Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Jose  Felix

Ventside Unlimited Company

Representatives

N/A

Kelvin Hyland Peninsula Business Services Ireland

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00074359-002

13/08/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Schedule 2 of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2014

CA-00074359-003

13/08/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00074359-004

13/08/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 28 of the Safety, Health & Welfare at Work Act, 2005

CA-00074359-005

13/08/2025

The Complainant was employed as a Valet from 28 November 2022 until 14 February 2025, working full-time and earning a monthly salary of €2,300. Further to the end of his employment, he referred a number of complaints to the WRC wherein he alleged that he was treated unfairly during his employment.

The Complainant stated that he was treated unfairly during his employment and that the circumstances surrounding the end of his employment were unjust. He alleged that he experienced difficulties in relation to medical accommodation, particularly concerning a foot condition that required the use of an orthopaedic boot. He also asserted that the employer failed to properly accommodate his condition and that he was prevented from returning to work without unnecessary barriers. He further alleged that he suffered penalisation as a result of raising concerns, and he disputed the reduction in his wages during January 2025.

He also stated that he was forced into signing a compromise agreement with the Respondent because he was so short of money and that the Respondent engineered this situation to force him into signing the compromise agreement by not paying him the wages he was due.

The Respondent asserted in the first instance that the Complainant entered into a severance agreement on 14 February 2025, which brought the employment relationship to an end. This agreement included a comprehensive waiver clause under which the Complainant agreed to relinquish any claims arising from his employment. The Respondent emphasised that the Complainant was expressly advised to seek independent legal advice prior to signing the agreement and that he knowingly chose not to do so. On this basis, the Respondent asserted that the waiver is valid and binding and that it precludes the WRC from hearing the complaints at all.

In addition, the Respondent disputed the characterisation of the termination as a dismissal. They asserted that that there was no dismissal—unfair or otherwise—and that the employment concluded by mutual agreement through the severance arrangement. This, they asserted, further undermines any claim based on dismissal or discriminatory termination.

Addressing the specific complaints, the Respondent denied any failure to accommodate the complainant’s medical condition. They stated that appropriate steps were taken, including offering assistance with footwear and facilitating his return to work once he obtained a fit-to-work certificate. The requirement for medical clearance, according to the Respondent, was a legitimate health and safety measure rather than discriminatory treatment.

In relation to pay, the Respondent stated that the Complainant’s reduced wages in January 2025 were the result of absences not supported by valid medical certification. They asserted that he was paid correctly for the time actually worked and that there was no unlawful deduction of wages.

The Respondent also rejected the allegations of penalisation, asserting that no adverse actions were taken against the Complainant as a result of any protected disclosures or health and safety complaints. Any issues that arose during the employment, including disciplinary matters, were said to have been wholly unrelated to such concerns.

The preliminary issue for determination in this case is whether the Complainant is precluded from pursuing his claims by virtue of having entered into a compromise agreement containing a waiver of all statutory and common law claims, and specifically whether that agreement can be set aside on the basis that it was executed under duress and because he did not avail of legal advice.

The Complainant asserted that he was effectively compelled to sign the agreement due to financial hardship. He alleged that he was in a position of acute financial pressure and that this situation was caused or exacerbated by the Respondent through the alleged non-payment of wages due to him. On this basis, he asserted that the agreement was not entered into freely and should not be regarded as binding.

The Respondent rejected this assertion and stated that the agreement was entered into voluntarily, following a clear process, and with full knowledge of its implications. In particular, the Respondent emphasised that the Complainant was expressly advised to obtain independent legal advice prior to signing the agreement and voluntarily declined to do so.

Having considered all the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that the Complainant has established that the agreement was executed under duress in a legal sense.

In this regard, I have had regard to the decision in Sunday World Newspapers Ltd v Kinsella & Another [2007] IEHC 324, where the High Court confirmed that a properly executed agreement expressed to be in full and final settlement will be upheld where it is entered into freely and with an understanding of its effect. I also note the approach of the Labour Court in UDD2532, where a waiver signed following an opportunity to obtain legal advice deprived the Court of jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

It is well established that duress requires evidence of illegitimate pressure such as to deprive a party of their free will. Financial pressure, even where significant, does not in and of itself amount to duress. In the instant case, while I accept that the Complainant may have experienced financial difficulties at the relevant time, there is no evidence that the Respondent engaged in improper or coercive conduct designed to force the Complainant into signing the agreement.

I have also considered the Complainant’s assertion that the Respondent withheld wages and thereby engineered a situation of financial hardship. However, the Respondent has provided a clear explanation that any reduction in pay arose from periods of absence not supported by appropriate medical certification and that the Complainant was paid for all time worked. I find no evidence to support a conclusion that wages were deliberately withheld for the purpose of exerting pressure on the complainant to sign the agreement.

Of particular significance in this case is the process surrounding the execution of the agreement. The evidence demonstrates that the Complainant was explicitly advised to seek independent legal advice prior to signing. This was not a general or informal suggestion but a clear recommendation contained within the agreement itself.

Furthermore, the Complainant signed an Employee Declaration within the agreement confirming that:

• he had been advised to seek independent legal advice,
• he expressly chose not to do so, and
• he nevertheless fully understood the contents of the agreement and its implications for his employment rights.

This is a critical factor. The Complainant was not deprived of an opportunity to obtain legal advice; rather, he consciously elected not to avail of that opportunity. In such circumstances, any absence of legal advice cannot be attributed to the conduct of the Respondent.

In addition, there is no evidence that the Complainant raised any objection to the agreement at the time of signing, nor that he indicated to the Respondent that he was acting under protest or duress. Instead, he executed the agreement, accepted its terms, and accepted the benefits arising from it.

When assessing the validity of a compromise agreement, it is necessary to consider whether it was entered into freely, with an understanding of its effect, and with a genuine opportunity to obtain independent advice. Having regard to all of the evidence, and consistent with the approach in Kinsella and subsequent Labour Court jurisprudence, I am satisfied that these criteria have been met in this case.

Accordingly, I find that the Complainant entered into the settlement agreement of his own free will and that the agreement constitutes a valid and binding waiver of his claims.

I find that that I do not have jurisdiction to investigate the complaints for the reasons set out above.