ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00057194

Parties:

	Complainant	Respondent
Parties	Mogadja Gheorghe	Midland Wall Insulation

Representatives

Self

Marius Marosan

Complaint(s):

Act	Complaint Reference No.	Date of Receipt
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991	CA-00069510-001	24/02/2025

Date of Adjudication Hearing: 21/04/2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Brian Dalton

Procedure:

In accordance with Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015 following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.

Background:

The Complainant, a plasterer from Romania, claims €1,800 in unpaid wages for facade work carried out on a house in December 2024, to be paid by reference to the square metres completed. He says he was directed and paid by individuals, not by a named company, and was never told that any company might be the entity retaining him.

The complaint was first listed for hearing in August 2025 and commenced on 24 November 2025, naming Oleg Bitu as Respondent. At that hearing the Respondent’s representative stated that Mr Bitu was not the correct party, and that the correct Respondent was Midland Wall Insulation, the entity that engaged and paid the Complainant. I wrote to the representative to confirm he was on record for that entity. He confirmed that he was, and the case was relisted on that basis and heard on 21 April 2026.

The Respondent’s case, set out in correspondence and submissions, is that the Complainant was a subcontractor, not an employee, that he was never paid because of faulty work he left unfinished, and that the wrong party was named, since the person who engaged and paid him was Vlad Bitu, said by the Respondent to be unconnected to Oleg Bitu. The Complainant’s evidence is that he dealt throughout with Oleg Bitu, who directed and coordinated his work, and that the one payment he received came from Vlad Bitu, who he describes as Oleg Bitu’s son. These matters are addressed further below.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS:

Preliminary Issue: Is the Complainant an Employee for the Purposes of the Act?

Section 1 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 defines a contract of employment more broadly than the ordinary contract of service. It includes any contract where an individual agrees with another person to do or perform work personally for a third person, where that other person is not a client or customer of a business genuinely carried on by the individual. The person liable to pay the wages is treated as the employer.

The Supreme Court set out the test for distinguishing an employee from a contractor in Revenue Commissioners v Karshan (Midlands) Ltd t/a Domino's Pizza [2023] IESC 24. The test asks:

Does the contract involve pay in exchange for work?
Is the worker providing their own service personally, rather than through someone else?
Does the other party have enough control over how the work is done for this to be capable of being an employment relationship?
Looking at everything, does the relationship point to the worker working for themselves, or for the other party?
Does anything in the relevant legislation change this analysis?

On control, the Supreme Court approved what Clarke CJ said in Minister for Education and Skills v The Labour Court [2018] IESC 52, that a contract of service is one where a person works under the control of the other party as to how the work is carried out, as opposed to a contract for services where an independent contractor is not subject to that degree of control.

Applying this test, the Complainant agreed to do plastering work in return for payment by square metre, so the first question is satisfied. He worked alone, personally, with no helper and no employees of his own, so the second question is satisfied.

On control, the Respondent says the Complainant decided his own hours and was free to bring help. I accept that the Complainant had some freedom over his daily working pattern. But the Supreme Court in Karshan made clear that freedom of this kind is not decisive on its own. What matters more is who directed the work, where it was carried out, and to what standard. Here, the Complainant was told the address and what needed to be done. He was sent the location of his next job by Google Maps link and reported his progress by WhatsApp. The cost of remedial work, and the decision as to what counted as a defect, rested with the person directing the work, not with the Complainant. This is a sufficient degree of control.

The Respondent says the Complainant was paid for the job, not for hours worked, and that he bore the risk of his own poor workmanship. I accept that the Complainant was paid by reference to the work completed rather than by the hour. But this is also common in many employment relationships, including piece work, and is not on its own inconsistent with employee status. The Complainant did not advertise his services, had no business of his own, did not deal directly with the ultimate customer, and worked exclusively on this job for the duration of the engagement. These factors point towards employee status rather than away from it.

The Respondent's submission refers to Karshan but sets out a different test than the one the Supreme Court actually applied. Even taking the Respondent's own account of the facts, it confirms that the Complainant was told the address and what needed to be done, and that work was checked and corrected by others if it fell short. These facts support a finding of control rather than independence.

This wide definition of employer is supported by Minister for Education and Skills v Boyle [2018] IESC 52, where Clarke CJ stated, at paragraph 9.8, that the definition of contract of employment for the purposes of the 1991 Act clearly includes any person who is liable to pay the wages of the relevant person.

