Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Aine  Geoghegan

 Tulip Blinds Limited

Representatives

The South Leinster Citizens Information Service

 The Owner

Act

Complaint/Dispute Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973

CA-00071876-001

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

CA-00071876-003

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994

CA-00071876-005

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994.

CA-00071876-006

26/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

CA-00071876-007

26/05/2025

The Complainant was employed as an Office Controller and alleged her employment was terminated because she was pregnant, that she was not given any contract of employment, that there was no mention of a 3 month probationary review prior to her dismissal, that she was due unpaid holidays and that she did not receive her Minimum notice entitlement.

The complainant attended a job interview with Tulip Blinds on the 4th October 2024. She was interviewed by the Respondent and was offered employment and introduced to staff within the company on the same day.

The complainant received an e-mail on 4th October 2024 from the “officer controller” informing the complainant of everything that was discussed and agreed at the interview. There was no mention of a probation period throughout this process.

On 14th October 2024 the complainant commenced employment with Tulip Blinds Ltd..

The complainant was included in the company’s WhatsApp group; this is communication between the respondent and all staff in the company. The complainant states that all calls in the office were monitored by the respondent. The respondent knew everything that was happening in the office including conversations between colleagues and phone conversations with customers.

The agreed hours were 20 hrs per week from 08:30 – 12:30pm five days per week @ €16 per hour.

The complainant received as agreed €20 of fuel each month from the company’s fuel card.

The complaints annual leave entitlements were 11 days per year plus public holidays.

The complainant’s duties included: 

·       Answering the phone,

·       diverting calls to the factory manager,

·       uploading invoices and receipts onto Xero (bookkeeping software),

·       Printed invoices,

·       answered e-mails and live chats,

·       quotes for customers,

·       uploaded orders to the system and sent them to the factory to be made,

·       invoiced customers. 

The complainant stated she never received payments or made payments if a customer wanted to make a payment, she would have to transfer the call to the manager. 

The complainant states she never handled cash, card or Revolut payment or paid any invoices and states she had nothing to do with payroll. The manager handled all of this.

On the 5th December the complainant confided to a colleague at work that she was pregnant. The complainant states it was after this the respondent informed her in the work WhatsApp group that “she would need to work on her production knowledge so you can answer the customer queries with confidence”.  Then the respondent went on to ask her in the WhatsApp group“what is a cord used for”.

On the 18th December 2024 the complainant informed the respondent and the respondent’s wife that she would have to leave early to attend a medical appointment for her daughter.

On the 18th December 2024 while attending her daughter’s medical appointment she had informed her General Practitioner that she was experiencing pain in her stomach. Her GP could not hear a fetal heartbeat and sent the complainant to the maternity hospital for a checkup and signed her out of work for 2 weeks.

On the 19th December 2024 the complainant sent her medical cert to the respondent.

On the 19th December 2024 the complainant sent a text message to the respondent’s wife who works in the company informing her of her pregnancy. This message was sent @ 18:27pm. At 18:35pm a message was deleted by the respondent’s wife, and a reply was sent to the complainant 20:25pm

On 20th December 2024 @ 07:32am the complainant received a reply from the respondent, who informed the complainant of a 3-month review scheduled to take place on the 10th January 2025.  This was the first time the complainant was aware of a review taking place.

On 3rd January 2025 the complainant received a text message from the respondent asking her to confirm if she will be back to work on the 7th January 2025

On the 6th January the complainant texted the respondent to inform him that her GP had signed her out of work until the 15th January 2025.  She also informed the respondent that the first time she had heard of the review was on the 20th December, after informing the respondent that she was pregnant.

On 6th January 2025 @17:11pm the respondent informed the complainant that this review was for all employees and informed the complainant that it had been mentioned at the interview stage.  The complainant has no recollection of this.

On 15th January 2025 @ 10:25am the complainant noticed she was no longer on the work WhatsApp groups “Tulip Managers” and “Tulip Blinds”.

On the 15th January 2025 the complainant received an e-mail from the respondent informing her that they were not going to extend her employment into a permanent position, telling the complainant that “unfortunately accounts don’t seem to be your thing”.  The complainant interpreted this to mean that a review of her position had been carried out in her absence and that her position was now terminated.  The complainant did not go back to work again.

On 9th April 2025, the complainant presented to the SLCIS.

On the 9th April the SLCIS wrote to the respondent seeking reasons for the dismissal

On 11th April the SLCIS received a letter from the respondent informing the service that the review was carried out in her absence, and it was decided that Tulip Blinds would not be offering he a permanent part-time position.

On 28th April the SLCIS made a Data Access Request to the respondent.

On 19th May 2025 SLCIS received a letter from the respondent informing us that:

“I can confirm that all records concerning Aine Geoghegan have been deleted from the computers. I can also confirm that the computer she used (because of running out of storage space) was taken back to factory mode, so we know there is no content that appertains to Aine Geoghegan on that computer. We do have a camera system working, but it does not record anything.”

Also in this  letter the respondent informed SLCIS that if we require information about the complainant’s payroll details we should contact the RDA accountants. 

On 26th May 2025, SLCIS submitted a complaint to the Workplace Relations Commission.

On 26th May 2025, SLCIS submitted a complaint to the Data Protection Commissioner

On 26th May 2025, SLCIS wrote to the respondent asking him if he could contact RDA accountants and enquire about what information they hold regarding the complainant.

On 29th May 2025, the service received correspondence from the respondent seeking clarification of what information they require.

