ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION

Adjudication Reference:  ADJ-00062304

Parties:

Complaint:

Date of Adjudication Hearing:  13/04/2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Catherine Byrne

1.          Procedure:

1.1      In accordance with section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, this complaint was assigned to me by the Director General.  I conducted a remote hearing on Monday, April 13th 2026 and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence relevant to the complaint.  The complainant, Mr Gheorghe Vasile Silvesan, represented himself and was the only witness for his case.  One week before the hearing, a business support manager from the respondent, Manning Global Limited, sent an email to the WRC and said that she would not attend.  The business support manager explained why she would not attend and I have taken account of her explanation in the conclusions I have reached below.  In the absence of any direct evidence from the respondent, I have reached a decision on this complaint based on the evidence of the complainant.

2.          Background:

2.1      The respondent has its headquarters in Munich and is a limited company with an address in Liverpool.  Its business is described on its website:

"Manning Global are one of the fastest growing staffing and Managed Services organisations operating globally. We are specialists in providing worldwide contract and permanent recruitment solutions across many industries, offering Quality Flexible Project Solutions for all your HR, Project and Consultancy needs by utilising both local and International Project specialists to offer you the best solutions for your business."

2.2      The complainant is a data centre technician and, in mid-February 2025, he was contacted on LinkedIn by a recruiter in the respondent’s company.  He agreed to be represented by the respondent for a role with Huawei Technologies (Ireland) Limited (“Huawei”).  On February 21st 2025, he did a telephone interview with a project manager from Huawei and this was followed by an in-person interview on February 24th.  On February 28th, the respondent offered the complainant a fixed-term position for one year as a data centre manager with Huawei, based in Mespil Road, Dublin 4. 

2.3      The complainant said that the recruiter informed him that he would be hired on a self-employed basis.  He said that he had a previous relationship with a company called Fenero, which provides tax and financial advice to contractors and self-employed professionals.  Fenero is in the title of seven companies on the register of the Companies Registration Office (CRO), including Fenero Managed Services Limited, Fenero Outsourcing Limited and Fenero Tempsec Limited.  The complainant entered into a contract with the respondent using a company, Skymaster Limited (“Skymaster”), which has the same registered address and shares a director with Fenero Tempsec Limited.  A filing at the CRO shows that when Skymaster submitted an annual return on September 15th 2025, the complainant was one of 11 directors of that company.  The complainant and the respondent were two components of a five-part employment relationship which may be set out in tabulated form as follows:

2.4      After the hearing on April 13th 2026, the complainant sent a book of documents to the WRC for my consideration.  Included was a copy of contract between the respondent and Skymaster.  The contract states that Skymaster,

“…supplies the services of the Personnel Individual: Mr. Gheorghe Vasile Silvesan for the full duration of this contract to completion unless otherwise specified and agreed.”

The duration of the contract was from March 3rd 2025 until March 2nd 2026.  The daily rate was €422.10 and the estimated project price for 253 “man days” was estimated to be €106,791.30 excluding VAT.  I note from the invoices included in the book of documents submitted by the complainant that no VAT was charged.  The contract states that overtime is “to be authorised by the client in written form in advance.”  Under the heading, “Project Termination,” the contract states:

“The Consultant/Supplier can terminate this agreement by giving 30 days’ notice in the written form.  Manning Global, or the Manning Global customer can terminate this agreement by giving 30 days’ notice in the written form.”

3.          Summary of Complainant’s Case:

3.1      In the opening section of the form on which he submitted his complaint to the WRC, the complainant stated:

“I was engaged as a contractor though Manning Global Ltd, subcontracted via Skymaster Ltd and paid through the umbrella company Fenero.”

3.2      On March 3rd 2025, the complainant started in the role of data centre delivery manager with Huawei.  He submitted photographs of an office which shows very basic conditions, with un-plastered walls, exposed cabling and gaps in the floor covering.  He provided a copy of a timesheet for March, dated April 3rd 2025, in which approval for 20 working days was signed off by his manager in Huawei.  He also provided an invoice, “Sky 855,” with the header, “Fenero” and “Skymaster.”  The invoice is for €8,442 for services provided for the period ending on March 31st 2025.  The complainant also submitted a “Money Tracker Payslip” dated April 3rd 2025 which appears to show that his employer is Skymaster.  The payslip shows that a management fee of €95.00 was deducted from €8,442.00 and that the complainant’s gross taxable pay for that month was €8,347.00.

