Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Ms Lorraine Gunenry

Repromed Holdings Limited T/A Reproscan

Representatives

Ms Siobhan Kinsella MBA

Mr Stephen Hanaphy BL instructed by Ms Orla Veale Martin Kennedys Solicitors LLP

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00075489-001

17/09/2025

This matter came before the Workplace Relations Commission dated 17/09/2025 as a complaint submitted under section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 (Constructive Dismissal).  The aforesaid complaint was referred to me for investigation.  A hearing for that purpose was scheduled to take place on 10/06/2026. 

The Complainant at all material times was employed as a receptionist.  The Complainant was paid €384.46 gross weekly for which she worked 21 hours.  The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 01/09/2015 and resigned from her employment on 11/09/2025. 

The Complainant claims constructive dismissal.

The Respondent disputes the claim in its entirety.

Both parties provided written submissions and supporting documentation in advance of hearing. 

CA-00075489-001

Overview of Complainant written submission

The salient facts giving rise to this complaint, which the Complainant will prove in evidence, are set out below. For ease of reference, they are presented in chronological order.

(a) Length and quality of service (2015 — 2024) The Complainant commenced employment with the Respondent on 1 September 2015. She gave loyal, dedicated and unblemished service to the Respondent for almost ten years. At no point during that decade had she ever been the subject of any disciplinary process, performance management procedure or warning of any kind. The Complainant will give evidence that her record was exemplary.

b) The 2024 bullying complaint and its mishandling.  In or about 2024, the Complainant was subjected to bullying behaviour in the workplace. She duly reported that conduct to her then-Manager, [redacted], who escalated the complaint to the Respondent’s Human Resources function. Notwithstanding the seriousness of the complaint and the obligations imposed upon the Respondent by the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 and by the Code of Practice for Employers and Employees on the Prevention and Resolution of Bullying at Work (S.I. No. 674 of 2020), the Respondent took no action and conducted no investigation. The Respondent’s inaction caused the Complainant to develop significant work-related stress, anxiety and psychological injury, in consequence of which she was obliged to obtain medical attention and to undergo a course of counselling exceeding ten weeks in duration. Medical evidence will be adduced at hearing. Following her return to work, the Complainant was transferred to a different role. Despite the Complainant’s repeated requests, the Respondent failed to furnish her with any job description for the new role, and provided no training whatsoever in respect of the duties of that role.

The unannounced meeting of 19 May 2025

On 19 May 2025, in circumstances which were wholly unprecedented in the Complainant’s ten years of service, she was summoned without notice to a meeting with a [redacted] who had travelled to the Complainant’s place of work for that purpose. The Complainant was given no advance notice that any meeting was to take place; no notice of any allegation or matter of concern; no opportunity to prepare any response; no opportunity to be accompanied by a witness, colleague or representative; and no copy of any procedural document by reference to which the meeting was being convened.

In the course of that meeting, [redacted] further raised the prospect of requiring the Complainant to return to work with the very individual who had bullied her in 2024 — that being the individual whose conduct had previously caused the Complainant to require ten weeks of medical and counselling treatment. The Complainant will give evidence that this prospect was raised by [redacted] in a manner calculated to intimidate.

Of particular significance, and as the Complainant will testify, at the conclusion of the meeting [redacted] candidly admitted to the Complainant that she had not wished to convene the meeting and had been instructed to do so, and to issue the subsequent letter, by the Respondent’s Human Resources function. That admission is highly material to the Complainant’s case that the meeting was an orchestrated and deliberate act of intimidation.

The “Letter of Concern” of 20 May 2025

On the day following the meeting, the Respondent issued a written “Letter of Concern” to the Complainant. The allegations contained therein were, on any objective view, spurious and trivial. The letter purported to advise the Complainant that it was being issued outside the disciplinary process. However, the Complainant had never been furnished with the Respondent’s disciplinary procedure (notwithstanding her ten years of service); she was not furnished with that procedure when the letter issued; and she was not furnished with that procedure at any time prior to her resignation, notwithstanding requests.

The “Letter of Concern” bore all of the indicia of a quasi-disciplinary sanction notwithstanding the Respondent’s self-serving characterisation of it. It was placed on the Complainant’s record, it referred to alleged shortcomings in her conduct, and it required her future improvement. By any objective and reasonable construction, it was a disciplinary measure imposed in the absence of any process, fair or otherwise.

On 16 July 2025, the Complainant submitted a formal written grievance setting out her objections to both the substance and the process of the “Letter of Concern”, and re raising her concerns regarding the un-investigated 2024 bullying complaint and the prospect of being required to work again with the alleged perpetrator.

Thereafter, the Complainant engaged in protracted written correspondence with the Respondent in an effort to obtain a substantive and satisfactory response. None was ever forthcoming. The Respondent’s HR function failed and refused to engage with the substance of the issues raised.

Conscious that material adverse decisions had been taken in respect of her employment without her input or knowledge, the Complainant exercised her statutory entitlement under Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (the General Data Protection Regulation) and Section 91 of the Data Protection Act 2018 to a copy of her personal data.  The disclosure made by the Respondent in purported compliance with that request was materially deficient. Information which ought, on any reasonable analysis, to have been within the personal data held by the Respondent (including in particular the internal communications between [redacted] and the HR function evidencing the instruction referred to above) was not disclosed. This omission is itself capable of giving rise to a separate complaint under the data protection legislation and is referred to here as further evidence of the absence of trust and confidence which made the continuation of the employment intolerable.

Resignation on 11 September 2025.  Having exhausted all reasonable internal avenues over a period of nearly four months following the “Letter of Concern”, and having received no substantive engagement from the Respondent in respect of either the bullying issue or the procedural defects of the 19 May 2025 meeting, the Complainant concluded — entirely reasonably — that she had no trust and no confidence in her employer, that her position had become untenable, and that her psychological welfare was being placed at continuing risk.  She accordingly tendered her resignation on 11 September 2025. The resignation was, in all the circumstances, the only course of action reasonably open to her.

