithstanding this, the Complainant states that he was subsequently advised by management that he would face serious consequences if he did not adopt the revised roster.

On 24th March 2025, the Complainant confirmed in writing that, under protest and due to the stress and pressure arising from the situation, he would comply with the revised working arrangements, while expressly maintaining that this did not alter his contractual terms and conditions or established custom and practice. The Complainant subsequently attended a grievance appeal hearing on 31st March 2025 without representation, having been refused permission to be accompanied by a person of his choosing. By letter dated 4th April 2025, the Respondent’s Managing Director upheld the original decision.

The Complainant states that, throughout the grievance process, although the Respondent indicated that his concerns had been considered, no meaningful engagement took place regarding the practical implications of the change on his family circumstances.

On 16th April 2025, the Complainant referred the matter to the Workplace Relations Commission.

The Complainant contends that the Respondent has characterised the change as a minor alteration made for cost-saving purposes; however, he disputes both the rationale and the proportionality of the measure. He submits that the alteration represents a substantial and unilateral change to his long-standing terms and conditions of employment, developed over more than three decades through custom and practice. He further submits that the change has had a significant adverse impact on his work-life balance and family arrangements, and that he adopted the new roster only under protest and under threat of disciplinary action. The Complainant seeks that due regard be given to his length of service and the established nature of his working arrangements.

The Respondent is a global provider of international express logistics services, operating within a highly competitive and time-sensitive industry which requires flexibility in workforce deployment to meet operational demands. The Respondent submits that it has at all times acted reasonably, in accordance with both the Complainant’s contract of employment and applicable statutory obligations, including the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994.

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent in 1992 as a driver and is contracted to work 40 hours per week. While the Complainant has historically worked a four-day week comprising four ten-hour shifts, the Respondent states that this arrangement reflects a working pattern rather than a fixed contractual entitlement to specific days off. The Respondent relies on the Complainant’s signed contract of employment and the employee handbook, both of which expressly provide that, due to the nature of the business, employees may be required to accept reasonable changes to their hours and patterns of work in line with operational requirements.

In January 2025, the Respondent reviewed its operational requirements and determined that changes to driver rostering were necessary in order to improve efficiency and ensure appropriate resourcing during peak periods, particularly at the beginning of the working week. The Respondent states that this decision was driven by legitimate business considerations, including cost efficiency and the need to concentrate resources on the busiest days of operation.

The Respondent submits that the Complainant was initially advised verbally by his line manager that changes to his working pattern were under consideration. This was followed by formal written notification dated 20th January 2025, which set out the proposed change in working arrangements and provided approximately three weeks’ notice prior to implementation. The Respondent states that this written notification satisfied the requirements of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, which obliges employers to notify employees in writing of any changes to the particulars of their employment.

The Respondent further submits that, in addition to providing written notice, it offered the Complainant a once-off payment of €1,000 as a gesture of goodwill in recognition of any inconvenience caused by the change.

Following receipt of this notification, the Complainant invoked the Respondent’s grievance procedure. A grievance meeting was convened in February 2025 at which the Complainant outlined his concerns, including the impact on his family arrangements. The Respondent states that it gave due consideration to these concerns and, as a result, determined not to proceed with the originally proposed move to a five-day working week. Instead, the Respondent sought to accommodate the Complainant by retaining a four-day week, while adjusting the pattern of working days to better align with operational requirements.

Under the revised arrangement, the Complainant was required to work Mondays and Tuesdays, with a rotating day off between Wednesday and Friday. The Respondent submits that this represented a reasonable compromise, balancing the Complainant’s preference to remain on a four-day week with the business need to ensure adequate staffing levels at key operational times. The Respondent maintains that this adjustment did not constitute a fundamental change to the Complainant’s terms and conditions of employment, but rather a minor alteration to his working pattern, particularly as the Complainant retained a four-day week and the same overall weekly working hours.

The Complainant’s grievance was not upheld at first instance, and he subsequently exercised his right of appeal. The Respondent states that a full and fair grievance process was followed, including an appeal hearing at which the Complainant was afforded the opportunity to set out his concerns. The Respondent further states that the Complainant was informed of his right to be accompanied at this hearing by a colleague or representative in accordance with company policy.

At all stages of the grievance process, the Respondent submits that it carefully considered the Complainant’s representations but ultimately concluded that the revised working arrangement was reasonable and necessary having regard to operational requirements. The Respondent maintains that it was entitled, both contractually and operationally, to implement such changes.

The Respondent also states that it advised the Complainant that he was required to comply with the revised roster while the grievance process was ongoing. It submits that this is consistent with established principles of workplace relations, whereby employees are expected to follow reasonable management instructions while disputes are being addressed through internal procedures. Correspondence issued to the Complainant during this period outlined the potential consequences of non-compliance, including the possibility of disciplinary action; however, the Respondent submits that this was communicated in an appropriate and proportionate manner as part of standard managerial practice.

The Respondent notes that the Complainant subsequently confirmed that he would work the revised roster under protest pending the conclusion of the grievance process. The Respondent further notes that the grievance process has now concluded and that the Complainant continues to work the revised arrangement.

The Respondent acknowledges that the Complainant expressed dissatisfaction regarding the impact of the change on his personal and family circumstances. However, it submits that these concerns were considered during the grievance process and that reasonable efforts were made to accommodate him, including the decision to retain a four-day week rather than implement the originally proposed five-day arrangement.