One 16th June 2025 the SLCIS wrote to the respondent informing him of the WRC Complaint had been submitted by the Service on behalf of the complainant. 

On 16th February 2026 SLCIS sent an EE.2 form to the respondent.  To date no reply was received.. 

Probationary / Review Meeting

On the 15th January 2025 the respondent sent an e-mail to the complainant informing her that a review took place and they would not extend her employment into a permanent position. The complainant had no prior warnings or indications that her performance was unsatisfactory.

 The practice and grievance and disciplinary procedures Under the Industrial Relations Act, 1998 must be complied with before any decision is taken by an employer to dismiss an employee during his / her probationary period.

The employer not only has to establish that there were substantial grounds justifying the dismissal but also the extent to which he complied with fair procedures.

These procedures were not adhered to in the complainant’s case. In fact, the complainant was on sick leave when the review took place and was not afforded the opportunity to fair procedures

Employees on probation with less than 12 months’ service are still entitled to fair procedures and natural justice and an employer should, at a minimum, provide the employee with a scaled back form of disciplinary process. 

The Complainant states there was no discussion at the interview stage of a probationary period. There was no training plan prepared nor was there a development plan issued to the complainant. It is clear the respondent failed to properly support the complainant in her employment.

Case Law

The complainant representative introduced  LCR 22301 C & W O’Brien Architects limited / A Worker.  In this case the Labour Courtheld that the employer is not relieved of their obligation to act fairly during a probationary period. The requirements of the code of practice on the grievance and disciplinary procedures made Under 42 of the Industrial Relations Act, must be complied with by the employer to dismiss the complainant before his / her probationary period is completed.  

The employer had failed to have any regard to the code of practice when it dismissed the employee during his probationary period without any due process. 

The complainant representative also introduced  ADJ – 00049088Bretland Construction / Claudia O’ Connor. In this casethe adjudicator did not accept that the complainant’s performance was the reason she was dismissed during her probationary period, it was due to her pregnancy.

“Within five weeks of being notified of her pregnancy, the respondent identified the complainants’ short comings, set out the areas in which he expected her to improve”

Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Act, 1973 -2005

Under the terms of the Minimum Notice and Terms of Employment Acts, 1973-2005, an employee or employer who intends to terminate a contract of employment must provide the other party with specified minimum notice.

The complainant commenced employment with Tulip Blinds Ltd on the 14th October 2024 and her employer ceased her employment on the 15th January 2025.

The complainant is entitled to a one week notice period amount owing €320 gross.

Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

The respondent did not keep statutory employment records.

Under the Act the complainant accrued a statutory minimum annual leave entitlement of approximately 5.2 days during her employment

Pursuant to Section 23 of the Organisation of Working Time 1997, where employment ceases and annual leave remains untaken, the employee is entitled to compensation in lieu of such accrued leave at her normal rate of pay.

Terms and Conditions (Information) Act, 1994

The complainant submits that she did not receive a written statement of her terms of employment, nor did she receive her core terms per section 3 of the Act.

(1)  An employer shall, not later than 2 months after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment (the Act then sets out the required terms that must be given in writing).

The Act states; (4)A statement furnished by an employer under subsection (1) shall be signed and dated by or on behalf of the employer.

Second claim;

(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1) an employer shall, not later that 5 days after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’semployment that is to say:

the full names of the employer and the employee

the address of the employer in the state or, where appropriate of the relevant business of the employer in the state or the companies act, 2014.

in the case of temporary contract of employment, the contract of employment is for a fixed term, the date on which the contract expires.

the title, grade, nature or category of work for which the employee is employed or a brief description of the work.

the date of commencement of the contract of employment.

the duration and conditions relating to a probationary period

the expected duration of the contract, in the case of a temporary contract, or the end date if the contract is a fixed term contract.

the remuneration, including the initial basic amount, any other component elements, if applicable, indicated separately, the frequency and method of payment of the remuneration to which the employee is entitled and the pay reference period for the purposes of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000.

the number of hours the employer reasonably expects the employee to work- per normal working day and per normal working week.

any terms and conditions relating to hours of work (including overtime);

where sections 4B to 4E (in so far as they are in operation) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 apply to the employer, the employers ‘s policy on the manner in which tips or gratuities and mandatory charges (within the meaning of section 1 of that Act) are treated]

the place of work or, where there is no fixed or main place of work, a statement specifying that the employee is employed at various places or is free to determine his or her place of work or to work at various places.

either –

the title, grade, nature or category of work for which the employee is employed, or

(ii) a brief specification or description of the work.

The date of commencement of the employee’s contract of employment.

any terms or conditions relating to hours of work (including overtime).

where a probationary period applies, its duration and condition

(1B) where a statement under subsection (1A) contains an error or omission, the statement shall be regarded as complying with the provisions of that subsection if it is shown that the error or omission was made by way of a clerical mistake or was otherwise made accidentally and in good faith.

(2) Each statement referred to in subsection (1) and (1A) shall be given to the employee notwithstanding that the employee’s employment ends before the end of the period within which the statement is required to be given.

(3) The particulars specified in paragraph (d) of subsection (1A) or paragraphs, (h) , (i),(j),(k) and (I) of the said subsection (1) may be given to the employee in the form of a reference to provisions of statutes or instruments made under statute or of any other laws or of any administrative provisions or collective agreements, governing those particulars which the employee has reasonable opportunities of reading during the course of the employee’s employment or which are reasonable accessible to the employee in some other way. 

