Complainant

Respondent

Parties

Camila  Nascimento Machado

Academic Bridge Limited

Representatives

Barry O’Mahony B.L. instructed by McGrath Mullan LLP

Eoin Morris B.L. instructed by MP Moloney Solicitors

Act

Complaint Reference No.

Date of Receipt

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071326-001

06/05/2025

Complaint seeking adjudication by the Workplace Relations Commission under Section 8 of the Unfair Dismissals Act, 1977

CA-00071588-001

14/05/2025

The complainant isaBraziliannational who commenced employment with the respondent onSeptember 5th, 2019.

She was initially engaged as a part time accounts assistant and on January 28th, 2022, she was promoted to the role of Financial Director.

The respondent business had been newly acquired by the current owner when significant debts were identified which required implementation oof cost reductions.

The complainant was made redundant. Until her dismissal, on thegrounds of redundancy, her salary was €64,000 per annum. Hercontractofemploymententitleshertopaymentof80%ofsalaryduringthe first 26 weeks of maternity leave.

The respondent submits that the dismissal of the complainant was solely on the grounds of redundancy and was not unfair. It resulted by reason of the redundancy of the employee.

The background was the revelation of significant undisclosed/underdeclared tax liabilities following a change in ownership around September 2024 with significant tax liabilities creating significant risk to the company's solvency. This necessitated financial restructuring, specifically related to the largest overhead: staffing. The redundancy of the complainant was an impersonal act involving commercial necessity and change, and not a discriminatory or retaliatory measure alleged by the complainant.

The subsequent elimination of the single Financial Director position and the reassignment of its duties to the company's Director, Mr. Shafikul Islam, directly demonstrates a genuine structural change mandated by the financial collapse of the underlying business, thus conforming to the legal requirements of redundancy.

Chronology of Events (All 2024).

Sep/Oct. New ownership takes control of Academic Bridge, leading to the discovery of significant undisclosed liabilities.

Oct/Nov. The respondent commences discussions and engagement with the complainant regarding proposals for restructuring the Financial Director role and salary due to the commercial difficulties.

Nov 7th. Complainant informs the new Director, Mr. Islam, that she is pregnant and intends to take maternity leave.

Nov 11th. Mr. Islam emails all staff announcing that significant salary reductions are necessary to ensure the survival and continued operation of the business. The complainant responds, noting she does "not agree that this is a genuine redundancy'‘, but she inquires about the statutory redundancy payment (€6,600). The respondent proposes a deferred statutory redundancy payment plan over three months (Dec2024-Feb2025).

Nov 22nd. The complainant agrees to work the full 4-week notice period (ending December 15th,) and is "fine with" the proposed deferred redundancy payment schedule.

Dec 12th. Respondent sends her a draft Redundancy Agreement and states the redundancy payment will be included in December payroll in three instalments.

Dec 13th. Complainant raises concern regarding the timing of payment, asserting she is entitled to the full €6,600 on the termination date but that she is "fine with" agreed payment dates.

Dec 15th, complainant’s employment terminates.

Dec 17th. Complainant confirms receipt of the first statutory redundancy payment. The second is paid on January 15th and the third on February 17th.

The respondent engaged with the complainant on the underlying business case for the redundancy as well as alternatives to it and offered an alternative contract of employment. It complied with its statutory obligations in respect of the decision-making process relating to the redundancy.

The respondent identified the Financial Director position, a single, non-teaching administrative role with an annual salary of €64,000, for redundancy as part of efforts to streamline overheads, which were the business's largest expenditure. The termination of the role was therefore impersonal and driven by the commercial need to ensure the continued viability of the institution.

Subsequently, the duties of the Financial Director role were absorbed and are now performed by the company's Director, Mr. Shafikul Islam, confirming a genuine structural change.

In line with restructuring, the respondent engaged with the complainant between October and November 2024 regarding proposals to restructure her role and salary. This led to new proposed contract terms on November 11th, 2024, which included a reduction in salary to €24,000 annually.

The complainant did not agree to these terms, submitting a formal grievance on  November 14th. The decision to terminate the role by reason of redundancy was the outcome of the failed attempt to negotiate revised terms.

