Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Philomena  Griffin

L'oreal (Uk) Ltd

Representatives

N/A

Sarah Dowling IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00076814-001

27/10/2025

The Complainant has been employed by the Respondent since November 2014 in a retail role associated with the Kiehl’s brand. She stated that her contract of employment is specific to a role as a Sales Consultant dealing exclusively with skincare products under that brand.

The Complainant took issue with the fact that the Respondent began referring to her as a “Beauty Advisor” and required her to sell a wider range of products, including makeup and fragrances, rather than remaining solely within the Kiehl’s skincare offering. She asserted that this amounted to a fundamental alteration of her role and that the Respondent’s assertion that no change had occurred was misleading.

The Complainant’s issues arose in the context of a restructuring process implemented by the Respondent in 2025, known as the “One Luxe” transformation. Prior to this change, the Complainant had been employed for a number of years as a Sales Consultant associated with the Kiehl’s brand, selling skincare products on a single-brand basis. She stated that her contract of employment reflects this specific role and that she had built her experience and customer base around this focused function.

The Complainant stated that, following the restructuring, the Respondent began referring to her role as that of a “Beauty Advisor” and required her to sell a broader range of products, including makeup and fragrances across multiple brands. She asserted that this represented a fundamental departure from her contractual position. In particular, she disputed the Respondent’s assertion that her role remained unchanged, stating instead that her original position was effectively removed and replaced with a materially different one. She stated that describing her role in these terms, and maintaining that no change had occurred, amounted to the provision of misleading information in respect of her employment.

The Respondent asserted that, while a business transformation did take place, the Complainant’s core contractual terms were unaffected. In this regard, the Respondent emphasised that her hours of work, rate of pay, and place of work all remained the same following the restructuring. The Respondent stated that the move to a multi-brand model was a reasonable and necessary operational development in line with evolving retail practices, and that it was entitled to implement such changes.

In response to the Complainant’s concerns regarding job title, the Respondent asserted that the terms “Sales Consultant” and “Beauty Advisor” are used interchangeably within the organisation to describe the same role. They further stated that the Complainant’s contract permits variation in duties and responsibilities, and that requiring her to sell an expanded range of products does not amount to a fundamental alteration of her employment but rather a reasonable evolution of her role.

The Respondent also highlighted the efforts they made to address the Complainant’s concerns, including engaging in correspondence, offering meetings, and ultimately reinstating her job title as “Sales Consultant” in company records. They stated that at no point did they provide inaccurate or misleading particulars of employment within the meaning of the Act.

Having carefully considered the submissions of both parties, I find that the central issue for determination is a narrow one. The Act is concerned with whether an employee has not been furnished with a written statement of terms or has been served with a statement that is false or misleading. It does not extend to determining whether changes to duties were lawful or reasonable in a broader contractual sense.

In relation to the job title, in respect of the instant case, while I accept that the Complainant placed considerable importance on being identified specifically as a Sales Consultant for a single brand, I am satisfied that the Respondent's use of the term "Beauty Advisor" was not intended to misrepresent her contractual status. The evidence indicates that both titles were used interchangeably within the organisation and that, when the issue was pressed, the Respondent reverted to the contractual title. In those circumstances, I do not find that the use of an alternative title, however unwelcome, constitutes the provision of false or misleading information within the meaning of the Act.

Turning to the question of duties, it is clear that the restructuring resulted in a material change in how the Complainant's work would be performed, specifically through the introduction of multi-brand selling. The Complainant strongly objected to this change and considers it inconsistent with the role she had carried out for many years. However, the legislation under which this complaint is brought does not prohibit such operational changes. Rather, it requires that the employee be accurately informed of the particulars of her employment.

I have also considered whether the proposed change to the Complainant's duties, involving the introduction of multi-brand selling, meant that the Respondent was obliged under Section 5 of the Act to notify her in writing of any change to the particulars specified in her statement of employment. Section 5 does not require such notification to take any particular form, still less to be effected by way of a formal amendment to the contract of employment; it is sufficient that the employee be notified of the change in writing. I am satisfied on the evidence presented that the Respondent did so, by way of correspondence with the Complainant that identified and addressed the proposed change to her role at the relevant time.

Considering all of the foregoing, I am satisfied that the Respondent did not furnish the Complainant with a statement of employment particulars that was false or misleading, and did not fail to notify her in writing of the change to her duties as required by Section 5. The Complainant has accordingly not established a contravention of Sections 3, 5, or 7 of the Act and the complaint is therefore not well founded.

I find that the complaint is not well founded for the reasons set out above.