The implied term of mutual trust and confidence — sometimes referred to as the Malik term, after the seminal decision of the House of Lords in Malik v BCCI [1998] A.C. 20 — has been described in the most authoritative terms by Finnegan J. in Berber (above). That implied term is a fundamental term of the contract of employment. The conduct alleged must be such that, viewed objectively, it was calculated or likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence: Malik; Berber. The issuing a written “Letter of Concern” the day following that meeting, founded upon allegations which were spurious and trivial; purporting to characterise the “Letter of Concern” as outside the disciplinary process while continuing to deny the Complainant a copy of any disciplinary process despite ten years of service and a request therefor; threatening to require the Complainant to work again with the perpetrator of bullying conduct previously reported by her; failing to investigate the prior bullying complaint at all, in breach of its statutory and contractual duties; transferring the Complainant to a new role without any job description or training; failing to provide any substantive response to the Complainant’s grievance of 16 July 2025; responding incompletely and inadequately to the Complainant’s Data Subject Access Request, withholding material plainly within scope; instructing the line manager [redacted]  to engage in conduct against her own better judgement — as candidly admitted by her to the Complainant — thereby revealing a deliberate corporate strategy of intimidation. The Respondent has shown no reasonable or proper cause for any of that conduct. The relationship of trust and confidence was thereby not merely damaged but destroyed.

The factors which, it is submitted, render the Complainant’s resignation entirely reasonable in the present case are these: she had given ten years of unblemished service; she had been subjected, without warning, to a quasi-disciplinary meeting in breach of every applicable procedural norm; the allegations made against her in the so-called “Letter of Concern” were spurious and trivial; she had been threatened with being made to work alongside the very person whose conduct had previously rendered her unwell; her bullying complaint of the previous year had been ignored without investigation; her grievance of 16 July 2025 had been met with silence and obfuscation; she had been transferred to a role for which she had been given no description and no training, and her requests for both had been ignored; and the manager who delivered the disciplinary meeting candidly admitted to her that she had been instructed by HR to engage in this conduct against her will — confirming the Complainant’s belief that she had been the subject of a coordinated attempt at intimidation.

It is respectfully submitted that no reasonable employee in the Complainant’s position could be expected to tolerate that catalogue of conduct, and her resignation was therefore a reasonable response within the meaning of the second limb of the Western Excavating test as applied in Berber.

Law relied upon by Complainant

Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 (as amended) section 1; section 6(1); section 7

The Industrial Relations Act 1990 (Code of Practice on Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures) (Declaration) Order 2000 (S.I. No. 146 of 2000)

Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005

The Code of Practice on Bullying (S.I. No. 674 of 2020)

 Western Excavating (ECC) Limited v Sharp [1978] I.C.R. 221, [1978] I.R.L.R. 27

Berber v Dunnes Stores [2009] IESC 10, [2009] E.L.R. 61

Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) [1998] A.C. 20;

Glover v BLN Limited [1973] I.R. 388

W.A. Goold (Pearmak) Ltd v McConnell [1995] I.R.L.R. 516.

Allen v Independent Newspapers (Ireland) Limited [2002] E.L.R. 84,

McCormack v Dunnes Stores UD 1421/2008

In re Haughey [1971] I.R. 217

Ruffley v Board of Management of St. Anne’s School [2017] IESC 33

Reid v Oracle EMEA Limited UD 1350/2014

Lewis v Motorworld Garages Limited [1986] I.C.R. 157

Omilaju v Waltham Forest London Borough Council [2005] I.R.L.R. 35, [2004] EWCA Civ 1493

Conway v Ulster Bank Limited UD 474/1981; Travers v MBNA Ireland Limited UD 720/2006

Murray v Rockabill Shellfish Limited [2012] 23 E.L.R. 331.

Summary of direct evidence of Complainant on oath

The Complainant commenced employment in 2015 – it would have been the Complainant and a Technician – whatever hours she (the Technician) worked the Complainant worked.  She worked as needed between 20 and 35 hours per week and as she lived close by she did what was needed.  No performance issues raised.  She loved the work; enjoyed the people and for her it was very special.  She worked with several Technicians and did lots of work with one in particular.  There were lots of complaints from patients about her (the Technician) disappointed with how they were treated.  They always said they were very happy with the receptionist.

The Complainant submits the last place she wants to be is in here today.  This particular Technician about whom complaints were made was always late; jabs were coming at her personally; she was out all night in nightclubs; she was always questioning her (the Complainant) like what would she do if her husband had an affair and she was saying she needed fish – the Complainant submits her husband is in the fish business.  This particular Technician showed at her husband’s mother’s wake.  The Complainant submits she could write a book on this sh*t.

The Complainant submits she had to go on medication and she is still undergoing counselling.  She wasn’t able to go back to work when she found she would be working with her again after being told she (the Technician) had been fired in 2024.  She had been assured by [redacted] that she would never be in the same room as her again.  The Complainant submits her line manager [redacted] at that time was as upset about all of this as she was and when she accepted new job she was told by her then line manager that she would never have to be in a room with that woman again.  

Meeting 19th May

The new manager walked in with one of the Technicians and the Complainant thought she was going to tell her the job was moving; she had no idea of what was coming.  The new manager said they needed to have a chat; there are a couple of problems.  The Complainant submits she had mixed up two scans; more than 10 times she had asked for training.  She submits she was thinking what’s all this about – what’s going on here.  Her manager said she had taken a lot of time off and that she knew she was a job sharer and she would be covering for [redacted] but she works with [redacted] (colleague against whom the Complainant had made a complaint) who is back. 

The Complainant submits she will not be in a room with her again and they (the Respondent) want her gone.  The Complainant nearly got sick knowing what went on.  There was no place for her anymore and she packed up all her stuff.  Her line manager told her she was very sorry she had to do that but HR told her to.  They said she was uncooperative; but she couldn’t work with somebody unsafe around her and unsafe around women.  She gave the job ten years of her life and they said she was uncooperative because she wouldn’t work with the person who bullied her.  They said she left at 20 to 4 on the shift to 4 but she had to go to collect her son. 

Complainant reads into evidence a letter she sent to the Respondent on 16th June; there was no response to the letter.

The Complainant submits there was no choice but to resign.

It was like she had never worked in the place.

She is not fit for work now; she is still working on herself; this has changed her as a person; she doesn’t trust anybody now; there has been a financial impact.

Summary of cross-examination of Complainant

Clarification is sought in regard to para 13 of the written submission under the heading Mitigation of Loss.  It is clarified that this is an error as the Complainant has averred that she is not fit for work. 

There is clarification sought regarding the schedule of documents which makes reference to an alleged grievance dated 16 July (should be 16 June) which is clarified.

Complainant accepts her role as receptionist encompasses the following – make bookings; answer phones; meet and greet; make coffees for people (sometimes); and deal with customers.