The formal Notice of Redundancy was issued by email on  November 15th, 2024, with a termination date of 15th December 2024. The decision reflected a significant restructuring and that the role no longer existed. The complainant’s pregnancy had no bearing on the redundancy of the position.

The statutory redundancy entitlement of €6,600.00 was agreed to be paid in three instalments between December 2024 and February 2025. Although the complainant questioned her immediate entitlement to the lump sum payment, she subsequently confirmed that she was "still fine with" the agreed payment dates. The full statutory sum was paid by February 2025.

The redundancy process involved the elimination of a unique, single position, meaning a selection matrix was not required. The dismissal was based on genuine redundancy, consistent with the definition that the dismissal results from "reasons not related to the employee concerned"

It is submitted that there are two questions only, as set out in the case of A Factory Worker v A Factory (ADJ-00004403): "firstly, whether there was a genuine redundancy situation and secondly, was the selection process for redundancy fair".

In Hayes v O'Kelly Brothers Civil Engineering Ltd UD 268/2001, the EAT held that, absent unfair selection, redundancy was a substantial ground justifying dismissal. The outstanding liabilities which created a de facto and significant risk of the company's insolvency. This necessitated financial restructuring, prioritising the reduction of high staffing costs.

This action meets the definition of redundancy provided for under Section 7(2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, specifically Section 7(2)(c):

As set out in the case of A Factory Worker v A Factory (ADJ-00004403) what is required of an employer in such circumstances is to demonstrate that a dismissal was fair by addressing two questions: "firstly, whether there was a genuine redundancy situation andsecondly, was the selection process for redundancy fair''.

The EAT found in St Ledger v Frontline Distributors Ireland Limited UD 56/1994 that the definition of redundancy has two important characteristics, namely impersonality and change:

It is well established that a valid redundancy can occur due to a restructuring of a business, as in Ullis v Kiernan EAT, 22/6/2004. In that case the EAT held that a valid redundancy had occurred where the complainant, a former general manager, was made redundant after business restructuring. As the complainant's wages were significantly higher than other managers, the Respondent had decided to re-distribute the general manager's functions among the regular managers of the business, which resulted in the complainant losing his job.

The Financial Director role was eliminated, and its duties absorbed by the  Director, Mr. Islam. This elimination of a single, highly paid administrative role is a valid, impersonal structural change.

Thus, the features of impersonality and change were present in the redundancy. The rationale underpinning the decision to eventually decide that the Complainant's role would be made redundant was articulated to her by Mr Islam in his emails dated November 12th, 2024, and 15th.

The Complainant places reliance on the case of Trinity College Dublin v Mr Ali Selim (UDO 1951), where redundancy under Section 7(2)(c) failed because the employer explicitly stated they were carrying on business with the same number of employees, having recruited a replacement.

In that respect, the within complaint can be distinguished from the Ali Selim case in that the Respondent unequivocally asserts that by having a Director, Mr. Shafikul Islam, absorb the duties, the company made a definitive decision to carry on the business with fewer paid employees in that job function. This is a genuine elimination of a function due to restructuring, as upheld in Lillis v Kiernan. It must be stated that the Director, as a principal, absorbing the role, is different and distinguishable from hiring a new employee.

The consultation process was appropriate given the urgency of the commercial crisis. The consultation concerning the essential restructuring began through engagements regarding proposed revised terms between October and November 2024.

The law mandates consultation to explore all alternatives:

 "The Court accepts that the Respondent was entitled to restructure its business and reduce its workforce if necessary. While the Court accepts that the Respondent was entitled to decide on the most appropriate means of achieving its operational requirements, its entitlement in that regard is not unfettered. The right of the Complainant to retain her employment must have been taken into consideration. That necessarily obliged the Respondent to look at all available options by which this could be achieved."

(Component Distributors (CD Ireland) Ltd v Brigid (Beatrice) Burns, Determination NO. UDD1854 ).

In that respect, an alternative role was contemplated and discussed by both the complainant and the respondent.

In Jeffers v DOC Ireland Limited UC 169/2000 the EAT said that, where a person was being made redundant, there was an onus on the employer to:

 "(1) to take reasonable steps to seek alternative employment within the company, for the employee being made redundant, (2) to know what positions, if any are available on the relevant date, and (3) to offer any such reasonable alternative positions to the employee whose position is becoming redundant'.

