Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Peter  Lavelle

Electricity Supply Board t/a  ESB Networks DAC

Representatives

Darren Erangey Connect Trade Union

Caroline Doyle BL instructed by  ESB Legal Department

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 6 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1991

CA-00073916-001

30/07/2025

The Complainant is employed by the Respondent, Electricity Supply as a Training Officer. He commenced employment in 2010 and was promoted to a flexible-based Training Officer role in 2022. While retaining Wilton, Cork as his contractual base, the Complainant was required to deliver training at the National Training Centre (NTC) in Portlaoise and at other locations. The role arose from operational requirements within the Respondent’s training function, with the intention that training delivery would extend beyond the centralised training centre.

The complaint is brought under the Payment of Wages Act 1991 and concerns the cessation, in November 2023, of payments described as travel-related overtime. The Complainant contends that he had an established entitlement to be paid overtime in respect of travel undertaken in the course of his duties. He submits that the payments were made consistently for a period of approximately two years, and that they formed part of his remuneration. He argues that their removal was unilateral and without agreement, and that it has resulted in a monetary loss which he estimates at approximately €42,000, representing unpaid travel time.

The Respondent disputes the claim and raises a preliminary objection that it is out of time, submitting that the alleged contravention occurred in November 2023 and that the complaint, lodged at the Workplace Relations Commission on 30 July 2025, falls outside the statutory time limits. In substantive terms, the Respondent contends that the payments in question were not “wages” properly payable under the Complainant’s contract or any applicable collective agreement. While accepting that overtime is payable to employees at the Complainant’s grade for hours worked beyond normal working time, it maintains that there is no contractual or collective provision for the payment of overtime in respect of travel. The Respondent’s position is that the payments arose from a local and incorrect practice which deviated from company policy and was subsequently discontinued for compliance reasons.

The Respondent further disputes the quantum of the claim, pointing to significantly lower levels of overtime historically paid and identifying inconsistencies in the Complainant’s calculation of loss. It also states that alternative measures were introduced following the cessation of the practice, including the provision of accommodation and a fixed allowance, although it maintains that these do not bear on the issue to be determined under the Act.

The dispute therefore concerns the preliminary issue of whether the complaint is within time, and if so, whether the cessation of travel-related overtime constitutes an unlawful deduction from wages.

Evidence of the Complainant:

The Complainant stated that he commenced employment with the Respondent in 2010 and qualified as a network technician in 2014. He explained that, following his promotion in or around 2022 to the role of Training Officer, he continued to operate under his existing contract of employment. In that regard, he emphasised that he had received written confirmation that “all my terms and conditions remain unchanged,” and he maintained that this included entitlement to overtime. He described overtime as forming part of his contractual remuneration and stated that, historically, “any travel away from a normal place of work was paid as overtime.”

In relation to his place of work, the Complainant maintained that his contractual base remained Wilton, Cork, notwithstanding his promotion. He rejected the suggestion that his place of work had effectively shifted to the National Training Centre (NTC) in Portlaoise, stating that he was required to travel there and to other locations nationwide to deliver training. He described this travel as forming part of his working duties rather than constituting a normal commute.

The Complainant gave evidence that, following his appointment to the Training Officer role, he was paid overtime in respect of travel for a period of approximately two years. He stated that these payments were processed through payroll, approved by management, and taxed in the normal way. He characterised this as an established and consistent practice. He further stated that he had raised concerns prior to taking up the role regarding overtime and subsistence and that he had received assurances that these arrangements would continue. He told the hearing that “I wouldn’t have taken the job if I knew that was going to happen,” referring to the subsequent cessation of payments.

He then outlined the events of November 2023, when he was informed that he was no longer entitled to overtime for travel. He described this as a unilateral decision imposed by the Respondent without consultation or agreement. He stated that attempts to resolve the issue informally were unsuccessful and that he subsequently invoked the internal grievance procedure in January 2024. He described that process as lengthy and unsuccessful.

