ADJUDICATION OFFICER DECISION
Adjudication Reference: ADJ-00061712
Parties:
| Complainant | Respondent |
Parties | Roisin Gleeson | Early Start Education |
Representatives | Self-represented | Ms Tina Quinn, Director |
Complaint:
Act | Complaint Reference No. | Date of Receipt |
Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 | CA-00073794-001 | 26/07/2025 |
Date of Adjudication Hearing: 11/03/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Ewa Sobanska
Procedure:
In accordance with section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 as amended, following the referral of the complaint to me by the Director General, I inquired into the complaint and gave the parties an opportunity to be heard by me and to present to me any evidence relevant to the complaint.
This matter was heard by way of remote hearing pursuant to the Civil Law and Criminal Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2020 and S.I. 359 of 2020, which designates the WRC as a body empowered to hold remote hearings.
At the adjudication hearing, the parties were advised that the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021 grants Adjudication Officers the power to administer an oath or affirmation. The legal perils of committing perjury were explained. All participants who gave evidence were sworn in. The parties were offered the opportunity to cross-examine the evidence.
The parties were also advised that, in accordance with the Workplace Relations (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2021, hearings before the Workplace Relations Commission are held in public and, in most cases, decisions are no longer anonymised. The parties are named in the heading of the decision. For ease of reference, the terms of Complainant and Respondent are used throughout the body of the decision and the Respondent’s employees are also referred to by their job titles.
I have taken the time to carefully review all the submissions and evidence both written and oral. I have noted the respective positions of the parties. I am not required to provide a line for line rebuttal of the evidence and submissions that I have rejected or found superfluous to the main findings. I am required to set out ‘such evidential material which is fundamentally relevant to the decision’ per MacMenamin J. in Nano Nagle School v Daly [2019] IESC 63.
Where I deemed it necessary, I made my own inquiries to better understand the facts of the case and in fulfilment of my duties under statute. Both parties confirmed that they had been given a full opportunity to present their respective case.
The Complainant was self-represented. The Respondent was represented by Ms Tina Quinn, Director.
The Complainant presented a typed-up document which purported to be a written statement signed by a named former coworker. The Complainant stated that the person in question would join the hearing in a witness capacity. The person did not attend the hearing. The Complainant also furnished a copy of a letter that related to a third party, another former colleague of the Complainant. I explained to the parties that the documents had limited evidential value given that the parties could not examine them under oath/affirmation.
Background:
The Complainant commenced her employment with the Respondent on or around 15 September 2022. Her employment terminated on 25 July 2025. The parties confirmed that the Complainant’s average weekly pay was €502.50 gross.
On 26 July 2025, the Complainant referred her claim to the Director General of the WRC pursuant to the Redundancy Payments Act, 1967 as amended. The Respondent rejects the claim.
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Summary of Complainant’s Case:
In her WRC complaint referral form, the Complainant submitted that she was employed by the Respondent from 2 September 2022 until 25 July 2025 as class teacher/tutor. At the hearing the commencement date was corrected to 15 September 2022. Ahead of the closure of the business and the end of the Complainant’s employment, she approached Ms Quinn, Director asking about the statutory redundancy payment. Ms Quinn told the Complainant that she was not entitled to it. The Complainant sought information from the WRC and the Department of Social Protection to clarify whether she was entitled to a statutory redundancy payment. The Complainant submitted that both confirmed that she met the necessary criteria and advised her to raise the matter with her employer. The Complainant queried this with the Respondent in writing. The Complainant submitted that she approached Ms Quinn and Ms Quinn’s accountant on several occasions in writing. Unfortunately, her emails to the accountant were ignored, and Ms Quinn stated that she was unfamiliar with the relevant legislation. She informed the Complainant that she had referred the matter to a 'third party', but when the Complainant asked who this was, she refused to disclose the identity stating that the Complainant was not entitled to that information. On the last day of employment, Ms Quinn assured the Complainant that she would have further information by 5:30pm on Friday, 25 July 2025. The Complainant received no such update. She subsequently emailed Ms Quinn to inform her of the intention to file a formal complaint with the WRC, but she still received no response. The Complainant submits that she has made every effort to resolve this issue amicably and in good faith. However, due to the lack of cooperation from both the Respondent and the accountant, the Complainant was left with no option but to escalate the matter formally. Written submission of 18 February 2026 Background Facts The Complainant began her employment with the Respondent on 15 September 2022. She remained in constant employment until 25 July 2025, when she was made redundant. The