I find that the Complainant comes within the extended definition of employee under section 1 of the Act, and that the WRC has jurisdiction to hear this complaint.

Preliminary Issue: Was the Complaint Out of Time Against the Correct Respondent?

The complaint was lodged on 24 February 2025. The date the payment was due was 7 December 2024. The complaint was lodged within the six-month time limit under section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015. The difficulty raised by the Respondent is not the timing of the complaint, but the fact that Oleg Bitu, rather than Midland Wall Insulation, was named on the form. At no time was the Complainant made aware that Midland Wall Insulation, rather than Oleg Bitu personally, was said to be the entity retaining him.

There is a direct conflict of evidence on this point. The Respondent's submission says Oleg Bitu and Vlad Bitu are two unconnected people, in different industries, and that Oleg Bitu had no role in the work and made no payment to the Complainant. The Complainant's evidence, given in his submissions and opened at the hearing, is that he worked with Oleg Bitu in the past, that it was Oleg Bitu who directed and coordinated his work on this job by sending him work locations, that he corresponded with Oleg Bitu throughout about the work and about payment, and that the one payment he did receive came from Vlad Bitu, who he describes as Oleg Bitu's son.

Having heard both parties, I prefer the evidence of the Complainant. His account was consistent across his original complaint form and his later submissions, and it was given before the question of the correct Respondent was ever raised, which makes it more reliable on this point. By contrast, the Respondent's account, that Oleg Bitu and Vlad Bitu are entirely unconnected, does not address or explain the family relationship between them, a relationship which the Respondent did not dispute once it was raised. I find as a fact that Oleg Bitu was not a stranger to this engagement but was the person who directed and coordinated the Complainant's work throughout. Midland Wall Insulation is the name put forward by the Respondent's own representative as the correct party connected with this work, and I proceed on that basis. Any further question as to the precise legal structure of that entity is a matter that can be raised on appeal if a party wishes to pursue it.

On this finding, naming Oleg Bitu was not a fundamental error going to the jurisdiction of this complaint. This is particularly so given that the Complainant was never told that Midland Wall Insulation was the entity that paid him.

The High Court has held that a defect in naming the correct party should not be allowed to defeat a claim where no real prejudice is caused. In O'Higgins v University College Dublin and the Labour Court [2013] IEHC 431, Hogan J held that even where the wrong party was named, no prejudice was caused by the error, and that striking out a case for a technical naming error of this kind would be a disproportionate response, interfering with a person's right of access to a forum to have their case heard. The Respondent's own representative came on record for Midland Wall Insulation once this was raised, attended the relisted hearing, and has had a full opportunity to deal with the substance of the claim. No prejudice has been shown.

If, contrary to the above, it were necessary to extend time to allow the claim to proceed against Midland Wall Insulation, I am satisfied that reasonable cause has been shown. The Labour Court set out the test for reasonable cause in Cementation Skanska (formerly Kvaerner Cementation) Ltd v Carroll, DWT0338: a claimant must show reasons that explain the delay and provide a reasonable excuse for it. The Labour Court has also held, in Alert One Security Ltd v Khan, DWT1572, that where confusion as to a worker's rights or as to who they were dealing with arises from the conduct of the other side, this can amount to reasonable cause. Here, on the facts as I have found them, the Complainant dealt with the work and payment arrangements through individuals, not through a named company, and was never made aware of the structure behind the work he carried out. This is a reasonable explanation for the delay in correctly identifying the Respondent, if such an extension is required at all.

I find that the complaint was not statute barred. Midland Wall Insulation is the correct Respondent.

Summary of Complainant’s Case:

The Complainant worked alone on the final stage of the job. He says he sent progress photographs by WhatsApp and was sent the next work location by Google Maps link in return, which he says shows he was working under ongoing coordination and supervision.

He could not finish siliconing and cleaning the site because of continuous rain, and because he had a flight booked to Romania the next day. He says he agreed with the person directing his work that this person would finish those small remaining tasks himself, deduct the cost from the amount owed, and pay the Complainant the balance. After he returned to Romania he chased payment by phone and message. He received one bank transfer from Vlad Bitu, who is Oleg Bitu's son. He was never paid the balance.