The respondent clearly took all of those steps with the offer of the revised contract constituting an offer of suitable alternative employment designed to meet revised operational needs. The alternative contract offer was unlawful, vitiating the consultation.

The Respondent relies on Jeffers v DOC Ireland Limited to demonstrate that the employer met the legal onus to take "reasonable steps to seek alternative employment within the company". By offering her a role, even on reduced terms reflectingthecrisis,therespondentdischargedthelegaldutytoexplorealternatives, which the complainant then rejected.

The termination resulted from the refusal of the alternative role under the restructuring plan, making the ensuing redundancy unavoidable. The dismissal process was therefore concluded due to the breakdown of consultation over the alternative offer.

Regarding the statutory redundancy lump sum (€6,600), the complainant subsequently confirmed that she was "still fine with “the agreed deferred payment schedule. This confirmation negates any claim that the payment schedule was a breach sufficient to render the dismissal procedurally unfair.

In or about September 2024 the ownership of the college changed. Notwithstanding completion of due diligence at the time by the incoming purchaser, significant tax liabilities were undisclosed/underdeclared in the process by the outgoing Vendor. The resulted in the respondent having to agree a scheme of payment with the Revenue Commissioners with a consequent and dramatic impact on is cash flow. This scheme was agreed in November 2024. The consequent tax liability rendered a de facto and significant risk of the insolvency of the company and the loss of jobs. Staffing is the largest overhead. A financial restructuring of the business became a priority.

The respondent is an educational centre which relies on its teaching staff for the delivery of it services and therefore it initially identified non-teaching administrative roles within the business that could be considered for restructuring. There is only one Financial Director position.

In its efforts to rectify the financial difficulties the Respondent engaged with the complainant between October and November 2024 with proposals for the restructuring of the role and salary of the position. She did not agree to the revised terms and on November 15th,  2024 she was notified that the position of financial director within the organisation was being made redundant. A notice period of four weeks was confirmed, and termination of the position was on December 15th, 2024.

The selection of Ms. Machado for redundancy was fair primarily because her position as Financial Director was a unique, single administrative role within Academic Bridge Limited. This fundamental characteristic means that the intricate requirements of applying a comparative selection matrix, such as those analysed in cases like Patricia Fleming v Sodexo or Kaye McDonald v Sodexo, simply did not apply. Her role was eliminated as part of a severe financial restructuring necessitated by the discovery of overwhelming undisclosed tax liabilities, amounting to €678,673. The dismissal was therefore an impersonal act dictated by commercial necessity and structural change, a key characteristic of genuine redundancy, as noted in general redundancy jurisprudence and as outlined, above.

The selection was justified by the fact that the functions of the Financial Director role were deemed redundant and subsequently absorbed by the company's Director, Mr. Shafikul Islam. This action falls under the legal definition of redundancy, specifically Section 7(2)(c) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, which covers situations where the employer decides "to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work... to be done by other employees or otherwise". The elimination of this single, high-cost position and the internal redistribution of its duties to existing management confirm that the selection was legitimate and unavoidable, resting on the substantive restructuring of the business rather than Ms. Machado's personal competence or circumstances.

The complainant suggests the redundancy was a cloak for a discriminatory dismissal related to her pregnancy or retaliation for raising a grievance. However, per Charleton J. in Panisi, redundancy

"Cannot... be used as a cloak for the weeding out of those employees who are regarded as less competent than others or who appear to have health or age-related issues. If that is the reason for letting an employee go, then it is not a redundancy, but a dismissal'.

Conversely, where the underlying reason is redundancy of the role as a result of organisational restructuring in furtherance of commercial necessity the dismissal is impersonal and permissible.

The timing of the dismissal (November 15th,2024) immediately following the grievance submission the day before reflects the culmination of restructuring discussions following her refusal of the necessary contractual terms, not retaliation.

The redundancy was triggered by the failure to agree to the only terms deemed financially sustainable in the context of the crisis. The dismissal was the unavoidable outcome of the failed attempt to negotiate terms relating to alternative employment that reflected the necessary financial sustainability of the company into the future.