period of employment is confirmed in a letter written by Ms Quinn dated and signed on 31 January 2025. On 16 July 2025, the Complainant made a written request for the payment of her statutory redundancy entitlement. On 18 July 2025, Ms Quinn acknowledged this email and responded that she would revert in due course. On 23 July 2025, the Complainant followed up on the outstanding issue. Despite confirming to revert with an update, Ms Quinn failed to do so by 25 July 2025, the final day of employment. The Complainant informed the Respondent on 25 July that she would be filing a complaint with the WRC. On 28 July 2025, Ms Quinn sent the Complainant an email refusing to pay the statutory redundancy entitlement. Ms Quinn claimed that the Complainant had resigned from her position, a claim without merit and unsupported by any evidence. On 15 August 2025, the Complainant’s solicitor wrote to Ms Quinn informing her that she was incorrect on a matter of law and advised her to avoid litigation, to reverse her conclusion and furnish the Complainant with her statutory redundancy entitlements. The Respondent’s solicitor replied on 16 September 2025 stating that the Complainant had resigned from her position and that she had indicated that she would not be renewing her contract in August 2025. No documentation was produced to substantiate these claims, and it is evident that no such supporting material exists. Summary of direct evidence and cross-examination of the Complainant The Complainant stated that she did not resign her position and that her intention was to return to the Respondent in September 2025 as per her request to the Teaching Council. She said that her employment ended because the crèche closed down. The Complainant said that she worked for the Respondent up until the end of July 2025 and claimed benefits from the Department of Social Protection (‘DSP’) during August 2025. The return to work date was stated on the DSP form as September 2025. The Complainant said that it was typical that she would have claimed DSP benefits during Easter breaks, Christmas time and the summer. She did not have to apply for her job back; it was a rolling contract. The Complainant said that she always wanted to further her education. She said that her plan was to do the interview, secure a place at the University and then defer the commencement of the course. She said that because the business closed, she had to go to college. The Complainant said that she sent an email to the college inquiring when she could defer and was told that she could do it at any stage. The Complainant said that she has never actually deferred the course but queried that option. She said that, if the preschool stayed opened, she would have stayed and worked for another year. The Complainant said that she did not resign her employment and there was no documentation to support it. She said that her job ended because the preschool closed. The Complainant said that she was not comfortable asking for a meeting with Ms Quinn as the relationship deteriorated towards the end. The Complainant said that she never requested her file from the Respondent. However, in response to Ms Quinn’s evidence, she agreed that, in fact, her solicitor requested it and she received it by post at her home address. The Complainant confirmed that she received a copy and signed the first contract of employment with the Respondent. She further confirmed that she received copies of the second and third contracts but did not sign or return a signed copy to the Respondent. She said that she was afraid to sign it, and other employees of the Respondent told her not to sign it. She agreed that she never raised any concerns about the contracts. |
Summary of Respondent’s Case:
The Respondent submits as follows. The Respondent’s position is that the claim for redundancy is not well founded. The Complainant was employed under a series of clearly defined fixed-term contracts, each concluding at the end of the academic year and followed by a break in employment. Prior to the end of her final contract in July 2025, the Complainant had repeatedly indicated that she did not intend to return, having accepted a college place in the UK. No clear communication was provided to confirm any change to this position until ten days before the preschool concluded for the 2024/2025 academic year. Furthermore, the operational closure of the preschool arose from broader staffing challenges and was not a decision taken in relation to any individual employee. The Respondent submits that all actions were undertaken in good faith, in accordance with contractual arrangements, and based on the information available at the relevant time. On 18 February 2026, the Respondent furnished the following submissions. Background The Respondent is a preschool that provides education specifically for children with autism. The business operates on a year-to-year basis, as it is dependent on annual sanction from the Department of Education to continue operating. This has to be applied for by formal request by June of each year. Children attend the preschool under the Home Tuition Scheme, delivered in a group setting. All children that attend are preschool aged 3 to 5 years. Staff are employed on fixed-term contracts that run from September to July, in line with the academic school year. At the end of each contract period, staff may apply for Jobseeker’s Benefit or seek alternative employment elsewhere. Each year, in April following the Easter break, the Director holds an informal meeting with all staff members, on an individual basis. These discussions cover the staff member’s plans for the following school year; whether they are interested in being issued a new contract starting in September, and any issues or circumstances that may affect the issuing of a