3.3      During April, the complainant said that he was responsible for key operational tasks and that his working conditions were difficult.  He said that he received 1,000 emails and actioned 600 himself.  He worked from 7.00am until 6.00pm and sent daily reports after he got home.  He said that, in April, he worked for 21 standard days and the equivalent of five days of overtime.  On May 2nd, he submitted a timesheet for 26 days’ work which was approved by his manager in Huawei on May 8th.

3.4      On May 9th, due to the excessive working hours, the working environment and the amount of work to be done, the complainant gave two weeks’ notice of his intention to resign.  He provided a copy of an email from a manager in Huawei who said that he believed that the complainant was expected to give 30 days’ notice and that his last day on the project would be June 6th.  The recruiter in the respondent’s company who placed him in Huawei asked him to work three weeks’ notice but, due to what he described as “serious concerns arising from multiple breaches of our contractual agreement,” he refused, and he left on May 9th.  On May 12th, the recruiter sent an email to the complainant as follows:

“Please be advised that if you decide not to abide by the termination period as signed in the contract (30 days) you are at risk to not have previous services delivered paid, additionally damages to be quantified and charged onwards to you personally for not providing a sufficient handover of responsibilities, potentially demanding the project and other legal issues which have been realized the past week.

As a kind reminder please note that the 30 days from the date you send the contract termination shall be on June 6th, and you are expected to act in a professional manner and complete your assignment accordingly.”

3.5      In his documents, the complainant included an invoice which has Fenero and Skymaster in the header and is dated May 16th 2025. The invoice is for work done by the complainant in April 2025.  The invoice is for €10,974.60 for 26 days including five days’ overtime.  On May 19th, the respondent’s finance assistant wrote to Fenero and said that “the concerned person was a consultant and not an employee, thus there cannot be overtime.”  An invoice was requested for 21 days.

3.6      While not entirely relevant to this complaint, the complainant said that he didn’t look for payment for the work he did in Huawei between May 1st and 9th and that the reason for this was to “maintain a professional standard and to limit disruption to the client’s operations.”

3.7      The complainant said that he was informed by the respondent that, unless he dropped the overtime claim, the entire payment for April would be withheld.  On May 23rd, Fenero submitted an invoice to the respondent for 21 working days and a separate invoice for five days.  The complainant said that this was done so that he could be paid for 21 days and that any dispute over overtime could be resolved separately.  On May 29th, he was informed by an “umbrella and CX division manager” in Fenero that the invoice for the overtime would not be “payrolled” and that she had no information regarding when the invoice for the 21 days in April 2025 would be paid.  With no resolution to the issue, on August 31st 2025, the complainant submitted this complaint to the WRC.

3.8      In September 2025, the complainant contacted the umbrella and CX division manager in Fenero again and she agreed that she would submit a credit note to the respondent for the invoice for the six days’ overtime, on condition that the main invoice for 21 days would be paid.  By November, the complainant hadn’t heard back from Fenero, apart from confirmation that no payment had been received from the respondent in respect of the two April invoices.  The complainant continued to follow up with Fenero and, on December 17th, the chief financial and tax officer sent him an email saying that he had been in touch with the respondent and that he thought that a solution was possible.  However, the complainant has no information about any further communication between the respondent and Fenero, and, from his perspective, the issue wasn’t resolved.

3.9      On April 7th 2026, one week before the hearing of this complaint, the respondent’s business support manager wrote to the case officer in the WRC in response to the request to attend the remote hearing.  She wrote:

“I don't understand the request received from you and shall not be attending.  I'm not a signatory to any contract and don't understand why I have been asked to attend.  Regarding this consultant we did not have any direct agreement with him.  Please refer to the company Skymaster that is a part of Fenero Group of companies with which we have an ongoing dispute in regards to (sic) the services supplied.  Any communication should be between this consultant and his company Skymaster.”