[Redacted] would do a clinic she was a Technician and midwives would do the Saturdays and she (the Complainant) went off the bookings on the system.  It became busier as time went by and she hired a girl to be available for cover in 2019. 

It is put to the Complainant that she has said that the Technician involved herself in her (the Complainant’s) personal life to which she responds she had gone to her mother’s funeral.  It is put to the Complainant her manager was aware of the issue and of the triangle between the Complainant, her husband and the colleague against whom she had made allegations.  The Complainant responds why would she turn up at her mother in laws wake.  The Complainant is asked if she was concerned her colleague was encroaching on her relationship with her husband to which she replies yes but she was more concerned about patients.

It is put to the Complainant that she had verbally made a complaint and that she had told her employer she didn’t wish to take it any further and that she had made it very clear to her employer she did not want to escalate to which the Complainant replies that she was told she (colleague) had been sacked and she agreed to put the business ahead of herself and she believed the company would put her first.

It is put to the Complainant that she had never been told her colleague had been sacked. It is put to the Complainant that her letter of 16 June does not contain the word grievance.  The Complainant responds she had to be taken home by her husband after the meeting; she was in an awful state.  It is put to the Complainant that her employer had acted reasonably and tried to keep them (the Complainant and the Technician) separate. 

Email threads between the parties are read into evidence by the Respondent representative together with correspondence of 10 September where the Complainant makes reference to the psychological contract between her and the Respondent being completely broken and is asked to explain what is meant by this.   The Complainant in response submits she reported somebody and she was told that person was sacked in 2024 and then she finds she couldn’t be sacked after being told she would never have to be in a room with her again. 

The Respondent representative reads into evidence email from the Respondent of 11 September 2025 inviting the Complainant to reconsider her decision to resign and inviting her to make use of the Company’s grievance process; if the Complainant is open to it there is an offer to arrange a meeting at a time convenient to the Complainant to discuss her concerns and explore possible solutions together. 

It is put to the Complainant that her letter to the Respondent of 18 September is the first time the word ‘grievance’ has been used by her.  It is put to the Complainant that her allegation that the Respondent’s attitude was reductionist as set out in her email of 04 July 2025 is an unfair allegation in circumstances where she did not give the Respondent the opportunity to provide her with the material she had requested. 

It is put to the Complainant that her of 18  September where she sets out as follows: “asking me to raise a separate grievance to what I have been trying to resolve with you all summer is an insult to any right minded person evaluating this situation” is a most disingenuous allegation in the context of the 4 sick leave certs submitted by the Complainant 23 September – 20 October; 18 June – 15 July; 16 July – 12 August; and 13 August to 09 September.  It is put to the Complainant that her written word suggests she is telling porkies. 

The Complainant submits after her DAR she received information belonging to two different people.  It is put to the Complainant that she has displayed less than ordinary robustness and Ruffley is cited.  It is put to the Complainant that she left work after an informal meeting was conducted; matters discussed which were accepted by her and yet she expressed shock in her letter of 16 June which is put to her is feigned shock – artificial shock to which the Complainant responds she asked for a job description constantly and never got it – reported several times to be trained. 

Complainant submits this was never put in writing.  The Complainant is asked to indicate where in the letter she received after the meeting on 19 May does it say she was uncooperative as the Complainant maintained in direct evidence that the letter said she was uncooperative. 

The Complainant submits she is reliving every bit of this now and she might be getting her words wrong. 

The Complainant is asked if she understands that an employer is entitled to ask questions if she was there in work when they are paying her to be there.    It is put to the Complainant that she declined all offers for coffee etc with the help of her representative and she had raised a complaint against a woman where there was an unusual nature to the relationship.  It is put to the Complainant that she made the decision to leave and pulled the trigger too early. 

Complainant responds there was no trust in her employer any longer.  It is put to the Complainant that voluminous documentation had been sent to her and she didn’t give the employer sufficient time to access the information. 

Closing submission Complainant

After 10 years with the company the Complainant was ambushed, labelled and ignored.  She resigned because her employer made it impossible for her to stay.  She has satisfied both tests in the Berber case.  Its no longer in dispute she reported in 2024 she was being bullied.  Nothing was done.  She needed 10 weeks of counselling.  She was given a new role with no job description and no training. 

She was called into a meeting; there was no procedure; told she might be sent back to work with the bully-er; never once shown the disciplinary procedure and her manager told her she’d been instructed to hold the meeting.  Records were not produced and no explanation was provided.  The trust between them was destroyed and the relationship was dismantled.  What would any reasonable person do? 

She reached the point of saying enough long after most people would.  Taken together this is all overwhelming – this is not just one bad day.  There is loss coming from the illness this employer caused – requests a finding that the Complainant was unfairly dismissed and compensate accordingly. 

CA-00075489-001

Overview of Respondent written submission

These submissions have been prepared on behalf of the Respondent in response to a complaint received by the WRC on the 17 of September 2025. The Complainant seeks compensation arising from her alleged constructive dismissal.

It will be submitted herein that the complaint is simply misconceived and without merit.

By way of preliminary observation, it will be noted that, in her WRC complaint form, the Complainant indicated that she would not have representation for the purpose of her WRC hearing. That is her prerogative. It is also her prerogative to change her mind in that regard, and the Respondent notes that the Complainant is now to be represented at hearing by Siobhan Kinsella MBA.  Under cover of her open email dated the 15 of May 2026 Ms. Kinsella MBA provided the Respondent with written submissions on behalf of the Complainant, and stated in said email, inter alia, that she would be inviting members of the media to attend the hearing. The Respondent, of course, accepts the possibility that members of the media may attend the hearing, particularly in circumstances where there seem to be no grounds on which to conduct the hearing otherwise than in public.

More importantly, however, and for reasons that will be elaborated upon below, the Respondent notes the following by way of further preliminary observation. The written submissions prepared by the Complainant, or on her behalf by Ms. Kinsella MBA (it is unclear which is the case), are indeed extremely sophisticated, but omit certain facts of which the WRC ought to be apprised in the instant matter. Principally, the written submissions of the Complainant, which are to a considerable extent concerned with her complaint of bullying in 2024 and its alleged mishandling by the Respondent, omit entirely the fact that the Complainant herself asked the Respondent to take no further steps in the investigation of that complaint after she had made it.

Insofar as she states at para 3.4 of her submissions that “the Respondent took no action and conducted no investigation”, that is a total and totally unfair misrepresentation.