new contract. All teaching staff are required to hold a valid Teaching Council registration number. For staff previously employed, this registration is issued on an annual basis for a maximum period of three years. Responsibility for applying for and renewing this registration each year rests with the staff member, with compliance also monitored and verified by the Director. After the three-year period has elapsed, the Teaching Council of Ireland will not renew registration unless the staff member can demonstrate that they have completed an additional recognised qualification in teaching. The Teaching Council of Ireland may, in exceptional circumstances, grant a limited extension beyond the initial three-year period. In the Complainant’s case, the Respondent wrote a letter to the Teaching Council requesting an extension until the end of academic year. Account of events relating to the redundancy claim On Wednesday, 16 July 2025, as Ms Quinn was entering the classroom, the Complainant approached her regarding a redundancy claim. This interaction was unplanned and no meeting had been requested in advance. During this conversation, Ms Quinn informed the Complainant that, to her understanding, she was not entitled to redundancy. This was based on the fact that she had repeatedly communicated to Ms Quinn over a number of conversations that she would not be returning after the end of the academic year. The Respondent exhibited a copy of a text message from the Complainant received on 15 August 2024 confirming this position. Following this interaction, Ms Quinn contacted her accountant for advice, however, he was on annual leave and due to return on Monday, 21 July 2025. Ms Quinn relayed this information to the Complainant and advised her that she would look into the matter once she had spoken with him. Later on, on Wednesday, 16 July 2025, (while checking emails at home) Ms Quinn received an email from the Complainant formally requesting redundancy. On Tuesday, 15 July 2025, the Complainant had also sent an email requesting additional working hours for September 2025. This email was automatically diverted to Ms Quinn’s junk folder, and she did not see it until Wednesday evening 16 July 2025 while at home. This request came as a complete surprise, as the Complainant had previously informed her that she had accepted a college place in the UK commencing September 2025 to complete a Masters in Speech and Language Therapy. Ms Quinn requested a meeting with the Complainant on Thursday, 17 July 2025, to seek clarification on this email. The Complainant asked that another member of staff be present, which was accommodated. During this meeting, Ms Quinn asked the Complainant to explain the email requesting additional hours in September. The Complainant stated that she had deferred her college place to September 2026. When Ms Quinn asked for additional information and clarification of this, she was told it was none of her business, despite the fact that the Complainant was indicating availability for work in September after previously confirming she was leaving to study in the UK. Prior to this email the Complainant has never indicated to the Respondent that she had deferred her place or that she was available for work in September. On Tuesday, 22 July 2025, Ms Quinn had a further verbal conversation with the Complainant during which she explained that she was awaiting advice from a HR professional whose contact details had been provided by her accountant. Ms Quinn again stated that she would update the Complainant once she had received further information. Later that day, the Complainant came to the office asking what Ms Quinn meant by “HR” and requested the name of the person she was consulting. Ms Quinn explained the meaning of HR and advised that it was not appropriate or necessary for the Complainant to know the identity of the individual she was seeking advice from. The Respondent submits that the document provided by the Complainant to the WRC on 17 September 2025 is a copy of a letter that she had previously requested for the purpose of applying to the Teaching Council of Ireland to extend her registration from May 2025 to 25 July 2025. Without a valid Teaching Council registration, she would not have been able to continue her employment, as this is a contractual requirement. Further to this, the Complainant requested another letter as the Teaching Council wanted more information from the employer as to the extension request. The Respondent submits that the Teaching Council extended this registration for one year. The Complainant subsequently informed Ms Quinn that she had obtained her registration number for the following school year, which is not an accurate account of why she extended it, as evidenced in Ms Quinn’s letter which states that she required the Complainant to retain her registration for the remainder of the year. On Wednesday, 23 July 2025, Ms Quinn received a further email from the Complainant. On Friday morning, 25 July 2025, the Complainant approached Ms Quinn at work seeking an update. Ms Quinn informed her that she was still awaiting a response from an employment law solicitor and that she hoped to have clarification by close of business at 5:30pm. Ms Quinn further advised that, if no update was received by then, she would follow up on Monday, 28 July 2025, and contact the Complainant as soon as new information became available. The Respondent submits that the Complainant was employed on a series of fixed-term contracts. The first contract commenced on 29 August 2022 and concluded on 21 July 2023. This contract ended at the conclusion of the academic year, with a break in employment thereafter. A second fixed-term contract commenced on 28 August 2023 and concluded on 19 July 2024, again followed by a break in employment. A