(4) A statement furnished by an employer under subsection (1) or (1A) shall be signed and dated by or on behalf of the employer.

(5) A copy of a statement furnished under this section shall be retained by the employer during the period of the employee's employment and for a period of 1 year thereafter.

6B. (1) An employer who, without reasonable cause, fails to provide an employee with a statement required by section 3(1A), within one month of the date of the commencement of that employee’s employment, shall be guilty of an offence.

Employment Equality Act 1998- 2015 and Pregnancy Protection

In addition to breaches outlined above, the complainant submits that under the Employment Equality Act, 1998, she was dismissed on pregnancy grounds.

The definition of discrimination is as per section 6(1) of this Act, discrimination shall be taken to occur where.

(1) person is treated less favourable than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as “the discriminatory grounds”) which –

               i.         exists,

              ii.         existed but no longer exists.

             iii.         may exist in the future, or

            iv.         is imputed to the person concerned “

(2)  as between any 2 persons the discriminatory ground and the description of those grounds for the purposed of this Act) are –

(a) that one is a woman and the other is a man (in this act referred to as “the gender ground”

6(2A) state less favourable treatment on pregnancy or maternity leave is deemed to constitute discrimination on the gender ground,

1. Section – 8 of the Act an employer in relation to –

(a)    access to employment

(b)   conditions of employment

(c)    training or experience for or in relation to employment

(d)   promotion or re-grading, or

(e)   classification of posts

(f)     an employer shall not discriminate

Article 10(2) of the Pregnant Workers Directive provides that where an employee is so dismissed employer must cite “substantiated “grounds for the dismissal. The very fact that a Pregnant workers are dismissed to raise an inference of discrimination which the employer must rebut.

CASE LAW

In its decision, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor jonge Volwassen (VJV- Centrum) C177/88 [1990] ECR I-3941 found un-favourable treatment because of pregnancy is automatically discrimination on the ground of gender, because only women can become pregnant and the employer’s motive are irrelevant.

Equality on grounds of gender is now expressly guaranteed by Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. Article 33.2 of that Charter also incorporates the prohibition of dismissal on grounds of pregnancy established in jurisprudence of the CJEU. It provides

“To reconcile family and professional life, everyone shall have the right to protection from dismissal for a reason connected with maternity and the right to paid maternity leave and to parental leave following the birth or adoption of a child”.

In the case Brown v. Rentokil (C-364/96) the court held that dismissing a woman due to pregnancy related absence also constitutes direct discrimination even if the respondent cites operational or financial reasons.

In Dekker (C-177/88, the CJEU held that refusing to hire a woman because she is pregnant is direct discrimination in Brown v Rentokil extended this principle to dismissal or adverse treatment due to pregnancy related absence, confirming that employer cannot justify such actions on operational or cost grounds. Together, these cases establish that any unfavourable treatment connected to pregnancy – whether hiring, working, or dismissal – is automatically direct discrimination.

Since the decision in the Dekker case, it has strengthened pregnancy discrimination cases by recognising dismissal due to pregnancy as direct discrimination, making it easier for pregnant employees to succeed in their claims and forcing employees to justify dismissal with non- pregnancy reasons.

EU Law in Dekker and related cases protect employees from dismissal because of pregnancy regardless of how long they have been employed. Been on probation does not remove protection against pregnancy discrimination.

The CJEU has clarified that in pregnancy cases:

·       There is no need for a comparator with a male employee

·       Direct discrimination cannot be justified by business needs or operational difficulties

·       The protection applies from the beginning of pregnancy to the end of maternity leave

Section 6(2)a of the Employment Equality Acts identifies gender as a prohibited ground. Irish case law and WRC decision follow the EU approach.

Once the complainant shows adverse treatment during pregnancy /maternity protected period, discrimination is prima facie established If the Respondent cannot provide such evidence discrimination is found

Burden of Proof

Section 85A- Where in any proceeding facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.

The burden of proof shifts to the respondent to prove the treatment was entirely unrelated to pregnancy.

The respondent must provide clear, objective and consistent evidence (e.g. performance issues, misconduct, genuine redundancy affecting others)

Pregnancy-related factors such as absence, cost, or operational inconvenience cannot justify the treatment.

The complainant was dismissed while she was out sick. The respondent had her probationary interview in the absence of the complainant.

The respondent failed to wait until the complainant returned to work to commence with the probationary review. The respondent used “performance issues” as the reason to cease the complainant’s employment. The complainant believes that  in fact the reason was due to her pregnancy.

It is well established that direct discrimination on the gender ground must be assessed on its own facts and does not require a comparison.

The Labour court has expressly adopted this principle in Trailer Care Holdings Ltd v Healy (EDA 128)

“Where the reason for the impugned treatment is pregnancy, no comparator is required, and such treatment automatically constitutes direct discrimination on the gender ground”.

In the case Coughlan V Saint Gobain (EDA0512) employers’ failure to document or communicate concerns made their explanation “not credible”.Timing during pregnancy strengthened the inference of discrimination.

The complainant submits that she was subjected to direct discrimination on gender grounds, contrary to the employment Equality Acts arising from her pregnancy.

The evidence clearly demonstrates that no concerns were raised regarding the complainant’s performance at any stage prior to the 19th December 2024. There were no warnings, no performance discussions, and no indication that her employment was at risk.

On the evening of the 19th December 2024, @ 6:30pm the complainant informed the respondent of her pregnancy.