The Complainant’s complaint of constructive dismissal should be viewed – and, it is submitted, dismissed – against that background.

The central proposition advanced on behalf of the Respondent is a simple one. The Complainant did not leave her employment because the Respondent had made continued employment impossible. She chose to resign at a time when a number of reasonable and obvious alternatives remained open to her, including further engagement with HR, a return to work meeting, the formal grievance process, EAP support, and occupational health support. The Respondent submits that the Complainant’s decision to resign did not result from either a repudiatory breach of her contract of employment or such unreasonable behaviour by the Respondent that she was justified in believing that she could not continue any longer in that employment.

The Complainant’s submissions set out the background to her employment.  The Respondent accepts the facts set out therein, save to submit that, insofar as the Complainant states at section 2.3 that she “tendered her resignation by reason of the Respondent’s conduct”, this is another misrepresentation of the matter by the Complainant, and will be shown to be such.

It is of some significance, also, that only a few months before the matters now complained of, the Respondent wrote to the Complainant stating its decision to increase her hourly rate to €17 and expressly stated that the increase reflected its appreciation of her contributions, dedication, and performance.

Indeed, this is yet another important fact that does not appear in the written submissions of the Complainant and is one that ought to be taken into account when the WRC considers the claim of constructive dismissal, and particularly the Complainant’s fanciful suggestion that she was intimidated into leaving her role.

By way of factual background also, and as indicated above, while the Respondent acknowledges that the Complainant did raise with her line manager a complaint of bullying in 2024, and while this complaint was referred to HR, the Complainant herself expressly asked that HR not investigate the complaint. Oral evidence will be given to this effect on the Respondent’s behalf at hearing.

The letter of concern and subsequent events:

In May 2025, concerns arose when a patient complained to the Respondent that its Swords office could not be contacted on a Friday afternoon, a time during which the Complainant was scheduled to be at work at that office. The patient in question expressed dissatisfaction and was given a refund in the circumstances. The Complainant has framed this as “trivial”. The Respondent’s position is that the patient complaint was not trivial as fertility treatment is time sensitive and a delay may impact their whole treatment. The Claimant was not available to provide the patient with her diagnostic results needed to attend her fertility treatment appointment. A copy of the Complainant’s job description is appended hereto for the sake of completeness.

Reasonably, the Respondent, and specifically [redacted] the Complainant’s line manager, met with the Complainant on 19 May 2025. The Respondent will submit that that meeting was entirely justified, appropriate and, moreover, in conformity with the Respondent’s disciplinary policies and procedures, which envisage the use of informal meetings in the event of suspected misconduct or poor performance.

The Respondent also notes the Complainant’s suggestion that [redacted] mentioned during this meeting the return to work of the individual whom the Complainant had identified as the person that had bullied her. The Respondent denies entirely that, insofar as that person may have been mentioned during the meeting, that reference was, as the Complainant states at 3.9 of her submissions, “calculated to intimidate”.

[Redacted]  wrote to the Complainant on foot of their conversation of 19 May 2025 setting out concerns regarding the Complainant’s failure to attend to responsibilities during working hours, her failure to send patient images and reports, leaving the clinic before shift end, failure to provide the requested job description and goals material, unavailability to cover leave, booking errors involving patient identifiers, and missing bookings on the system.

The letter also recorded the explanations given by the Complainant including that she thought she had sent the images, assumed she could leave at her leisure, did not think to send on the job description because another employee had done so, and regarded holiday or shift cover as a favour.

Critically, the letter expressly stated that the Respondent had decided not to proceed with formal disciplinary action and that an informal warning only was being issued, albeit with a warning that repetition could lead to formal disciplinary action.

That approach, it is submitted, was not only reasonable and fair, but was also consistent with the Respondent’s disciplinary procedure, which provides that minor misconduct or poor performance will normally result in informal counselling in the first instance, with escalation to the formal process only where the informal approach is unsuccessful or the matter is more serious.

On 16 June 2025, the Complainant wrote to [redacted] challenging the process and content of the said meeting and letter, and she also referred in that letter to the earlier issue involving another employee. 

It should be noted that, in her written submissions, the Complainant appears to err in giving the date of said letter as 16 July 2025. More importantly, it will be noted that the Complainant refers in her submissions to her “grievance of 16 July 2025”, and accuses the Respondent of failing to deal with that grievance. This submission is simply groundless, particularly when one has regard to the correspondence between the parties, as iterated below.

On 19 June 2025 Sipho Moyo, the Respondent’s Head of HR, responded sympathetically to the Complainant, acknowledged that the Complainant was unwell, stated that she wished to hear her perspective, and indicated that she wished to see how she could support her once she returned from sick leave.  In the context of the accusations now made by the Complainant against the Respondent, including her stated belief that she was intimidated into leaving her employment and had no alternative option, it is important to note the following contents of the said letter from Ms. Moyo:

“I understand you are not well. I am sorry to hear that and I hope you recover well. I have also received your response following the meeting and the letter of concern subsequently issued by [redacted].  I would like to hear your perspective on what happened and see how I can support you, once you are back from sick leave of course. Take the time you need to rest and recover now. We are looking forward to having you back! If you need any support in the meantime, please feel free to reach out to me.

On 26 June 2025, Ms. Moyo wrote again, apologised for delay, said that she wanted the opportunity to clarify matters to the best of her ability when she was back from sick leave, and proposed meeting the Complainant in Swords.

On 4 July 2025, Ms. Moyo wrote again, stated that the Respondent took her concerns seriously, that it was committed to supporting her moving forward, and offered a return to work meeting, access to the confidential EAP, and a referral to occupational health.

The EAP documentation furnished by the Respondent describes a free and confidential support service available at any time to employees and their family members.

On 10 September 2025, the Complainant wrote a resignation letter stating that she believed that the Respondent’s actions had been designed to intimidate her and that she felt “the psychological contract” between her and the Respondent had been broken, and that she intended to bring a constructive dismissal claim. 