The Complainant also gave evidence regarding the impact of the change. He stated that, following the cessation of overtime and changes to subsistence arrangements, he was required to undertake significant travel, including daily journeys from Cork to Portlaoise, without compensation for travel time. He described leaving home at approximately 6 a.m. and returning late in the evening, with all travel undertaken outside of paid working hours.

Under cross-examination, the Respondent’s representative challenged the Complainant’s assertion that his contractual terms had remained unchanged. It was put to him that his move to the Training Officer role represented a notable change in duties and working arrangements. The Complainant accepted that his role had changed but maintained that his contractual entitlements, including overtime, had not.

He was questioned as to the nature of his work and the extent to which he was based at the NTC. It was put to him that he had previously stated that “80% of my time is spent in the ESB NTC.” While he accepted that he had made such a statement, he disputed its accuracy and emphasised that his work was not confined to that location.

 Respondent counsel put it to the Complainant that travel from his home to Portlaoise formed part of his normal working routine. The Complainant rejected this, stating unequivocally: “It is not a commute. It is a business journey.”

The Complainant was asked whether there was any provision in his contract specifically providing for payment of overtime in respect of travel time. He accepted that there was no such express provision, stating: “Not in my contract. No.” He was similarly unable to identify any provision in the relevant collective agreement expressly providing for such payments. However, he maintained that the entitlement arose from the general overtime provisions, his contractual base, and the established practice over a prolonged period.

It was put to him that the payments in question arose from a local and incorrect practice rather than from any contractual entitlement. This was rejected by the Complainant, who maintained that the consistent payment of overtime for travel over a two-year period, with management approval, gave rise to a binding entitlement. He described the arrangement as “custom practice” and stated that it had become “implied” into his terms and conditions.

The Respondent also challenged the quantum of the Complainant’s claim. It was put to him that he was claiming in the region of €42,000, whereas the actual overtime payments made to him in 2022 and 2023 were approximately €5,900 and €3,800, respectively. It was suggested that his current claim was “almost four times what you historically received.” The Complainant accepted the historical figures but explained that his current claim reflected the increased amount of travel undertaken following the cessation of overnight subsistence arrangements, which previously reduced his need to travel daily.

 It was put to the Complainant that he had claimed a sizeable number of overnight allowances in 2022 and 2023 and that these had reduced his commuting burden. Counsel suggested that his current loss arose, at least in part, from his decision not to avail of prepaid accommodation offered after November 2023. The Complainant responded that the previous arrangements provided flexibility and financial benefit and that the new arrangements were not comparable, stating that he would not have accepted a role requiring prolonged absences from home.

It was put to the Complainant that certain dates included in his claim did not correspond with company records of his work location. The Complainant accepted that there “may be one or two mistakes” but maintained that he had supporting documentation, including mileage and subsistence claims, to substantiate his position. it was put to the Complainant that the cessation of travel-related overtime represented the correction of an incorrect practice rather than an unlawful deduction from wages. The Complainant rejected this proposition, maintaining that the payments were properly payable and that their removal constituted a unilateral and unlawful reduction in his pay.

Complainant’s Argument:

1) Preliminary Issue – Time Limits.

The Complainant rejects the Respondent’s contention that the complaint is out of time. It is submitted that the matter constitutes a continuing unlawful deduction, rather than a once-off contravention occurring in November 2023.

In his representative’s written submission, the Complainant asserts that “the deduction is ongoing every week Mr. Lavelle works additional hours caused by mandatory travel without payment.” It is argued that each occasion on which the Complainant is required to travel outside normal working hours without payment gives rise to a fresh contravention under the Payment of Wages Act 1991. Reliance is placed on decisions of the Workplace Relations Commission which, it is contended, recognise that repeated failures to honour contractual entitlements may constitute a continuing breach rather than a single historic act.

In his closing submissions, the Complainant further submits that he acted reasonably in seeking to resolve the matter through internal procedures prior to referring the complaint externally. It is contended that the internal grievance and dispute resolution processes within the Respondent organisation were invoked promptly and pursued in good faith, but that these processes were protracted and unsuccessful. The Complainant submits that this engagement contributed to the timing of the complaint and should be taken into account in considering whether the claim is properly before the Commission.