It is apparent from this that the respondent does not consider itself to have a contract with the complainant as an employee, and their position is that their contractual relationship is with Skymaster.  As I have already noted, so that he could be assigned by the respondent to work for Huawei, the complainant became a director of Skymaster.

3.10    In support of his position that he is entitled to unpaid wages from the respondent, the complainant asked me to consider the February 2025 decision of my colleague adjudicator, Michael McEntee, in the case of Paul Lingard and Randridge International Limited (in liquidation)[1].  Mr Lingard worked with Randridge as a document controller.  He was employed as a sub-contractor through his own company, PSL (Aberdeen) Limited and he submitted invoices for his work.  His relationship with Randridge was uneventful until a dispute arose about payments and a payment was withheld.  Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Revenue Commissioners v Karshan (Midlands) Ltd t/a Domino’s Pizza[2] (“Karshan”), the adjudicator decided that, irrespective of the statements in the contract between Mr Lingard and Randridge that purport to show that he was a self-employed contractor, the working relationship was that of an employee and an employer.  On this basis, Randridge was directed to pay Mr Lingard wages of €8,500 that had been withheld.

4. Findings and Conclusions:

The Relevant Law

4.1      The respondent is engaged in sourcing and placing qualified professionals in client companies.  I am satisfied that its business activity is encompassed by the definition of “employment agency,” as set out at s.1 of the Protection of Employees (Temporary Agency Work) Act 2012: 

“employment agency” means a person (including a temporary work agency) engaged in an economic activity who employs an individual under a contract of employment by virtue of which the individual may be assigned to work for, and under the direction and supervision of, a person other than the first-mentioned person[.]

The respondent (“a person”) contracted the complainant (“an individual”) to work under the direction and supervision of Huawei (“a person other than the first mentioned person”).  The complainant’s case is that the respondent failed to pay him €10,974.60 for 26 days’ work in April 2025 which was approved by Huawei.  The respondent’s position is that they have no contract with the complainant as an employee and that his employer was Skymaster.  The complainant has brought this complaint against the respondent and not against Skymaster and my task therefore, is to consider if, by not paying him €10,974.60 for working in April 2025, the respondent is in breach of s.5(6) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (“the Act”), which provides as follows:

Where -

(a) the total amount of any wages that are paid on any occasion by an employer to an employee is less than the total amount of wages that is properly payable by him to the employee on that occasion (after making any deductions therefrom that fall to be made and are in accordance with this Act), or

(b) none of the wages that are properly payable to an employee by an employer on any occasion (after making any such deductions as aforesaid) are paid to the employee,

then, except in so far as the deficiency or non-payment is attributable to an error of computation, the amount of the deficiency or non-payment shall be treated as a deduction made by the employer from the wages of the employee on the occasion.

It is apparent from this section that the Act seeks to regulate the payment of wages by employers to employees.  The respondent’s position is that the complainant was not their employee and, to reach a conclusion on the substantive matter of the failure to pay wages, I must address that issue in the first instance. 

4.2      An “employee” is defined at s.1 of Act as,  

a person who has entered into or works under (or, where the employment has ceased, entered into or worked under) a contract of employment and references, in relation to an employer, to an employee shall be construed as references to an employee employed by that employer[.]

Consistent with this definition, to determine if the complainant was employed by the respondent, I must be satisfied that he entered into a contract of employment with them.  A contract of employment is defined at s.1 of the Act as,    

(a) a contract of service or of apprenticeship, and

(b) any other contract whereby an individual agrees with another person to do or perform personally any work or service for a third person (whether or not the third person is a party to the contract) whose status by virtue of the contract is not that of a client or customer of any profession or business undertaking carried on by the individual, and the person who is liable to pay the wages of the individual in respect of the work or service shall be deemed for the purposes of this Act to be his employer[.]

Considering subsection (b), it is apparent that the complainant (“an individual”) agreed with the respondent (“another person”), to work for Huawei (a third person).  In the contract between the respondent and Skymaster which was drawn up to regulate this agreement, Huawei is identified as the customer of the respondent.  The complainant is identified in on page 1 as a “Consultant / Supplier” and, on page 11, and as “the personnel individual” whose services are being provided by the respondent to their customer. 