On the following day, 11 September 2025, Ms. Moyo wrote to the Complainant by email (Appendix 11) as follows:

“I wanted to take a moment to acknowledge the resignation notice you submitted on 10th September 2025. While we respect your decision, we are genuinely concerned about the circumstances that appear to have led to it. Your contributions have been greatly valued, and we believe you are an important part of our team. Before we move forward with finalizing your resignation, we would like to invite you to reconsider your decision. As set out in our email to you of 4 July, we want to ensure that you feel supported in your return to work and we repeat our invitation to conduct a return to work meeting and would invite you to make use of the company’s grievance process (please see the attached Grievance Policy). This process is designed to provide a fair and confidential platform for employees to raise any concerns or issues they may be facing, with the aim of finding a resolution. If you are open to this, we can arrange a meeting at a time convenient for you to discuss your concerns and explore possible solutions together. We want to ensure that you feel supported and heard. Please let us know if you would be willing to take this step before making a final decision. Thank you for your consideration, and we look forward to hearing from you.”

The Respondent followed up again by email on 17 September 2025 reminded her of the grievance process and the available supports, and asked her to confirm her position by 19 September 2025.

In response, that is by letter dated 18 September 2025, the Complainant did not accept Ms. Moyo’s invitation but instead said that asking her to raise a separate grievance was an insult and maintained that she had been left with no choice but to resign.

The Respondent then accepted her resignation by email on 22 September 2025.

As acknowledged above, the written submissions relied upon by the Complainant are extremely sophisticated, and set out in admirably clear terms the general legal position governing claims of constructive dismissal. They also, indeed, set out the statutory framework based on which employers are to guard against workplace bullying. As indicated above also, however, the submissions of the Complainant omit certain important matters of fact. Evidence will be adduced at hearing showing that the Complainant herself had requested that the Respondent not take any further action on foot of the complaint of bullying made by her in 2024. It is not open to the Complainant simply to characterise the matter as an unexplained failure by her employer to address her complaint of bullying at work in circumstances where she herself had asked that no further action be taken in that regard.

It should also be noted that the Complainant’s written submissions are silent on the Respondent’s efforts to retain the Complainant as an employee, as well as its offer of a return to work meeting, access to the confidential EAP, and a referral to occupational health. The Complainant has regrettably failed in her written submissions to acknowledge the Respondent’s invitation to her to reconsider resignation, or otherwise to engage with the proposition that concrete alternatives to resignation remained available to her.

It is also important to note that the documentary evidence contradicts the Complainant’s suggestion that the Respondent failed to deal with the matters raised by her in her letter of 16 June 2025 (or what she calls her “grievance of 16 July 2025”). The Complainant appears to have formed the belief that, as she states in her letter of 10 September 2025, “the actions taken by the company against me were designed to intimidate me from my employment”. How the Complainant came to form that subjective belief is a matter for herself, but the objective reality is that she resigned from her employment without allowing her employer to address the various concerns she claimed to have. 

Case law cited by the Respondent

Marlboro Trust Retail Ltd v Cotter (15 August 2025, UDD 2526)

Bankole v Petrogas Ltd (17 November 2025, ADJ 00054880)

A Worker v Food Service Provider (14 Augus 2018, ADJ-00007085)

Summary of direct evidence of Respondent witness Ms Sipho Moyo (hereafter SM) on oath

SM is the regional HR Director across all clinics.  The witness was aware of matters in 2024 as she had received a phone call from the Complainant’s line manager advising her of the Complainant’s allegations of humiliating behaviours by a colleague.

SM provided advice on the two options – informal mediation or formal grievance.  The line manager told her that the Complainant was not comfortable proceeding with either option and queried if they could split them up and that is what they did. 

Important to understand the context here – they used to go away on holidays together such was the extent of the friendship.  The Complainant had raised the issue that her colleague had been making comments about her husband. 

A patient complaint had come in and they had to ensure that this wouldn’t happen again as treatments are very time sensitive.  The patients wanted their diagnostics and the Complainant had left.  She was not at her desk when she was supposed to be and this impacts on the patient experience.  They assume people are at their desk when they are meant to be.  SM’s role is not to tell the business what to do but to guide and support the business. 

SM submits she knew the Complainant was aggrieved and that is why she kept writing to her to see if she could sit down with her and talk to her to try and understand her.  There were a number of emails sent to the Complainant giving her a number of options as she was obviously unwell – she was on sick leave – and that’s why she offered the support.  In regard to being accused of being reductionist the witness submits she does not think that is fair and it was never her intention at any time to dismiss the Complainant’s feelings.

Summary of cross-examination of SM

It was not specifically a bullying complaint in 2024; the Complainant had said she felt undermined by her colleague.  Confirms there was no fact finding process when asked because the Complainant had said she did not want to proceed.  The witness was not aware the Complainant needed counselling.  There is no job description for fertility coordinator. It is put to the witness the Complainant was told she failed to give a job description which is corrected by the witness who states she was told she had failed to complete the goal setting.  The witness is not aware she had asked for a job description and not aware there were any new duties attached.  Confirms she does not direct – she advises managers.  The witness confirms there was no risk assessment.  The witness confirms she was not asked to work with her colleague against whom allegations had been made and it is put to the witness that it was inflammatory to suggest they might be working together.

It is put to witness there was no copy of the disciplinary procedure attached to the letter and she didn’t receive it until after she had resigned.  It is put to the witness calling the letter of concern such was to avoid disciplinary procedures.  The witness submits she assumed she would be back as the cert expired and she expected she would be back but she resigned.  The witness submits data was issued in accordance with the Complainant’s instructions.  They were already subject to legal proceedings.  It is put to the witness that the access response was deliberately incomplete which is denied. 

Closing submission Respondent

The Complainant was a valued employee to the business that’s the truth and she made a significant contribution to the company which the Respondent representative wants to put on record.  The Complainant’s submissions were eloquent heavy on the law but light on the facts. 

There were numerous errors and an erroneous reference to mitigation and loss.   There was reference to shock at the outcome of an informal meeting about truancy.    Ruffley is relevant here and it should inform the AO deliberations.

The Complainant’s submission makes reference to S.I. 674 of 2020 – this matter was dealt with sensitively and there was good reason to deal with it in a sensitive fashion because it was a sensitive issue – a triangle that was dealt with sensitively. 

It was not a grievance in 2024 – there was no formal grievance raised.  The letter of 16 June is a retrospective attempt at grievance.  Cites ADJ-00054880 in the context of heat of the moment.  She resigned too early and contributed by her own conduct and never showed up to work again after.

In conducting my investigation and in reaching my decision, I have reviewed all relevant submissions and supporting documentation presented to me by the parties.  I have carefully considered the oral evidence adduced at hearing.  I have carefully considered the caselaw to which I have been directed.   I deemed it necessary to make my own inquiries into the complaint during hearing to establish and understand the facts and to seek clarification on certain matters.