 The complainant was not the only former employee to have been made redundant. The respondent's initial redundancy programme, over the subsequent months, ultimately captured 14 positions which were made redundant. The process started with a company-wide need for salary reduction.

In the event of a finding of unfair dismissal the complainant has failed in her statutory duty to mitigate losses and submits that she suggested an implied unavailability for employment due to inter alia childcareduties,evidencedbyhersearchforcrecheplacementaslateas November2025.

Furthermore, the respondent relies on the principle established in Panisi v JVC Europe Ltd that any compensation awarded must be offset by payments already received, and that the statutory redundancy payment (€6,600) should be deducted from any compensatory award for unfair dismissal.

This approach was applied in Cusack v Dejay Royal Alarms Ltd (UD/1159/2004) where the Tribunal off set a previously made redundancy payment as again an award, treating the purported redundancy payment as a payment in partial satisfaction of the unfair dismissal and minimum notice claims with which it was concerned.

The complainant was not unfairly dismissed; her role was affected by a genuine redundancy situation brought about by a necessary operational restructuring of the Respondent's business. In that respect, a proper redundancy consultation procedure was embarked upon, and she was not unfairly selected for redundancy.

The redundancy was an impersonal act involving commercial necessity and change, rather than the discriminatory or retaliatory measure alleged by the complainant. The burden on the employer is "to establish redundancy and of showing which kind of redundancy is apposite," as noted by Charleton J in Panisi v JVC Europe Ltd. This burden has been fully discharged.

The complainant was paid her salary in full including untaken leave entitlements in December 2024.

The role of Financial Director no longer exists within the organisation. The duties and responsibility are now performed by the Director of the company, Mr. Islam. Subsequent to the termination of the position of the Applicant, the company subsequently completed a process of engagement with teaching staff and Unite the Union with a view to further restructuring the business. This resulted in a number of redundancies in April 2025.

The Complainant was asked to consider re-engagement under an alternative contact of employment but declined to do so.

Evidence of respondent.

The respondent Mr. Mohammed Islam give evidence on affirmation.

He  stated that he acquired the business in November 2024 and discovered very significant financial difficulties to the extent that they threatened the future viability of the business. Specifically, there were outstanding debts to the revenue commissioners and the respondent’s bank in particular. These accounted for about 65% of the total debt.

He met the complainant and discussed the financial position especially given that her salary was a significant contributor to the overhead. This first meeting took place on either November 7th or 8th 2024 and he followed this up with an e-mail to the complainant on the 11th.

A similar e-mail was sent to all the other company’s employees on the same date.

The witness's intention was to assume responsibility for the financial affairs of the business himself. He formed the view that there were no other suitable  roles available for the complainant, and he confirmed that subsequently there were a range of other redundancies. The complainants was not an isolated situation, and she was not singled out in any way. Out of a total of forty employees seventeen were made redundant.

The costs of meeting redundancy payments were born by the Department of Social Protection as the company had no resources. The complainant’s pregnancy was not a factor in her selection.

In response to questions from the complainant’s Counsel the witness accepted that there was no reference to redundancy in his e-mail to her on November 11th. However, he says that he subsequently spoke to her about that.

In relation to the various proposed changes to the complainant’s conditions of employment he says these were for discussion only and were withdrawn fairly soon after they had been sent to her.

He accepted that she had not been told that she was at risk of redundancy and that she had not been given any right of appeal.

The complainant is a Brazilian national who commenced employment on September 5th, 2019. She was initially engaged as a part time accounts assistant and on January 28th, 2022, she was promoted to the role of Financial Director. Until her dismissal, allegedly on t h e grounds of redundancy, her salary was €64,000 per annum. Her contract of employment entitles her to payment of 80% of salary during the first 26 weeks of maternity leave.

Around October\November 2024, the business was sold to Mr. Mohammad Shafiqul Islam. On November 7th, the complainant informed Shafiqul Islam that she was 25 weeks pregnant.  By email on November 11th, 2024, Mr Islam emailed all staff of the Respondent advising staff of its intention to unilaterally reduce salaries.