third fixed-term contract commenced on 2 September 2024 and concluded on 25 July 2025. Each contract was separate and for a fixed period, with no contract of employment in place during the intervals between contracts. In December 2024, the Complainant requested a letter of reference from the Respondent in support of her application to undertake a Speech and Language degree at a college in the UK. This letter was provided. In March 2025, the Complainant confirmed to Ms Quinn that she had received and accepted a place in this college. Prior to Thursday 17 July 2025, the Respondent was not informed of any intention to defer this college place. On the contrary, in several discussions before this date, Ms Quinn was advised that the Complainant had secured on-campus accommodation and that herself and a work colleague would be residing on the same campus. The Respondent submits that for the 2024/2025 academic year, it employed four members of staff. Three of these employees applied for college places commencing in September 2025, and all three had accepted their offers. This staffing situation was a factor in the Respondent’s decision to close the preschool for the forthcoming academic year, as recruiting suitably qualified staff had become increasingly challenging each year. On 23 February 2026, the Respondent furnished the following submission. The Respondent submits that the Complainant had not completed her first year of employment and had instead given notice that her employment would end on 22 June 2023. For clarity, under the terms of her fixed-term contract, her scheduled finish date was 21 July 2023. However, she gave notice that she would finish her employment on 22 June 2023. Acting on legal advice, Ms Quinn replied to the Complainant with what she understood to be a suitable and legally appropriate response. However, following receipt of further correspondence from the Complainant’s solicitor, in which it was indicated that the issue of her length of service was not relevant to the matter under consideration, Ms Quinn reconsidered her position. In the interest of full transparency and clarity, she provided a complete account of all relevant facts pertaining to the Complainant’s request. Ms Quinn confirmed that her initial response was made in good faith and based entirely on legal advice received at the time. Her subsequent clarification was provided to ensure that all pertinent information was before the WRC. Summary of direct evidence and cross-examination of Ms Tina Quinn, the Director Ms Quinn said that the staff had a “year on year” contract. Ms Quinn would have had an informal conversation every year inquiring if the staff members would like to return next September and each year she would have to apply to the Department of Education. Every year staff would finish employment between 19 and 25 July depending on the academic year. Staff were free to look for another job. However, the Complainant claimed DSP benefits and decided to return for a number of years. Regarding the Teaching Council registration, Ms Quinn said that the Complainant approached her after the Complainant had applied for the Teaching Council registration. The Complainant needed to extend her registration if she wanted to stay until July 2025 as her registration was due to expire on 24 May 2025. Ms Quinn stated that she provided the Complainant with a letter dated 3 March 2025 for the Teaching Council, on the Complainant’s request. The letter stated that Ms Quinn would need the Complainant to complete the academic year which started in September 2024 and the preschool end date was 25 July 2025. She would require the Complainant to retain her Teaching Council registration for the remainder of the year which finished on 25 July 2025. The Complainant required her registration until July 2025. However, the Teaching Council do not extend the registration for 2-3 months but for a full year, hence the expiry date is May 2026. Ms Quinn said that the Complainant sent her an email on 15 July 2025 asking for extra hours. The Complainant said in the email that she was planning to start college in September 2026 and was looking for more hours from September 2025 to save up in advance. Ms Quinn said that it was the first time she heard that the Complainant was planning to start college in 2026. To her knowledge the Complainant was starting college in 2025. Ms Quinn said that it was the Complainant’s plan to get into a college in the UK. Ms Quinn said that she met with the Complainant, who requested two witnesses to attend. The Complainant told her that she deferred the college but said that it was not Ms Quinn’s business. The Complainant said that she would not go to college and was now available in September but did not want to communicate with Ms Quinn any further. Ms Quinn said that it was always the case that the Complainant was to finish on 25 July 2025. Ms Quinn reverted acknowledging that, after a meeting with the Complainant on 17 July 2025, the Complainant explained the reasons behind the email above. On 16 July 2025, the Complainant emailed requesting a redundancy payment. Ms Quinn reverted on 18 July stating that she made inquiries and was awaiting a meeting with her accountant. Ms Quinn said that she had four staff members in total. Three of her staff members informed her that they would be going to college that year and, as she could not find new staff, she decided to close the business. She gave her notice to the landlord in March 2025. The landlord was interested in taking over the business. Ms Quinn said that she asked the three staff members, including the Complainant if they would be interested in staying with the new owner, if the landlord decided to take over. They all said they would not. Ms Quinn said that she talked to her accountant, HR and