Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Stephen  Reid

Keltech IoT Networks Limited

Representatives

Rosalynn McVeigh B.L. instructed by McHale Muldoon Solicitors

 Mark Kellet, CEO

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 11A of the Protection of Employment Act 1977

CA-00059495-001

19/10/2023

The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 8 September 2020 as Commercial/Sales Director.

The Respondent's position was that the Complainant's employment terminated by reason of redundancy on 30 June 2023 and that he was paid a statutory redundancy payment. During the hearing, the Complainant accepted that his employment terminated on that date.

On 19 October 2023, the Complainant referred a complaint to the WRC under the Protection of Employment Act 1977. The complaint concerned matters arising from what the Complainant contended was a flawed redundancy process. Subsequently, by correspondence dated 2 February 2024 and in submissions furnished on his behalf, the Complainant contended that he had also been unfairly dismissed. The Respondent disputed that any complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 (as amended) had been validly referred within the applicable statutory time limits. That jurisdictional issue arose following the Complainant's attempt to pursue a complaint of unfair dismissal and was addressed during the hearing. It falls to be determined before consideration of any substantive matters.

The Complainant submitted that he commenced employment with the Respondent on 8 September 2020 as Commercial/Sales Director.

The Complainant contended that during 2023 the Respondent sought to make him redundant. He submitted that the redundancy was not genuine and that none of the appropriate redundancy procedures were followed. In particular, he maintained that he was the only employee selected for redundancy, that there was no consultation process, and that he had no disciplinary or performance issues which might otherwise explain the termination of his employment. He stated that he believed he had been singled out by the Respondent.

The Complainant stated that he received notification by email on 20 June 2023 requesting an in-person meeting as the Respondent described it as coming to the end of the notice period of his redundancy. He accepted that he received a statutory redundancy payment but contended that the amount paid was incorrect. He also submitted that he had outstanding expenses due to him.

The Complainant further submitted that there were discussions regarding the possibility of him continuing to engage with clients through his own business pursuant to a supply agreement with the Respondent. He stated that the Respondent sought to link the execution of such an agreement to his signing a discharge and waiver document. The Complainant considered this to be coercive and refused to sign the document.

The Complainant maintained that the Respondent continued to operate and expand its business following his departure and submitted that his role remained necessary to the business. He contended that the circumstances of his departure were inconsistent with a genuine redundancy situation.

The Complainant subsequently contended that he had been unfairly dismissed in addition to having been unfairly made redundant. It was submitted on the Complainant’s behalf that the WRC complaint form had been completed by him personally and without legal assistance and it was argued that the complaint should be considered by reference to the substance of the matters raised rather than the specific statutory provision selected on the complaint form.

The Respondent submitted that the Complainant's employment terminated by reason of redundancy on 30 June 2023 following a consultation process. It was contended that the redundancy was genuine and arose from the operational requirements and the financial position of the Respondent’s business.

The Respondent submitted that a meeting took place on 30 June 2023 between the Complainant and the Respondent’s CEO, at which the Complainant was provided with documentation relating to the termination of his employment. The Respondent further submitted that the Complainant received a statutory redundancy payment following the termination of his employment.

The Respondent contended that discussions took place between the parties regarding the possibility of the Complainant providing services to the Respondent through his own business pursuant to a proposed supply agreement. The Respondent submitted that those discussions commenced in the context of the redundancy process and continued after the termination of the employment relationship. It was contended that they constituted commercial negotiations between independent parties rather than any continuation of the employment relationship. While discussions took place, no agreement was ultimately concluded.

The Respondent disputed the Complainant's assertion that he remained employed after 30 June 2023 and submitted that there was no ambiguity regarding the termination of the employment relationship. The Respondent maintained that the Complainant's employment ended on 30 June 2023 and that any subsequent dealings between the parties related solely to the possibility of a future commercial arrangement.

The Respondent raised an objection to jurisdiction. It was submitted that the complaint referred to the WRC on 19 October 2023 was expressly brought under section 11A of the Protection of Employment Act 1977 and concerned an alleged failure to provide information in the context of a collective redundancy. The Respondent submitted that the circumstances of the case did not involve a collective redundancy and that the Protection of Employment Act 1977 therefore had no application.

The Respondent further submitted that the Complainant did not raise any complaint of unfair dismissal until his correspondence to the WRC dated 2 February 2024. It was contended that this constituted a new complaint rather than an amendment or clarification of the complaint originally referred. As the Complainant's employment had terminated on 30 June 2023, the Respondent submitted that any complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) was referred outside the statutory six-month time limit and that the WRC therefore lacked jurisdiction to investigate such a complaint.