In respect of the Complainant’s claim under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994, the Respondent maintains that it has fully complied with its statutory obligations. It submits that the Complainant was provided with written notification of the change to his working pattern in advance of its implementation and that the change itself does not amount to a fundamental alteration of his contractual terms, but rather a permissible adjustment within the scope of his existing contract.

Accordingly, the Respondent contends that it acted reasonably, lawfully and in accordance with both contractual provisions and statutory requirements. It submits that the change to the Complainant’s working pattern was justified by legitimate business needs, was implemented following appropriate communication and engagement, and did not constitute a breach of the Complainant’s terms and conditions of employment.

The complaint form referring this matter to the WRC identifies the legislation which is alleged to have been contravened in this case. I note that the complaint form is not a statutory document and is intended to aid litigants to state their case. The form submitted on 16th April 2025 states that the complaint falls under “Terms and Conditions of Employment” and that the Complainant “was not notified in writing of a change to my terms of employment”. The selected redress option is under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

Under Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, an employee can make a complaint if they believe their employer has contravened any of the employment laws listed in Schedule 5 of the Act. These complaints are presented to the Director General of the WRC, usually using the WRC’s complaint form, and the Director General shall then pass the complaint to the WRC’s Adjudication Service. Section 41(1) says:

An employee (in this Act referred to as a “complainant”) or, where the employee so consents, a specified person may present a complaint to the Director General that the employee’s employer has contravened a provision specified in Part 1 or 2 of Schedule 5 in relation to the employee and, where a complaint is so presented, the Director General shall, subject to section 39, refer the complaint for adjudication by an adjudication officer.

That is how the above complaint has come to me, as an Adjudication Officer, to examine and carry out all necessary inquiries.

The complaint form alleges a breach of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 and, more specifically, that the Complainant was not notified in writing of a change to his terms and conditions. Section 5(1) of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 is the applicable section for such a complaint and it states as follows:

Subject to subsection (2), whenever a change is made or occurs in any of the particulars of the statement furnished by an employer under section 3, 4 or 6, the employer shall notify the employee in writing of the nature and date of the change as soon as may be thereafter, but not later than—

(a) the day on which the change takes effect, …

In evidence, the Complainant did not dispute that he had been notified in writing of the change. It was accepted that he received a letter dated 20th January 2025 which set out the proposed change to his working arrangements. What he was opposed to was the change itself and he explained that as he is a lay litigant he is not familiar with employment legislation.

In circumstances where the Complainant accepts that he was notified in writing of the proposed change, I must conclude that this complaint is not well founded.

The Complainant did not seek to amend his complaint form at any time to include any further employment rights complaints. I note that a letter acknowledging receipt of the complaint was sent to the Complainant on 25th April 2025. That letter stated:

You will see from this letter that the WRC has generated specific complaints from the contents of the selections made in your submitted complaint form. Please check that the specific complaints stated above reflect all the issues you wish to raise with the WRC. Please alert the WRC if there are issues you have raised but for which a specific complaint has not been generated.

The Complainant did not notify the WRC of any other specific complaints.

He did seek to include an industrial relations dispute which is discussed in the Background section of this decision, but that is a different dispute resolution process to an employment rights complaint. An industrial relations dispute concerns a disagreement between the parties about workplace issues and is generally resolved by way of a non-binding recommendation. As set out earlier in this decision, the law says that an employer has three weeks within which to object in writing to an industrial relations dispute. That time is calculated from the date on which notice of the referral was sent by post to the party concerned. In this case, that notice was not sent to the Complainant’s employer and there was insufficient time to allow for the statutory period within which to object. I therefore cannot address this complaint under the industrial relations dispute mechanism. As previously stated, that does not prevent the Complainant from raising a dispute separately using a new complaint form.

An employment rights complaint, on the other hand, concerns an alleged breach of employment legislation and is determined by an adjudication officer who issues a legally enforceable decision on the parties' rights and obligations. In an employment rights complaint, it is therefore imperative that the right allegedly breached is identified by the party raising the complaint.

The complaint form submitted in this case identifies an employment rights complaint alleging a breach of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

I have carefully reviewed the written submissions received from the Complainant. The narrative of the complaint form states that “under custom and practice law” it is a major change to his working terms and conditions. However, no other specific additional legislation is identified for me to adjudicate on, other than the above Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 complaint.

It was explained to the Complainant at the hearing that, having regard to the independent nature of the Adjudication Officer role, I could not advise any party on their case or identify legislation under which a complaint might be brought. It is a matter for a complainant to identify the complaints they wish to pursue.

While the complaint form is not a statutory form, the onus remains on a complainant to refer any complaint to the Director General within the applicable statutory time limits.

The Complainant furnished written submissions on 15th October 2025, which I have considered. Those submissions likewise did not identify any additional employment rights legislation upon which the Complainant sought to rely. Nor did the Complainant seek at the hearing to amend either the complaint or the complaint form so as to include any further employment rights complaints.

In those circumstances, the only employment rights complaint identified by the Complainant, and of which the Respondent had notice, is the complaint under the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 referred to above. This is therefore the only complaint that has been validly submitted for consideration.

For the sake of clarity, this decision is confined to the question of whether the Complainant received written notification of a change to his terms and conditions of employment. I make no findings in relation to any other factual matters arising from the evidence.

In circumstances where the Complainant acknowledges having received the notice in writing, I must find that this complaint is not well founded.

For the reasons set out above, I find that this complaint is not well founded.

Notified in writing of change to terms and conditions