4.3      A reasonable, literal interpretation of subsection (b) above properly describes the relationship between the respondent, an employment agency, and the complainant, a director of Skymaster and the individual who was placed by the respondent in Huawei.  Clearly, the complainant agreed with the respondent to work for Huawei.  However, he also agreed to carry out the work on a self-employed basis but, for the purpose of this complaint, he asserts his right to the status of an employee.  I understand from the respondent’s very brief submission, that their position is that he was not their employee and that liability for his wages rests with Skymaster. 

4.4      I am satisfied that that the complainant entered into a contract with the respondent and that he agreed to work as a data centre manager in Huawei for €422.10 per day.  His decision to manage his relationship with the respondent in the guise of a self-employed contractor complicates any clear understanding of his entitlement to wages which are properly payable by an employer to an employee.  Some further examination of his employment status is therefore required. 

The Relevance of Karshan

4.5      Most employment law practitioners agree that the October 2023 decision of the Supreme Court in Karshan ushered in a new clarity and rigour concerning the determination of the employment status of a worker.  As we know, Karshan (Midlands) Limited trades as Domino’s Pizza and the issue at the centre of that case was the relationship between what was referred to as the “overarching contract” and the contract that came into effect each time a delivery driver turned up for work.  The overarching contract provided that Karshan recognised the right of the delivery drivers to make themselves available on dates and times of their choosing and also the right of Karshan not to use their services.  The second contract came into effect when a driver turned up for work and this gave rise to an examination of the “mutuality of obligation” test, which, ultimately, Murray J held was no longer the threshold test that determined if a worker was self-employed or employed under a contract of service.  The “correct approach” he decided, was to resolve the issue by reference to five questions of which, the first four are material to the matter under consideration here.  The fifth question, whether there is anything in the legislative regime that requires a particular approach to be taken, is not relevant to the instant case.

4.6      While not unique, the circumstances in Karshan are specific to the “gig economy” where the question of whether there was mutuality of obligation between the parties was in doubt.  The judgement in Karshan is hugely important, providing as it does, a comprehensive analysis of the law on employment status in the UK and Ireland over the last 40 years.  It is my view however, that it is important not to shoehorn an analysis into Murray J’s five-step framework, and to omit certain other criteria that may point towards one form of employment over another.  I am mindful of the dicta of Edwards J in The Minister for Agriculture and Food v. Barry[3] that all the tests are potential aids for identifying the nature of the working relationship and no single test is definitive.  This must also apply to the test in Karshan. 

4.7      Considering the agreement between the complainant and the respondent, no comparison can be drawn between his circumstances and the working arrangements of the Domino’s pizza delivery drivers.  Unlike the drivers, the complainant was expected to work for a specific number of hours in a specific place for five days every week.  He earned a fixed daily rate and the respondent agreed to employ him for a fixed-term of 12 months.  While the mutuality of obligation test is no longer as critical as it was before Karshan, it is my view that it remains an important criterion for determining employment status and, in the complainant’s case, the degree of mutual obligation in his relationship with the respondent weighs more heavily in favour of him being an employee rather than an independent contractor.

The Five-step Framework

4.8      As described in Karshan, the five-step framework acts as a useful filter to arrive at a conclusive picture of the reality of the employment relationship, and it is helpful to apply the framework to the complainant’s circumstances.

4.9      (i) Does the contract involve the exchange of wages or other remuneration for work?

The complainant accepted an assignment from the respondent to work as a data centre delivery manager in Huawei for €422.10 per day.  He was identified on the contract as “the personnel individual” who would carry out this assignment.  A payslip dated April 4th 2025 shows that, in respect of an invoice issued to the respondent with the reference “SKY855” and work done in March 2025, he received €8,442 gross minus a management fee of €95.00.  His net pay after deductions for tax, PRSI and USC was €5,394.55.  Based on this transfer of pay from the respondent to the complainant, I am satisfied that he can answer “yes” to the question, does the contract involve the exchange of wages or other remuneration for work?