Accordingly, the Complainant maintains that the complaint is within time, either on the basis that the alleged deduction is ongoing in nature or, alternatively, that the circumstances surrounding the delay warrant the matter being heard.

(2) Substantive Complaint – Payment of Wages

On the substantive issue, the Complainant contends that the cessation of travel-related overtime constitutes an unlawful deduction from wages within the meaning of section 5 of the Payment of Wages Act 1991.

The Complainant’s case is that the payments in question were properly payable as wages. It is submitted that overtime for travel was “expressly agreed, consistently paid for nearly two years,” and confirmed in writing at the time of his appointment that “all other terms and conditions remain unchanged.” He further relies on the internal Unions/Company PC&I Agreement, which he submits provides for overtime eligibility at his grade.

It is contended that these payments were processed through payroll, taxed as earnings, and approved through normal management channels. The Complainant submits that this demonstrates that the payments were not discretionary or ex gratia in nature but formed part of his remuneration. In his closing submissions, he emphasised that “this was paid via payroll, it was treated as overtime and was based on hours. These are wages, not expenses.”

The Complainant also advances a custom and practice argument. He submits that the consistent payment of travel-related overtime over a prolonged period, coupled with his reliance on those payments in accepting the role, gave rise to an implied contractual entitlement. He contends that these payments were “regular, consistent, approved and relied upon,” and therefore satisfy the criteria for incorporation into his terms and conditions of employment.

It is further submitted that the Respondent’s decision to cease these payments amounted to a unilateral variation of contract. The Complainant argues that the change was implemented without consultation, agreement, or recourse to established industrial relations mechanisms. In his closing submissions, he stated that there was “no agreement, no consultation, no procedure and no consent,” and that once the payment had become established, “it could only be removed by agreement.”

The Complainant rejects the Respondent’s characterisation of the payments as an incorrect or non-contractual practice. He contends that the Respondent is attempting to retrospectively reclassify payments which were, in practice, treated as wages. He further distinguishes the payments from expenses or allowances, arguing that they were linked to “real, measurable hours outside normal working time” and therefore fall squarely within the statutory definition of wages.

In relation to loss, the Complainant claims that the cessation of payments has resulted in a monetary loss of approximately €42,000, representing unpaid travel time. He submits that this reflects a substantial and ongoing reduction in his income.

The Complainant rejects the Respondent’s reliance on the introduction of a €5,000 allowance as a mitigating factor. He submits that this allowance is unrelated to hours worked, was not negotiated, and cannot substitute for a contractual entitlement to overtime.

Evidence of Ms Claire Purcell, Employee Relations Officer.

The witness confirmed that she was employed as an Employee Relations Officer within the Respondent organisation and had involvement in the matters at issue, including oversight of the grievance and appeal processes engaged by the Complainant.

 The witness outlined the background to the Complainant’s role. She explained that the Complainant had been promoted into the position of a flexible-based Training Officer. She stated that this role had been developed due to difficulties in recruiting training officers to the NTC in Portlaoise and that the intention was to facilitate training delivery on a more regional basis. She noted that this intention was impacted by the Covid-19 pandemic, with the result that training continued to be delivered primarily at the NTC.

Turning to the issue of travel-related payments, the witness described the practice which had developed as “an incorrect practice of overtime being approved for travel time.” She stated that, while employees travelling for work would ordinarily submit claims for mileage and expenses, the approval of overtime for travel time was not grounded in any contractual or policy provision. She confirmed that, although the Complainant’s contract and the applicable collective agreement permitted the payment of overtime, it was “not for travel,” and that “there’s no payment in the PC&I agreement for any grades” in respect of travel time.

The witness further confirmed that, following the cessation of this practice in November 2023, the Complainant remained eligible to receive overtime where he worked hours in excess of his normal working time, but not in respect of travel.

She then addressed the Complainant’s claim for monetary loss. Referring to payroll records, she stated that in 2022 the Complainant worked “116 and a half hour” of overtime, for which he was paid approximately €5,927, and in 2023 worked 72 hours of overtime, for which he was paid approximately €3,862. She contrasted these figures with the Complainant’s asserted loss of over €42,000 and stated that “the reality is that the figures claimed by the Complainant are exaggerated,” noting that the records reflected the actual overtime paid while he was performing the role.