Within a very short timeframe and without any prior indication of dissatisfaction, her employment was terminated. The proximity in time between the disclosure of pregnancy and the dismissal gives rise to a strong inference of discrimination.

Absence of Fair Procedures

The respondents’ reliance on alleged performance issues is not credible in circumstances where:

Ø  No warnings were issued

Ø  No improvement plan was implemented

Ø  No training or opportunity to improve was provided

Ø  No internal procedures were invoked

Ø  No fair procedures were afforded

Ø  The Complainant was on sick leave at the time of the review

Ø  The dismissal was affected without any meaningful process.

It is submitted that even in circumstances of probation, an employee is entitled to basic meaningful process.

It is well established in both Irish and EU law that pregnancy is afforded special protection, and any unfavourable treatment arising from pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination

Ø  Pregnancy discrimination

Ø  Falls within the gender ground

Ø  Requires no comparator

Ø  Is automatically deemed discriminatory

Burden of Proof

In accordance with Section 85A Employment Equality Acts, the complainant must establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred

Once established, the burden shifts to the respondent. In this case the complainant has established prima facie case based on:

The proximity between pregnancy disclosure and dismissal

The absence of any prior performance concerns

 It is submitted the respondent has failed to discharge this burden.

In light of the above, the complainant respectfully submits that the dismissal was pregnancy related and discriminatory in nature and seeks appropriate redress.

The dismissal occurred immediately after that disclosure, without any fair procedures in line with established Irish and EU Law, this gives rise to a clear inference of discrimination which the respondent has failed to rebut. The only thing that changed was her pregnancy.

 In the Respondents written submission prior to the Hearing a preliminary issue regarding the Name of the Respondent was raised but the Hearing was informed this was prepared by an outside company and the Owner was not conversant with it and agreed the Respondent was Tulip Blinds Ltd.

 Respondent Statement of Events

Tulip Blinds Ltd is a family-run blinds manufacturer and supplier based in Timahoe, County Laois. The Company has over 40 years of experience providing made-to-measure blinds and window shading solutions for homes and businesses across Ireland.

Tulip Blinds Ltd has been in financial difficulty for some time, which is clear from the Company accounts filed publicly. I am well beyond retirement age, but I have continued to keep the Company operating in order to protect the jobs of our employees. However, I am now seriously reconsidering whether I can continue trading as a going concern. If the company cannot continue, it would unfortunately result in the loss of jobs for the other employees.

 Ms. Aine Geoghegan (the Claimant) has raised 6 claims against Tulip Blinds Ltd (the Respondent) that of;

 CA-00071876-001 — Minimum Notice under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 

While Aine (the Claimant) had just accrued 13 weeks’ service, she was absent and not actively working at the time her employment terminated. In the circumstances, she had no loss of earnings, and we deny that any entitlement to payment in lieu of notice exists.

 CA-00071876-002 — Discrimination / Equality / Equal Status under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998 

It was outlined to Aine during the interview process that her employment would be subject to a three month review period, as applies to all employees. During the two month period in which Aine was actively present at work, Mr. Fisher had a number of conversations with Aine regarding concerns with her performance and errors arising in the course of her duties. These concerns included administration errors, confusion between the various companies within the group, issues with customer interactions and telephone manner, together with concerns regarding her overall suitability for the role.

Aine’s employment was ultimately terminated due to these ongoing performance and conduct concerns and was in no way connected to her absence on sick leave. Mr. Fisher was acting in accordance with the Company’s standard review process and procedures, which apply equally to all employees during their probationary period.

 CA-00071876-003 — Hours of Work under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

 Upon further review, it appears that Aine may be entitled to additional hours of annual leave pay, which the I am willing to process and pay without delay. I believe this is a total of €332.80.

 CA-00071876-005 — Terms and Conditions of Employment under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 

Mr. Fisher presented Aine with a copy of her Contract of Employment by hand on her first day in the office. As per the contract is clearly states a three month review process applicable to all employees.

 CA-00071876-006 — Terms and Conditions of Employment under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 

As outlined in Claim 005, Mr. Fisher personally gave Aine a copy of her Contract of Employment, which would not require a 5 day statement to be issued. 

 CA-00071876-007 — Discrimination / Equality / Equal Status under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998

The company denies that Aine was dismissed for any reason connected to pregnancy, maternity related illness, gender, family status, or any protected ground under the Employment Equality Acts.

Aine commenced employment on 14th October 2025 and was subject to a probationary period of three months as set out in her Contract of Employment.

The Company applies a standard three month probationary period to all new employees commencing their employment. The Complainant was treated no differently in this regard and was subject to the same probationary review process, standards, and assessment procedures as all other employees during their probationary period. This is as per the contract provided. 

From an early stage of employment, concerns arose regarding Aine’s performance.

As mentioned above, during the interview process that her employment would be subject to a three month review period, as applies to all employees. During the two month period in which Aine was actively present at work, Mr. Fisher had a number of conversations with her regarding concerns with her performance and errors arising in the course of her duties. These concerns included administration errors, confusion between the various companies within the group, issues with customer interactions and telephone manner, together with concerns regarding her overall suitability for the role.

Aine was provided with support, guidance, and feedback regarding these concerns during her employment. Despite these interventions, the Company formed the view that the required standard of performance had not been achieved and that Aine was not suitable for continued employment beyond probation.