4.10   (ii) the Personal Service Test

The complainant agreed to provide his expertise as a data centre technician to Huawei.  He was sought out by the respondent on LinkedIn, when they had a role with a client that matched his skills and experience.  The respondent didn’t look for a company with a group of qualified data technicians, but they specifically sought out the complainant to do the work.  When he was in the job, he couldn’t provide a substitute, or bring in anyone to assist him, despite the fact that he claims that the work was excessive.  When he resigned, he was under some pressure from Huawei and from the respondent, to work out his notice of four weeks, leading to a reasonable conclusion that his personal engagement on the job was critical.  Based on these facts, I am satisfied that he meets the second limb of the framework test.

4.11   (iii) the Control Test

As he was assigned by the respondent to work in Huawei, the day to management of the complainant transferred to that company.  The respondent is an employment agency and, in the relationship between an employment agency and a worker, the control test carries less weight than a direct relationship between an employer “user” and a sub-contractor, such as was the case in Randridge to which I referred earlier.  To satisfy the respondent that he had carried out the work assigned to him, the complainant was required to produce a monthly report and to get timesheets approved.  Outside of the day-to-day performance of his work, the respondent had ultimate control over whether he was paid, how much he was paid and if he was retained after the expiry date of his contract. 

4.12    (iv) the Terms of the Contract in Light of the Factual Matrix

I am satisfied, that the complainant has met “the threshold test” as it is set out at paragraph 253 of Karshan.  Moving to the fourth limb, I must now determine,

“…whether the terms of the contract between employer and worker interpreted in the light of the admissible factual matrix and having regard to the working arrangements between the parties as disclosed by the evidence, are consistent with a contract of employment, or with some other form of contract having regard, in particular, to whether the arrangements point to the putative employee working for themselves or for the putative employer.”

Murray J’s rationale for his inclusion of the fourth limb in the framework test is provided at paragraph 238 and 239 of his judgement where he re-framed what was the third stage of the control test in the UK case of Ready Mixed Concrete (Southeast) Limited v Minister for Pensions and National Insurance[4] (RMC):

“238.  This formulation seeks to make four matters clear, having regard to the case law in this jurisdiction since RMC.  First, while RMC looked to ‘the provisions of the contract’, the decision in Castleisland[5] establishes that the contract itself must be interpreted (as, today, with all contracts) in the light of the factual matrix in which it was concluded.  There is nothing new in that regard in Irish law, but insofar as the RMC test does not make this clear, it should be expressly stated.

239. Second, both Henry Denny[6] and Castleisland demand that in conducting that inquiry, the court must take into account the actual dealings between the parties. Keane J. thus referred in the first of these cases to the relevance of ‘the manner in which the work was done’, Murphy J. to ‘the facts or realities of the situation on the ground’ and (in Castleisland) Geoghegan J. stressed that the Appeals Officer whose decision was in issue in that case, was bound to examine ‘what the real arrangement on a day to day basis between the parties was.’”

Murray J went on to remark that these statements mean that where an agreement seeks to characterise the relationship between or the status of the parties, that description “does not fetter the function of the court” in determining, as a matter of law, what the agreement actually is.

4.13    Setting the parameters to the function of the court, at paragraph 241 of his judgement, Murray J stated,

“The issue of whether the court can disregard provisions of a detailed written contract of employment that define the legal rights and obligations of the parties (as distinct from purporting to describe the legal consequences of those rights and obligations) where those provisions are inconsistent with the manner in which the parties have conducted themselves, raises more complex questions.”

Acknowledging that, in Autoclenz Limited v Belcher[7], the UK Supreme Court held that it could disregard the provisions of a contract that define the legal obligations of the parties if the provisions are inconsistent with how the working relationship was conducted, Murray J held that this was not the law in Ireland.  Explaining his rationale, he continued at paragraph 241:

“This court has never adopted this position, and neither Henry Denny nor Castleisland should be understood as having so decided.  In neither of those cases was it expressly decided that the substantive terms of the parties’ written agreement (as distinct from the conclusions of law they sought to include in their contract) could be over-ridden simply because they were contradicted by the parties’ conduct.”