The witness also gave evidence regarding subsistence payments. She confirmed that in 2022 the Complainant claimed 178 overnight allowances amounting to approximately €26,048, and in 2023 claimed two hundred overnight allowances amounting to approximately €29,253. She indicated that these arrangements had significantly reduced the Complainant’s need to commute daily. She further stated that, following November 2023, the Complainant continued to travel daily despite the availability of prepaid accommodation, which had been offered by the Respondent as an alternative arrangement.

In addition, the witness outlined measures introduced by the Respondent following the cessation of the travel-related overtime practice. She confirmed that a Training Officer assignment allowance of €5,000 had been introduced in February 2024, backdated to November 2023, and stated that its purpose was to reflect the demands of the role, including flexibility and potential out-of-hours requirements. She also confirmed that the Complainant continued to receive mileage expenses.

In cross-examination, the witness accepted that, prior to November 2023, the Complainant had in fact received overtime payments in respect of travel. When asked directly, she agreed that “prior to November 2023 [he was] paid for travel… overtime for travel, yes.” However, she maintained that this arose from the incorrect practice previously identified.

The Complainant’s representative then challenged the witness’s characterisation of the Complainant’s loss as exaggerated. It was put to her that the Complainant’s current claim reflected the period following the cessation of payments and therefore could not be directly compared with earlier figures. In response, the witness reiterated that the historical records showed that “when we were paying overtime for travel time it was nowhere near the amount that we’re seeing here today,” and that the current claim was not consistent with the actual payments previously made.

The cross-examination further explored the basis upon which the witness described the claim as exaggerated. She confirmed that her assessment was based on a comparison between the Complainant’s current claim of approximately €42,000 and the level of overtime payments historically made to him, which she stated averaged “below €5,000” per annum. She maintained that the current figures did not align with those records.

Evidence of Mr Keith Kavanagh, Training Manager.

The witness confirmed that he was employed as Technical Training Manager within the Respondent organisation and had responsibility for oversight of training operations and training officers at the NTC.

The witness outlined his role and responsibilities, stating that he had assumed responsibility for the NTC in or around September 2024 and that his role included ensuring compliance with company policies and governance requirements. He explained that, upon taking up the role, he undertook a review of existing practices and identified matters which gave rise to concern, including issues relating to subsistence and travel-related payments. He stated that this review led to an assessment that certain practices were not compliant.

The witness gave evidence that there was no provision in either company policy or the relevant collective agreement for the payment of overtime in respect of travel. He stated unequivocally: “There’s no provision,” when asked whether any such entitlement existed. He confirmed that the decision was taken that the practice of paying overtime for travel should cease and that this decision was communicated to the Complainant and other affected employees in November 2023.

Referring to his communication of 10 November 2023 to affected staff, the witness stated that it was conveyed that “the practice for claiming overtime for travelling had to discontinue,” and that it was “regrettable that a clear understanding of what was appropriate wasn’t communicated earlier.” He emphasised that the communication reflected the company’s established position that overtime was not payable for travel.

The witness also referred to subsequent correspondence issued in December 2023, which set out the Respondent’s position and the rationale for the changes. He indicated that concerns had arisen not only in relation to overtime but also in relation to subsistence claims and compliance with Revenue requirements. The witness outlined steps taken by the Respondent following the cessation of the practice, including the introduction of prepaid accommodation arrangements to reduce the need for daily commuting. He stated that such accommodation was made available to the Complainant but that he continued to travel daily notwithstanding this option.

Turning to the Complainant’s claim for loss, the witness gave evidence that he had reviewed the Complainant’s schedule of alleged losses, which covered a period of just over two years from November 2023 to December 2025. He stated that he had compared this schedule with official training records and had identified discrepancies. He explained that the purpose of the Respondent’s analysis was to highlight “inconsistencies between claimed travel and recorded work locations,” and he identified specific examples where the Complainant’s claimed location did not correspond with the official training schedule.