The Company further notes that it was only when Aine commenced a period of sick leave that the Company became aware of her pregnancy and/or pregnancy related medical issues. Prior to this, Aine had not informed the Company that she was pregnant. The Company maintains that the decision regarding her employment was based solely on performance concerns and was entirely unrelated to her pregnancy or any pregnancy related illness as claims by Aine. 

It is important to note that there was no contractual entitlement to payment beyond statutory sick leave requirements, however Aine was paid for the entirety of her sick leave absence. These payments were made as a gesture of goodwill and support by the Company during her period of illness.

These payments were made despite the Company experiencing financial losses at the relevant time, a position which remains ongoing. The payments were authorised personally by Mr. Fisher in circumstances where the Company tried to support Aine during her absence. This further demonstrates that the Company acted reasonably and supportively toward Aine and that her pregnancy related illness was not treated adversely in any way.

For the avoidance of any doubt, Aine’s pregnancy, or pregnancy related illness, or related absence did not form any part of the decision making process regarding the termination of employment. 

In conclusion, Aine was dismissed due to performance concerns during her probation period. She was given a contract of employment, which clearly set out the probation terms, and we do not believe she was entitled to minimum notice in the circumstances. We also believe the claims were made against the wrong Company name and that no discrimination took place. A payment of €332.80 for annual leave remains due and can be paid immediately.

The Evidence;

The Complainant gave evidence that she had to attend a medical appointment on December 18th 2024 due to complications and had to leave work. The Complainant was put on sick leave by her GP and informed the Respondent on December 19th that she was certified sick. On December 20th she was informed by the Respondent that she had a 3 month review due. She stated she had never been informed of mistakes or performance issues up to then. She advised the review was conducted on January 15th 2025 without the presence of the Complainant. She stated she was protected under the pregnancy ground of the Act and had no job to go back to. She advised she contacted Mr. Fisher by text on December 19th 2024 but got no reply and then texted his wife Ms. Linda Boland, also a Director of the Company with her medical certificate and was told to take her time to deal with her issue. The Complainant outlined her duties and advised she dealt with wages, sales ledger, emails, answering the phone and working with the Factory. She advised she was offered the job at the interview, there was no mention of a probation review and she got no contract of employment. She was advised she was introduced to staff on the same day and she was the only female employee. She advised Mr. Fisher was her Supervisor and if he was away he monitored phone calls and the cameras on site. She advised she got minimum training and was not shown the products. She advised her performance was never reviewed verbally or in writing and she received no warnings. She advised she was never informed her performance was below expectations.  She advised there was not an issue with her work prior to her notifying the company of her pregnancy on December 19th. She advised she did not hear back after being informed of the 3 month review. She advised she never heard of any performance review prior to informing the company of her pregnancy. She advised she noticed she was removed from the Company Whats App on January 15th 2025. She advised she received an email stating she was being let go as “Accounts was not your thing”. The Complainant told the Hearing she had nothing to do with wages or cash payments. She advised she was not invited to any performance review or given the right of appeal of the decision to terminate her employment. She advised she was shocked and surprised and she worked part time because it suited her family life. She advised she had nothing to do with wages and did not pay any invoices. The Complainant added that she had medical issues previously with her daughter and when did not feel right she went to the GP who sent her immediately to the Maternity Hospital.

Mr. Bill Fisher, Owner gave evidence to the Hearing. He advised the computer with the employment information relating to the Complainant was scrubbed to clear it up for a new system and that the Accountant did all the wages. He advised he interviewed the Complainant and everyone was given a three month trial. He advised the contract of employment was handed to the Complainant but did not recall if it was him or the Production Manager that left it on her desk. In reply to the Adjudicators querying his recollection of events he advised he must have left it on the Complainants desk. He advised the Complainant inputted invoices and answered phones and did not do wages. He advised the Respondent had two companies, one in Ireland and one in the UK, and she had to deal with both of the companies as they were run from the same office. He advised the Complainant would have had a review if she had been at work. He advised the Complainant had an ill child and kept sending in sick certs and he had no chance to meet her and do the probation review. He advised the Complainant was mixing up the invoices for the two companies. He advised the business was a business to business activity that required good performance. He advised he felt the Complainant was quite foul mouthed at times and she did not understand accounts. He advised bookwork was the main reason for not extending her probation. In relation to holidays due he accepted that what was claimed was due as they did not have the records to dispute this. He advised if they did have a sit down review the Complainants employment would not have been made permanent as she did not have the right personality for their business and he felt she was not going to grow into the employee they required. He advised most employee are long term and that he dd not even know the Complainant was pregnant and that his wife was involved in taking the decision to terminate the employment and she never informed him that the Complainant was pregnant. 

Mr. Fisher was cross examined by the Respondent Representative, Ms. Christine Guilfoyle. He was asked to confirm that the Complainant sent a medical cert on December 19th and he confirmed it was sent to his wife. He was asked why the Complainants message was deleted by his wife at 18.35 and agree they sent a reply on December 21st regarding the 3 month probation review. He replied and said he was not in business communication with his wife at the time. He was asked why the Respondent did not pay the Complainant notice pay and he stated there was no loss of earnings. He was asked was he aware his action meant the Complainant lost her entitlement to maternity benefits and rights and he replied he did not know if she had those rights or not. He advised the contract was produced by a HR contracted company and he recalled informing the Complainant verbally of her 3 month review. He was asked what documentation exists about the 3 month review and he stated he verbally informed her the review was getting close. He was asked did he inform her before the 19th December and he replied as far as he remembers. He was asked what letter was sent about the review and he said it was by what’s app. He was asked was the decision made to dismiss prior to December 19th and he advised the Complainant was not there to conduct her probation review. He was asked why there was no documentation evidence before the dismissal regarding performance, and he advised they were a small company. He advised following a review they employed a HR Company to get their paperwork in order. He replied that he had left the contract on the Complainants desk and she had had signed it. Mr. Fisher was asked what role his wife played in the Company and he advised she was a shareholder and Director and worked in the company every now and then. The Complainant Representative questioned his leaving of the contract on the Complainants desk and put it to Mr. Fisher he never issued the contract which he denied.