4.14    It is apparent to me that the point being made here is that a decision-maker may not unravel the substantive terms of a contract of employment, but, that they may examine the “facts or realities of the situation on the ground” and “the manner in which the work was done” and they may reach a conclusion that the legal provisions on which the contract is based are not sound.

4.15    Clearly, Murray J intended the decision-maker to consider on the one hand, the terms of the contract, and to examine those terms “in the light” of the working arrangements.  It seems to me that there is an acceptance in this statement that the terms of an employee’s contract may not be reflected in the reality of the working relationship.  My role as the adjudicator therefore is to consider if the complainant’s contract, interpreted in light of the “factual matrix,” and the reality of the working relationship between him and the respondent, is consistent with a contract of employment or that of an independent consultant. 

4.16    It is apparent that the contract agreed between the respondent and the complainant in February 2025 was intended to formalise a commercial agreement between “Manning Global” and “Skymaster Limited.”  Under the heading, “Consultant’s Obligations” at page 8, the contact states:

“The Consultant hereby provides assurances that he/she does not exclusively work for one client, but that there are other work agreements with other clients to a comparable extent and/or he/she also employs employees subject to an insurance obligation.”

Clearly, this is not the reality of the situation, because the complainant worked exclusively for Huawei and he had no employees working for him.  His evidence is that there was so much work to do that he had to submit reports when went home in the evenings.   

4.17    In the schedule on page 11 of the contract, it is stated that,

“The above Company (Skymaster Limited) supplies the services of the Personnel Individual: Mr. Gheorghe Vasile Silvesan for the full duration of this contract to completion unless otherwise specified and agreed.”

The reality of the complainant’s working relationship is that he was exclusively assigned to Huawei, he didn’t work for anyone else and he couldn’t substitute any other person to work in his place.  I am not satisfied that the day-to-day reality of his working relationship with the respondent was consistent with how he was described in his contract as a “Consultant / Supplier.”  I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons:

• (i) The complainant was identified by the respondent on LinkedIn as the person who was suitable for a role as a data centre delivery manager with their client, Huawei. The respondent did not contact Skymaster Limited seeking a suitable technician, but they identified and selected the complainant as that suitable technician.  This is not typical of a relationship between a company and a supplier, where the “supplier” may send a suitably qualified and unnamed person or persons to do the work for the client.
• (ii) For the duration of the 10 weeks of his employment, the complainant did the work personally 100% of the time. In this regard, his attendance in the workplace was similar to directly employed staff.
• (iii) The complainant attended work in the premises of Huawei. There is an error in the contract where the location of the work is stated to be Dundalk, but this is not material to the issue of location.  The complainant went to work every day in Huawei’s premises in Mespil Road, Dublin 4.  He used Huawei’s facilities and laptop and he provided no equipment of his own.  He had no discretion regarding the level of his attendance, even complaining that the hours were excessive.
• (iv) The complainant’s email contains the Huawei logo and describes him as the “Data Centre Delivery Manager. In this regard, he reported to a senior manager in Huawei.    
• (v) The complainant was paid a fixed daily rate of pay and was not in a position to introduce efficiencies or innovations or to make changes to his way of working so that he could increase his earnings.

4.18    The Code of Practice on Determining Employment Status was developed by the Department of Social Protection and updated in October 2024 in the wake of Karshan by an interdepartmental group comprising the Department of Social Protection, the Revenue Commissioners and the WRC.  The Code provides guidance on the applicability of the five steps of the Karshan framework to individual circumstances.  Under the heading, “All the Circumstances of the Engagement,” at clause 5.4, the Code states:

“While a detailed written agreement may carry significant weight, efforts to describe a relationship in a particular way which differs from the day-to-day reality, in order to circumvent or frustrate the operation of statutory provisions, will be challenged.  Additionally, terms of a written contract, which seek to describe the legal consequences of rights and obligations or conclusions of law, rather than defining the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract, may be disregarded.  Phrases such as ‘as a self-employed contractor you will be responsible for your own tax’ will carry little weight.”