Having carefully considered at length all the evidence presented to me I find the within complaint is characterised by some disparity and at times inconsistency in the perception, and in some instances in the recall, as to the manner in which events unfolded on occasions during the course of the Complainant’s employment with the Respondent. 

Notwithstanding, I am obliged to draw my conclusions from the facts as presented to me and by the application of the law to those said facts whilst taking into account all other relevant factors and surrounding circumstances.  The role of the Adjudication Officer is to decide the case before him/her, resolving conflicts in evidence according to the direct evidence presented at hearing. 

Where the evidence of the parties differs greatly and cannot be reconciled findings are made on the balance of probabilities.  In my decision-making role I am constrained both by statute and by precedent. 

I am guided by the findings of the Labour Court in Rezmerita Limited v Katarzyna Uciechowska [DWT1018] where the Court held as follows:

“In this case there is a marked conflict in the evidence tendered on behalf of the Respondent as against that given by the Claimants in relation to all material issues arising in this case.  There was also an absence of any probative independent corroboration on either side.  The standard of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of non-compliance is the preponderance of probabilities, usually referred to as the balance of probabilities.  In Miller v Ministry of Pensions [1947] 2.All E.R, 372 Denning J. (as he then was) explained, in relation to this standard of proof, that: -

“[i]f the evidence is such that the Tribunal can ‘say we think it more probable than not’ the burden is discharged, but if the probabilities are equal it is not.”

CA-00075489-001 complaint pursuant to section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 (“the 1997 Act”)

The Relevant Law

Constructive dismissal is included in the definition of “dismissal” at section 1(b) of the 1997 Act as follows:

“the termination by the employee of his contract of employment with his employer, whether prior notice of the termination was or was not given to the employer, in circumstances in which, because of the conduct of the employer, the employee was or would have been entitled, or it was or would have been reasonable for the employee, to terminate the contract of employment without giving prior notice of the termination to the employer,”

There are two situations envisaged in which a resignation may be considered a constructive dismissal; where the employer’s conduct amounts to breach of contract or repudiation of the contract (the “contract test”) or is such in relation to the employee that it was reasonable for the employee to resign (the “reasonableness test”).  

In short, a constructive dismissal case may arise where the employee felt their employer’s conduct was so untenable that they have no option but to resign or, again as a result of employer conduct, the employee has suffered a repudiatory breach of their terms and conditions of employment.

As the Complainant is alleging constructive dismissal, the fact of dismissal is in dispute and therefore the onus of proof rests with the Complainant to establish facts to prove that the actions of the Respondent were such as to justify her terminating her employment.

The Contract Test

The accepted statement of this test is by Lord Denning MR in Western Excavating v Sharp [1978] ICR 221 as follows:

“If the employer is guilty of conduct which is a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the employer no longer intends to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract; then the employee is entitled to treat himself discharged from any further performance.  If he does so, then he terminates the contract by reason of the employer’s conduct.  … [T]he conduct must … be sufficiently serious to entitle him to leave at once …”

The Reasonableness Test

Constructive dismissal may arise where the employer’s conduct was such that it was reasonable for the employee to terminate his or her employment.  Lord Denning MR addresses this concept in the

same case as follows:

“It is that the employer must act reasonably in his treatment of his employees. If he conducts himself or his affairs so unreasonably that the employee cannot fairly be expected to put up with it any longer, the employee is justified in leaving.”

It is well-established in this context that there is a reciprocal duty on an employee to act reasonably in terms of affording an employer the opportunity to address any issues.  This is clearly set out in Reid v. Oracle EMEA Ltd [UD1350/2014] where the EAT stated: 

“It is incumbent on any employee to utilise and exhaust all internal remedies made available to himor her unless he can show that the said remedies are unfair.” 

In this regard, the Employment Appeals Tribunal in Conway v. Ulster Bank Ltd [UD474/1981] held that a complainant had not acted reasonably in resigning “without first having substantially utilised the grievance procedure to attempt to remedy her complaints.

The Labour Court in Ranchin v. Allianz Care S.A.[UDD 1636] held as follows:

“In constructive dismissal cases, the Court must examine the conduct of both parties.  In normal circumstances a complainant who seeks to invoke the reasonableness test in furtherance of such a claim must also act reasonably by providing the employer with an opportunity to address whatever grievance they may have.” 

InMary Kirrane v. Barncarroll Area Development Co Ltd [UDD1635] the Labour Court held that the person complaining of constructive dismissal must also access available grievance procedures to deal with the circumstances which led him/her to resign. 

In Berber v. Dunnes Stores [2009] 20 ELR the Supreme Court held as follows:

“There is implied in a contract of employment a mutual obligation that the employer and the employee will not without reasonable and proper cause conduct themselves in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between them.  The term is implied by law and is incident to all contracts of employment unless expressly excluded.  The term imposes reciprocal duties on the employer and the employee.”

In Berber the Supreme Court detailed a test that looked to consider the conduct of both employer and employee as a whole when assessing if constructive dismissal has in fact occurred; and the following four principles are noteworthy: 

1. The test is objective
2. The test requires that the conduct of both employer and employee be considered
3. The conduct of the parties as a whole and the accumulative effect must be looked at
4. The conduct of the employer complained of must be unreasonable and without proper cause and its effect on the employee must be judged objectively, reasonably and sensibly in order to determine if it is such that the employee cannot be expected to put up with it.

In Berber the Supreme Court approved of the definition of the mutual obligation of trust and confidence as set out in Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. where the conduct objectively considered is likely to cause serious damage to the relationship between employer and employee. This is based on what the Supreme Court states was:

“Implied in a contract of employment a mutual obligation that the employer and the employee will not without reasonable and proper cause conduct themselves in a manner likely to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of confidence and trust between them.  An objective test means the issues detailed must be viewed not in relation to this particular employee and her personal circumstances; rather did the conduct of the employer objectively judged repudiate the contract. If not a contract breach, was the conduct of the employer so unreasonable to justify leaving?”

In considering whether there has been a constructive dismissal I have to determine whether there has been a repudiatory breach of contract by the Respondent, or, if there has been no repudiatory breach, whether the Respondent engaged in conduct which made it reasonable for the Complainant to terminate her contract. 

