UDD2545

PARTIES:

DIVISION:

SUBJECT:

Appeal of Adjudication Officer Decision No's: ADJ-00043074 (CA-00053475-002)

BACKGROUND:

The Worker appealed the Decision of the Adjudication Officer to the Labour Court on 23 January 2024 in accordance with Section 8A of the Unfair Dismissals Act 1977 to 2015.

A Labour Court hearing took place on 9 December 2025.

The following is the Decision of the Court.

DECISION:

1. Background to the Appeal

This is an appeal by Caitlin Nichiaradh against a Decision of an Adjudication Officer (number ADJ-00043074, CA-000534745 -002) under the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977 (“The Act”) against her former employer, Moyross Community Enterprise Centre (Moyross Adult Education).

Caitlin Nichiaradh referred her complaint under the Act to the Workplace Relations Commission (WRC) on 29 October 2022. The Adjudication Officer found that the complaint was out of time. Caitlin Nichiaradh appealed that decision to the Labour Court. A virtual hearing was held in Dublin on 9 December 2025. The Court heard six linked appeals on the same date.

For ease, the parties are referred to in this Determination as they were at first instance. Hence, Caitlin Nichiaradh is referred to as “the Complainant” and Moyross Community Enterprise Centre (Moyross Adult Education) as “the Respondent”.

1. Preliminary Matter

A preliminary matter was raised by the Respondent in relation to the time limits under the Act for lodging a complaint. Rule 34 of the Labour Court Rules provides that: -

“The Court may, in its discretion, give a preliminary ruling on any aspect of the case where it is satisfied that time and expense may be saved by the giving of such a ruling and/or where it has the potential to be determinative of the case”.

By agreement with the parties, the Court proposed that it would hear and decide the preliminary matter in the first instance. It advised the parties if it decided that the complaint was lodged to the WRC within time, a further hearing would be scheduled to consider the substantive appeal. If the Court decided that the complaint was lodged outside the time limits set down in the Act, the appeal would be out of time and statute barred.

2. Position of the Respondent

The Complainant’s employment terminated on 29 April 2022, when she received her last payment. She was paid for her statutory public holiday entitlement on 2 May 2022, even though her contract of employment ended on 29 April 2022.

The Complainant failed to file her complaint within the 6-month statutory timeline. She filed her complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act on 29 October 2022, which is therefore is out of time.  She later lodged a second complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act on 26 April 2023 which is also out of time. 

The established case law places an onus on the Complainant to identify the reason for the delay and to establish that the reason relied upon provides a justifiable excuse for the actual delay. The Complainant has not established reasonable cause for her failure to present the complaints within 6 months. At the WRC hearing, she said that she was not aware of the urgency. The Complainants’ inactions, as confirmed by her own statements, demonstrate that she has failed to establish ‘reasonable cause’ for an extension of time.

3. Position of the Complainant

The Complainant’s termination date for the purposes of the Act was 2 May 2022. The termination date of 29 April 2022 cited in the Complainant’s contract of employment is an error. At the outset of her employment, the Respondent agreed to employ the Complainant for at least 2 years. This constituted an express term of her employment. This is supported in the relevant scheme guidelines which refer to the scheme as a two-year scheme. 

Furthermore, the Complainant attended a meeting in April 2022 with the Respondent where an extension to her contract was agreed. The Complainant was subsequently invited to a second meeting on 27 April 2022 to finalise the extension of her contract.  Instead of signing the contract, she was informed that her employment would end two days later 29 April 2022. The Complainant was paid up to and including 2 May 2022, which constitutes the last day of employment.

Her complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act was lodged within six months of the 2 May 2022 termination date. The Complainant delayed in submitting her complaints to the WRC because she contracted Covid in August 2022. She contacted the Citizens Advice Service for advice but did not submit a claim until October, as she had long Covid.

When she lodged her initial complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act to the WRC she may have ticked some boxes in error.  As a result, the Complainant lodged fresh complaints under several enactments to the WRC on 26 April 2023.

4. Relevant Law - Time Limits

Section 41(6) and 41 (8) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015, provides as follows:

“(6) Subject to subsection (8), an adjudication officer shall not entertain a complaint referred to him or her under this section if it has been presented to the Director General after the expiration of the period of 6 months beginning on the date of the contravention to which the complaint relates.”

“(8) An adjudication officer may entertain a complaint or dispute to which this section applies presented or referred to the Director General after the expiration of the period referred to in subsection (6) or (7) (but not later than 6 months after such expiration), as the case may be, if he or she is satisfied that the failure to present the complaint or refer the dispute within that period was due to reasonable cause.”

5. Deliberations

The Complainant lodged an initial complaint under the Unfair Dismissals Act to the WRC on 29 October 2022. Therefore, the relevant period for consideration by the Court when assessing a contravention of the Act, having regard to the six-month statutory time frame set down at Section 41(6) of the Workplace Relations Act, 2015, is the period from 30 April 2022 to 29 October 2022.

The Complainant contends the complaint was lodged in time as her employment ended on 2 May 2022, which falls within the statutory six-month timeframe. The termination date is disputed.