I am satisfied that the complainant’s circumstances meet all the elements of the first four of the framework tests in Karshan.  As he did not work in a regulated sector, there is no requirement to examine the application of the fifth step.  It is my view that the reality of the complainant’s relationship with the respondent is that of an employee and an employment agency and, in this regard, his contract is consistent with the definition of “any other contract” which is described at subsection (b) under the heading “contract of employment” at s.1 of the Payment of Wages Act.

The Relevance of Ryanair v Reddy

4.19    Aside from the guidance provided by Karshan, a proper examination of the complainant’s case would be incomplete without some reference to the November 2024 judgement of the High Court in Ryanair DAC v Aidan Reddy (in his capacity as Appeals Officer), the Chief Appeals Officer and the Minister for Social Protection[8] (“Ryanair v Reddy”).  The background to that case is as follows:

In October 2009, when he passed the Ryanair cadet assessment, Mr Paul Clements was contacted by Brookfield Aviation International Limited (“Brookfield”) and offered a contract to commence a type-rating course for a specific aircraft.  The homepage of Brookfield’s website describes that company’s business:

“Brookfield Aviation International is your global aviation recruitment specialist. We provide recruitment solutions for pilots, licensed and unlicensed aircraft engineers, cabin crew, and aviation professionals across short-term and long-term contracts as well as permanent roles worldwide.”

In August 2010, Mr Clements commenced as a first officer with Ryanair.  Until his last day at work on May 1st 2014, Brookfield was invoiced for his work by Redsberry Management Services Limited (“Redsberry”) to whom payroll and tax advice was provided by CXC Global.  For Revenue purposes, Mr Clements was declared to be an owner-director in Redsberry and paid by way of a director’s emolument.  He paid PRSI contributions as a self-employed person at Class S.  In April 2014, Mr Clements sought a determination from the Scope section of the Department of Social Protection concerning his PRSI status.  In August 2015, a deciding officer held that he had been in insurable employment with Redsberry and that, for PRSI purposes, he was a Class A contributor.  However, more than seven years later, in July 2021, following a circuitous route including oral hearings before a Social Welfare Appeals Officer and judicial review proceedings on the part of Redsberry and Ryanair, the Appeals Officer, Mr Aidan Reddy, determined that Mr Clements was insurable at Class A as an employee of Ryanair.  Ryanair challenged that finding and, upholding the appeal, “having regard to the guidance and approach set out in the judgement of the Supreme Court in Karshan,” Mr Justice Bradley held that the five steps of the framework test had not been met. 

4.20    A simple table illustrates the five-component similarity between the complainant’s employment situation and that of Mr Clements:

The complainant was assigned to work in Huawei by the respondent.  The respondent was invoiced for his work by Skymaster, to whom payroll and tax advice was provided by Fenero.  One significant difference between the two cases is that, while the Department of Social Protection argued that Ryanair was Mr Clements’ employer; the complainant is not asserting that Huawei was his employer, but that, for the purpose of this complaint, the respondent is his employer.

4.21    At paragraph 70 of Ryanair v Reddy, Bradley J sets out the reasons for his finding that Mr Clements was not an employee of Ryanair: 

• (i) He rejected the status and weight given to the new evidence and facts considered by the Appeals Officer in July 2021;
• (ii) He found that Brookfield did not act in an “agency capacity” for Ryanair;
• (iii) He rejected the Appeals Officer’s finding that there was an implied contract between Ryanair and Mr Clements;
• (iv) He was critical of the Appeals Officer’s failure to have regard to the regulatory context and the consequences of Mr Clements operating Ryanair’s scheduled flights.

4.21    Regarding the first point, the new evidence considered by the Chief Appeals Officer, this has no relevance to the complainant’s case as it was concerned with the representatives of Redsberry not being aware of the August 2014 decision of the Scope section that Mr Clements was insurable at Class A PRSI.

4.23    Considering the second point, Bradley J concluded that Brookfield did not act in an agency capacity for Ryanair, although he found that Brookfield “supplied a pool of pilots to Ryanair…”  This is a conclusion with which I respectfully disagree, and which is inconsistent with Brookfield’s description of its business on its website. 