On November 11th,  2024 the complainant was presented with a new contact of employment,which purported to remove her continuity or service with a new a start date of November 1st,  2024, inserted a probationary period despite her having six years of service, and, reducing her remuneration from €5333 per month to €2000 per month for 40 hours work, an hourly rate lower than the operative minimum wage at that being which was €12.70 per hour. The new contract purported to reduce the Complaints annual salary from €64,000 to €24,000 an unlawful reduction of €40,000.

Upon receipt of the proposed contract, the Complainant contacted Mr. Islam by email dated the November 14th,  2024, seeking to raise a grievance about the proposed contact.

The following day, rather than seek to address the grievance raised by the complainant, he immediately dismissed her under the guise of redundancy. The dismissal was carried out without any of the protections to which an employee is entitled. Moreover, she was not provided with any right of appeal.

The decision to dismiss the complainant was in direct responsetoherraisingagrievanceregardingtheproposedamendmentstoherrole and in response to the fact that she was pregnant and intended to take maternity leave.

Any purported financial difficulty in which the respondent may have found itself does not mitigate the breach of the complainant’s statutory rights, her right to natural justice and fair procedures, her contractual rights, and her right to fair and adequate consultation regarding any purported redundancy, her maternity rights and her employment equality rights.

She worked her notice period, her last day of employment being December 15th, 2024.

On  November 16th, 2024, the complainant told the Respondent that she did not believe that the redundancy was genuine, and advised that she would work out her notice, or that she could be paid in lieu of notice.

In response, on November 16th, 2024, Mr. Islam asked her if she wished to take a shorter period of notice and indicated that it would be statutory redundancy over three months, on December 15th, 2024, January  16th, 2025 and February  25th, 2025, he also indicated that he was going to draft an agreement in relation to the redundancy.  She was contacted on a number of occasions between November 15th, 3024 and December 15th,  2024 with the Respondent tried to get her to accept the redundancy it was enforcing on her. On December  11th, 2024 Mr. Islam indicated that in order to receive her redundancy payment, the Complainant would have to sign an agreement.

She refused to sign the agreement and her employment terminated on December 15th, 2024. The proposed agreement sought a waiver from the complainant in consideration for her statutory redundancy payment which she received over three months.

Her dismissal was not a genuine redundancy, but retaliation for her raising concerns of wholly unreasonable changes as well as in response to her pregnancy.  There was no selection process, no consultation process, and no right of appeal. The purported reason for the dismissal, financial difficulties, applied to all staff in all roles.

Section 7(2) of the Redundancy Payments Acts 1967, as amended, defines a dismissal by reason of redundancy . None of the circumstances referred to therein the Act apply to this dismissal of the complainant and that therefore a genuine redundancy situation did not arise.

There was no change in circumstances to justify a redundancy. The duties for which she was employed continued, and she was flexible in her willingness to address any issues which the Respondent faced. The author in Redmond on Dismissal, at para 17.13, notes that “the notion of change runs through all the five paragraphs which define redundancy”. It is submitted that there was no such change.

 InanticipationthattherespondentmayseektorelyonSection7(2)(c)oftheRedundancy PaymentsActsassetoutabove.

The Labour Court has confirmed in the decision of Trinity College Dublin v Mr Ali Selim UDD1951 that the proposition that an employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees is a condition precedent for reliance on Section 7(2)(c) of the Act. The Respondent did not decide to carry on the business with fewer or no employees.

To prove that the Complainant was dismissed by reason of redundancy falls on the Respondent. In the case of Panisi v JVC Europe Ltd [2012] ELR 70 Charleton J. stated:

In an unfair dismissal claim, where the answer is asserted to be redundancy, the employer bears the burden of establishing redundancy and of showing which kind of redundancy is apposite. Without that requirement, vagueness would replace the precision necessary to ensure the upholding of employee rights. Redundancy is impersonal. Instead, it must result from, as s 7(2) of the Redundancy Payments Act 1967, as amended, provides, “reasons not related to the employee concerned.’

The respondent did not carry out any consultation process. Rather, he provided an amendment to her role. When she took issue with this, she was immediately dismissed. It is well established that employers are required to engaged on a consultation process with employees in the event that there is a possibility of redundancy see Patricia Fleming v Sodexo (ADJ-00032053), Kaye McDonald v. Sodexo (ADJ-00032098), Thomas Anglim v Coachbury Taverns (ADJ 31165) Trinity College v Ifitkhar Ahmed (UDD2030).