In making these findings, I have considered the documentation submitted by the parties, the oral evidence adduced at the hearing summarised above and the oral and written submissions made by and on behalf of the parties at the hearing.

Application for Recusal

An application was made by Counsel on behalf of the Complainant on 22 April 2026 seeking that I recuse myself on the basis of an alleged connection with the Respondent and concerns regarding the manner in which the hearing had been conducted.

At the commencement of the first hearing date on 23 February 2024, I identified that an individual attending on behalf of the Respondent resided in the same general locality as I did. I immediately disclosed this to the parties. I advised that I had no personal, social or professional relationship with that individual and that the connection was limited to residing in relative proximity. I further confirmed that I had no knowledge of, or connection with, the Respondent company or its CEO.

The individual in question attended on behalf of the Respondent and gave evidence concerning the financial position of the Respondent company at the relevant time. He had no involvement in the Complainant’s employment, the redundancy process or the decision to terminate the Complainant’s employment.

Following that disclosure, I expressly invited the parties to consider the position. The Complainant’s legal representative took instructions from the Complainant and confirmed that there was no objection to me continuing to hear the matter. The Complainant likewise confirmed personally that he was satisfied for the matter to proceed. The Respondent similarly confirmed that there was no objection. The hearing thereafter proceeded over multiple hearing days without any application being made for my recusal.

The present application was made on the final day of the hearing, after the matter had proceeded over several hearing dates and after the Respondent’s evidence had concluded and the Complainant had given direct evidence. No new facts or circumstances were identified beyond those disclosed at the commencement of the hearing.

The applicable test is whether a reasonable person, in possession of the relevant facts, would have a reasonable apprehension that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to bear on the issues for determination. In this regard, I have had regard to the judgment of Denham J. in Bula Ltd v Tara Mines Ltd (No. 6) [2000] 4 IR 412 and the observations of the Chief Justice in Patrick Kelly v University College Dublin & Anor [2025] IESC 6 concerning the disclosure of relevant facts where an issue of recusal arises.

Having considered the application, I am satisfied that the connection identified by me is limited to the fact that a witness who attended on behalf of the Respondent resides in the same general locality as me. I have no personal, social or professional relationship with that individual and no connection whatsoever with the Respondent company or its CEO. The witness attended on behalf of the Respondent and his evidence was confined to the financial position of the Respondent company. He had no involvement in the matters giving rise to the complaint and no role in the decision-making processes challenged by the Complainant.

I have also considered the concerns raised regarding the conduct of the hearing, including interventions during questioning, evidential rulings and case management decisions. I am satisfied that any interventions were directed towards clarifying the evidence, identifying the issues in dispute and ensuring the fair and efficient conduct of the proceedings. I am further satisfied that both parties were afforded a full opportunity to present evidence, examine and cross-examine witnesses and make submissions.

In those circumstances, I am satisfied that a reasonable and informed observer, having knowledge of all of the relevant facts, would not conclude that there was any real possibility of bias or that I would fail to bring an impartial mind to bear on the determination of the issues before me.

Having considered the application, I am satisfied that full and transparent disclosure was made at the earliest opportunity, that the parties expressly agreed to the matter proceeding following that disclosure and that no new information emerged thereafter which would alter that position. Applying the objective test set out above, I am satisfied that there is no basis upon which a reasonable apprehension of bias could arise.

Accordingly, I refused the application for my recusal and proceeded to conclude the hearing of the matter.

Preliminary Issue

Before considering the substantive issues arising in this case, I must first address a preliminary issue concerning the jurisdiction of the WRC.

The complaint was referred to the WRC on 19 October 2023. On the WRC complaint form, the Complainant identified his complaint as arising under the Protection of Employment Act 1977 and selected a complaint under section 11A of that Act. He stated that “Date of Commencement: 08/09/2020”. However, he left blank the sections headed “Date of Notice received (if applicable):” and “Date Employment ended (if applicable)”. In the narrative section of the complaint form, the Complainant set out his concerns in respect of what he understood to be a proposed redundancy. He stated that his employer wished to make him redundant and that none of the appropriate redundancy processes had been observed. He asserted that he was the only employee selected for redundancy, that there had been no consultation process, and that he had been singled out by the Respondent. He further referred to issues concerning his statutory redundancy payment, outstanding expenses, a proposed discharge and waiver, and discussions regarding the possibility of continuing to provide services to the Respondent through his own business. Significantly, the Complainant concluded his narrative by stating: “As far as I am concerned I am still employed by the company.”