an employment law solicitor. Ms Quinn said that it was hard to secure new staff and she had only one person at that stage. At the time, she did not apply for funding to the Department of Education for 2026/2027 academic year. She emailed the Department stating that she probably would not run the place as she had staff issues. As one person said that they might stay, Ms Quinn emailed the Department again querying if she could apply for funding if she found new premises (she already gave her notice to the landlord). The Department agreed. She did not secure new premises and told the person who was willing to stay, they she would not continue. Ms Quinn said that the Complainant signed her first-year contract but she dd not return signed contracts for year two and three. Ms Quinn referred to a text messages exchange between her and the Complainant where Ms Quinn asked the Complainant “did you get your teaching”. The Complainant replied on 15 August 2024 “…they wouldn’t let me even sit the interview cause my maths course I did for it is out of date so definitely going to leave Ireland after this year and just save my boyfriend will be done his masters then and then will just head away.” Ms Quinn said that subsequently, In March 2025, the Complainant told her she got a place at a UK University. Ms Quinn stated that the Complainant told her that she accepted a place in the college. She issued a letter/reference dated 16 December 2024 to the Complainant, which she understood was for college in the UK. Ms Quinn said that she always tells her employees to come and talk to her if they have any issues. It was the first time she heard that the Complainant had any issue with signing the contracts, she never raised any concerns. |
Findings and Conclusions:
The Complainant contended that her position was made redundant and that she is entitled to a statutory redundancy payment. The Respondent submitted that there was no redundancy situation and contended that the Complainant resigned her position. The Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 (as amended) and Regulations made thereunder provide that in order to qualify for a statutory redundancy payment, an employee must (1) have at least two years’ continuous service, excluding any period of employment with that employer before the age of 16 years (2) be in employment which is insurable under the Social Welfare Acts, (3) be over the age of 16 and (4) have been made redundant as a result of a genuine redundancy situation. The relevant portion of Section 7 of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967 provides as follows: “7(1) An employee, if he is dismissed by his employer by reason of redundancy or is laid off or kept on short-time for the minimum period, shall, subject to this Act, be entitled to the payment of moneys which shall be known (and are in this Act referred to) as redundancy payment provided- (a) he has been employed for the requisite period, and (b) he was an employed contributor in employment which was insurable for all benefits under the Social Welfare Acts, 1952 to 1966, immediately before the date of the termination of his employment, or had ceased to be ordinarily employed in employment which was so insurable in the period of four years ending on that date. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an employee who is dismissed shall be taken to be dismissed by reason of redundancy if for one or more reasons not related to the employee concerned the dismissal is attributable wholly or mainly to- (a) the fact that his employer has ceased, or intends to cease, to carry on the business for the purposes of which the employee was employed by him, or has ceased or intends to cease, to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed, or (b) the fact that the requirements of that business for employees to carry out work of a particular kind in the place where he was so employed have ceased or diminished or are expected to cease or diminish, or (c) the fact that his employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise, or (d) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained, or (e) the fact that his employer has decided that the work for which the employee had been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforward be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained. Section 7(5) provides that “In this section “requisite period” means a period of 104 weeks' continuous employment (within the meaning of Schedule 3) of the employee by the employer who dismissed him, laid him off or kept him on short-time, but excluding any period of employment with that employer before the employee had attained the age of 16 years.” Iin this case, appears that the Complainant’s employment was governed by a sequence of fixed‑term contracts, the final of which expired by the natural passing of time on 25 July 2025. It was open to the Complainant to seek alternative employment after each contract expired. The Complainant chose to register for Job Seeker’s Benefit with the Department of Social Protection and return to work for the Respondent for three academic years. I accept the Respondent’s position that the Complainant informed the Respondent of her plans to terminate her employment after the end of the academic year 2024/2025. The text message exhibited by the Respondent supports this assertion. In the text dated 15 August 2024 (commencement of the 2024/2025 academic year) regarding her plans, the Complainant states: “…so definitely going to leave Ireland after this year …” Ms Quinn gave evidence, which was not challenged by the Complainant, that the Complainant had taken steps in December 2024 to pursue further education when she requested a letter of reference in support of her application to undertake a Speech and Language degree