The complainant was able to obtain maternity benefit for the period of her maternity leave period, which commenced on February 8th, 2025, and lasted for a period of 26 weeks.

She was entitled to be paid 80% of her normal rate of pay had she not been unfairly dismissed. It is submitted therefore that this period is reckonable, as it is financial loss attributable to the dismissal. As the Complainant was on maternity leave, she was not required to seek alternative employment during this period.

The complainant would have been entitled to the sum of €34,667 arising out of her financial losses during her maternity period alone. She has taken significant steps to mitigate her losses which were submitted.

Despite her efforts, including when she would have arguably been entitled not to be in search for work for mitigation purposes, she has not to date been able to obtain alternative and appropriate employment. Arising from the financial difficulties caused by the Respondent, the Complainant travelled to Brazil in November 2025 to stay with her parents temporarily. The stay in Brazil is allowing her more easily search for work as she has some childcare available to her from her family and also allows a room in her house be rented out to assist in covering costs while she continues to search for employment. The Complainant is actively seeking alternative employment and remains available to take up work in Ireland.

The statutory redundancy payment is not discounted in calculating the appropriate level of redress to be paid to the Complainant. See Williams v Alfrank Designs ADJ-00044425,

The complainant’s losses to date are €58,337.70 and ongoing: December 16th, 2024, to February 8th, 2025: 40 x €246.15 : €9,846.15, February 9th,  2025 to August 9th,  2025 (maternity period): 130 x €196.92 : €25,599.60, August 10th to December 17th,  2025: 93 x €246.15 : €22,891.95.

Her losses are continuing. It is submitted that she has not contributed in any way to her dismissal, and the conduct of the Respondent in the current circumstances was particularly reprehensible. As such the Complainant should be awarded the maximum permissible pursuant to the act.

Evidence of complainant.

The complainant attended the hearing online and gave her evidence on affirmation.

The complainant said that she had her first meeting with Mr. Islam on November the 6th at which point she was seven or eight months pregnant. She submitted a grievance about the proposed redundancy on November 14th and heard nothing until she received the formal notice of redundancy.

There was no discussion between the submission of the grievance and receipt of the redundancy notice.

She received a revised draft contract on November 11th, and she also confirmed in her evidence that she had not been given any right of appeal. In relation to her attempts at mitigation she said that she was making efforts to find a new position. Obviously, she was not available for work for the duration of her pregnancy but stated that she was looking for work every day otherwise.

In response to questions from the respondent’s council she confirmed that she was aware of the financial situation of the respondent and also that she did not accept the revised contract that was put to her.

She also accepted that at least one of those people she claimed was employed to replace her not in fact engaged as an employee. She also said that she did not accept that references to salary reductions and her revised contract should have made her suspect that her position was at risk.

She also rejected the suggestion that the submission of a grievance brought the consultation to an end; she simply expected a new contract.

There were two identical complaints, CA-00071326-001 and CA-00071588-001. The latter was withdrawn at the hearing.

The sequence of events is set out above and is not significantly in dispute.

The respondent business was acquired by Mr Islam and for reasons which were not fully explained as they are not directly relevant to this decision he appears to have only discovered after the acquisition (and despite due diligence) that he was facing very significant trading difficulties following the revelation of large debts.

He then set about tackling these, initially by unilaterally announcing a salary cut and, specifically in the complainant’s case, presenting her with a new contract which very substantially and adversely altered her terms of employment. Very significantly, there is no reference to redundancy in this letter of November 15th although there was every opportunity to include it in a list of options.

Also, it is clear from this letter that however surprised he was about the unexpected level of debts the new owner was well aware of the position regarding salaries in the business he had acquired. He told the complainant in the letter of November 15th that the level of the salaries had been a factor in the decision by the previous owner to sell the business.

Quite how the respondent thought this approach would be successful is not clear as it would have required reductions in the complainant’s income from €64,000 to €24,000. The respondent was apparently surprised that this was not acceptable to her.