Ms. Linda Boland, Director than asked to be put into evidence. She advised she used to work full time but since her Daughter had a medical issue in 2023 she only worked part time. She advised her Husband was away a lot in South America on business. She advised she received a text on December 19th from the Complainant that said she was at the hospital and she understood this to be with her daughter and it said they found no heart beat and she stated she did not know the Complainant was pregnant and did not know what to say and they should talk when she was better. She advised she regretted what she said but did not know what to say. She advised she did not say it until 8.30 that night as she was looking after her daughter.

With regard to the probation review she advised she remembers being in the office and joking about giving the Complainant the answers for the review and it would be a written test. She regretted not being in the office at the time as she would have followed up on the contract issue.  Ms. Boland stated that in the past they employed someone that was pregnant a Ms. A, and it involved allowing her work from home to facilitate her circumstances and that being pregnant was never going to be an issue with the Company as they employ 7 people and treat staff like family and with great flexibility. She advised they felt bad the Complainant lost out on maternity benefits and things would have been different if she had been at work. She advised previously they allowed staff bring their children to work if the circumstances needed it. Ms Boland remembered a conversation with the Complainant about codes as they were new to her and accepted she did not have a probation review with the Complainant. She stated that if she had been there at the time things would have ben handled differently. She advised that she told the Complainant at interview of the need to pay on time and she noticed some invoices were not posted and some deadlines were not met. She advised if she had sat the Complainant down she would probably have explained what she was good at and what she was not good at. She advised that if she had been at work at the time she would have followed a process. She noted the Complainant was off sick until the end of January. On cross examination Ms. Boland stated it was not clear from the Complainants Whats app that she was pregnant and the message did not say she was pregnant.

Findings;

In assessing the evidence provided in this case there is a major conflict in that the Respondent stated they were not informed the Complainant was pregnant either verbally or in the Whats App message she sent. It was also disputed by the Complainant that she was ever told about a 3 month probation period or review. It was also disputed if the Complainant ever got a contract of employment. The one provided by the Respondent was unsigned by either party and therefore has little if any evidential merit. What is clear is the Complainants employment was terminated while pregnant without any face to face meeting being held and there was no opportunity given for her to address any of the stated performance issues that the Respondent maintained in their evidence. There was no explanation, other than Ms. Boland not being at work due to personal family issues or not waiting until the Complainant returned to work after her illness, to conduct a review and offer an opportunity for the Complainant to address any issues the Respondent might have had with her duties/performance. Ms. Boland’s evidence regarding the past hiring of a pregnant woman was noted and while her concerns regarding the Complainant seemed sincere, it does not excuse the manner in which the Complainants employment was ended. Ending an employment relationship by an Employer by a Email message is not best practice, to state the obvious.  Overall, I am satisfied that the Complainant has established a prima facia case of discrimination and that the Respondents position, while being within a band of possible reasonable scenarios, it does not pass the basic rationale test and even if proof of notification of the Complainants pregnancy was at issue, the Complainants version of events are much more credible. I am not convinced by the Respondents Directors argument they were unaware of the Complainants pregnancy but even if this were so, the fact the Respondent never met the Complainant to discuss her performance or end her employment means they deprived themselves of the opportunity to establish the facts of her pregnancy/circumstances and deprived the Complainant the opportunity to plead her side of the case. I am also convinced that to base the review and termination of employment of a person who was not in attendance at work on a clause in an unsigned contract of employment was another sign of poor practice and judgement by the Respondent. If the Respondent was going to rely on a clause relating to a probationary period in a contract to terminate the employment, it is clearly evident it should not have relied on a completely unsigned contract, by both parties

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994   CA-00071876 -005

Section 3 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act provides an outline of what an employer is required to provide to an employee.  It states as follows:

“3.—(1) An employer shall, not later than one month after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment, that is to say—

(…)

(fa) a reference to any registered employment agreement or employment regulation order which applies to the employee and confirmation of where the employee may obtain a copy of such agreement or order,

…

(ga) that the employee may, under section 23 of the National Minimum Wage Act, 2000, request from the employer a written statement of the employee’s average hourly rate of pay for any pay reference period as provided in that section,]

(h) the length of the intervals between the times at which remuneration is paid, whether a week, a month or any other interval,

…

(j) any terms or conditions relating to paid leave (other than paid sick leave),

(k) any terms or conditions relating to—

(i) incapacity for work due to sickness or injury and paid sick leave, and

(ii) pensions and pension schemes,

(l) the period of notice which the employee is required to give and entitled to receive (whether by or under statute or under the terms of the employee’s contract of employment) to determine the employee’s contract of employment or, where this cannot be indicated when the information is given, the method for determining such periods of notice,

(m) a reference to any collective agreements which directly affect the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment including, where the employer is not a party to such agreements, particulars of the bodies or institutions by whom they were made,