at a college in the UK and the Respondent furnished such a reference. A copy of the reference was exhibited at the hearing. There was no dispute that the Complainant applied for a MSC in Speech and Language Therapy at the University of Essex. Post-hearing, the Complainant furnished a copy of an email dated 12 March 2025 from the Postgraduate Admissions Team stating that her place had been confirmed with a course start date of 29 September 2025. The Complainant also provided a copy of an email dated 26 September 2025 with an offer of accommodation form Accommodation Essex, University of Essex. The Complainant did not challenge Ms Quinn’s evidence that in March 2025, the Complainant informed Ms Quinn of her intention to commence the course in September 2025 at the University of Essex. Furthermore, it appears from the Respondent’s communication dated 3 March 2025 to the Teaching Council on the Complainant’s request that the expectation was that the Complainant needed to retain her Teaching Council registration only until the end of academic year 2025 i.e. 25 July 2025, which again, supports the Respondent’s assertion that to the Respondent’s knowledge, the Complainant intended to remain in the Respondent’s employment until the end of academic year 2024/2025. There was nothing to suggest that the Complainant communicated anything regarding her changed plans and her intention to remain with the Respondent post 25 July 2025. The letter states as follows. “Roisin Gleeson is employed on a full-time contract since September 2022 as a Supervisor/tutor and assistant in the preschool. Roisin is a valuable member of our team and I will need Roisin to complete the academic year, which has now been in structure since September 2024. The preschool year has an end date of 25th July 2025. Just to confirm I need Roisin to retain her teaching council number for the remainder of this academic school year which finished on 25th July 2025.” I also note that the letter dated 31 January 2025, which the Complainant exhibited as documentary evidence of her employment from September 2022 to the 25 July 2025 is the letter that was subsequently reworded by Ms Quinn following a further query from the Teaching Council and stated: “Roisin Gleeson is employed on a full-time contract since September 2022 as a Supervisor/tutor and assistant in the preschool. Roisin is a valuable member of our team and I will need Roisin to complete the academic year, which has now been set in structure since September 2024. The preschool year has an end date of 25th July 2025.” At no stage did the Complainant raise any difficulty with the letters above and the requirement for the Teaching Council’s registration up until 25 July 2025. I note that the Complainant did not dispute that in March 2025 she communicated to the Respondent her intention to commence the course. However, the Complainant suggested that she did not resign her employment as, at some stage, she made a decision to defer the college place and remain in her employment with the Respondent. It is unclear when, if at all, such a decision was made. There was nothing put before me to suggest that the Complainant communicated this decision to the Respondent prior to 15 July 2025, when she requested additional hours from September 2025 as she was “planning to start college in 2026”. In fact, there was nothing put before me to suggest that the Complainant did, in fact, contemplate deferral until then. I note that, by then, the Respondent has taken steps in preparation for the upcoming academic year based on the understanding that the Complainant, and by Ms Quinn’s evidence, two other employees would not be returning in September 2025. Ms Quinn informed the Department of Education that, due to a staffing shortage she would not be applying for funding for the next academic year. Ms Quinn also made arrangements with her landlord to terminate the lease of the premises from which the preschool operated. The Complainant was given an opportunity post-hearing to furnish a copy of the email exchange with the University and/or the student accommodation provider where she allegedly queried the possibility of deferral. No such documentary evidence was furnished. The Complainant emailed the WRC post-hearing stating that the inquiry was “done through live chat with the university”. This contradicts her direct evidence when she stated at the hearing that she sent emails where she inquired about the deferral and received a reply. Post-hearing, the Complainant also furnished copies of what appear to be screenshots of Google search on whether it is possible to defer the commencement of a course with the University of Essex, which fails to demonstrate the point proposed by her. Having carefully considered the written and oral submissions and the evidence before me, I find that the sequence of events shows that the decision to cease operation was made after the Complainant communicated her intention to terminate her employment to the Respondent. Consequently, the Complainant has not established that her position was redundant when she chose to communicate her intention to terminate her employment at the end of 2024/2025 academic year. The timing suggests that the Complainant's pursuit of redundancy appears to have been prompted by the subsequent knowledge that the Respondent was ceasing operations. I find that the Complainant resigned from her employment, and therefore no genuine redundancy occurred. |
Decision:
Section 39 of the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967, as amended requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under that Act.
For the reasons outlined above, I disallow the Complainant’s appeal. |
Dated: 21/07/2026
Workplace Relations Commission Adjudication Officer: Ewa Sobanska
Key Words:
Redundancy- |