4.24    Considering the finding that Mr Clements did not have an implied contract with Ryanair (as asserted by the Social Welfare Appeals Officer), it is important to note that the complainant is not asserting that he had any kind of a contract with Huawei.  He claims that his contract was with the respondent.  I agree with him on this point and I am satisfied that his relationship with the respondent meets the definition of “any other contract” as described under the heading “contract of employment at s.1 of the Act.

4.25    Finally, Bradley J placed considerable emphasis on the regulatory regime in which the airline industry and Mr Clements operated.  This is not relevant to the complainant’s situation, as he was employed in the IT industry, which, although governed by certain regulations and employment law, is not governed by an overarching regulator similar to the Irish or European aviation authorities. 

4.26    With deference to the decision in Ryanair v Reddy, while I accept that there are technical similarities in the employment relationship of Mr Clements and Ryanair and the complainant and Huawei, the differences between them are so significant that they lead me to a contrary conclusion.  The complainant asserts that his relationship is with the respondent, an employment agency, and not the agency’s client.  Bradley J placed a considerable emphasis on the regulatory regime in which the airline industry operates and the role of Brookfield in that regime.  No such similarity can be drawn in the complainant’s field of expertise. 

5       Claim under the Payment of Wages Act 1991:

5.1      Based on the timesheet that he sent to the WRC after the hearing of this complaint, I am satisfied that a manager in Huawei agreed that the complainant worked for 21 days in April 2025 and that he did overtime equivalent to five days.  The complainant’s contract provides that his rate of pay was €422.10 per day.  He claims therefore, that he is entitled to unpaid wages of €10,974.60.

5.2      In an email to the complainant shortly after his resignation on May 9th 2025, the business manager wrote as follows:

“Please be advised that if you decide not to abide by the termination period as signed in the contract (30 days) you are at risk to not have previous services delivered paid…”,

It is apparent from this that the decision not to pay the complainant his wages for April 2025 was because he refused to work a notice period of four weeks.  When she wrote to the WRC on April 7th 2026, the business manager did not state that payment for “services delivered” was withheld by Huawei.

5.3      Leaving aside the unprofessional conduct of the complainant, there is no provision in law to deduct wages from an employee who refuses to work their notice.  The contract between the respondent and Skymaster allows for the provision of the service to Huawei by any director of Skymaster, and the insistence on the complainant working out the four weeks’ notice further underlines the relationship between him and the respondent as an employee.

5.4      Based on the evidence presented to me, I have concluded that wages of €10,974.60 which were properly payable were not paid to the complainant.  I am satisfied therefore that the respondent has failed to comply with s.5(6) of the Act and that the failure to pay the wages amounts to an illegal deduction.

6       Decision:

6.1      Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.

6.2      I decide that this complaint is well founded.  In respect of redress, in accordance with section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 (as amended), I am required to direct the respondent to pay compensation as a net amount.  I note from the payslip that deductions for PAYE, PRSI and USC amount to 35% of the complainant’s gross pay.  Therefore, in respect of unpaid wages, I direct the respondent to pay the complainant compensation of €7,134.00.

Dated:   24th July 2026

Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer:  Catherine Byrne

Key Words:  Status of employment, dispute concerning wages, failure to pay final wages

[1] Paul Lingard and Randridge International Limited (in liquidation), ADJ-00053934

[2] The Revenue Commissioners v Karshan (Midlands) Ltd t/a Domino’s Pizza, [2023] IESC 24

[3] The Minister for Agriculture and Food v. Barry and others, [2008] IEHC 216, [2009] 1 IR 215

[4] Ready Mixed Concrete (Southeast) Limited v Minister for Pensions and National Insurance, [1968] 2QB 497

[5] Castleisland Cattle Breeding Society Limited v the Minister for Social Welfare, [2004] IESC 40, [2004] 4 IR 150

[6] Henry Denny & Sons v Minister for Social Welfare

[7]  Autoclez Limited v Belcher, [2011] UKSC 41

[8] Ryanair DAC v Reddy & Others, [2024] IEHC 719