The witness concluded his evidence by stating that he was satisfied that the decision taken in November 2023 accurately reflected the company’s position and was necessary to ensure compliance with policy and governance requirements.

In cross-examination, the Complainant’s representative first established that the Complainant’s terms and conditions were governed by both his individual contract and collective agreements, including the PC&I Agreement. The witness accepted that the PC&I Agreement formed part of the contractual framework and that employees at the Complainant’s grade were eligible for overtime. However, when asked whether he could identify any clause prohibiting overtime for travel, he replied: “to my knowledge there isn’t,” while maintaining that the absence of an express prohibition did not imply that such payments were permissible.

The witness accepted that he had issued the instruction in November 2023 that overtime for travel would cease and that this was communicated without prior agreement with employees. When asked whether there had been consultation or negotiation with unions prior to the change, he confirmed that “there wasn’t anything to negotiate,” describing the communication as a statement of the company’s position rather than a matter for agreement. He similarly accepted that “there was no negotiation” and that the matter was not referred to any formal industrial relations process prior to implementation.

It was put to the witness that the practice of paying overtime for travel had been in place for a prolonged period and had been approved through normal management and payroll processes. He accepted that the Complainant had received such payments and that they had been approved but maintained that the practice had “deviated” from the appropriate position and was therefore incorrect.

The Complainant’s representative further challenged the basis for the Respondent’s reliance on policy and Revenue compliance. It was suggested that the Respondent had relied on an incorrect interpretation of Revenue rules, particularly in relation to subsistence, and that this had influenced the decision to cease payments. The witness maintained that compliance considerations were central to the decision-making process but accepted that issues relating to expenses were distinct from the question of overtime.

The witness accepted that, following the November 2023 instruction, the payments in respect of travel ceased and that this resulted in a reduction in the Complainant’s income. He also accepted that the change was implemented without the Complainant’s consent. However, he maintained that the decision represented a correction of an incorrect practice rather than a variation of contractual terms.

The witness confirmed that the €5000 allowance was introduced after the cessation of the payments and was not negotiated with unions. He described it as a measure intended to recognise the flexibility required of training officers rather than as a direct substitute for the discontinued payments.

Evidence of Mr Frank Murphy, Manager of the NCT.

The witness confirmed that he was the manager of the National Training Centre (NTC) in Portlaoise and that, in that capacity, he had day-to-day interaction with training officers, including the Complainant.

The witness described the typical structure of a training day at the NTC. He stated that the standard schedule was “nine to half four,” but clarified that there was a degree of flexibility in practice. He explained that “classes do finish earlier,” depending on how quickly course material was covered, and that training officers were not necessarily required to remain until a fixed end time if the training objectives for the day had been completed.

The witness was asked to respond to the Complainant’s evidence from the previous hearing day that attendance was mandatory from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and that, as a consequence, all travel occurred outside working hours. He rejected that characterisation, stating: “that has not been my experience,” and added that he had personally observed the Complainant leaving the training centre before the end of the working day on multiple occasions.

He further explained that training delivery was governed by a formal schedule, which determined where training officers were required to be on any given day. He described this as an official company record and stated that, when assigned to the NTC, the Complainant would be expected to be present “in one of our training rooms… in the NTC” during working hours.

Turning to the Complainant’s claim for loss, the witness was asked to consider the schedule produced by the Complainant, which included claims for daily travel time. He noted that the schedule generally assumed between two and four hours of travel per day. The witness stated that, if accepted, this would imply that the Complainant “left at 5 o’clock” each day and travelled outside working hours. He rejected this assumption, stating that such a position “wouldn’t be correct,” as in practice some travel could occur within normal working hours where training finished early.

The witness was also asked about changes in the Complainant’s attendance at the NTC over time. He stated that, compared to 2022 and 2023, the Complainant’s attendance at the NTC had reduced. He was then asked what this indicated in relation to the Complainant’s loss schedule, and his evidence was that the schedule did not accurately reflect actual attendance patterns.