Summary of Respondent’s Case:

The Respondent's case is that the Complainant was never an employee. He worked together with Oleg Bitu in the past, and when out of work asked Mr Bitu if he knew of any jobs available. He was directed to Vlad Bitu, the main contractor, and agreed with him the terms of engaging as a subcontractor.

The Respondent says the Complainant was paid for the job, not a salary, wage, or payment for hours worked, and that the sooner a job was finished the sooner he was paid and could move to the next one. The Respondent says the Complainant was responsible for the quality of his own work, and that where work was not done to a proper standard, he was not paid for it, as happened here.

On control, the Respondent says the Complainant decided his own start and finish times, that he was free to bring help with him to finish a job more quickly, and that he in fact worked alone on some jobs by choice, with no supervision in place. The Respondent says the Complainant was simply told the address and what needed to be done, and that he alone decided when to start and how long to work.

The Respondent says the Complainant was not conducting Midland Wall Insulation's business but his own, that he did not take calls from customers, and that he bore the financial risk of his own work, since unsatisfactory work was not paid for. The Respondent points to messages in which the Complainant agreed that money could be deducted from the amount owed to cover repairs carried out after he left the site, and to evidence that the Complainant was told he was responsible for the house he worked on.

The Respondent says it had no time limit on any project, that it was in the Complainant's own interest to finish jobs quickly to increase his income, and that this points away from an employment relationship.

On jurisdiction, the Respondent says the complaint was made against a person, Oleg Bitu, and not against a company. It says Oleg Bitu was not the main contractor and never made any payment to the Complainant, and that the person who engaged the Complainant and made payment to him is a different person, Vlad Bitu. The Respondent says Oleg Bitu has his own business in a different industry, and that this is not a question of a trading name or business owner, but of two different people.

On the substantive matter, the Respondent says the Complainant was not paid because of faulty work on the projects he undertook, not because of any refusal to pay an employee his wages, and that for these reasons the WRC has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

Findings and Conclusions:

The Complainant for the purposes of his claim under the Act is an employee retained by Midland Insulation based on the Respondent’s evidence and submission. The claim was lodged on time as the supervising parties to this claim up to the first hearing was an Oleg Bitu and Vald Bitu father and son.

The Complainant says he is owed €1,800.00 for work completed by 7 December 2024, calculated by square metre. The Respondent's position is that the Complainant was not paid because of faulty work on the projects he undertook, not because of any refusal to pay wages owed. The Respondent does not dispute that the work was carried out. The dispute is over its quality.

Section 5 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 prohibits an employer from making deductions from wages, except in certain limited circumstances. Section 5(6) provides that where the total wages paid to an employee on any occasion is less than the total wages properly payable, then, apart from a deficiency caused by an error of computation, the shortfall is to be treated as a deduction made by the employer. The first question, following the approach taken in Dunnes Stores (Cornelscourt) Ltd v Lacey [2007] 1 IR 478 and Balans v Tesco Ireland Ltd [2020] IEHC 55, is to decide what wages were properly payable to the Complainant for this work.

The Complainant's own evidence is that the site still needed siliconing and cleaning when he left, that this was due to continuous rain and that he had booked his return flight, and so could not finish the job. He agreed the cost of finishing these tasks would be deducted from what he was owed.

The Respondent says other workers had to rectify work the Complainant had done. The Complainant accepted in his messages that a reasonable deduction could be made for defective work, while asking to be paid fairly for the rest.

On the evidence, I am satisfied that the Complainant carried out the bulk of the work to an acceptable standard, but that the agreed cost of finishing the siliconing and cleaning, and of remedying any defective work, properly reduces the sum payable to him. I find that the wages properly payable to the Complainant for the work he completed, after that reduction, were €1,100.00. The shortfall between this sum and the amount actually paid to him is a deduction within the meaning of section 5(6) of the Act.

Section 6(1) of the Act provides that where a decision of an adjudication officer finds that a complaint of a contravention of section 5 is, in whole or in part, well founded as respects a deduction, the decision shall include a direction to the employer to pay to the employee compensation of such amount, if any, as the adjudication officer considers reasonable in the circumstances. Having regard to the deduction found above, I consider the sum of €1,100.00 to be reasonable compensation in the circumstances of this case.

Decision:

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.

The Complaint is well founded, and I order the Respondent to pay the Complainant €1100 an amount that is properly payable to him.

Dated: 22nd June 2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Brian Dalton

Key Words:

Employment Status, Correct Respondent, Time limits, Reasonable Cause