In what may be an unfortunate proofing oversight the respondent’s submission contains the following in its timeline of events.

c November 11th Complainant is presented with a new contract that included drastic, unlawful changes, such as reducing her annual salary from €64,000 to €24,000 (below the minimum wage) and removing her continuity of service,

Indeed, whatever chance the respondent might have had of getting a positive response it was rendered a good deal less likely by the manner in which he approached the matter. The critical phase of the process lasted a mere four days.

On the basis of the evidence submitted it is not hard to find that the objective circumstances of the business, specifically the debt, provided a credible basis for seeking whatever reorganisation might be required to address the crisis facing it.

The Redundancy Payments Acts 1967 to 2007; section 7 provides the legislative basis for assessing redundancies in this jurisdiction. A valid redundancy situation is deemed to have occurred where a dismissal occurs "wholly or mainly" from one of the following situations:

1.       Where an employer has ceased or intends to cease to carry on the business for the purposes for which the employee was employed by him or has ceased or intends to cease to carry on that business in the place where the employee was so employed.

2.       Where the requirements of the business for an employee to carry out work of a particular kind, in the place where he was so employed, ceased, or diminished, or are expected to cease or diminish.

3.       Where an employer has decided to carry on the business with fewer or no employees, whether by requiring the work for which the employee had been employed, (or had been doing before his dismissal) to be done by other employees or otherwise.

4.       Where an employer has decided that the work for which the employee has been employed should henceforth be done in a different manner for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained.

5.       Where an employer has decided that the work for which the employee has been employed (or had been doing before his dismissal) should henceforth be done by a person who is also capable of doing other work, for which the employee is not sufficiently qualified or trained.

Again on the basis of the evidence and submission of the respondent the facts of this case can be said to fit the situations set out in paragraphs 3 and 4. So I find that there was a situation in which genuine redundancy was properly ‘on the table’.

Likewise, I am satisfied that the necessary degree of reorganisation of the complainant’s role was undertaken and her submissions to the effect that it was not, (specifically that she had been directly replaced) had little merit. The respondent acknowledged that he could not take on all of the complainant’s work but said he did about 60% of it.

However, the obligations falling on an employer do not end there.

As with all situations in which a termination of employment is contemplated, they extend to the process by which  the process is to be conducted. Thus, redundancy will not be a valid defence to a claim for unfair dismissal in circumstances where the redundancy is not a genuine redundancy or where an employee has been unfairly selected for redundancy.

This also extends to selection for redundancy if it is inconsistent with the contract of employment or the previous manner in which redundancies had been dealt with in the company unless there is a special reason to justify a deviation from prior standard practice.

However, overarching all of this is the general principle of fair procedure and natural justice, conspicuously absent in this case.

There was a lack of transparency and openness in the respondent’s dealings with the complainant.

Questions put to the complainant in cross examination contained an innuendo that she should have divined or deduced that she was at risk of redundancy from, for example, the fact of being offered a new contract that would have very significantly diminished her earnings.

Perhaps she should, but a redundancy process is not a TV show or a parlour game, in which participants are expected to make guesses about their future employment prospects based on clues provided by their employer.

In general terms, an employer is expected to present any relevant information on which a decision might be made to the employees affected, outline any exposure to outcomes adverse to their employment and seek their cooperation in looking at alternatives.

Then there is an obligation to set out what selection process is to be followed (or if there is to be no process, why not) and to engage with the employees affected in implementing the next steps.

While the specific circumstances will vary from case to case, the overriding obligation is fairness (and courtesy) to employees.

In this case, while the respondent was under very considerable business pressure, he failed abjectly to meet any of these standards, culminating in his attempts to require the complainant to enter into some agreement in respect of the payment of her statutory entitlement only.

He cannot now, on the facts submitted, retrospectively elevate the various communications to the complainant and her co-workers to being a process of consultation. At no stage was the complainant told that she was at risk of redundancy, until the day she was told she was actually being made redundant.

The time that elapsed between November 11th, when he announced general pay cuts and the revision of the complainant’s conditions of employment to the communication of her redundancy on November 15th speaks for itself.