In cross-examination, it was suggested that, even where training finished early, training officers were paid until the end of the working day. The witness accepted this, confirming that “they’re paid up to 5 regardless of what time they finished,” and that overtime would only arise after that point.

Respondent’s Argument:

Preliminary Issue – Time Limits

The Respondent submits that the complaint is statute-barred and that the Adjudication Officer has no jurisdiction to entertain it. It is argued that the relevant statutory provisions, namely section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015, require that a complaint be presented within six months of the date of the contravention to which it relates.

The Respondent contends that, on the Complainant’s own case, the contravention is clearly identified as the cessation of travel-related overtime in November 2023. It is submitted that this was “a single identifiable decision that was applied uniformly thereafter,” and that the complaint form itself expressly anchors the claim to that point in time. The Respondent argues that the Complainant cannot now recast that complaint as a continuing breach in order to bring it within time.

In this regard, the Respondent places reliance on the judgment of the High Court in Moran v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 154. It is submitted that the Court made clear that the statutory time limit runs from the date of the contravention itself and not from the date on which its consequences continue to be experienced. In particular, reliance is placed on the principle articulated by Keane J. that a continuing failure to implement a decision “does not constitute a continuing contravention… but rather the continuing consequences of an earlier contravention.” The Respondent submits that this principle is directly applicable to the present case, where the alleged loss arises from a single decision taken in November 2023.

Further reliance is placed on Health Service Executive v McDermott [2014] IEHC 331, where the High Court emphasised that jurisdiction is determined by reference to the complaint as actually presented. The Respondent submits that the Court held that “the jurisdiction of the tribunal is determined by the complaint as presented… and not by some alternative complaint which might have been made.” While acknowledging that the concept of a rolling or continuing time limit may arise in certain circumstances, the Respondent argues that such circumstances require the identification of discrete, actionable contraventions within the relevant period. It is submitted that no such contraventions have been identified in this case.

The Respondent therefore maintains that the Complainant’s reliance on the notion of an “enduring” or “ongoing” deduction is misconceived and contrary to binding High Court authority. On that basis, it is submitted that the complaint, having been lodged on 30 July 2025 in respect of a decision taken in November 2023, is clearly outside the statutory time limit and must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

Substantive Issue – Payment of Wages

Without prejudice to its primary submission on jurisdiction, the Respondent contends that the complaint is not well founded on its merits. It submits that the payments claimed by the Complainant do not constitute “wages properly payable” within the meaning of the Payment of Wages Act 1991.

The Respondent accepts that the Complainant, as a Band 4C employee, is eligible for overtime under the applicable collective agreement. However, it emphasises that neither the Complainant’s contract of employment nor the PC&I Agreement provides for the payment of overtime in respect of travel time. As was stated in closing, while overtime eligibility exists, “it doesn’t specify overtime in respect to travel to or from the place of work, nor does Mr. Lavelle’s contract provide such.”

The Respondent’s position is that the payments in question arose from a local and informal practice which developed over time, but which had no contractual or policy basis. That practice, it is submitted, was identified as incorrect and was subsequently discontinued in order to bring arrangements back into compliance with established company policy. The Respondent argues that the mere fact that payments were made for a period does not give rise to a contractual entitlement. In this respect, it submits that such payments cannot be regarded as “properly payable” simply because they were processed through payroll.

It is further contended that the administrative processing of payments is not determinative of their legal status. The Respondent submits that “the mere existence of payroll entries… doesn’t automatically convert sums into wages properly payable under the Act,” and that payroll treatment cannot create an entitlement where none exists in contract or collective agreement.

The Respondent also challenges the fundamental premise of the Complainant’s claim, namely that travel time constitutes working time. It is submitted that the Complainant’s claim rests on “an incorrect assumption… that commuting time constitutes working time,” which is not supported by any contractual provision or by the collective agreement governing his employment. The Respondent maintains that travel to the NTC constituted normal attendance at the place of work rather than compensable working time.

In support of its position, the Respondent relies by analogy on Cleary v B&Q Ireland Ltd (PW777/2012), in which it was held that the withdrawal of a discretionary or non-contractual payment does not amount to an unlawful deduction under the Act. The Respondent submits that the present case is analogous, in that the payments in question were not grounded in contractual entitlement but arose from a practice which was capable of being discontinued.

