Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Bernard  Francillette

Avoca Handweavers Ltd

Representatives

Zoe O'Sullivan IBEC

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00075796-001

27/09/2025

The Respondent alleges that the complaint is statute barred. The Complainant contests the preliminary application.

The Complainant was dismissed on 23rd January 2025. The Complainant did appeal the decision to dismiss him.  Whilst he was waiting for the appeal outcome, he resigned. That was on 13th March. He was asked to wait until the outcome of the appeal. He did not receive the outcome until 28th March. That is when he got the letter. When shown the outcome letter dated 14 March 2025, the Complainant admitted that he did get the letter on the 14th.  It was also admitted that the subject matter of the complaint lodged occurred whilst the was in employment.

The Respondent submits that this claim (CA-00075796) is out of time.

In the WRC Claim Form, the Complainant alleges that he was dismissed on 28 March 2025. The Respondent disputes this entirely. It is the Respondent’s position that the Complainant was dismissed on 23 January 2025. This is evidenced in his dismissal letter and appeal outcome letter which upheld the sanction of dismissal. The Complainant submitted his complaint to the WRC on 27 September 2025, more than 8 months after the date of dismissal. Therefore, the Adjudication Officer does not have jurisdiction to hear this complaint as the matter is out of time, and therefore statute barred.  The Complainant did appeal the dismissed and that process was concluded on the 14 March 2025. The decision to dismiss was upheld. The subject matter of the within complaint occurred during the course of his employment and therefore is statute barred now.

The Complainant was dismissed from his employment on 23 January 2025. He appealed the decision to dismiss and that process concluded on 14 March 2025. That date was initially challenged by the Complainant however following some questioning on the date he admitted that he had received the letter on dated 14 March 2025. His complaint was not filed with the WRC until 27 September 2025 outside of the six months permitted by Section 41(6) of the Act.

Section 41(8) of the 2015 Act empowers an adjudication officer to extend the initial six months limitation period by no more than a further six months, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint within the initial period 'was due to reasonable cause'.

Without prejudice to the above argument “reasonable cause” has been considered in a number of cases. In Salesforce.com v Alli Leech   the Labour Court set out in detail the legal principles to establish whether reasonable cause has been shown for an extension of time.  The Court stated “The established test for deciding if an extension should be granted for reasonable cause shown is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338 Cementation Skanska v Carroll.  Here the test was set out in the following term;

“It is the Court’s view that in considering if reasonable cause exists it is for the Claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay.  The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd.  In the context of which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the Claimant at the material time.  The Claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon.  Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the Claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability that had those circumstances had not been present,  he would have initiated the claim on time.”

In that case, and in subsequent cases in which the question arose the Court adopted an approach analogous to that taken by the superior Courts in considering whether time should be enlarged for “good reason” in judicial review proceedings pursuant to Order 84 Rule 21 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986.   That approach was held to be correct by the High Court in Minister for Finance v CPSU and others .   The test formulated in Cementation Skanska v Carroll draws heavily on the decision of the High Court in Donal O’Donnell and Catherine O’Donnell v Dunlaoghaire Corporation  .  Here Costello J (as he then was) stated as follows; “The phrase “good reasons” is one of wide import which it would be futile to attempt to define precisely.    However, in considering whether or not there are good reasons for extending the time I think it is clear that the test must be an objective one and the Court should not extend the time merely because an aggrieved Plaintiff believed that he or she were justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.  What the Plaintiff has to show (and I think the onus under Order 84 Rule 21 is on the Plaintiff) is that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.

It is clear from the authorities that the test places the onus on the Applicant on an extension of time to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay.   Secondly, the onus is on the Applicant to establish a causal link between the reason proffered for the delay and his or her failure to present the complaint in time.   Thirdly, I must be satisfied, as a matter of probability, that the complaint would have been presented in time were it not for the intervention of the factors relied upon as constituting reasonable cause.  It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified. Finally, while the established test imposes a relatively low threshold of reasonableness on an Applicant, there is some limitation on the range of issues which can be taken into account.”   In particular, as was pointed out by Costello J in the passage quoted above, a Court should not extend a statutory time limit merely because the Applicant subjectively believed that he or she was justified in delaying the institution of proceedings.

Having considered the evidence of the Complainant, I find that no reason existed within the first six months following the termination of his employment that could have prevented him from filing is complaint within time. In those circumstances I find that I do not have jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

The complaint fails.    

The complaint fails.