Having carefully reviewed the complaint form in its entirety, I find that there is no reference whatsoever to a dismissal, whether fair or unfair, nor any suggestion that the Complainant considered his employment to have terminated at the time of referral. The complaint, as framed, is exclusively directed towards the redundancy process and associated matters.

I note the decision of the High Court in County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal [2009] IEHC 370, where McGovern J. accepted that a complaint form is intended to set out, in broad outline, the nature of a complaint and that amendments may be permitted where the justice of the case requires, provided the general nature of the complaint remains the same. I also have regard to the observations of Charleton J. in Galway-Mayo Institute of Technology v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2007] IEHC 210 that a tribunal is not entitled to invoke a statutory remedy which has not been sought and in respect of which the parties are not on notice.

Applying those principles, I am satisfied that while the WRC complaint form is not a statutory form, it must nonetheless identify, at least in broad terms, the nature of the complaint being advanced so as to place the Respondent on notice of the case it is required to meet.

In this case, the complaint as referred on 19 October 2023 did not encompass a claim of dismissal. On the contrary, the Complainant expressly maintained that he remained employed. The narrative is wholly inconsistent with a claim under the Unfair Dismissals Acts 1977 (as amended).

Following the referral of the complaint, the Complainant wrote to the WRC by email dated 2 February 2024. In that correspondence he stated:

“Therefore, I would argue I have been unfairly dismissed in addition to been unfairly made redundant.”

I have considered this correspondence carefully. It is clear that this email represents the first occasion on which the Complainant articulated a claim of unfair dismissal. It is also apparent from the wording used by the Complainant that this was advanced as an additional complaint rather than as a clarification of the complaint originally referred.

In my view, this correspondence does not alter the character of the complaint as originally submitted on 19 October 2023. Nor can it operate to retrospectively introduce a complaint of unfair dismissal within the statutory time limits. Rather, it constitutes the raising of a new and distinct cause of action.

The Complainant's legal representatives subsequently sought to amend the complaint and submitted that the complaint form had been completed by the Complainant personally and without legal advice. Reliance was placed upon the decision in County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal. I have carefully considered that submission. However, I am satisfied that the circumstances of the present case are distinguishable from those considered by the High Court. This is not a case in which the Complainant sought to further particularise or refine a complaint already before the WRC. Rather, the complaint originally referred concerned matters arising from what the Complainant considered to be a flawed redundancy process and was advanced on the express basis that, in his view, he remained employed by the Respondent. The subsequent assertion that he had been unfairly dismissed introduced an entirely different cause of action requiring consideration under a separate statutory framework.

It was not until the course of the hearing that the Complainant ultimately accepted that his employment had in fact terminated on 30 June 2023. In circumstances where that is the operative date of termination, the statutory time limit for the referral of a complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) had expired by the time such a claim was first advanced on 2 February 2024. I am therefore satisfied that any complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) was referred outside the applicable statutory time limit.

I further find that the principles in County Louth VEC v Equality Tribunal do not avail the Complainant. While amendments may be permitted where the general nature of the complaint remains the same, that is not the position here. A complaint grounded in alleged deficiencies in a redundancy process, advanced at a time when the Complainant expressly asserted that he remained employed, cannot be said to encompass a claim of unfair dismissal.

In addition, I note that the statutory provision relied upon by the Complainant, namely section 11A of the Protection of Employment Act 1977, concerns collective redundancies. On the evidence before me, this was not a situation involving collective redundancies within the meaning of the Protection of Employment Act 1977. As section 11A applies in the context of collective redundancies, and as the Complainant's own case was that he was the sole employee selected for redundancy, the complaint disclosed no cause of action under the Protection of Employment Act 1977. The Complainant's own complaint form states that he was the only employee made redundant. Accordingly, I find that the complaint referred under section 11A of the Protection of Employment Act 1977 discloses no cause of action under that Act and cannot ground jurisdiction.

Having regard to all of the foregoing, I find that the complaint, as originally referred, did not include a claim of unfair dismissal. I further find that the subsequent attempt to introduce such a claim constituted a new and distinct complaint advanced outside the applicable statutory time limits. Finally, I find that the legislative provision relied upon by the Complainant does not arise on the facts of this case.

Accordingly, I find that I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into a complaint of unfair dismissal. I further find that the complaint referred under section 11A of the Protection of Employment Act 1977 discloses no cause of action under that Act and cannot ground jurisdiction. Accordingly, I have no jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint referred.

For the reasons set out above, I find that the complaint referred under section 11A of the Protection of Employment Act 1977 does not disclose a cause of action under that Act and that I do not have jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint of unfair dismissal advanced subsequently. Accordingly, the complaint is not well founded.