The Respondent disputes the quantum of the claim. It submits that the figure advanced by the Complainant, in excess of €42,000, bears no relation to the level of overtime historically paid and is based on a speculative and self-generated calculation. It is argued that the claim represents “a unilateral reconstruction” of alleged loss and is “completely detached from the historic payments actually made”. The Respondent further contends that any increase in claimed hours arises from changes in the Complainant’s own working patterns following the cessation of the practice, rather than from any entitlement to wages properly payable.

In those circumstances, the Respondent submits that the cessation of travel-related overtime constituted the correction of an erroneous practice rather than an unlawful deduction, and that the complaint should be dismissed in its entirety.

Preliminary Issue – Time Limit.

A preliminary issue arises as to whether the complaint has been presented within the statutory time limits prescribed by section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015.

Sections 41(6) and (8) of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 states:

…(6) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates…

…(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.

The Complainant contends that the cessation of travel-related overtime in November 2023 gave rise to a continuing deduction, such that each occasion on which he undertook travel without payment constituted a fresh contravention. The Respondent submits that the complaint relates to a single, identifiable decision taken in November 2023 and that the complaint, having been lodged in July 2025, is out of time.

Having considered the totality of the evidence, both documentary and oral, I am satisfied that the factual matrix supports the Respondent’s characterisation of the events. In particular, I attach weight to the evidence of the witness, Mr Keith Cavanagh, who gave clear and unambiguous evidence as to the timing and nature of the decision in question. He confirmed that a review of practices was undertaken and that a decision was made and communicated on 23 November 2023 that “the practice for claiming overtime for travelling had to discontinue.” That evidence was not materially contradicted and provides a clear point in time at which the alleged contravention arose.

In determining the legal effect of that finding, I am guided by the judgment of the High Court in Moran v Employment Appeals Tribunal [2014] IEHC 154. In that case, Keane J. made clear that the statutory time limit runs from the date of the contravention itself and not from the date on which its consequences continue to be experienced. The Court drew a distinction between a continuing contravention and the continuing consequences of an earlier decision, stating that a continuing failure to reverse or remedy a decision “does not constitute a continuing contravention… but rather the continuing consequences of an earlier contravention.”

Applying that principle to the present case, I find that the cessation of the payments in November 2023 constituted the alleged contravention. While the Complainant has continued to experience monetary loss arising from that decision, those losses represent the ongoing effects of the decision rather than a series of new and distinct contraventions within the meaning of the Act.

I am further guided by the decision in Health Service Executive v McDermott [2014] IEHC 331, which emphasises that the jurisdiction of the tribunal is determined by reference to the complaint as presented. In this case, the complaint is clearly framed by reference to the cessation of travel-related overtime on 23 November 2023. It is not pleaded as a series of discrete deductions arising within the six months prior to the presentation of the complaint. In those circumstances, it is not open to recast the complaint as a continuing breach in order to circumvent the statutory time limit.

The Complainant also relied on the fact that he pursued internal grievance and industrial relations processes following the cessation of the payments. While I accept that those processes were engaged in good faith and that the Complainant sought to resolve the matter internally, it is well established that the operation of statutory time limits is not suspended by the pursuit of such processes. I am not satisfied that the circumstances relied upon constitute reasonable circumstances which prevented the presentation of the complaint within time or which would justify an extension of time, notwithstanding the fact that my power to extend the time period is that of a further six months, which is still considerably outside the time period between 23 November 2023 and 30 July 20225.

Having regard to the clear evidence as to the timing of the decision, the manner in which the complaint has been framed, and the binding authority of the High Court, I find that the relevant contravention occurred in November 2023 and that the complaint, having been presented in July 2025, falls well outside the statutory time limit.

Therefore, the complaint is out of time and that I do not have jurisdiction to entertain it.

CA-00073916-001: For the reasons outlined above, the complaint was out of time, and I do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon it.

Payment of Wages Act 1991. Continuing Breach. Out of Time.