Indeed, the respondent’s attempt to suggest that the submission of the grievance by the complainant on November 14th effectively brought the consultation process to an end is risible. If anything, the opposite should have been the case, in that this provided an opportunity for a proper engagement between the parties and this reflects poorly on the respondent‘s case.

This is not to say that there might not be circumstances where an accelerated process would be possible, but at the very least it would require a great deal more transparency and probably the consent of the employee affected; neither of which was present here.

The respondent also asserted in its written submission that it had engaged with the complainant ‘between October and November regarding proposals to restructure her role and salary’.

This is demonstrably untrue; it did no such thing. The process lasted from November 11th until November 15th; a total of four days.

Accordingly, I find that the dismissal was unfair as a result of these grave procedural inadequacies. The offer of a revised contract at less than 40% of her previous earnings cannot be considered to be a serious alternative.

Critically, this was not in any event presented as an alternative to redundancy as there had been no mention of redundancy at that point.

In reaching a decision on an award of compensation I am obliged to have regard to a number of considerations set out in Section 7 of The Unfair Dismissals Act 1977. These relate to losses attributable to the termination.

Section 7(1) (c) reads as follows.

c) (i) if the employee incurred any financial loss attributable to the dismissal, payment to him by the employer of such compensation in respect of the loss (not exceeding in amount 104 weeks remuneration in respect of the employment from which he was dismissed calculated in accordance with regulations under section 17 of this Act) as is just and equitable having regard to all the circumstances, or

In addition to the normal considerations which apply in relation to this, the complainant has submitted that her contractual entitlement to payment while on maternity leave should be considered in assessing her losses and I return to this below.

In respect of her general losses her submission was that her losses in the two periods excluding the maternity leave were approximately €32,700.

Evidence was heard of the complainant’s efforts to mitigate her losses attributable to the termination. Even excluding the period on maternity leave (and making some allowance for the holiday period between the termination of her employment on December 15th and her maternity leave on February 8th ) they were not sufficient.

She is a highly qualified person, previously employed by the respondent as its Financial Director, for which skillset there must be an obvious market.

While there was a flurry of some eight applications in August 2025, when her maternity leave ended, and three in each of July and October 2025 this amounts to almost all her attempts at mitigation and falls well short of the requirement placed on her to mitigate her losses.

There were no job applications in September, November, or December 2025 (the hearing was on December 17th) and only one between the termination of her employment on December 15th, 2024, and the commencement of her maternity leave on February 8th, 2025.

Had the complainant been relying on this alone, and having regard to the statutory benefit already paid her failure to mitigate her losses especially in the months leading up to the hearing would have significantly impacted negatively on any award of compensation and I take it into account in making my award.

However, returning to the contractual maternity leave benefit she had, according to her contract of employment, an entitlement to be paid 80% of her normal rate of pay during her pregnancy had she continued in employment and not been unfairly dismissed.

As the complainant was on maternity leave, she says that she was not required to seek alternative employment during this period and says that she is entitled to €34,667 in lost wages arising out of her financial losses during her maternity period alone, €25,599 being attributable to the loss of the contractual benefit referred to above.

On any plain reading of the statute, it is hard to take issue with the complainant on this point.

The contract of employment was submitted in evidence, and its provisions were not disputed by the respondent. She was entitled to be paid 80% of her salary for the twenty-six weeks of maternity leave. Her loss of this benefit may be entirely attributed to the fact of her unfair dismissal.

It is also worth recalling the complainant’s undisputed evidence that Mr Islam, her employer had been on notice that she was pregnant since November 7th, early in the process.

While it was strongly argued that her pregnancy was not a factor in her selection for redundancy, and no convincing case was made out that it was, the respondent‘s possible exposure to this contractual provision, knowing that the complainant was pregnant, ought to have led him to be more circumspect in the management of her exit.

I am also mindful that Section 7 of the Act enjoins an Adjudicator to have regard to the ‘justice and equity’ of the case ‘having regard to all the circumstances’. In my view, the consequence of an unfair dismissal which impacts on pregnancy and maternity pay falls to be considered in that category.

I uphold complaint CA-00071326-001 and, for the reasons set out above award the complainant €30,000.00.

Complaint CA-00071588-001 was withdrawn at the hearing.

Redundancy, Unfair Dismissal.