The type of conduct which can give rise to a constructive dismissal cannot be petty or minor but must be something serious or significant which goes to the root of the relationship between the employer and employee: Joyce v. Brothers of Charity [2009 EAT] UD407/2008; [2009 EAT] ELR 328.

The Complainant bears the burden of proving on the balance of probability that, due to a fundamental or repudiatory breach of contract and/or unreasonable behaviour on the part of the Respondent, she had no choice but to resign

The proofs which the Complainant must advance to prove her case are that the behaviour of the respondent and of which she complains corresponds with the requirements laid out in one or both of the two tests and was behaviour which left her with no option other than resignation. 

The Relevant Facts

The Complainant resigned from her employment and therefore is claiming that she was constructively dismissed.  In a constructive dismissal case, the fact of dismissal is in dispute, and it is up to the Complainant to prove on the balance of probabilities that she was constructively dismissed. 

The Contract Test

I must consider whether there has been a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment.  The Complainant advances a number of reasons to ground her claim of constructive dismissal; she relies on both the contract test and the reasonableness test.  I note under the former the Complainant submits there has been a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence and it is her claim that the sustained course of conduct destroyed the relationship. 

The Complainant submits there has been a breach of the express and the implied terms relating to fair procedures and submits the Respondent’s conduct on and after 19 May was the very antithesis of fair procedures.  It is not in dispute that a meeting took place on 19 May to discuss work-related issues with the Complainant. 

I am unable to accept this meeting was the antithesis of fair procedures for the following reasons.

I note from the facts as presented there were areas in which the Complainant’s performance had been less than what might be expected including i.e., leaving the office and the phone unattended at a time during which the Complainant was scheduled to be at work and sending a patient scan to the incorrect patient. 

I note the Complainant in written submissions describes these allegations about her performance as ‘spurious and trivial’.    

I note the Complainant submits she left her workplace before the end of her shift because she had to collect her son and she submitted the scan error was because she had received no training.    

Notwithstanding, I note the Respondent sought to address these performance deficits and appeared to view them as minor in nature as borne out by the manner in which the Respondent chose to address them.        

To this end, I note the Disciplinary Policy and Procedure provides for informal counselling in respect of minor poor performance / minor misconduct / or minor breaches of the rules.  I am mindful of In Re Haughey [1971] IR 217 where the Supreme Court interpreted Article 40.3 of the Irish Constitution as encompassing a guarantee of fair procedures in any proceedings where a person’s conduct is impugned.  However, it is well-established the right to fair procedures is not absolute and the requirements of fair procedures will vary according to the circumstances of the case. 

I am satisfied the formal disciplinary procedure was not invoked in respect of the Complainant and in such circumstances the panoply of rights and fair procedures associated with a formal procedure was not necessary.  I am unable to find the Respondent acted outside the bounds of fair procedure.    

I am unable to find the conduct of the Respondent in raising these matters with the Complainant meets the standard of being “an arbitrary, capricious or abusive exercise of managerial power” as described in Gogay v. Hertfordshire County Council[2000] IRLR 7030, such that it made it reasonable for the Complainant to resign. 

I note with significant interest both parties have directed me to the Ruffley case in support of their respective positions but from very different perspectives.  The Complainant cites Ruffley as authority for the definition of workplace bullying as she seeks to revisit her bullying complaint of 2024.    

The Respondent cites Ruffley as authority for the proposition that an ‘employer is entitled to expect ordinary robustness from its employees’ as held by Charleton J when he specifically distinguishes normal management interactions from bullying as follows:

“Correction and instruction are necessary in the functioning of any workplace and these are required to avoid accidents and to ensure that productive work is engaged in. It may be necessary to bring home a point by requesting engagement in an unusual task or longer or unsocial hours. It is a kindness to attempt to instil a work ethic or to save a job or a career by an early intervention. Bullying is not about being tough on employees. Appropriate interventions may not be pleasant and must simply be taken in the right spirit. Sometimes a disciplinary intervention may be necessary”. 

I have reviewed and carefully considered Ruffley v Board of Management of St. Anne’s School[2017] IESC 33to which I have been directed by both parties.  I fully accept Ruffley as the authority for defining workplace bullying whilst at the same time acknowledging the very helpful definition of that which does not constitute bullying provided therein affirming the need to strike a balance so as not to "disrupt the duty of managers to see that work is done". 

The Supreme Court recognised that "few people subjected to reprimand or discipline accept it stoically; it is human nature to be offended". 

I note the Complainant was offended and indeed very upset after the meeting that took place on 19 May to such an extent that she packed up all her stuff and got her husband to collect her.    

I note the Complainant’s claim that the possibility she might have to return to work with the individual who had bullied her in 2024 was raised by her line manager with her in a manner calculated to intimidate.  I note the Respondent witness under cross-examination submits the Complainant was not asked to work with the colleague against whom she had made allegations.    

I further note that in the Complainant’s letter of 16 June 2025 she makes a reference as follows to her colleague:

“For you to say to me, “you know Technician is coming back at out meeting on 19th May shocked and frightened me.”   

There was no evidence presented that the requirement to work with the Technician colleague against whom the Complainant had made a complaint was in fact unilaterally imposed which could be said to undermine the contract of employment.    

I note the Complainant submits there has been a breach of the implied term as to safety, health and welfare supported by her claim that a failure to investigate her claim of bullying and a threat to return her to work alongside her bully were clear breaches of that duty.   However, I am unable to identify either in the written submissions or in the evidence adduced an incident where the Complainant was specifically informed that she would be working again with that colleague. 

The Complainant submits there has been a breach of the implied term to provide a grievance procedure and to deal with grievances reasonably. 

It is not in dispute that the Complainant raised a complaint about a Technician colleague with her line manager in 2024.  However, I am unable to accept the claim there has been a breach of the implied terms under safety, health and welfare in circumstances where the Complainant acknowledges that she did not wish the complainant to be investigated.   

Furthermore, I note the Complainant expressly articulated her request for the matter not to be investigated and for no further action to be taken which was not disputed by her at hearing. 

In respect of the Complainant’s claim there has been a breach of the implied term to provide a grievance procedure and to deal with grievances reasonably I note the grievance procedure was not attached to the letter of concern that issued on 20 May further to the meeting on 19 May. 

I am unable to find this omission to attach the grievance procedure to the letter constitutes a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment. 

On balance, I find that the Complainant has not pointed to any action on the part of the Respondent that demonstrates that there was a significant, or for that matter, a minor breach of her contract. 