(n) the training entitlement, if any, provided by the employer,

(o) in the case of a temporary contract of employment, the identity of the user undertakings (within the meaning of Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 November 20085 on temporary agency work), when and as soon as known, and

(p) if the work pattern of an employee is entirely or mostly unpredictable, the statement shall inform the employee of —

(i) the principle that the work schedule is variable, the number of guaranteed paid hours and the remuneration for work performed in addition to those guaranteed hours,

(ii) the reference hours and days within which the employee may be required to work, and

(iii) the minimum notice period to which the employee is entitled to before the start of a work assignment and, where applicable, the deadline for notification in accordance with section 17 of the Organisation of Working Time Act 1997, and

(q) where it is the responsibility of the employer, the identity of the social security institutions receiving the social insurance contributions attached to the contract of employment and any protection relating to social security provided by the employer.”

and

“(1A) Without prejudice to subsection (1), an employer shall, not later than 5 days after the commencement of an employee’s employment with the employer, give or cause to be given to the employee a statement in writing containing the following particulars of the terms of the employee’s employment, that is to say:

(a) the full names of the employer and the employee;

(b) the address of the employer in the State or, where appropriate, the address of the principal place of the relevant business of the employer in the State or the registered office (within the meaning of the Companies Act 2014);

(c) in the case of a temporary contract of employment, the expected duration thereof or, if the contract of employment is for a fixed term, the date on which the contract expires;

(d) the remuneration, including the initial basic amount, any other component elements, if applicable, indicated separately, the frequency and method of payment of the remuneration to which the employee is entitled and the pay reference period for the purposes of the National Minimum Wage Act 2000;

(e) the number of hours which the employer reasonably expects the employee to work—

(i) per normal working day, and

(ii) per normal working week;

(f) where sections 4B to 4E (in so far as they are in operation) of the Payment of Wages Act 1991 apply to the employer, the employer’s policy on the manner in which tips or gratuities and mandatory charges (within the meaning of section 1 of that Act) are treated,

(g) the place of work or, where there is no fixed or main place of work, a statement specifying that the employee is employed at various places or is free to determine his or her place of work or to work at various places;

(h) either—

(i) the title, grade, nature or category of work for which the employee is employed, or

(ii) a brief specification or description of the work; 

(i) the date of commencement of the employee’s contract of employment;

(j) any terms or conditions relating to hours of work (including overtime);

(k) where a probationary period applies, its duration and conditions.

(1B) Where a statement under subsection (1A) contains an error or omission, the statement shall be regarded as complying with the provisions of that subsection if it is shown that the error or omission was made by way of a clerical mistake or was otherwise made accidentally and in good faith.”

The Complainant claimed she never received a contact of employment and the Respondent submitted an unsigned contract that the Owner in his evidence to the Hearing was unsure whether he or the Production Manager had left it on the Complainants desk when she started. I find the Complainants evidence more credible, her claim well founded and I award the Complainant the maximum award of 4 weeks pay for the failure to provide a written contract within one month of the start date and the compensation awarded is 1,280 Euros.. 

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994   CA-00071876 -006

Section 3 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act 1994 was amended by the Employment (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2018 (as per above).  The amended provisions require an employer, within five days of an employee’s start date, to provide them with a statement containing certain core information regarding hours of work, pay, the type of contract on offer and the name and address of the employer and in particularly important in this case a clause relating to any probationary term.  The Respondent alleged they provided  an unsigned document which (broadly) fulfils these requirements and included a clause regarding probation. The Complainant denied ever receiving the contract. I find the Complainants evidence more credible, her claim well founded and award her the maximum award of 4 weeks pay amounting to 1,280 Euros compensation for breach of this part of the Act..

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997  CA-00071876 -003.

The Complainant sought the payment of unpaid holidays of 332.80 Euros and the Respondent following a review agreed that 332.80 Euros was due.  I find the claim well founded and I award the Complainant 332.80 Euros.

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973  CA-00071876-001

The Law; Minimum period of notice.

“4.—(1) An employer shall, in order to terminate the contract of employment of an employee who has been in his continuous service for a period of thirteen weeks or more, give to that employee a minimum period of notice calculated in accordance with the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.

(2) The minimum notice to be given by an employer to terminate the contract of employment of his employee shall be—

(a) if the employee has been in the continuous service of his employer for less than two years, one week,”

The Complainant was employed for just a few days over 13 weeks and her employment was terminated without notice. The Respondents argument that because the Complainant was not at work is not relevant to their requirement to provide one weeks notice as the Complainant was consecutively employed even while on sick leave. I find that the Complainant was entitled to one weeks notice  irrespective of whether she was at work or on sick leave as per the Act and the Respondent did not comply with the Act. Her employment was terminated while she was on unpaid sick leave and thus depriving her of the opportunity to return to work and receive notice while being paid.  I find the claim well founded and I award the Complainant compensation of one weeks pay amounting to 320 Euros.

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 77 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998  CA-00071876-007

6.—F14(1) For the purposes of this Act and without prejudice to its provisions relating to discrimination occurring in particular circumstances discrimination shall be taken to occur where—

(a) a person is treated less favourably than another person is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on any of the grounds specified in subsection (2) (in this Act referred to as the "discriminatory grounds") which—

(i) exists,

(ii) existed but no longer exists,

(iii) may exist in the future, or

(iv) is imputed to the person concerned,

(b) a person who is associated with another person—

(i) is treated, by virtue of that association, less favourably than a person who is not so associated is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation, and

(ii) similar treatment of that other person on any of the discriminatory grounds would, by virtue of paragraph (a), constitute discrimination.