The Respondent relies on the contract of employment signed by both parties which states a commencement date of 3 May 2021 and that “the appointment is for a fixed term of 52 weeks and the expiry date is 29th April 2022.” The Complainant contends that termination date cited in the contract was an error as the contract was intended as a 52-week contract, which would logically end on 2 May 2022.

In response to questions for the Court, the Complainant accepted that she signed the fixed-term contract with an expiry date of 29 April 2022 and agreed to be bound by its terms.  Notwithstanding her contention that the termination of 29 April 2022 cited in her contract of employment was an error, she accepted that she never raised any issues with the Respondent in relation to that matter.

While the Complainant referred to other documentation which she said supported her contention that her employment ceased on 2 May 2022, no such documentation was provided to the Court. The Respondent refuted the existence of any document citing a termination date later than 29 April 2022.  The payment date on last payslip issued to the Complainant is dated 28 April 2022.

Based on the evidence submitted, and in the absence of any evidence indicating another termination date, the Court is satisfied that the Complainant’s employment terminated on 29 April 2022, in accordance with the terms of her fixed-term contract of employment. It follows, therefore, that the within complaint, when lodged to the WRC on 29 October 2022, was out of time, having regard to Section 41(6) of the 2015 Act.

The timeframe for considering when a contravention occurred can be extended from six months to twelve months for reasonable cause. Notwithstanding the Complainant’s reliance on 2 May 2022 as her termination date, she seeks an extension of the timeframe for lodging her complaint to the WRC on the basis that her failure to present a complaint within time was due to reasonable cause.

The Complainant submits that the reason for the delay in lodging her complaint to the WRC on 29 October 2022 was because she was suffering from long Covid around that time and was not aware of the urgency around submitting a complaint within the statutory time frames. The Court notes that she secured advice from the Citizens Advice Centre before submitting her complaint. Furthermore, no evidence was provided to the Court to support the Complainant’s contentions that she was suffering from a medical ailment or condition that prevented her lodging a complaint to the WRC in time. While ignorance on the part of the Complainant about the appeal process may explain a delay in submitting an appeal under the Act, this Court has regularly found that ignorance of the law cannot excuse the lodging of complaints outside the statutory time limits that apply.

The established test for deciding if an extension of time can be granted for reasonable cause is that formulated by this Court in Labour Court Determination DWT0338, Cementation Skanska (Formerly Kvaerner Cementation) v Carroll.  The test was set out as follows:

“It is the Court's view that in considering if reasonable cause exists, it is for the claimant to show that there are reasons which both explain the delay and afford an excuse for the delay. The explanation must be reasonable, that is to say it must make sense, be agreeable to reason and not be irrational or absurd. In the context in which the expression reasonable cause appears in the statute it suggests an objective standard, but it must be applied to the facts and circumstances known to the claimant at the material time. The claimant’s failure to present the claim within the six-month time limit must have been due to the reasonable cause relied upon. Hence there must be a causal link between the circumstances cited and the delay and the claimant should satisfy the Court, as a matter of probability, that had those circumstances not been present he would have initiated the claim in time.”

The burden of proof in establishing the existence of reasonable cause rests with the Complainant. To discharge that burden, and for this Court to grant an extension of time, the Complainant must both explain the delay and offer a justifiable excuse for the delay.  The Complainant must establish a causal connection between the reason for the delay and the failure to present the complaint in time. Finally, the Court must satisfy itself that the complaint would have been presented in time if not for the factors relied upon as reasonable cause. It is the actual delay that must be explained and justified.

The Court finds that no adequate explanation was provided to explain what prevented the Complainant from lodging a complaint to the WRC in time. In all the circumstances, the Court finds that the Complainant does not meet the threshold outlined in Cementation Skanksa whereby the statutory timeframe within which he is permitted to refer his complaint under the Act can be enlarged for reasonable cause.

It is well settled that an application for an extension of time must both explain the delay and provide a justifiable excuse for the delay. While the reasons submitted by the Complainant in this case may explain the delay, the Court finds that they do not provide afford a justifiable excuse for the delay.

The Court cannot assume a jurisdiction which is not conferred to it. A failure on the part of a Complainant to present a complaint in time deprives the Adjudication Officer, and this Court on appeal, of jurisdiction to hear the claim. As a result, the Court finds that it has no jurisdiction to hear the complaint.

6. Finding

 The Court finds that the reasons provided by the Complainant are not sufficient to demonstrate reasonable cause for the delay in filing her complaint under the Act to the WRC.  Therefore, the Court finds that the within claim was out of time when it was presented to the Workplace Relations Commission and is accordingly statute barred. In these circumstances, the Court cannot proceed to hear the substantive matter.

The complaint is not well founded. The appeal is rejected, and the Decision of the Adjudication Officer is upheld.

The Court so decides.

	Signed on behalf of the Labour Court
	Katie Connolly
AR	______________________
23 December 2025	Deputy Chairman

NOTE

Enquiries concerning this Decision should be addressed to Mr Aidan Ralph, Court Secretary.