Having careful regard to the totality of the evidence there is no evidence that the Respondent was guilty of conduct which was a significant breach going to the root of the contract of employment, or which shows that the Respondent no longer intended to be bound by one or more of the essential terms of the contract. 

The Reasonableness Test

The proofs which the Complainant must advance in order to prove her case is that the behaviour of the Respondent and of which she complains corresponds with the requirements laid out in the reasonableness test and was behaviour which left her with no option other than resigning. 

I note for the reasonableness test the Complainant is relying on similar for the most part to that which she relies on to satisfy the contract test and submits that the test is not whether the employer’s conduct fell within the band of reasonable responses; it is whether the employee’s response was a reasonable response to the employer’s conduct.   

I note for this test there is reliance placed on a breach of contractual terms; breach of fair procedures and constitutional justice; and failure to investigate the 2024 bullying complaint. 

Finally, it is the Complainant’s case that a sustained course of conduct by the Respondent destroyed the relationship between the parties.  Having considered the totality of the evidence and having carefully considered what the Complainant characterises as “the doctrine of the last straw / cumulative argument”, insofar as the Complainant resigned in the face of allegedly unreasonable behaviour, there is insufficient evidence to establish that any such behaviour was of sufficient gravity as to leave the Complainant with no choice but to resign. 

I am not satisfied that the Respondent’s conduct, viewed in the round, came anywhere close to approaching the high threshold required to justify resignation. The evidence indicates ongoing engagement by the Respondent up to and after the Complainant’s resignation and, on any objective analysis, this does not indicate a withdrawal from the employment relationship or an intention to abandon it. 

I find the Complainant has failed to establish she was constructively dismissed particularly when regard is had to “the reasonableness or otherwise of the conduct (whether by act or omission) of the employer in relation to the dismissal” pursuant to the Unfair Dismissals Act.  I cannot find the Respondent acted in a manner which was so unreasonable as to make it impossible for the Complainant to continue in the employment.

Based on my careful consideration of the written and oral submissions, on balance, I find the Complainant has failed to discharge the burden of proof to support her claim that she was constructively dismissed for the following reasons.  There is no evidence to suggest that the Respondent no longer intended to be bound by any essential term of the contract of employment. 

Having carefully reviewed all the facts as presented to me I cannot accept the proposition that the Respondent’s conduct was such that the Complainant could no longer be reasonably expected to put up with it so as to leave the Complainant with no option but to resign.  In assessing if the conduct of this employer was so unreasonable that it led to this employee being constructively dismissed, I must apply an objective standard.  I must consider the behaviour of both the Respondent and the Complainant. 

The facts do not tend to support the test as referenced in Berber. 

It is well established that other than in exceptional circumstances an employee claiming constructive dismissal must invoke and exhaust the employer’s grievance procedure. 

I am guided the case of Jabczuga v Ryanair Limited [UD66/2013] where the EAT held as follows:

“In resigning in circumstances that a claimant asserts amount to constructive dismissal, such claimant must act reasonably. This includes affording her employer an adequate and reasonable opportunity to address and remedy any grievance. By resigning before the grievance procedure had run its course the claimant did not afford this opportunity to the Respondent and the Tribunal is satisfied that she did not act reasonably in so doing. Accordingly, this claim pursuant to the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 to 2007 fails.”  [emphasis added]

I am also mindful of the case of PeadarDuane v Masonry Fixing Services Limited [UD35/2013] where the EAT determined as follows:

“It is incumbent on an employee in a constructive dismissal scenario to act fairly towards his employer, just as he is entitled to expect to be treated fairly by his employer. Part of this is that he will sufficiently notify his employer of any grievance and allow the employer a reasonable opportunity to resolve this. The claimant did not do so. He resigned before allowing the Respondent a reasonable opportunity to resolve his grievances.”

I note the Complainant submits she raised a formal grievance on 16 June 2025 and in so doing submits she has ‘more than discharged any obligation that lay upon her to give the Respondent an opportunity to remedy its conduct’. 

However, even if the correspondence of 16 June is accepted to constitute a formal grievance in circumstances where the word ‘grievance’ does not appear in the correspondence I am also bound to consider the circumstances where the Complainant went on sick leave on 18 June from which she did not return prior to resigning and the ramifications of such an absence on the conduct of an internal investigation.   

It is well established that it would be an imprudent employer who would engage with an employee on an internal investigation while the employee is absent on sick leave without ensuring medical clearance in advance of any investigation.

In fact, such an approach by an employer if indeed they had sought to commence an investigation may well have been deemed to be inappropriate or oppressive. 

I note the Complainant in correspondence of 18 September 2025 makes reference to ‘issues / grievances’ allegedly raised in her correspondence of 16 September which is the first reference to a grievance.  The aforesaid correspondence issued after the Complainant’s letter of resignation on 10 September 2025. 

I note the Respondent on 11 September 2025 invited the Complainant to reconsider her resignation followed by a second invitation to do same on 17 September the second of which was responded to by the Complainant in the correspondence of 18 September 2025. 

I do not find it was reasonable for the Complainant to conclude that she had no alternative and in making this finding I place reliance on Ranchin set out above.  The Respondent had reached out to the Complainant in June and July offering next steps including and not limited to a return-to-work meeting to focus on the Complainant’s needs and any other concerns she may have. 

However, these overtures were rebuffed by the Complainant who by this stage appears to be focused on her requirements in regard to a Data Subject Access Request submitted by her on 19 June.  For completeness, the issues raised around Data Access Requests are outside of my remit and I offer no comment in relation to same. 

I am of the view the Complainant could have accepted the overtures made by the Respondent to meet and to set out her concerns prior to a return to work as an alternative to resigning.   I am unable to accept resigning was the only course of action available to the Complainant for the reasons set out above.   

Having carefully considered the evidence and submissions, and applying the relevant law, I find that the Complainant was not dismissed, constructively or otherwise.  In the circumstances I find that the Complainant resigned from her employment of her own volition and she has not discharged the burden of establishing she was constructively dismissed within the meaning of section 1 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977. 

For the reasons outlined above I am not persuaded by the Complainant that resignation was her only option.  Accordingly, I find that she has failed to establish she was constructively dismissed within the meaning of the Act and her complaint cannot succeed.

CA-00075489-001 complaint pursuant to section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

For the reasons set out above I decide this complaint is not well-founded.