(2) As between any 2 persons, the discriminatory grounds (and the descriptions of those grounds for the purposes of this Act) are—

(a) …

(c) that one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”),

The complainant submits that he was dismissed because he had a discussion about paternity leave this claim is taken on the ground of family status asserting that he had exercised his entitlement to paternity leave and was dismissed for doing so.

The Employment Equality Act 1998 prohibits discrimination as between any two persons in employment on the following nine grounds as contained in Section 6 (2) of the Act as follows:

(c)     That one has family status and the other does not (in this Act referred to as “the family status ground”).

Section 85A (1) of the Act provides: -

85A.— (1) Where in any proceeding’s facts are established by or on behalf of a Complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the Respondent to prove the contrary.

It is clear from Section 85A (1) of the Act above that the burden of proof is on the Complainant. If the case meets the threshold set out above, then the burden of proof shifts and it is on the Respondent to rebut the presumption of discrimination.

This view is consistent with the decision of the Labour Court in Mitchell v. Southern Health Board [2001] ELR 201, where it was held thar:

“The first requirement […] is that the claimant must “establish facts” from which it may be presumed that the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them.  This indicates that a claimant must prove, on the balance of probabilities, the primary facts on which they rely in seeking to raise a presumption of unlawful discrimination. 

It is only if these primary facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, and they are regarded by the Court as being of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination, that the onus shifts to the Respondent to prove that there is no infringement of the principle of equal treatment.”

Section 85A (1) provides as follows:

—(1) “Where in any proceedings facts are established by or on behalf of a complainant from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him or her, it is for the respondent to prove the contrary.”

In Margetts v. Graham Anthony & Company Limited [EDA038] the evidential burden which must be discharged by a complainant before a prima facie case of discrimination can be said to have been established was outlined by the Labour Court as follows:

“The law requires the complainant to establish facts from which it may be inferred that discrimination has taken place.  The appellant must, on the balance of probabilities, prove those facts from which such inferences can be drawn.  When these facts are established to the satisfaction of the Court, the onus shifts to the respondent to show, on the balance of probabilities, that it did not discriminate against the appellant.  The mere fact that the complainant falls within one of the discriminatory grounds laid down under the Act is not sufficient in itself to establish a claim of discrimination.  The complainant must adduce other facts from which it may be inferred on the balance of probabilities that an act of discrimination has occurred.”

The Labour Court in the case of Melbury v. Valpeters [EDA0917] held as follows in its consideration of section 85(A):

“…provides for the allocation of the probative burden in cases within its ambit.  This requires that the Complainant must first establish facts from which discrimination may be inferred.  What those facts are will vary from case to case and there is no closed category of facts, which can be relied upon.  All that is required is that they be of sufficient significance to raise a presumption of discrimination.  However, they must be established as facts on credible evidence.  Mere speculations, unsupported by evidence, cannot be elevated to a factual basis upon which an inference of discrimination can be drawn.  Section 85A places the burden of establishing the primary facts fairly and squarely on the Complainant and the language of this provision admits of no exceptions to that evidential rule.”  

This requires a complainant to establish, in the first instance, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been discrimination in relation to him.  If he succeeds in so doing, then, and only then, is it for the respondent to prove the contrary.  The Labour Court has consistently held that the facts from which the occurrence of discrimination may be inferred must be of “sufficient significance” before a prima facie case is established and the burden of proof shifts to a respondent.  “Prima facie” evidence is evidence which in the absence of any contradictory evidence would lead any reasonable person to conclude that a discrimination had occurred.

Based on my Findings set out above I conclude that the Complainant has established a prima facia case of discrimination on the pregnancy ground and the Respondent’s position lacks credibility with regard to the provision of a contract of employment to the Complainant which included a 3 month probationary review and to their evidence that they were unaware of the Complainants pregnancy. Also, if the Respondent did have issues with the Complainants performance they did not give the Complainant any formal opportunity to be advised of this and address it and could not offer any written evidence of advising the Complainant of performance issues. My overall conclusion from the evidence provided to me is the Complainants employment was terminated after she notified the Respondent of her pregnancy on December 19th.I have given careful consideration to the amount of compensation that is reasonable in this case and concluded that taking all matters into consideration compensation of 5,000 Euros is the just and equitable compensation. I find the Complainant was discriminated against and award her 5,000 Euros compensation.

Section 41 of the Workplace Relations Act 2015 requires that I make decisions in relation to the complaints in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under Schedule 6 of that Act.:

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 12 of the Minimum Notice & Terms of Employment Act, 1973 

I find the complaint well founded and I award the Complainant one weeks pay amounting to 320 Euros. CA-00071876-001

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 27 of the Organisation of Working Time Act, 1997

I find the complaint well founded and I award the Complainant unpaid pay of 332.80 Euros. CA-00071876 -003

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 

  I find the complaint well founded and award the Complainant the maximum award of 4 weeks compensation which equates to 1,280 Euros.  CA-00071786 -005    

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under section 7 of the Terms of Employment (Information) Act, 1994 

I find the complaint well founded and award the Complainant 1,280  Euros compensation.   CA-00071876 -006 

Section 79 of the Employment Equality Acts, 1998 – 2015 requires that I make a decision in relation to the complaint in accordance with the relevant redress provisions under section 82 of the Act. :

I find the Complainant was discriminated against and award her 5,000 Euros compensation. CA-00071876-007

Discrimination